Developmental trends in adolescents' psychological and legal competence to consent to abortion

United States Supreme Court has affirmed the right of states to require parental consent or notice from minors seeking abortion. We examine an underlying presumption that minors are not competent to consent to abortion. Participants (N=75 age 13–21, seeking a pregnancy test at a women's medical clinic) completed an interview that was audiotaped and scored on four cognitive and volitional criteria of legal competence. Competence was compared in three age groups (≤15; 16–17; 18–21) for participants who considered abortion and for those who did not. Adolescents age 16–17 and adolescents ≤15, who considered abortion, appeared as competent as legal adults; only≤15-year-old adolescents who did not consider abortion appeared less competent. Regression analysis was used to identify psychosocial predictors of competence. Results challenge the presumption that minors are not competent. An alternate policy based upon informed consent and empowerment of minors as decision makers is proposed.     

Garner plus five years: An examination of Supreme Court intervention into police discretion and legislative prerogatives

This paper examines legislative changes, state attorney general activities, and early federal case law following the 1985 United States Supreme Court holding inTennessee v. Gamer that laws authorizing police use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing, unarmed, non-violent felony suspects violated the Fourth Amendment. Only four of the 23 states apparently affected by this decision have brought their statutes into line with it. Only two of the attorneys general in the remaining 19 states have advised police of the decision. These findings indicate that control of police discretion in use of deadly force has been assumed by police administrators, and that criminal law definitions and the legal advice of attorneys general are largely irrelevant to effective control of police behavior     

Closing the Floodgates on Privacy Class Actions: Lloyd v Google LLC

In Lloyd v Google LLC [2021] UKSC 50, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision, which had allowed a claim under the Data Protection Act 1998 to proceed as a representative action under CPR 19.6. This is significant because the Court of Appeal's decision arguably paved the way for further data protection/privacy claims to be brought as opt-out ‘class actions’ using this procedure. This case note summarises the Supreme Court decision and assesses its implications for both the procedural law of collective redress and the substantive law of privacy in England. It argues that the Supreme Court's reasoning in relation to both of these areas is sound as a matter of precedent and statutory construction. As a matter of public policy, the decision is likely to re-enliven debate about the availability of collective redress in English law and whether the existing collective proceedings regime should be broadened.     

Why Requiring Parents to Pay for Postsecondary Education is Unconstituional and Bad Policy

For divorced parents, the question of who should pay for their child's college tuition is very difficult, especially when the issue was never addressed in their separation agreement. Consequently, some states allow judges the discretion to extend child support duties for noncustodial parents after considering certain factors. Such factors may lead to the requirement of parental contributions to their child's postsecondary education. While many states have amended their statutes to encompass extended child support, Pennsylvania is the only state to have found their statute unconstitutional. Based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Curtis v. Kline, this Note argues that, in order to diminish inequalities between divorced and nondivorced parents, as well as between children of divorced and nondivorced parents, all states should amend their child support statutes to declare that no parent is obligated to pay for his/her child's postsecondary education, unless voluntarily agreed to, in writing, prior to the child entering college.     

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

The author attempts to apply semiotic analysis to a question of family law. By examining the language used by the Supreme Court in the title case, Michael H. v. Gerald D., along with the case briefs, lower court opinions, other Supreme Court cases and prior legal scholarship, the author attempts to determine the requisite relationships between father–child and father–mother in order for a legal tie to exist between a father and his biological child. The author tries to not only determine the necessary circumstances but also the political ideology that distinguishes these familial ties. The author further attempts to analyze the goals of these underlying political ideologies.     

Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases*

The Supreme Court early took note of extralegal, “social science” materials in Muller v. Oregon (1908), and a half-century later made specific reference to social science authorities in the famous footnote 11 of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Since Brown, much has been written about the Supreme Court's use of social science research evidence, but there has been little systematic study of that use. Those writing on the subject commonly focus on areas of law such as jury size, where social science has been used, and have generally assumed that social science information has been utilized in Supreme Court decisions with increasing regularity. Surprisingly little is known, however, about either the justices' baseline use of social science authorities, or many other aspects of their uses of social science information. The focus here is on the citation of social science research evidence in a sample of 240 criminal cases decided during the 30 years between the Supreme Court's 1958 and 1987 Terms. The resulting portrait contributes to a fuller understanding of the justices' use of social science materials, and may ultimately help promote more effective utilization of social science research evidence in Supreme Court decisions.     

Making sense of the case law on Ombudsman schemes

This article analyses the case law on ombudsman schemes in the UK, with the purpose of identifying some of the key trends that underpin this branch of law pre-the first Supreme Court decision in this area, JR55 v Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints. While the law on ombudsman schemes remains based on legislation and the various grounds of administrative law available in judicial review, distinct bespoke principles have also been relied upon. These principles are beginning to provide consistent guidance on how the law should be used and interpreted in cases involving an ombudsman scheme. One task of the Supreme Court in JR55 will be to confirm these principles, or rationalize any departure from them.     

