Formal independence of regulatory agencies and Varieties of Capitalism: A case of institutional complementarity?

The Varieties of Capitalism literature posits that national economic institutions reflect the mode of coordination of a country's market actors. Despite the importance of this claim and a rich literature on the emergence of regulatory capitalism, few studies test such prediction for Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). This article connects the two fields of research by analysing the impact of economic coordination on the formal independence of IRAs. The results show that, beyond issues of credible commitment and policy stability, the collective action capacity of market actors matters. In particular, regulators in Coordinated Market Economies enjoy less independence than in Liberal Market Economies, while intermediate regimes grant IRAs the least autonomy. The policy implications are nontrivial. Similar to other macroeconomic institutions, inappropriate combinations of economic coordination and IRA independence may engender Pareto‐suboptimal regulatory solutions. In such cases, policymakers should reconsider the rules governing national regulators.     

The role of independent regulators in policy making: Venue‐shopping and framing strategies in the EU regulation of old wives cures

This article addresses debates on the formulation of public policy, building upon a body of literature which has focused on the interconnectedness between the venues of policy action and the way issues are defined. It does so by focusing on the strategic role of policy actors in a policy subfield and their attempts at manipulating either frames or venues in order to shape policy. The novelty here consists in pointing to the involvement of regulators in such strategic action. An emerging body of research has indeed shown that the activity of formally independent regulators is not necessarily limited to the implementation of delegated regulatory competencies and that they are increasingly engaged in policy‐making activities. Thus, by resorting to the agenda‐setting and framing literature, the article sheds light on novel pathways through which regulators intervene in policy‐making activities, making a claim that they have very good ‘tools’ at their disposal in order to shape policy. These dynamics are examined in the case of the last piece of the EU's pharmaceutical framework – the 2004 Directive on Traditional Herbal Medicines – which provoked intense debate among manufacturers of herbals, retailers, consumers, and both EU‐level and domestic‐level regulatory authorities.     

Doctors with borders: occupational licensing as an implicit barrier to high skill migration

Research on the political economy of immigration overlooks the specificity of human capital in skilled occupations and its implications for immigration preferences and policymaking. Conclusions that skilled Americans are unconcerned about labor market competition from skilled migrants build on a simple dichotomy between high and low skill migrants. In this article we show that natives turn to occupational licensing regulations as occupation-specific protectionist barriers to skilled migrant labor competition. In practice, high skill natives face labor market competition only from those high-skill migrants who share their occupation-specific skills. Licensure regulations ostensibly serve the public interest by certifying competence, but they can simultaneously be formidable barriers to entry by skilled migrants. From a collective action perspective, skilled natives can more easily secure sub-national, occupation-specific policies than influence national immigration policy. We exploit the unique structure of the American medical profession that allows us to distinguish between public interest and protectionist motives for migrant physician licensure regulations. We show that over the 1973–2010 period states with greater physician control over licensure requirements imposed more stringent requirements for migrant physician licensure and, as a consequence, received fewer new migrant physicians. By our estimates over a third of all US states could reduce their physician shortages by at least 10 percent within 5 years just by equalizing migrant and native licensure requirements. This article advances research on the political economy of immigration and highlights an overlooked dimension of international economic integration: regulatory rent-seeking as a barrier to the cross-national mobility of human capital, and the public policy implications of such barriers.     

Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities

This article shows that political competition generates incentives that affect the pace of adoption of market reforms in the context of policy convergence. Previous work shows the effect of financial and technological pressures in promoting policy convergence and the impact of institutional constraints on shaping the pace of policymaking. Controlling for these effects, this article demonstrates the policy effects of political competition and ideological polarization even at a time when ideological policy differences seem to be fading due to policy convergence. This article studies policy adoption using duration analysis for the 18 countries of Latin America during the 1985–2000 period when most of the market reforms in public utilities were adopted.     

