Back to Basics: A Theory of the Emergence of Institutional Facts

In order to account for the mode of existence of social rules and norms, the author develops a theory of the emergence of institutional facts. Just as other kinds of institutional fact, rules and norms are meanings. Therefore, insight into the emergence of social rules and norms can be achieved by studying the recognition and the communication of meanings. Following accounts of meaning and factuality, institutional facts are characterized as unquestionable shared typifications. It is argued that, in becoming an institutional fact, a typification goes through two phases. First, it becomes a social habit. Second, this habit turns into an obligation by being objectified.     

Escaping the Regulatory Net: Why Regulatory Reform Can Fail Consumers*

This paper considers the impact of recent reforms to the UK food safety régime and considers whether the reforms have been able to deliver their promised benefits and if not, why not. Empirically, the paper examines the UK Food Standards Agency's (FSA) reforms to the régime managing food allergen risks, and the extent to which those reforms have reflected the FSA's guiding principle of “putting consumers first”. The paper finds that the operationalization of that guiding principle was mitigated by a number of factors, including: interpretative flexibility in representing consumer interests; the institutional structure and character of the régime; the political and cultural environment in which the régime operated; and normative uncertainties about the allocation of rights and responsibilities in managing risks. The paper concludes that risk regulation reforms are likely to fail in prioritizing consumer interests unless such factors are taken into account.     

国家资助项目职务发明权利配置的法经济探析

国家资助项目中职务发明权利配置面临诸多法律法规与行政规章的规范竞合,其规范适用效果须以其能否有效促进其职务发明权利流转为判定基准,其效率价值实现有赖增进其职务发明权利流转、减小其交易成本、确保利益受损者获得有效补偿,完善其有关制度安排须明晰其职务发明权属的法定范围,完备其职务发明人的优先申请、优先受让与优先实施专利等法定权利,强化其职务发明人的法定义务。     

How Do Base Rules Constitute a Virtual World?

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique - The classic theory of rules and norms rooted in John Searle’s theory of institutional...     

Labour Constitutions and Occupational Communities: Social Norms and Legal Norms at Work

This paper considers the interaction of legal norms and social norms in the regulation of work and working relations, observing that, with the contraction of collective bargaining, this is a matter that no longer attracts the attention that it deserves. Drawing upon two concepts from sociology – Max Weber's ‘labour constitution’ and Seymour Martin Lipset's ‘occupational community’ – it focuses on possibilities for the emergence, within groups of workers, of shared normative beliefs concerning ‘industrial justice’ (Selznick); for collective solidarity and agency; for the transformation of shared beliefs into legally binding norms; and for the enforcement of those norms. If labour law is currently in ‘crisis’, then a promising route out of the crisis, we argue, is for the law to recover its procedural focus, facilitating and encouraging these processes.     

Defeating the Inference from General to Particular Norms*

Abstract. The author argues that in order to maintain, with the later Kelsen, that particular norms are not deducible from general norms, it is unnecessary to deny (1) that norms are propositional, (2) that norms have truth value, (3) that there are normative facts, or (4) that norms fall within the compass of logic. It is claimed that general norms, like many generalizations in science, are not, typically, unrestricted universal generalizations, but generalizations of a different kind, which have sometimes been called normic generalizations. Normic generalizations may have truth value and describe facts; and there is no obvious reason for thinking that they fall outside the compass of logic. Yet they do not deductively imply the instances which fall under them. Exceptions to a generalization of this sort need not constitute falsifying instances; in some cases, at least, they serve rather to qualify the scope or power of the generalization. The logic of such generalizations is thus not deductive. Granting that general norms are typically of this kind, we may accept Kelsen's conclusion about the non-deducibility of particular from general norms without accepting the grounds upon which he accounted for this fact.     

The Theory of Legal Dynamics Reconsidered*

Abstract. The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co-validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double-faced reconstruction of the legal order.     