The Problem of Emergency in the American Supreme Court

Sixty years before Carl Schmitt wrote his Political Theology, and more than a 100 years before President Bush announced a ‘war on terrorism’ the American Supreme Court grappled with the difficult issue of emergency powers in connection with issues arising out of the American Civil War (1861–1865). The question confronting the Court in a set of cases named the Prize Cases was whether President Lincoln’s decision to respond to acts of aggression by the secessionist Southern states with measures of war was lawful. The legal problem was that Lincoln had made this decision unilaterally although the American Constitution specifically allocates the power to declare war to Congress. The Court solved the dilemma by arguing that in cases where no war has been declared, the decision whether the country is in a state of war is ultimately ‘a question to be decided by him [the President], and [the Supreme] Court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted’ (Prize, p. 669). The precedent, which the Court thereby laid down, has since played out as an important leverage for the Bush government’s legal arguments in connection with the war on terrorism. This article engages the theoretical framework of Locke, Schmitt and Agamben in order to come to a better understanding of this important set of cases.     

The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation

Abstract The European model of the constitutional review of legislation, characterized by the concentration of the constitutional review power in a single constitutional court, had its origin in the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that this Constitution established at the same time a parliamentary system of government in a fairly radical form. As the author explains, this “invention” of a constitutional court is attributable to two factors. One factor is the federal aspect. The Court was conceived by the framers of the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 as an umpire between federal legislation and the legislation of the states or Länder. In this respect it was meant as a substitute for the principle of the priority of federal law over state or Land law. This is manifest in the initial draft of the Constitution, where actions on questions of the constitutionality of legislation could only be brought by the Federal government (against the legislation of one or another of the states or Länder) and by the State or Land governments (against federal legislation). Right from the beginning, however, the Court could examine a parliamentary act ex officio when it had to apply such an act in another proceeding. It was this power of the Court that triggered the development of constitutional review. Its exercise gradually transformed the Court into a guardian of the Constitution as a whole, in particular, the fundamental rights of citizens. The author traces this development in the context of the concept of state and law that prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This concept included specific restrictions on constitutional review. On the basis of a different understanding of the functions of a constitution, the Court gave up these restrictions and followed the examples of the European Court of Human Rights, the German Constitutional Court and—indirectly—the American Supreme Court.     

Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council: A Material Contribution to Uncertainty?

In the conjoined cases of Sienkiewicz and Willmore, the Supreme Court decided that the exceptional Fairchild approach to the proof of causation in negligence applied where a mesothelioma victim had been negligently exposed to asbestos by one defendant at a level well below unavoidable environmental asbestos exposure. The negligent exposures in both cases materially increased the risk of mesothelioma thereby satisfying the Fairchild test. Whilst reasserting the primacy of the common law as governing the rules of causation in mesothelioma cases, the Supreme Court failed to clarify the scope of the Fairchild exception. Moreover, in an extensive obiter discussion of epidemiological evidence, the Supreme Court has raised more questions than it has answered relating to the role, if any, of scientific evidence in the law of toxic torts.     

Separate versus Equal Treatment Approaches to Parental Leave: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence*

This article examines the legal and economic arguments behind the separate versus equal treatment approaches to maternity/parental leave. Three sets of legal arguments that were advanced in the U. S. Supreme Court case California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 1987 are examined. The economic arguments that correspond to each of these legal arguments are then developed, including the arguments of groups who (1) oppose all versions of mandated leave, (2) support mandated parental leave without qualification (the Separate Treatment Approach), and (3) support some, but not all formulations (the Equal Treatment Approach). Each of these theoretical perspectives generate specific hypotheses regarding the potential compensation and employment effects for women of childbear-ing age. These hypotheses are tested with data from the Current Population Survey, May 1979 and May 1983. Overall the empirical findings suggest that parental leave legislation can significantly improve the labor market position of women of childbearing age, but all approaches are not equal and some methods may undermine, rather than improve their position.     

Seasonal Affective Disorder: Clerk Training and the Success of Supreme Court Certiorari Petitions

We investigate why the Supreme Court grants a smaller percentage of cases at the first conference of each term compared to other conferences. According to received wisdom, Supreme Court law clerks are overly cautious at the beginning of their tenure because they receive only a brief amount of training. Reputational concerns motivate clerks to provide fewer recommendations to grant review in cert. pool memos written over the summer months. Using a random sample of petitions from the Blackmun Archives, we code case characteristics, clerk recommendation, and the Court's decision on cert. Nearest neighbor matching suggests clerks are 36 percent less likely to recommend grants in their early cert. pool memos. Because of this temporal discrepancy, petitions arriving over the summer have a 16 percent worse chance of being granted by the Court. This seasonal variation in access to the Court's docket imposes a legally irrelevant burden on litigants who have little control over the timing of their appeal.     

