Drawing the Boundaries of Nanoscience – Rationalizing the Concerns?

Nanotechnology as an emerging field is strongly related to visionary prospects which are disposed to reappear as dystopian concerns. As long as nanotechnology does not provide reliable criteria for assessing these worries as rational or as irrational they remain a challenge for ethical reflection. Given this underdetermination, many nanovisions and their corresponding concerns should therefore be considered as "arational." For that reason, a "constructivist" stance is endorsed which does not seek to take part in discussions as to how ethicists should cope with controversial worries, but tries to observe how concerns are managed by different social actors. This perspective allows us to remodel some concerns such as "grey goo" not solely as a societal reaction, but also as challenging and irritating factors. As such they potentially initiate two different processes simultaneously: a differentiation in terms of demarcating science from non-science on the one hand, and a rationalization of concerns on the other. Analyzing these processes empirically allows to reconstruct how "arational" concerns are socially made rational or, on the contrary, irrational.     

Reversing the ‘Tragedy’ of the Commons? Sustainable Management and the Commons Act 2006

The Commons Act 2006 is the first statute since the Commons Registration Act 1965 to address the problems associated with the management of common land in England and Wales. A key focus for the 2006 Act is the introduction of mechanisms for the sustainable management of common land, including self‐regulatory commons councils. This article examines the ‘sustainable’ management of common land in historical and contemporary perspective. It sets the 2006 Act, and the sustainable management of common land, in the wider context of the ongoing debate triggered by Hardin's ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ and subsequent institutional and post‐institutional scholarship on common pool resource management. It uses historical and qualitative research data drawn from three case studies to demonstrate the irrelevance of Hardin's thesis in an English context, and identifies the Commons Registration Act of 1965 as the true ‘tragedy’ of the English and Welsh commons. The case studies also illustrate the challenges posed by the introduction of legal mechanisms to promote the ecologically sustainable management of the modern commons, and inform the critique of the Commons Act 2006 developed in the article.     

Falling into Line? The Hostile Environment and the Legend of the ‘Judges’ Revolt’

In 2012 the Government made a number of controversial changes to the Immigration Rules, which it claimed would ‘comprehensively reform the approach taken towards ECHR Article 8 in immigration cases’. This paper examines the judicial response, arguing that the courts ‘fell into line’, adapting human rights law to the government's aims through unprincipled and opportunistic techniques, whilst inflicting hardship and injustice on working-class British citizens in particular. Four key moves are identified. First, the courts created an ‘incapable’ test which immunised the rules from in principle challenges. Second, Lord Bingham's Article 8 test, in which the reasonableness of any family member relocation was a central consideration, was replaced with a far less family-friendly test. Third, the courts adopted an ultra-lax rationality test at common law, even when the ‘fundamental rights’ of British citizens were engaged. Finally, the courts identified immigration policy as the ‘constitutional responsibility’ of the executive.     

Beyond the ‘<Emphasis Type="Italic">Tomlinson</Emphasis> Trap’: Analysing the Effectiveness of Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006

One of the intentions underpinning section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 was to provide reassurance to individual volunteers, and voluntary organisations, involved in what the provision called ‘desirable activities’ and including sport. The perception was that such volunteers, motivated by an apprehension about their increased vulnerability to negligence liability, and as driven by a fear of a wider societal compensation culture, were engaging excessively in risk-averse behaviour to the detriment of such socially desirable activities. Academic commentary on section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 has largely regarded the provision as unnecessary and doing little more than restating existing common law practice. This article argues otherwise and, on critically reviewing the emerging jurisprudence, posits the alternative view that section 1, in practice, affords an enhanced level of protection and safeguarding for individuals undertaking functions in connection with a desirable activity. Nonetheless, the occasionally idiosyncratic judicial interpretation given to term ‘desirable activity’, potentially compounded by recent enactment of the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015, remains problematic. Two points of interest will be used to inform this debate. First, an analysis of the then House of Lords’ decision in Tomlinson and its celebrated ‘balancing exercise’ when assessing reasonableness in the context of negligence liability. Second, a fuller analysis of the application of section 1 in the specific context of negligence actions relating to the coaching of sport where it is argued that the, albeit limited, jurisprudence might support the practical utility of a heightened evidential threshold of gross negligence.     