Sources,Recognition and the Unity of the Legal System

A critical analysis of Kelsen’s theory leads to a broad concept of custom, which covers diverse types of customary norms, where the always required conviction of legal bindingness depends on different types of factual and normative reasons. In it we should include a strict concept of custom or legal usage, derogating custom, custom of general international law, custom that establishes an unwritten constitution, custom that establishes a new written constitution, judicial custom which creates a rule of precedent and custom newly expressed in the judicial application of customary rules. The basic norm could be formulated as a constitutive norm: ‘If the norms created through the first historical constitution are effective, then the first historical constitution (and all the norms derived from it) are valid.’ It is thus a customary constitutive rule that recognizes the first historical constitution as valid law. Norms which establish sources of law are constitutive rules, they can be customary norms or legislated norms, but if they are legislated, they have their validity recognized by, directly or indirectly, a constitutive customary norm. By using a broad concept of custom as a conventional practice, Hart implies that general recognition of a customary rule, together with the practice that accompanies it, are sufficient conditions of validity. A doctrine of recognition that is arrived at by means of criticism and a rational reconstruction of the doctrines of Kelsen and Hart regains the essential theses of the traditional recognition theory of Bierling and Engisch.

     

Eating Peas with One’s Fingers: A Semiotic Approach to Law and Social Norms

This paper proposes a semiotic theory of norms—what I term normative semiotics. The paper’s central contention is that social norms are a language. Moreover, it is a language that we instinctively learn to speak. Normative behaviour is a mode of communication, the intelligibility of which allows us to establish cooperative relationships with others. Normative behaviour communicates an actor’s potential as a cooperative partner. Compliance with a norm is an act of communication: compliance signals cooperativeness; noncompliance signals uncooperativeness. An evolutionary model is proposed to explain how this comes about: evolution has generated an instinctual proficiency in working with these signals much like a language—a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. We see these social rules as possessing a certain ‘rightness’ in normative terms. This adaptive trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual’s ability to speak this code. Because these signals communicate who is and who is not a reliable co-operator, sending and receiving cooperation signals is crucial to individual survival. Individuals who internalized the entire process and thus became more adept at speaking the language were at an advantage. Law seeks to shape the language of norms by maintaining the collective standards of society; as such, understanding how and why this normative language emerges is critical to understanding a core function of law.     

The Creation of Normative Facts

In Kelsen's formalist and reductionisttheory of law, the concepts of `authority' and`competence' may be explained exclusively in termsof those norms on which the validity of other legalnorms or of legal acts is dependent. Kelsen describesthe nature of these norms in different ways; at leastthree different conceptions can be distinguished. Arational reconstruction of the most plausible of theseconceptions will understand sentences expressing such`norms of competence' either to state truthconditions for normative sentences of a lower level orto state criteria for an act to be a legal act. Inboth functions, norms of competence regulate thecreation of normative facts.     

The reasonable citizen: A model for bridging ethics and politics in the EU

The ethical-political model of the EU needs normative rethinking after the pandemic. Using Dworkin's ‘thesis of continuity’ between ethics and politics, I argue that a strong model of the citizen, called on to exercise duties and civic virtues, is badly needed by the EU. The legitimacy of EU political institutions is not enough, if we want to promote the participation of citizens to their functioning. The basic point is that of arguing in favour of the model of ‘the reasonable citizen’, aimed to overcome the dominant liberal model of ‘citizenship as rights’. This is shown by the ‘European Social Model’, but its weaknesses need to be supplemented by a republican conception. In order for the reasonable citizen not to be just an abstract ideal, some measure of operationalisation is proposed through ‘progressively increasing constellations of common identities’; these rely on and respect the multiple demoi of the EU.     

案件事实的形成及其法律判断

作为法律判断根据的案件事实区别于客观事实和规范事实,案件事实是在客观事实基础上依据规范的事实要件构筑的。案件事实及其判断既为法律规范所规定,又为社会生活实际所制约,兼有主客观共居的属性。案件审理中的事实认定与法律判断,不是两个可以简单分开的阶段或过程。案件事实和可得适用的法律的发现及其判断,几乎是同步进行并相互制约的。     

Constructing a New Scottish parliament for the ‘Europe of regions’: Can institutional engineering assure subsidiarity?