Flatliners: Ideology and rational learning in the adoption of the flat tax

What factors explain the wave of adoption of the flat tax in Eastern Europe? It is argued in this article that, once the first few successes were underway, governments with liberal outlooks toward taxation adopted the reform through a process of rational learning: an often radically new government will tend to adopt the policy based on successful implementation of its neighbours. The issue of policy diffusion is approached by explicitly modeling the different mechanisms that might underlie the process. Little evidence is found for pure ‘bandwagoning’ in the adoption of the flat tax – the presence of other market‐minded reforms do not predict adoption of the flat tax, and contagion measures do not capture the dynamics of the adoption of the reform. Instead, rational learning, where economically right‐wing governments evaluated the success of the reform (as measured by their ability to attract foreign investment) in the medium term, plays the largest role. Rational emulation in a shorter time period contributes to the probability of adoption as well, as does a change to an economically liberal ideology.     

The Rise and Fall of Radical Civil Service Reform in the U.S. States

Initiated by a 1996 Georgia statute, “radical” civil service reform quickly swept the United States. This article explains the wax and eventual wane of state efforts to increase the number of at‐will employees at the expense of the population of fully protected merit system employees. Using an event history approach to explain this policy diffusion with state‐level variables, the author shows that electoral competition and gubernatorial powers are the most significant determinants of this kind of policy diffusion. Whereas previous literature concluded that these reforms ceased spreading because the new programs were failing to create the promised governmental efficiency, this article argues that the institutional conditions for these human resource management policies have been less propitious in recent years. The article signifies an important contribution in that it brings civil service reform back into the scope of policy diffusion literature and identifies political insights into a perpetually important question.     

A Concurrent Analysis of Three Institutions that Transform Health Technology‐Based Ventures: Economic Policy,Capital Investment,and Market Approval

Drawing on institutional theory, this article articulates qualitative insights from a program of research on Canadian health technology‐based ventures to examine the rules that characterize economic policy, capital investment, and regulatory approval as well as the way these institutions enable and constrain the development of ventures at an early stage. Our findings clarify how economic policy integrates these ventures into the entrepreneurial domain, how capital investment configures them for economic value extraction, and how regulatory approval fully releases their market value. These findings help to revisit current policy modernization initiatives by calling attention to the convergence among the three institutions. Rather than operating solely as a source of constraints, these institutions provide a highly integrated market‐oriented space for health technology‐based entrepreneurial activities to unfold.     

Voluntary Regulations and Innovation: The Case of ISO 14001

Governments enact environmental regulations to compel firms to internalize pollution externalities. Critics contend that regulations encourage technological lock‐ins and stifle innovation. Challenging this view, the Porter‐Linde hypothesis suggests that appropriately designed regulations can spur innovation because (1) pollution reflects resource waste; (2) regulations focus firms’ attention on waste; and (3) with regulation‐induced focus, firms are incentivized to innovate to reduce waste. This article explores the regulation–innovation linkage in the context of voluntary regulations. The authors focus on ISO 14001, the most widely adopted voluntary environmental program in the world. Examining a panel of 79 countries for the period 1996–2009, they find that country‐level ISO 14001 participation is a significant predictor of a country's environmental patent applications, a standard proxy for innovation activity. The policy implication is that public managers should consider voluntary regulation's second‐order effects on innovation, beyond their first‐order effects on pollution and regulatory compliance.     

Judicious Incentives: International Public Policy Responses to the Globalization of Environmental Management

Public policymakers and regulators worldwide are grappling with the desire to improve environmental quality through appropriate regulation of business, while also streamlining government. Concurrently, environmentally conscience consumers are calling for improved environmental performance by industry. As a result of these pressures, regulators and lawmakers worldwide are attempting to craft effective policies that create adequate incentives for environmental protection on the part of firms, in the face of decreasing budgets and an increased demand for the use of market‐based incentives. To aid decision makers as they struggle with these concerns, this study provides a detailed case examination of the dilemmas and responses of national‐level regulators as they try to develop appropriate responses to the rise of international and “voluntary” management regimes. To accomplish these goals, this article compares the public policy responses of governments around the world to one such voluntary international environmental regime: ISO 14001. ISO 14001 is a form of industry self‐regulation in response to market forces calling for harmonization in environmental management and as a result of consumer and trade‐partner demands. This study examines the relationships between regulators and the regulated in order to understand if ISO 14001 certified firms are receiving regulatory relief or other forms of public policy/regulatory benefits as a result of their certification. It will also examine the impact that government incentives (or their absence) are having on the certification decisions of firms around the world. This information helps us to begin to understand how the trends toward smaller government and voluntary environmental regimes are affecting one another.     

