印度的海洋战略及印美在印度洋的合作与矛盾

作为主要的印度洋国家,印度长期以来寻求一项确保自身安全和经济利益的大国海洋战略,它体现了印度立足南亚、面向印度洋、争做世界大国的战略图谋。冷战结束以来,特别是随着印度综合国力的发展以及追寻其“大国梦”的步骤加快,印度对印度洋的安全需求持续增大,将确保海洋战略利益、特别是保证印度洋海上石油通道的安全视为保护其基本国家战略利益的头等大事。鉴于印度洋对印度和美国的重要战略意义,印度在实施其海洋战略过程中既会与美国保持合作,同时也可能引发相互间的利益冲突。     

The power triangle in the Indian Ocean: China,India and the United States

The Indian Ocean is increasingly becoming the point of focus in assessing Asia's future security challenges. As both India and China are building up their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and as China's stakes in the region (protecting its maritime trade) interact with India's aspirations (being the regional dominant power and security provider), tensions are likely to rise. The United States has an established role in the Indian Ocean, and its approach to the contestation between Indian and Chinese interests may play a key role in limiting frictions. These developments have led many analysts to foresee the emergence of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and East Asia which would be comparable to that of nineteenth-century Europe. In presenting the interplay between the three major stakeholders in the Indian Ocean, this paper aims to outline the implications of a balance of power system in the Indian Ocean region and demonstrate that it may not guarantee peace and stability, but, with regard to Organski's ‘power transition’ theory, could lead to quite the contrary.     

印太战略视域下的印法印度洋地区海洋安全合作探析

印度洋地区的海上战略通道价值为世界所公认。世界上一些主要国家提出了相应的印太战略,印度洋地区的海上战略通道价值更为显著。在法国与印度的印太战略框架中,双方都把印度洋地区的海洋安全视为重点。基于印太战略,印度洋地区海上战略通道的安全成为法国与印度共同的战略关注。由于印度洋地区的海洋安全威胁日益复杂,合作是法国与印度维护海上战略通道安全的最好方式,符合双方共同的利益。面对印度洋地区复杂的海洋安全威胁,法国与印度意识到了海洋安全合作的必要性与可行性,并初步建立了海洋安全合作机制。     

印度海洋战略析论

作为印度洋地区的重要国家,印度积极推行以称雄印度洋为核心目标的海洋战略,争当海权强国。经过20多年的发展与完善,印度已经形成一套完备的海洋战略思想体系,其体系建构之宏大,远洋海军发展信心之坚定日益引起亚太地区国家的广泛关注。尤其是近年来,印度大举扩充海军军备,意图打造一支攻守兼备的庞大远洋海军,更令周边国家感到不安。如何看待印度海洋战略的内涵和利益指向是包括中国在内的国家应当审慎思量和切实应对的重要问题。     

印度海洋安全环境:新变动与新挑战

印度海洋安全战略的制定与调整深受外部安全环境影响,后者既有延续性也有变动性。近年来,印度海洋安全环境变动加速,主要涉及四方面:首先是印度洋战略地位持续提升;其次是传统安全与非传统安全交织,大国角逐等传统安全问题回归;再次是非安全问题的战略重要性凸显;最后是地区治理结构破碎,多个海洋合作倡议呈竞争性发展,不确定性加大。这些环境变动促使印度对其海洋安全战略进行了较大调整,包括持续更新战略文件;积极确立新型海上安全观,主动回应新型特别是非传统海上安全挑战;进一步细化各子战略,全面回应新的海洋安全环境;积极推动海军国际交流合作,援引外力提升本国安全。     

A Rising India's Search for a Foreign Policy

As India seeks to become a major player on the international political stage, it will face two major internal constraints. First, India will have to recognize the need to exploit the extant structure of international system to its advantage more effectively. Structural constraints are the most formidable ones a state encounters in its drive towards the status of a major power. Yet, Indian foreign policy continues to be reactive to the strategic environment rather than attempting to shape the strategic realities. While such an ad hoc response to the structural imperatives carried little costs when India was on the periphery of global politics, it holds grave risks now that India seems poised to play a significant role in global politics. Second, India must come to grips with its discomfort with the very notion of power and in particular its wariness of the use of “hard power.” Throughout history, all major powers have been required to employ the military instrument skillfully. India's reluctance to accept a more sophisticated understanding of power, in general, and military power, in particular, will continue to undermine Indian foreign and security policy.     

“Security and growth for all in the Indian Ocean” – maritime governance and India’s foreign policy

ABSTRACT

In a March 2015 speech delivered in Mauritius, India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi outlined what he described would be India’s vision for the Indian Ocean Region. Under the acronym, SAGAR or “Security and Growth for All in the Region,” five key points were elucidated. At the time, the speech was praised for articulating a proactive approach to the Indian Ocean and the various visits to, and agreements that followed with, littoral and island countries, appeared to confirm this. This paper seeks to assess the extent to which India has been able to deliver an agenda of security and growth for the maritime region. Despite the enthusiastic reception to SAGAR, the critique is often made that India is slow to deliver on the promises made as part of the country’s maritime and naval diplomacy. The paper highlights a selection of decisions and actions taken since 2015, which have contributed to maritime governance in the region and argues that there is a substantial change in the way SAGAR provides a framework for strategic action.     