‘Stop the ECJ’?: An Empirical Analysis of Activism at the Court

This article uses a disaggregated approach to study the role of the Advocate General in the European Court of Justice (CJ). It presents original empirical material based upon interviews with Advocates General (AsG) and referendaires at the CJ to assess the question of activism at the Court. Using answers to specific questions, I conclude that while the AsG are entrepreneurs, neither they nor the Court can be described as ‘activist’per se.     

‘We the People of the United States…’: <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Matrix</Emphasis> and the Realisation of Constitutional Sovereignty

In its enunciation of “We the people,” the Constitution of the United States of America becomes a constitution of the flesh as it simultaneously invokes a constitution, a nation and a people. Correspondingly, its amendments as a list of rights pertaining to sex and race discrimination, and freedoms of bodily movement and action, assert the Constitution’s authority through the evocation of “natural” human bodies. In this article, I explore the way in which a sovereignty of the United States’ Constitution is realised in the particularlised bodies of its citizens. The fundamental and foundational laws of the United States, and the narratives and myths used to interpret them, are in part rendered legitimate by the Constitution’s embodiment, which extends from its physical manifestation in written documents into the flesh of its citizens. In order to make this argument, I turn to the film The Matrix (1999), the success of which relies on an investment in bodies and the United States’ Constitution as matter through its interwoven narrative themes of human slavery and emancipation, reality and computer-generated simulation. At the same time, The Matrix extends its ideological play into the bodies of its audience, who experience the film’s thrillingly sensorial fantasies of constitutional rights while enjoying its affective special effects. Thus, the sovereign authority of United States constitutional law is experienced as “natural” through the phenomenological experience of cinema.     

What Did the Lawyers Do During the ‘War’? Neutrality,Conflict and the Culture of Quietism

Using Northern Ireland as a case study, this paper explores how lawyers responded to the challenges of entrenched discrimination, sustained political violence and an emerging peace process. Drawing upon the literature of the sociology of lawyering, it examines whether lawyers can or should be more than ‘paid technicians’ in such circumstances. It focuses in particular upon a number of ‘critical junctures’ in the legal history of the jurisdiction and uncouples key elements of the local legal culture which contributed to an ethos of quietism. The paper argues that the version of legal professionalism that emerged in Northern Ireland was contingent and socially constructed and, with notable exceptions, obfuscated a collective failure of moral courage. It concludes that facing the truth concerning past silence is fundamental to a properly embedded rule of law and a more grounded notion of what it means to be a lawyer in a conflict.     

Dworkin and Phenomenology of the “Pre‐Legal”?

Ronald Dworkin states in his preface to “Law's Empire” (1986) that he is doing a phenomenology of law. In regards to a phenomenology of law, I wish to investigate Dworkin's theory of law, and subsequently, what is left out in order for it to be considered a phenomenological account. In doing so, I will compare Dworkin's phenomenology of law to Schütz's phenomenology of the social world. The comparison between the two will illuminate what I believe is necessary for law, and that is a Phenomenology of the Pre‐Legal.     