Two spheres of regulation: Balancing social and economic goals

Independent regulatory authorities hold comprehensive policy mandates that cover both economic and social goals. They take on various roles in market regulation, competition policy, consumer protection, and labor inspection. This article questions whether policymakers are driven by different rationales when delegating the realization of social, as opposed to economic goals, and analyzes how regulators accommodate their various roles in practice. The conceptual framework links the literature on delegation and organizational models. Comparative analysis of postal policy in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom covers a serious area of potential conflict between social and economic regulation. Variation in delegation points to the relevance of instrumental considerations, but also to the politics of institutional arrangements. Variation in regulatory practice shows that organizational models make a difference in accommodating conflict. The article makes a strong case that social and economic regulation need to be addressed as two distinct, yet interacting spheres. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd     

International diffusion of regulatory governance: EU actorness in public procurement

This paper attempts to go beyond actor‐centered explanations of the European Union's (EU) presence in regulatory politics by examining the role of the EU in the diffusion of regulatory norms and practices. We explore the international diffusion of public procurement policy, to which multiple organizations and especially the EU and the World Trade Organization have made an active contribution. Using the “opportunity‐presence‐capability” scheme, we argue that the EU is actively co‐shaping the global agenda on public procurement, mainly as a result of the “opportunity” and “presence” dimensions of its global actorness and its role in the horizontal diffusion of public procurement regulations between international organizations. For “EU as a global actor” literature to offer valuable explanations, an in‐depth analysis of its relationship with other international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, reveals significant interactions and the co‐shaping of policy agendas.     

The Multiple Domains of Harmonisation: Politics,Policy, Process and Program

This article builds a taxonomy of the different functions performed by the term ‘harmonisation’ in contemporary policy debates. Four broad functions or domains of use are identified – political, policy, process and program – within each of which there are multiple different uses. Based on this classification, the article then develops a multi‐dimensional conceptual framework through which the term can be better understood and examined, its political uses identified and isolated, and harmonisation initiatives constructed, framed and analysed. The framework should prove useful for Ministers and government departments called upon to determine if, how and to what extent to harmonise regulations in a particular area; regulators called upon to administer and enforce harmonised regulatory regimes; and regulatees, practitioners and academics concerned to understand the impact of a harmonisation task.     

Business–Regulatory Relations: Learning to Play Regulatory Games in European Utility Markets

Although regulation is on the rise in the European Union, the liberalization of the telecommunication and energy markets has not created a uniform European Regulatory model. The principle focus of this article is to examine the interaction and regulatory learning between national regulatory authorities and business in the U.K. and German utility markets to assess the degree of convergence and demonstrate how the regulatory relationship has evolved beyond that envisaged in the initial delegation of powers to the regulator. The article shows that independent regulatory authorities have moved from distant and often confrontational relationships with business to strategic working relationships driven by exchanges of information and reputation building and that regulatory learning and trust have evolved at distinct speeds in sectors and countries depending on the number of regulatory authorities in a market place, the degree to which there are concurrent powers between authorities, their discretion in the consultation process, and the length of time that regulatory authorities had existed. Consequently, significant variance is continuously seen in the business—regulator relationships in comparing the young legalist German regulatory authorities with the established independent and discretion-based regulators in the U.K.     

Designing a Choice Architecture for Regulators

The emergence of behavioral public administration has led to increasing calls for public managers and policy makers to consider predictable cognitive biases when regulating individual behaviors or market transactions. Recognizing that cognitive biases can also affect the regulators themselves, this article attempts to understand how the institutional environment in which regulators operate interacts with their cognitive biases. In other words, to what extent does the “choice architecture” that regulators face reinforce or counteract predictable cognitive biases? Just as knowledge of behavioral insights can help regulators design a choice architecture that frames individual decisions to encourage welfare-enhancing choices, it may help governments understand and design institutions to counter cognitive biases in regulators that contribute to deviations from public interest policies. From these observations, the article offers some modest suggestions for improving the regulatory choice architecture.     