US and India: Emerging offshore balancing in Asia

ABSTRACT

The US and India have become closer in recent times. Compared with the last century, the relationship between the two countries is in steady growth. Under both the Bush and Obama administrations, and now the Trump administration too, India is receiving significant importance in US’ strategic policy toward the Indo–Pacific. India’s emergence as a credible power in the Indian Ocean region has brought both countries much closer. The relationship has also steadily progressed as result of China’s emergence as a potential hegemon in Asia. The US faces difficulty in maintaining its preponderant position across the Indo–Pacific and requires strong allies in the region to help share the burden. In this regard, India could be the offshore balancer in Asia to counter China’s emergence as a potential hegemon in the region.     

Commercial Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Context of Economic Reform: The Indian Experience

It is almost a decade since India began its economic reforms. Apart from the purely domestic economic objectives that the reforms were expected to achieve, there was a recognition that reform was imperative if India wanted to become an economic power of consequence within and beyond its region. This had important foreign policy implications. Official pronouncements reflected the concern that the balance of fiscal power as opposed to military power was the key factor in determining a country's international standing. This called for an integrated strategy to bring economic and foreign policies closer. The implementation of a vigorous foreign economic policy could not be undertaken without sharpening the commercial diplomatic tool. Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been grappling with this challenge. This article analyses the reorientation in Indian foreign policy, assesses the efforts undertaken so far to make commercial diplomacy viable and highlights the challenges that multi-layered diplomacy poses for a country like India.     

Commercial Diplomacy and Statecraft in the Context of Economic Reform: The Indian Experience

It is almost a decade since India began its economic reforms. Apart from the purely domestic economic objectives that the reforms were expected to achieve, there was a recognition that reform was imperative if India wanted to become an economic power of consequence within and beyond its region. This had important foreign policy implications. Official pronouncements reflected the concern that the balance of fiscal power as opposed to military power was the key factor in determining a country's international standing. This called for an integrated strategy to bring economic and foreign policies closer. The implementation of a vigorous foreign economic policy could not be undertaken without sharpening the commercial diplomatic tool. Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been grappling with this challenge. This article analyses the reorientation in Indian foreign policy, assesses the efforts undertaken so far to make commercial diplomacy viable and highlights the challenges that multi-layered diplomacy poses for a country like India.     

Whither Non-Alignment? Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and New Delhi’s Selective Alignment with Great Powers during the Cold War, 1964–1979

First proposed in 1964 by the Sri Lankan prime minister, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace [IOZP] entailed eradication of foreign military bases from the Indian Ocean region as well its denuclearisation. During the Cold War, India was one of the most vehement supporters of IOZP. If some saw India’s interests in the IOZP as another manifestation of Nehruvian idealism, others viewed it as a part of its non-aligned foreign policy. This analysis argues otherwise. India’s record on IOZP reveals a policy of selective alignment with Great Powers and its adaptation to the principles of power politics in international relations. India’s support for the presence of one or the other Great Powers in the Indian Ocean region found premise on balancing those it considered hostile to its national security interests. In public, India supported the call for IOZP as dictated by its non-aligned foreign policy; privately, New Delhi remained highly sceptical and often worked to IZOP’s detriment. Under the cloak of IOZP, India not only pursued diplomatic alignment with Great Powers but also ensured that its own regional ambitions remain unchecked. In this picture, India’s role was not only supportive of the Cold War but to the extent it could use the opportunities provided by superpower rivalry in the region to further its own ends, even determinative of the process.     

Soft power,strategic narratives,and state identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan relations post-2011

In 2011, India and Afghanistan signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement that delimited cooperation in economic, social, political, and cultural areas. It depicted the rise of Indian soft power influence. However, the extent to which India garners strategic influence in Afghanistan through soft power remains contentious. This article contends that India’s soft power effectiveness in Afghanistan post-2011 can be fully grasped only via the construction and reception of India’s regional power identity negotiated at the sites of: “civilization,” “democracy,” and “economic-military” enabling India to provide a regional leadership that can forward both India and Afghanistan’s mutual interests. Examining soft power via the constructivist-discursive framework of collective identity strategic narrative, this article compares India-Afghanistan relations in periods 2011–14 and 2014–17. The former formalized strategic partnership agreement and the latter marked continuation of the agreement albeit through domestic political transitions in both countries. This article demonstrates that the Indian soft power influence in Afghanistan between 2014 and 2017 has increased markedly.     

