Introduction

Even before 1865, it was an axiom that British foreign policy was designed and pursued to ensure international stability. Stability not only gave security to the British Isles and to its global Empire; it minimized disruptions to trade and commerce - the life-blood of 'Great' Britain. In the century after 1865, the pursuit of international stability remained at the heart of diplomatic initiatives supported by capable armed forces and a strong economy. The grand strategy by which successive British governments endeavoured to achieve these national and imperial ends involved the maintenance of a balance of power - both in Europe and in the wider world where the protection of British interests in the form of prestige, markets, strategic outposts, and lines of communication preoccupied cabinets, the Foreign Office, the service ministries, other departments of state, and, sometimes, public opinion. In one sense, there were a number of individual balances of power - in Western Europe, in the western and eastern Mediterranean, in the Western Hemisphere, in South Asia, and in the Far East and Pacific Ocean. In the British diplomatic parlance of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these balances were represented as 'questions', like the 'Eastern Question'; and the answers to these questions combined in the minds of those responsible for British foreign policy as representing a global balance of power. In this context, the European balance of power had decided importance because any continental disequilibrium could imperil the security of the home islands, the centre of the Empire, and the well-being of Britain's people and economy.     

Britain, France, and America's Year of Europe, 1973

Britain's entry into the European Community in 1973 coincided with an American initiative aimed at redefining relations between the United States and Western Europe. This confronted British diplomats with a serious dilemma. They wished to maintain close collaboration with Washington and, for the sake of European unity, to expand on their recently achieved reconciliation with France, a country whose Gaullist elite rejected any further institutionalization of transatlantic relations. French reluctance to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Americans resulted in a fractious debate over the drafting of two seemingly innocuous declarations, and this was exacerbated by the mixed response of the Europeans to the outbreak of the fourth Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing energy crisis. Finally, at the Washington energy conference of February 1974, the British chose to work with the Americans, rather than the French, in seeking to mitigate the economic impact of OPEC's oil policies.     

Separated by the Atlantic: The British and de Gaulle, 1958-1967

The British and French held divergent views from the late 1940s on relations with the United States and on the development of European integration. Differences between the two countries caused particular strain once General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958. The clash that ensued between British and French policies towards the Atlantic Alliance and Europe during his presidency is the subject of this article. It suggests that while the British were unable to overcome de Gaulle's resistance to their membership of the EEC, Britain's fortunes in Europe were nevertheless improved by the Wilson government's response to de Gaulle's actions in the Atlantic Alliance.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922-24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923-4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

The Sincerity of the British Commitment to the Maintenance of the Balance of Power 1714-1763

'A nation interested in the preservation of a certain distribution of power tries to make its interest appear to be the outgrowth of the fundamental, universally accepted principle of the modern state system, and hence, to be identical with an interest common to all nations. The nation itself, far from defending a selfish, particular concern, poses as the guardian of that general principle; that is, as the agent of the international community.'¹

The balance of power can be seen as one of the guiding principles of European diplomacy over the past three centuries. Yet the subject remains controversial, with critics arguing that states have never routinely or sincerely pursued it. The study examines British policies towards pursuing and maintaining a balance of power in Europe between 1714 and 1763, through an analysis of the pamphlet literature and diplomatic correspondence of the period, as well as the foreign policy record. The policy was debated at length in Britain, with criticism of it mounted on a variety of grounds. But that this was indeed Britain's policy was never doubted. The conclusion is that while British policy was far from altruistic, support for the balance was perceived in Whitehall as dovetailing with national self-interest, and while many factors contributed to British support for the maintenance of the equilibrium, her commitment to maintaining it was sincere.     

Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955-56

This paper examines the neglected nuclear dimension of the 'relaunch' of Europe at Messina. France favoured British membership of EURATOM and some interests in Britain saw the commercial and diplomatic advantages of Britain's leadership of the European nuclear industry. However, the possibility of a French military nuclear programme and European nuclear proliferation compounded Britain's established reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo-American nuclear weapons cooperation. Britain's aversion to using the hypothetical 'nuclear card' is a recurrent theme in Anglo-French diplomacy.     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960-62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion 'neutralism' in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

Agonizing Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-54

In 1953, the US government threatened to undertake an 'agonizing reappraisal' of its commitment to European security if the rearmament of West Germany through the European Defence Community (EDC) came to nothing. Although many in Europe dismissed the threat as a bluff, the British government, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in particular, took it extremely seriously. In September 1954, following the demise of the EDC, the British broke with long-standing tradition and pledged to retain military forces in Germany at a set level for as long as their European allies so desired. This was Britain's own 'agonizing reappraisal', undertaken at Eden's prompting to neutralise the danger of the United States implementing its own version.     

Heirs of the King-Makers: The British Embassy in Athens, 1951-61

This article examines the role and position of the British Embassy in Athens, as a test case of a diplomatic mission facing strains because of a bitter regional dispute, the Cyprus crisis. In the mid-1950s Whitehall decided that the retention of Cyprus was necessary for British policy in the Middle East, even at the cost of sacrificing relations with Greece. Thus the Embassy's recommendations were constantly being ignored in Whitehall, while its relations with the Greek authorities were growing worse. After 1957, the new Ambassador, Sir Roger Allen, focused on British cultural influence and on Britain's role in tying Greece more solidly to the West. The 1959 Cyprus settlement and the 1961 visit of the Greek Prime Minister to London marked the most important successes of this more flexible approach.     

Never look back: political thought and the abolition of slavery

The campaigns for the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, spanning over 40 years, represented one of the major political issues of the late Enlightenment, and drew in people of all backgrounds. The very idea of humanity was at stake and this was an issue of broad-based concern. For the abolitionists, the humanity of black slaves was not in doubt, it was the actions of a society who condoned the practice, active or passive, that they saw as inhuman. Against this backdrop, Enlightenment thinkers were working on theories of justice, rights and humanity which would have an enduring influence on politics, society and academic thought for hundreds of years to come. This article addresses this historical context which, it is argued, is vital in reading, interpreting and applying Enlightenment thought in international relations today. The article presents primary and secondary historical evidence to this end and proposes that Spivak's conceptualization of ‘sanctioned ignorance’ offers much for understanding how it can be that European political thought has been so divorced from the context of slavery, from whence it emerged.     

Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain's China Policy, 1945-50

Based on Britain and China 1945-1950 (DBPO, 2002), this article examines four major themes in Britain's China policy between 1945 and 1950: British attitudes towards Chinese communism and China's civil war, Anglo-American relations over China, attempts to restore and sustain British commerce in China, and the future of Hong Kong. The central feature of policy was to 'keep a foot in the door', even under a communist government, to protect British interests. Only modest success was achieved. British officials were divided over the issue of Chinese communism and Britain miscalculated the timescale in the ending of the civil war. The US administration proved largely uncooperative over China, and British commerce was eventually squeezed out. Hong Kong survived as a British colony. Amidst the considerable thought given to the future of Hong Kong, and to Britain's ability to defend it, intelligence reported that the communists had no plans to seize the colony.     

From “War-in-Sight” to Nearly War: Anglo-French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875-1898

The 1904 entente has cast a long shadow across the twentieth century. As a political “myth,” the notion of an entente cordiale between the two longstanding European enemies and overseas rivals France and Britain has overtaken the event itself, in so far as its historical importance is concerned. In this way, the notion of the entente has tended to obscure important aspects of a more complex and ambiguous history of cross-Channel relations. Using a range of British and French diplomatic, naval and private papers, this chapter examines the tensions in Anglo-French relations, caused by balance-of-power considerations in Europe and overseas imperial competition, between the “War-in-Sight” crisis of 1875 and the 1898 Fashoda stand-off.     

From “War-in-Sight” to Nearly War: Anglo–French Relations in the Age of High Imperialism, 1875–1898

The 1904 entente has cast a long shadow across the twentieth century. As a political “myth,” the notion of an entente cordiale between the two longstanding European enemies and overseas rivals France and Britain has overtaken the event itself, in so far as its historical importance is concerned. In this way, the notion of the entente has tended to obscure important aspects of a more complex and ambiguous history of cross-Channel relations. Using a range of British and French diplomatic, naval and private papers, this chapter examines the tensions in Anglo-French relations, caused by balance-of-power considerations in Europe and overseas imperial competition, between the “War-in-Sight” crisis of 1875 and the 1898 Fashoda stand-off.     

Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961

The Kuwaiti crisis of 1961 has conventionally been accorded little attention in histories of Britain's role in the Middle East. In fact, the crisis was an important defining moment, focusing the minds of policymakers on British interests in the Gulf, and the question of the best means of preserving them. It was also the largest scale mobilization of British forces in the Middle East in the post-Suez era. This article sets the crisis in the context of longer term British relations with Kuwait, internal developments in the Emirate, the evolution of British strategy in the region since Suez and Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations in order to understand the significance of the episode.     

Britain and Cambodia, September 1945-November 1946: A Reappraisal

Using archival evidence from Britain and France, and published primary and secondary literature, this article offers a reassessment of Britain's role in Cambodia during liberation duties following World War II. Britain's actions in the removal of the Son Ngoc Thanh nationalist government and the Cambodian-Siamese border dispute are analysed, revealing both a more complex and detailed British involvement in Cambodian affairs than has previously been stated.     

“Brighter Futures, Better Times”: Britain, the Empire, and Anglo-American Economic Competition in Cuba, 1898-1920

This article examines Anglo-American economic competition in Cuba in the crucial twenty years after 1898. Anglo-American economic competition on the new island nation suggest a number of things about the nature of British and American imperialism, the difficult position of smaller countries—and economies—like Cuba, and the “inevitability” of American economic pre-eminence in the evolving twentieth century. And as an important corollary to the British dimension of this question is the role that Canada and Canadian overseas investment played in the extension of Britain's economic power and influence in the wider world.     

Britain's power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government's defence debate at Chequers in November 1964

Prior to the advent of the Wilson government, there existed a large number of official memoranda and reports on Britain's power and influence in the world. Central to Whitehall's concern was the discovery of some means of reducing the cost of maintaining Britain's three main strategic roles - nuclear deterrence, the defence of western Europe and East of Suez. It was clear that Britain should not, and could not, maintain these three roles indefinitely, a view which was shared by Labour ministers at the Chequers meeting. This article examines the evolution of Whitehall's thinking on Britain's long-term world role during the period before and after Labour came into power in October 1964, and concludes that British ministers and officials began to consider Britain's eventual disengagement from bases East of Suez, a disengagement which was finally announced by the Wilson government in July 1967.     

Britain,France, and America's Year of Europe, 1973

Britain's entry into the European Community in 1973 coincided with an American initiative aimed at redefining relations between the United States and Western Europe. This confronted British diplomats with a serious dilemma. They wished to maintain close collaboration with Washington and, for the sake of European unity, to expand on their recently achieved reconciliation with France, a country whose Gaullist elite rejected any further institutionalization of transatlantic relations. French reluctance to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Americans resulted in a fractious debate over the drafting of two seemingly innocuous declarations, and this was exacerbated by the mixed response of the Europeans to the outbreak of the fourth Arab–Israeli war and the ensuing energy crisis. Finally, at the Washington energy conference of February 1974, the British chose to work with the Americans, rather than the French, in seeking to mitigate the economic impact of OPEC's oil policies.     

Binding Prometheus: How the 19th Century Expansion of Trade Impeded Britain's Ability to Raise an Army

This article explores how the dramatic expansion of British trade in the decades prior to World War I affected Britain's ability to raise an army. We first develop a simple institutionally based model of British army recruiting which we then perturb by expanding trade while holding all other variables constant. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the expansion of trade would impede Britain's ability to raise an army, a prediction that finds substantial support in the historical record using both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that trade enhances a state's military power, we find that the expansion of trade did not ease Britain's resource constraints by making labor more freely available for military purposes. Rather, by raising the civilian demand for labor, the expansion of trade made labor more expensive and difficult to mobilize, even as a more effective army became more important to British strategy.