Use the Purpose by Which All May Benefit: The Semiotics of ‘Public Use’

This paper applies semiotic analysis to issues arising from the recent Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. City of New London [545 U.S.469] (2005). The author uses the tools of semiotics to explore the evolution of language and speech and their relationship to the terms, “private property” and “public use” as used by the Supreme Court and the general public in the years leading up to the Kelo decision. This paper will first provide an overview of the field of semiotics, describing the prevailing thought and the methods utilized by semioticians to find meaning. Second, the tools of semiotics will be applied to Supreme Court cases, beginning with Bauman v. Ross [167 U.S. 548] (1897) and continuing to Kelo v. City of New London. Utilizing these tools, the author will show how, within the span of approximately 100 years, the speech of the court has affected the language of legal discourse. The signs to which both Bauman and Kelo seek to attach meaning are found in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which provides, in relevant part, “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”(emphasis added) (U.S. Const. Amendment 5). This dialectic activity resulted in the development of two different languages. One was used by the layperson, whereas the other was found in relevant legal/political institutions such as the US Supreme Court. This paper will focus on the fundamental change in the meaning of the sign/expression “public use.”     

Mixed Messages in Bottles: the European Union,Devolution, and the Future of the Constitution

An unprecedented eleven‐member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 24 January 2017. The Government's argument, that it could start the process of withdrawing from the EU using a prerogative power instead of an Act of Parliament, was comprehensively defeated by an 8:3 majority. However, the Government also secured a unanimous verdict that it did not need the consent from the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland before invoking Article 50 of the TEU. I explore the judicial argumentation in light of Philip Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional argument, five of which feature, and one of which ought to have featured, in this seminal case.     

Communicating to the Courts and Beyond: Why Members of Congress Participate as Amici Curiae

Members of Congress engage in discretionary behaviors, such as making speeches and cosponsoring bills, which are generally motivated by either electoral needs or policy preferences. We examine a discretionary behavior that engages the judicial branch in the conversation: the participation of members of Congress as amici curiae before the Supreme Court. Amicus curiae briefs provide members of Congress with a direct avenue of communication with the judiciary, and this characteristic suggests that cosigning would be a method of creating good public policy. Using data from the 1980–97 terms of the Supreme Court, however, we find that members of Congress cosign onto amicus curiae briefs as a means of “taking stances,” akin to cosponsoring a bill. The action allows the member to speak indirectly to an audience beyond these governmental institutions. Evidence shows that ideological extremism and committee jurisdiction promote participation as amicus curiae.     

The ex turpi causa principle in Hounga and Servier

In Hounga v Allen the majority of the Supreme Court employed a test for the application of the ex turpi causa defence involving the balancing of public policy arguments for and against allowing the defence. Although this has attracted some early academic support, this note will argue it is inconsistent with authority and principle. The later decision in Servier v Apotex does not address the Hounga decision directly but strongly endorses a more conservative approach to the ex turpi causa principle. The resulting tension between these two Supreme Court decisions is likely further to destabilise the law in this area. This note advances arguments in favour of the Servier approach, summarises both decisions in terms of their consistency with authority and considers the ways in which Servier may have limited the effects of Hounga.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

最高人民法院裁判、司法解释的法律地位

The decisions and the legislative interpretations of judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court of China can be considered as a part of Mainland China’s customary law, and carried by decisions and judicial interpretations. Customary law is the very source of its normal force and they are supposed to be an informal source of the law for they have the required characteristics for substantiating customary law. Accordingly, the legislative judicial interpretations and decisions of the Supreme Court that are qualified to be promulgated in the Gazette of the Supreme Court should be standardized by the requisites of customary law and have the quality supposed to be universally fair. Cao Shibing is a senior judge of the Supreme Court of China majoring in civil law, and he was awarded the doctorate of law by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Till now, he has published an amount of academic works, for instance, On Anti-monopoly Law (1996), Resolve of the Problems in the Suretyship Law of China and its Prospect (2001), On Insolvency Law of China (2003), and his translated book in Chinese (1998) —The Death of Contract (originally written by Grant Gilmore in 1995).     

The Elective and Automatic Theories of Termination in the Common Law of the Contract of Employment: Conundrum Resolved?

If a party to an employment contract commits a repudiatory dismissal or resignation, it has long been unclear whether the other party has the option either to terminate or affirm the contract (the elective theory) or whether the former's breach operates to bring the contract of employment to an end (the automatic theory). The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Société Générale (London Branch) v Geys has finally resolved this question. By a majority, the Supreme Court held that the elective theory also applies in the context of a wrongful repudiation of the employment contract by express dismissal or resignation. This note examines the significance of Geys in the context of the common law of the contract of employment and evaluates whether a number of related issues surrounding the breach and termination of the employment contract have been resolved.     

The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Shaping Federal Drug Policy

Through judicial review, the United States Supreme Court has played a pivotal role in deciding and/or interpreting the constitutionality of legislation. Since the passage of the Pure, Food and Drug Act in 1906, the Supreme Court’s role has been integral in formulating drug policy. In some instances, the Court’s decisions have limited the authority of the federal government, while in others have greatly expanded this authority. As a direct result of the decision-making of the Supreme Court, limitations have periodically been placed on Congress to regulate controlled substances. Many people, who were perceived as medical patients, became criminal drug users. The Court has restricted and later approved of the use of drugs during the free exercise of religion. Lastly, the Court has continually reinforced the supremacy of the federal government over the states, in turn limiting the ability of the states to consider marijuana legislative reform.