中泰关系-东盟合作中的战略支点作用——基于21世纪海上丝绸之路的分析视角

中国提出的21世纪海上丝绸之路的倡议,将为中国—东盟合作提供重要动力和契机,有助于推进多层次、宽领域、全方位合作。不过,南海争端的现实难题,将在很大程度上制约21世纪海上丝绸之路的海路通道建设。因此,通过中南半岛的互联互通建设,构筑从中国西南内陆出发进入印度洋的陆路通道,很可能成为建设21世纪海上丝绸之路的优先选择。对中国而言,以中泰关系为战略支点,不仅有利于促进中南半岛次区域合作,而且有助于增强东盟国家对华合作的积极性与自信心。     

美印在印度洋上的博弈对双边关系的制约与推动

美印关系在多个维度内取得长足发展的同时也存在许多不确定因素，这些因素如果处理得好则会进一步改善两国关系，处理不好不仅严重影响美印关系，甚至对地区稳定造成威胁，印度洋安全就是其中之一。美国和印度在印度洋上既有相同的利益又有不同的战略目标，这就必然导致它们要在印度洋上进行多种博弈，印度洋因此成为推动与制约美印关系的双因素。     

Sailing through the Cold War: Indian Navy's Quest for a Submarine Arm, 1947-67

ABSTRACT

It took approximately two decades for the Indian Navy to acquire submarines even when the first naval plan prepared by the Naval Headquarters in New Delhi and informally submitted to the British Admiralty in September 1947 contained an active submarine component. Other littoral navies in the Indian Ocean went for submarines much earlier. Using Indian, British, and U.S. archives, this article argues that the delay in India’s submarine arm was largely a result of the vagaries of the Cold War. Both Britain and the United States wanted the Indian Navy to contribute to the Western effort for a collective defense against the communist threat, which was largely conceived to be submarine based. This resulted in a surface heavy force structure. However, as India’s threat perceptions changed in 1960s, its quest for submarines gained momentum. When negotiations with the Western powers did not result in anything concrete, Indian Navy turned to the Soviets for initiating its own submarine arm. This decision had long-term implications for the Indian Navy as its underwater fleet thereafter remain dependent upon Soviet assistance for the rest of the Cold War.     

南中国海：印度制衡中国的新战略牌

近年来,印度因中印边界争端和中国快速崛起而对中国的恐惧感不断上升。为反制中国战略“威胁”,印度利用南海争端日趋复杂化之机,将南海作为遏阻中国扩大战略影响、牵制中国战略布局的新战略支点,通过加强与南海争端国和域外大国关系,强化自身在南海的实际存在等方式介入南海,使中国的周边地缘政治环境变得更加复杂,增加了中国维护南海权益的难度,对中国在东南亚和印度洋的战略利益形成了挑战。     

印度教与印度民族主义

本文探讨了印度教对印度民族主义的负面影响 ,以及印度民族独立运动的领袖如何利用印度教来促成印度民族主义的形成、教派民族主义者如何利用印度教来为教派民族主义服务 ,并指出以印度教为基础的民族主义对印度社会的的双重作用。     

印尼一印度战略伙伴关系：动因、发展及影响

自2005年11月印尼与印度建立战略伙伴关系以来,两国在政治与安全、经济与贸易等领域取得了快速发展,特别是两国的贸易额提前完成政府规定的目标。在未来5—10年,将是两国关系加速发展时期,经济与贸易仍然是两国关系的主轴。鉴于两国日益增强的国力,两国关系的发展不仅对于两国本身,而且对整个亚州区域一体化将起到积极的推动作用,成为南南合作的典范。印尼一印度战略伙伴关系的发展将对中国与东盟关系产生一定的制衡作用,但更多地是机遇。     

Pivoting Indian Manufacturing Policy Differently

Indian manufacturing has been receiving considerable attention for its weak performance and its inability to generate desired employment. India has set a target of increasing manufacturing’s contribution to GDP significantly. What will it take to make India a global manufacturing hub? While inadequacies in infrastructure, utilities, labor laws, and practices that govern doing business are generally cited as barriers to growth in manufacturing, in this article we argue that manufacturing policy needs substantive transformation to even take advantage of existing resources.We address three debates in Indian manufacturing: volume versus variety, manual versus capital intensive, and low tech versus hi-tech production that have created a misalignment between capabilities and strategies. We present a framework for thinking of transformation of manufacturing policy by focusing on a new set of enabling factors that will align strategies and help build long-term dynamic capabilities that are essential for growth of manufacturing in India.     

China and India: Economic Ties and Strategic Rivalry

How well do theories of economic interdependence and structural realism explain the India-China divergence between growing economic relations and continuing strategic mistrust? This article looks at the Indian side and argues that we need to go beyond economic and strategic factors, and brings in a more contingent approach based on domestic elite discourse and thinking. The article suggests that a more nuanced and complex debate on China is emerging in India than that posited by interdependence or realism, a debate that is framed by what I term nationalist, realist and globalist schools of thought, with the latter two groups currently holding the center of gravity.