The Usage of the AMA <Emphasis Type="Italic">Guides</Emphasis> for the Determination of Psychological Injury Within the State and Federal Workers’ Compensation Systems

Psychological injuries, like physical injuries, may occur within the workplace. If those injuries are reported to be a result of a triggering event in the workplace, then a workers’ compensation (WC) claim may be filed by the individual. State WC and the federal WC systems have laws and rules in place to address workplace psychological injury claims. However, because each State has its own WC State laws as does the federal WC system, there is no current standardization in defining either psychological injury or in defining disability. This is because each system has its own definitions. A few States allow workplace psychological injury claims. Some States do not accept WC psychological injury claims. The remaining States recognize workplace psychological injuries but with specific limitations. The federal WC system allows WC psychological injury claims. There are problematic issues that occur in the State and federal WC systems. These issues are utilizing outdated terminology, employing outdated diagnostic criteria, and allowing documentation submission and professional opinion that does not comport with current professional standards of care. In addition, the need for a definitive answer to address causation is not always possible to address with regard to psychological injury. These types of issues introduce imprecision into the determination of psychological injuries. To address these concerns, the American Medical Association developed the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as a means to take a more scientific approach to the assessment of impairment. This stance was a move away from the poorly defined term, “disability”. The focus was on evaluating the individual’s functioning in terms of impairment. The AMA holds that this is a more objective method that provides a balance between clinical opinion and the utilization of a more scientific methodology that increased precision in the determination of psychological injury and purported impairment in functioning that may have resulted from the injury. The American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment are utilized by many States and the federal WC systems to assist in the evaluation of psychological impairment in functioning and in the WC claims process. Some States opt to use earlier editions of the Guides. Other States and the federal WC system require the usage of the most current edition of the Guides. A few States opt to forego the usage of the Guides altogether and develop State-specific guidelines. The complexities that arise within the WC systems as well as usage of the Guides to evaluate and assess psychological injury are explored as well as potential solutions to address the imprecision that occurs within the WC systems.     

Charging children with child pornography – Using the legal system to handle the problem of “sexting”

No one would disagree that the purposes and aims of child pornography laws are legitimate and necessary. Recently, however, these laws, which have the ostensible aim of protecting children, are instead being used to punish children and dissuade the new phenomenon of “sexting” in the United States. “Sexting” refers to the use of mobile phones with built-in cameras to produce and distribute images of oneself in a sexually provocative or revealing position. The potential danger that this trend poses to minors is huge. Photographs produced by the use of “sexting” can be distributed to unintended third parties, often leading to embarrassment and harassment. Moreover, senders are also in danger of being charged with possession and distribution of child pornography, regardless of the fact that they are minors and the pictures are often of themselves. Not only is charging minors with child pornography a rather new phenomenon, it also appears to be a strategy that several states are adopting. This paper will look at the growing trend of charging minors who engage in “sexting” with child pornography charges by a case study of an actual prosecution, what the consequences of such a conviction entails in the United States, legislative responses, and an analysis of the appropriateness of using the legal system as a way of dealing with this problem.     

Towards ‘Accountable Independence’? Parliamentary Controls of the European Central Bank and the Rise of a New Democratic Model

The independence of the European Central Bank is legally defined in very clear and strict terms. Although most scholars in economics describe this status as a crucial condition of the Bank's efficiency, it is frequently criticised by politicians and political scientists as a contradiction to democratic theory. This paper will examine the emerging practice of parliamentary control of the ECB, from its installation until September 1999, in order to understand which kind of ‘accountability’ is elaborated in this unprecedented relationship between ‘politicians’ and lsquo;technocrats’. It will first show that MEPs have rejected all forms of parliamentary control based on a logic of constraint. It will then describe the numerous institutional links created between the Bank and the EU political organs to favour their cooperation. Finally it will analyse the recent initiatives taken by MEPs to influence central bankers and to convince them to submit their decisions to public debates. The hypothesis developed from these empirical analyses is that a new kind of ‘accountability’ is emerging in the EU. From a horizontal point of view (inter‐institutional controls), it is based on influence rather than traditional parliamentary constraint. From a vertical point of view (accountability to citizens), it focuses on responsiveness rather than on classic responsibility.     

