Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach

Public Choice - To ameliorate ideological or partisan cleavages in councils and legislatures, we propose modifications of approval voting in order to elect multiple winners, who may be either...     

Admissible and sincere strategies under approval voting

This essay reasses the assumptions of the Brams-Fishburn theory of approval voting, and proposes modifications to make the theory correspond better with likely voting choices. With a small number of candidates, voters who use the inadmissible strategy of voting for all candidates can help to produce a result that better reflects the voters' wishes than is possible with admissible strategies, so we propose a widening of the definition of admissibility to encompass this case. With more than three candidates, we define first-order admissible strategies, which are the most likely strategies to be used in practice, and are also strongly sincere, in that a vote for any candidate is always accompanied by votes for all more or equally-preferred candidates. Their number is less under approval voting than under plurality voting. Both proposed modifications strengthen the technical arguments favoring approval voting over plurality voting.     

Efficacy,power and equity under approval voting

Approval voting allows each voter to vote for as many candidates as he wishes in a multicandidate election. Previous studies show that approval voting compares favorably with other practicable election systems. The present study examines the extent to which votes for different numbers of candidates can affect the outcome. It also considers generic powers of voters and the extent to which approval voting treats voters equitably. If there are three candidates, votes for one or two candidates are equally efficacious in large electorates. For four or more candidates, votes for about half the candidates are most efficacious. Although inequities among voters can arise under approval voting, the common plurality voting system is considerably less equitable than approval voting.     

Presidential elections in Finland: A plea for approval voting

The Finnish President is elected by an indirect method-the people elect special electors who carry out the final election. A proposal for a reform aiming at direct elections is, however, presently being considered. This paper agrees with this proposal and suggests that approval voting is a proper method for direct elections. Several properties of the approval voting system are discussed and the method is demonstrated to be superior to the plurality runoff method in presidential elections. It is argued that the approval voting system chooses a candidate who has overall support in the electorate and that the system therefore promotes the position of the President as a neutral and moderating political force.     

Efficacy in small electorates under plurality and approval voting

Assuming independent voting and random tie-breaking, we describe a procedure for computing the efficacy of a voting strategy under approval voting (AV) and plurality voting (PV) in single winner elections. When the number of candidates exceeds three, the voter's efficacy — his or her ability to affect the outcome of an election — is greater under AV than PV. The relative advantage of AV over PV increases as the number of voters or number of candidates increases.This study has been supported by grant 84-00329 of the U.S.A.-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Jerusalem, Israel, in collaboration with Steven Brams and Zeev Maoz.     

The problem of indeterminacy in approval,multiple, and truncated voting systems

It is well known that a plurality election need not reflect the true sentiments of the electorate. Some of the proposed reform procedures, such as approval and cumulative voting, share the characteristics that there are several ways to tally each voter's preferences. Voting systems that permit truncated ballots share this feature. It is shown that the election results for any such procedure can be highly indeterminate; all possible election results can occur with the same choice of sincere voters. This conclusion of indeterminacy holds even when measures of voters' sentiments, such as the existence of a Condorcet winner or even much stronger measures, indicate there is considerable agreement among the voters. Then, multiple systems are compared with all standard tallying procedures. For instance, a corollary asserts it is probable for the plurality voting method to elect the Condorcet winner while approval voting has an indeterminate outcome.The work of both authors was supported, in part, by NSF Grant IST 8415348. This work was partially stimulated by comments concerning the assertions about approval voting and other systems that are discussed in (Saari, 1987). In particular, we are pleased to thank S. Brams, Carl Simon, and the other participants for their questions after one of us presented (Saari, 1987) at the July, 1984, Workshop on Mathematical Models in Political Science held at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis.     