Front‐line Regulators and their Approach to Environmental Regulation in Southwest Ohio

Regulatory approaches and strategies are frequently the subject of study in various literatures, but that examination focuses on practices rather than looking more deeply at the nature of regulatory interactions. Also missing is a more thorough look at what it is front‐line regulators—in this case, environmental inspectors and site coordinators—desire in their interactions and how they perceive their regulatory counterparts. Interviews with regulators in Southwest Ohio reveal that 82 percent of them think the regulated community intends to comply with regulations. Additionally, 71 percent of regulators say that their interactions are positive with the regulated community with three‐quarters indicating that trust plays a role in these interactions. Only 36 percent of interviewees prefer a clear cut and consistent approach while the rest favor a collaborative approach or some combination thereof. These findings should impact discussions concerning regulatory approaches in environmental policy, particularly conversations concerning next‐generation policies.     

Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign‐style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign‐style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two‐pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five‐Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign‐style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign‐style enforcement.     

Epistemic contestation and interagency conflict: The challenge of regulating investment funds

Scholarship on regulating global finance emphasizes the importance of national and bureaucratic interests, but less attention has been devoted to epistemic sources of regulatory conflict. We address this by analyzing the failure of regulators to agree tougher rules for large investment funds after the 2008 crisis. The article suggests this outcome was the result of epistemic contestation between prudential regulators and securities regulators, rooted in divergent interpretive “frames.” We show that US and EU prudential regulators pushed for entity-based regulation of investment funds by escalating the issue to global standard-setting bodies. But this was successfully resisted by securities regulators that exercised epistemic authority through recursive practices—appeals to expertise, jurisdictional claims, and alliance building—to defend their transaction-based approach. The article demonstrates how an interpretivist perspective can provide new insights into inter-agency conflict and regulatory disputes in other policy fields.     

China’s Development of ETS as a GHG Mitigating Policy Tool: A Case of Policy Diffusion or Domestic Drivers?

China launched its national emissions trading scheme (ETS) in late 2017. This article examines the key drivers behind China’s 2011 decision to opt for ETS as a GHG mitigating policy tool and what lay behind the choice of the system’s design features. Given the existence of the frontrunner EU ETS and that market mechanisms have spread across the world in recent years, we analyze the role played by policy diffusion in the decision to launch an ETS and in the subsequent design process, seen in relation to domestic drivers. The article investigates policy developments culminating in the 2011 carbon market announcement, and the reasons these design elements were chosen for the pilot schemes and the national market in the period 2011–2017. The article contributes to our understanding of policy diffusion at different stages of policy development in China, by revealing which diffusion mechanism is more prevalent at different stages. We find first that overall domestic conditions and drivers had the most consistent impact on policy decisions to establish a carbon market and on the selected sectors. However, a second key finding is that the role of policy diffusion varied over time, with such diffusion, in the form of ideational impact, playing the most important role early on, providing a powerful inducement for China to go for a carbon market. Third, sophisticated learning from international projects took place in the pilots, allowing China to adapt policies and design features to match local conditions.     

Passing the buck? Analyzing the delegation of discretion after transposition of European Union law

This article seeks to map and explain the extent to which national legislators constrain discretion contained in European Union directives during transposition. To this end, we use standard hypotheses from the domestic delegation literature regarding the necessity of policy conflict and transaction costs. Our empirical approach is based on a focused comparison of the transposition of several provisions of the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In order to capture content‐specific aspects of discretion we employ an innovative measurement tool, the so‐called Institutional Grammar Tool. The study shows that while all three states formally comply with the directive, the level of European Union discretion delegated to practical implementers varies considerably across the cases. Standard delegation theory cannot fully explain the patterns. Instead, existing delegation theories have to be adjusted to the transposition context, by accounting for domestic preferences regarding the status quo.     

Economic liberalisation,market institutions and labour rights

What effect do pro‐market economic policies have on labour rights? Despite significant debate in policy and academic circles about the consequences of economic liberalisation, little is known about the labour rights effects of pro‐market policies. Extant literature has focused only on the possible outcomes of market‐liberalising policies, such as trade and investment flows, rather than directly assessing market‐friendly policies and institutions. Moreover, this line of research has found mixed results on how these outcomes influence labour conditions. To provide a comprehensive assessment of this linkage, this article combines data on five distinct policy areas associated with economic liberalisation with data on labour rights for the period 1981–2012. The results indicate that pro‐market policies – except the ones involving rule of law and secure property rights – undermine labour rights. Thus while there are some positive economic and political outcomes associated with market‐supporting policies, economic liberalisation comes at the cost of respect for labour rights.