An Analysis of Consequentialism and Deontology in the Normative Ethics of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Bhagavadgītā</Emphasis>

This paper identifies the different normative ethical arguments stated and suggested by Arjuna and Krishna in the Gītā, analyzes those arguments, examines the interrelations between those arguments, and demonstrates that, contrary to a common view, both Arjuna and Krishna advance ethical theories of a broad consequentialist nature. It is shown that Krishna’s ethical theory, in particular, is a distinctive kind of rule-consequentialism that takes as intrinsically valuable the twin consequences of mokṣa and lokasaṃgraha. It is also argued that Krishna’s teachings in the Gītā gain in depth, coherence, and critical relevance what they lose in simplicity when the ethical theory underlying those teachings is understood as a consequentialism of this kind rather than as a deontology.     

Rethinking the History of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Kāma</Emphasis> World in Early India

This essay introduces a special issue on the history of kāma?āstra in medieval India. It briefly reviews the secondary scholarship on the subject from the publication of the first translations of the genre at the end of the nineteenth century. It highlights the relatively unexplored history of later kāma?āstra, and stresses the need for contexualized and detailed studies of the many kāma?āstra treatises produced in the second millennium CE. The introduction, and the essays that follow, also argue for an expanded interpretive framework for the genre, moving beyond ‘sex’ and ‘sexuality,’ to a more widely defined notion of a ‘kāma world’, in which sensual pleasure is understood as being deeply enmeshed with aesthetic, ethical and cosmopolitan cultures.     

‘Factual causation’ and ‘scope of liability’: What's the difference?

According to a dominant view, for the negligent defendant to be held liable for the plaintiff's harm the plaintiff must establish first, that the breach was the ‘factual cause’ of the harm, and second, that the harm is within the ‘scope of liability’. On this view, factual causation is purely factual, while scope of liability is normative and non‐causal. This article accepts the basic two‐step approach, but argues that the distinction is overstated. A close analysis of the principles shows that factual causation may require value judgment, and that scope of liability often involves an assessment of the strength and nature of the causal connection between breach and harm.     

Variations in Member States’ Preliminary References to the Court of Justice—Are Structural Factors (Part of) the Explanation?

The preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which enables national courts to request the Court of Justice to provide a ruling on the interpretation or validity of an EU legal act, is widely considered to be the jewel in the crown of EU law. When considering the number of references from different Member States, it will become immediately apparent that there are considerable variations. This article examines to what extent these variations may be explained by three structural factors, namely (1) population size, (2) willingness to litigate and (3) Member State compliance with EU law. It is concluded that some—but not all—of the variations in number of references from Member State judiciaries may be attributed to structural factors rather than being merely a reflection of different Member State courts’ willingness to make use of Article 267 TFEU on such references (the so‐called behavioural factors).     

Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

The CLSR-LSPI Seminar – ‘The future of privacy regulation in the online world’

The annual CLSR-LSPI Seminar (www.lspi.net) took place on 19 September 2011 at the Sixth Legal, Security & Privacy Issues in IT Conference (LSPI) at University of Nicosia, Cyprus. The event, led by Prof. Steve Saxby, Editor-in-Chief of CLSR, invited contributions from five legal specialists on a variety of current issues dealing with the future of privacy. A lively discussion took place amongst those present after each intervention. The reports of those who presented are recorded below.     

Hands‐Off or Hands‐On?: Deconstructing the ‘Test‐Case’ of Re G within a Culture of Children's Rights

This note challenges the so‐called ‘test‐case’ status of Re G in so far as it attempts to overturn the principle established in Re T that courts should adopt a neutral position when it comes to weighing the merits of different upbringings and the education provided by parents of minority religions. In determining the future upbringing and education of children who had been brought up in a minority religious community, Re G applies a principle of maximising educational opportunity in order to uphold the mother's proposed educational choice and way of life. This note argues that Re G was wrong to do so, should not be regarded as establishing any new principle and that the only relevant principle, both in determining this case and future cases, ought to rest on the psychological well‐being of the child.