Candidate status, presidential approval, and voting for US senator

This research tests whether the effects of assessments of presidential performance on the senate voting decision are largest for out-party incumbents and smaller for out-party incumbents and candidates in open-seat contests, a pattern suggested by the restricted in-party culpability thesis. Analysis of data from the 1988–1990–1992 Pooled Senate Election Study reveals that the effects of appraisals of presidential performance are greatest in open-seat contests and those with in-party incumbents, contrary to the restricted in-party culpability thesis. For incumbents of the out-party and candidates in open-seat contests, the effects of assessments of presidential performance are principally a function of the competitiveness of the contest. Assessments of presidential performance shape the voting decision in contests with in-party incumbents regardless of the level of electoral competitiveness.     

Eliciting preferences for land use alternatives: A structured value referendum with approval voting

This article discusses an experimental application of the Structured Value Referendum (SVR) with approval voting. The decision context is selecting the best land use for an undeveloped area of publicly owned suburban land in Richmond, British Columbia. Subjects were a random sample of 200 registered voters, selected in a "mall‐intercept" format. Subjects reviewed relevant information, completed a ballot, and then completed a survey about their satisfaction with the approval voting format. The results are of substantive interest for the land use decision, and show a high preference for an approval voting format. The results show ease in understanding the task and information provided, as well as a belief that this approach could be useful in guiding public policy. © 1999 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

The effect of electoral rules on voting behavior: the electoral college and shift voting

The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of the rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The ‘slippage’ between the individual's articulated preference ordering and his actual vote is analyzed (using 1968 data) with respect to the strategic position of the voter in his state. The direction of the findings support the theoretically-derived propositions. Nevertheless, the low overall incidence of shifts and the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally-viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment.     

Voters and roll call voting: The effect on congressional elections

The subject of this research is whether ideological preferences play a major role in explaining voters' refusal to reelect some members of the U.S. House of Representatives. If ideological control is important, one would expect to find a large difference between the voting record of a rejected incumbent and his or her replacement. In distinction, whenever voters must replace a congressman or congresswoman because that person had died in office or chose to run for higher office, the hypothesis of ideological tracking implies that the newly elected member of Congress will resemble his or her predecessor. The data confirm these hypotheses and show, as well, that ideological control exists within parties and not only between them; that the degree of voters' ideological control is as great over senior congressmen and congresswomen as over junior ones; and that voters' concern about ideology has increased over the last two decades.     

The calculus of voting: An empirical test

Abstract. According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP − C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote — Respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P, and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.     

The robustness of quadratic voting

Combining local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in a German state, we study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a quasi-experimental framework. We hypothesize that state governments pursue two distinct goals when allocating grants to local governments: (1) helping aligned local parties win the next election and (2) buying off unaligned municipalities that may obstruct the state government’s policy agenda. We argue furthermore that the relative importance of these two goals depends on local political conditions. In line with this argument, we show empirically that the effect of political alignment on grant receipts varies depending on the degree of local support for the state government. While previous contributions find that aligned local governments always tend to receive larger transfers, our results imply that the political economy of intergovernmental transfers is more intricate.     

The paradox of voting intelligently

Classical economic models predict far less voting than happens in practice. Expressive voting may partly explain the divergence, but some who are generally uninterested in politics and thus unlikely to take elections as an important form of personal expression nevertheless vote. One possible explanation is that these voters overestimate the instrumental, outcome-changing consequences of voting; such systematic misperception may be more likely among those with less cognitive capacity. Analysis of responses to the American National Election Studies confirms this hypothesis: while intelligence and interest both increase the likelihood of voting, the combination enhances the likelihood of turnout still further.     

The downsides of information transmission and voting

I analyze a model of information transmission in collective choice environments. An Expert possesses private information about the consequences of passing an exogenous proposal and engages in cheap talk to persuade voters to pass or reject the proposal. The Expert may successfully persuade the voters to take her preferred action even when all or most voters would receive a better ex ante payoff with no information transmission. I consider several remedies that an institutional designer may consider in order to avoid this problem while allowing information transmission that benefits the voters. I evaluate the effects of (1) limiting Expert communication to binary endorsements, (2) encouraging competition between Experts, and (3) restricting the agenda in order to consider only one dimension at a time. None of these proposals completely eliminate negative persuasion outcomes, but limiting the Expert to binary endorsements avoids the worst manipulation while preserving beneficial information transmission.