The creation of an elected parliament in Scotland raises questions for legislative scholars, among them how a parliamentary body representing a stateless nation within a member state of the European Union can influence and implement European legislation. One version of the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ states that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen, encouraging assemblies throughout the EU to articulate and implement their own preferences in key policy areas. Reporting findings from a survey of the Scottish parliament's first cohort of legislators, this article identifies conflicting perceptions of subsidiarity, charts how best to pursue it, and evaluates the institutional norms, rules and procedures put in place to help secure it. Data demonstrate that preferences vary by level of MSP knowledge about European policy, by party membership and by method of election. Low levels of legislator knowledge combined with internal divisiveness constitute barriers to institutional strength in the pursuit of subsidiarity.     

Authority,Self-Determination,and Community in Cosmopolitan War

This paper examines Cécile Fabre’s cosmopolitan reductionist approach to war. It makes three main points. First, I show that Fabre must ‘thin down’ justice’s content in order to justify the cosmopolitan claim that the same rights and duties bind people everywhere. Second, I investigate Fabre’s account of the values at stake in national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Can cosmopolitanism explain why it is permissible to fight in defense of one’s political community? I doubt it. I argue that Fabre’s reductionist approach cannot justify national self-defense in many cases. Finally, I explore the role that authoritative institutions play in specifying the rights and duties we have under cosmopolitan justice. I believe Fabre takes an overly simple view of the relationship between rights, duties, and authoritative institutions. A more complex account may leave less space for private war on the part of individuals than she does.     

Self-Mediated Risk in Criminal Law

The paper addresses the question whether ‘self-mediated risk’ – risk whose coming-to-fruition depends on future volitional conduct by the actor himself – bears on the wrongfulness of an actor's present conduct. Moral philosophers have long been divided on this question. ‘Actualists’ take the view that an actor's present moral obligations do, in fact, depend on what he or she actually is likely to do in the future. In contrast, ‘possibilists’ take the view that an actor's present obligations depend only on what he or she will have the capacity to do in the future. This paper argues that actualism better captures the morality that underlies the criminal law. The paper also explores actualism's implications for criminal law. Among these is the implication that the locus of moral fault in criminal cases sometimes is temporally removed from the conduct that triggers the assignment of blame.     

重大公共卫生事件下的刑事政策模式

坚持道德理性而否认规范理性,或者主张规范理性而排斥道德理性,都是有失偏颇的。规范目的与整体法秩序目的是两种不同层次的目的,两者互补互济、相辅相成,能有效衡平社会伦理道德与刑法规范的关系,并使刑法适用保持活性与弹力,充分迎合司法实践需要。信守规范目的而忽视整体法秩序的刑事政策,有时不利于维护社会共同体利益。信奉整体法秩序目的而忽视规范的刑事政策,可能不利于保护共同体成员的个人权益。重大公共卫生事件下,传统刑事政策面临诸多困境,应贯彻刑事政策发展模式。刑事政策发展模式要求正当事由得到现实化延伸,合理调适定罪量刑标准,扩展刑法解释体系范畴。刑事政策发展模式下,需要严控适用范畴,合法约束模糊管理,有效限制道德理性和规制辩证逻辑。     

The Fundamental Features of Legal Rationality

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to clarify the logical structure of a code connecting together some distinctions already introduced by different authors: a distinction between primary norms and secondary norms, the latter being implied by the provisions describing institutions in the indicative; a distinction between norms the content of which concerns a state and those the content of which concerns a behaviour which is itself function of several states; a distinction, among the primary norms, of the norms of competence by which a normative power can be delegated to an individual; lastly a distinction between regulative rules and constitutive rules.     

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post‐crisis will be a very different animal from the pre‐crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path‐dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post‐crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision‐making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.