A Review of: “Alison Pargeter. The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe.”

Recent years have witnessed a significant increase in the amount of counterterrorism legislation worldwide. The commonly held assumption behind the adoption of counterterrorism legislation links it to the terrorist threat in a state. However, little research has focused on empirically testing reasons driving states to legislate. This article addresses this void by analyzing the puzzle of why states choose to adopt new terrorism-specific legislation. The article presents empirical analysis of the probability of states to legislate before and after September 11, 2001, and is based on a new database of counterterrorism legislation. The findings reveal that before September 11, state decisions to adopt new legislation correlated with the number of terrorist organizations operating in their territory. Since September 11, however, the most significant predictors for the adoption of new legislation have become the existence of previous counterterrorism legislation and the participation of a state in the War on Terror.     

An epistemic break from “expertise”: Misunderstanding Terrorism by Marc Sageman

ABSTRACT

Professor Marc Sageman’s latest contribution to terrorism “studies” builds on an ever-increasing critique of a field in which “expertise” is something that is largely taken for granted, rather than empirically “known”. His book Misunderstanding Terrorism seeks to refocus our attention towards what is knowable through a Bayesian analysis based on his unique access to acts of terrorism within the Western world. Key, however, is his framing of what terrorism “is”, and to that effect, this review article first assesses the work of two individuals writing on terrorism, Rafaello Pantucci and Shiraz Maher, to place Sageman’s significant book within a wider context of terrorism literature.     

Culture and Terrorism: The Role of Cultural Factors in Worldwide Terrorism (1970–2013)

The relationship between terrorism and culture was systematically examined using three high-quality global databases. Contrary to prior research, terrorism—collapsed across form and era—was not related to any of Hofstede's cultural dimensions. Yet, particular forms of terrorism—incidents involving substantial casualties and damage, suicide bombings, and the proportion of incidents involving fatalities—all showed relationships with cultural dimensions. Tolerance of terrorism and relative tolerance of the 9/11 attack were related to cultural dimensions and terrorist events. Finally, populations that were relatively voiceless, disengaged from their communities, suffering, angry, and hopeless showed more tolerance of terrorism and incidents of terrorism.     

Temporal trends in US counterterrorism sting operations, 1989–2014

How has the US government’s use of counterterrorism sting operations changed over the past quarter-century? Have major terrorist attacks led to more frequent sting operations and/or more frequent entrapment – and if so, have such changes been temporary or long-lasting? Have different types of terrorism provoked different reactions? This study answers these questions using a database of US terrorism prosecutions occurring between 1989 and 2014, each coded for 20 indicators of entrapment. We analyse temporal trends, and in particular, compare the government’s responses to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 9/11 terror attacks. Results indicate that after the Oklahoma City bombing, the number of sting operations against right-wing extremists doubled, while the average number of entrapment indicators dropped. This suggests that authorities in the 1990s responded to the growing threat of right-wing terrorism appropriately: conducting more investigations while avoiding entrapment. After 9/11, sting operations against suspected jihadi terrorists rapidly increased, but in this case, they featured high numbers of entrapment indicators through the end of the study period, suggesting widespread and persistent entrapment. Reasons for this difference, and for the government’s failure to reduce entrapment in response to widespread criticism over the past decade, are analysed.     

Evaluating Claims of Social Connection to International Conflict Casualties

Recent studies examining the political impact of individuals' connections to the victims of international violence find these ties have a powerful effect on people's attitudes and feelings. How reliable, however, are self-reported claims of ties to a conflict's casualties? Using data from 9/11 and the Iraq War, I examine these claims, analyzing: 1) their influence on both public assessments of foreign policy and voting behavior, 2) whether critical demographic and political factors predict the likelihood of individuals reporting a tie to a conflict casualty, 3) the predicted, aggregate likelihood of survey respondents having connections to conflict victims, and 4) the theoretical distinction between actual vs. perceived casualty connections. The results strongly support the use of casualty connection data for understanding individuals' responses to international violence, and encourage future applications of social network approaches to the study of war and politics.     

Sam Fisher and the “war on terror”: an analysis of Splinter Cell in a post-9/11 context

This article examines the values and attitudes present within the 2002 video game Tom Clancy’s Splinter Cell, and the methods employed to convey them. It compares the game’s message with the rhetoric contained in the Bush administration’s post-9/11 “war on terror” narrative. A qualitative content analysis of a Splinter Cell “game movie” and gameplay sessions is undertaken to examine the messages communicated through elements of simulation and representation. This article finds that Splinter Cell and the “war on terror” narrative express similar perspectives of terrorism and counterterrorism. First, both exaggerate the physical and normative threat of terrorism, and portray it as overwhelmingly powerful. Second, both sources justify violent counterterrorism action through claims of necessity, urgency and self-defence. Third, violence is consistently portrayed as effective for achieving the desired objective. Finally, violence and military action are represented as simple solutions that ultimately lead to victory over terrorism. The parallels between the messages within Splinter Cell and the “war on terror” rhetoric indicate that the game was shaped by the post-9/11 culture in which it was developed. More significantly, however, Splinter Cell perpetuates and legitimises the “war on terror” narrative by conveying its message through an immersive interactive environment.     

Issues in teaching terrorism as cultural artefact

From a humanities course on terrorism that focuses on how terrorist ideology and acts are transformed into cultural artefacts, several pedagogical–theoretical issues have emerged: the incongruity of viewing terrorist violence as art; 9/11 as an ahistorical event; the impossibility of defining terrorism; the infiltration (trivialisation?) of terrorism into popular culture; subgenres of terrorist works, each with its own paradigm; and the iconoclastic potential of many terrorist texts and films. These issues have implications for the curricular design of terrorism courses and for the role of instructors – in academia and in the larger community.     

Cutting the fuse: the explosion of global suicide terrorism and how to stop it,by Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman

This article considers a ‘new-old’ media – that is, a relatively newly created medium with deep historical roots – that has gained increasing popularity in recent years: a subgenre of the comic book, most often referred to as the graphic novel. Presented here as an antidote to dominant interpretations of political violence ranging from the state terrorism of the Holocaust to the events of 9/11, the article briefly traces the history of graphic novels and details their growing popularity before describing and analysing representations of terrorism, both written and visual, in eight paradigmatic works that purvey variously victim, survivor and perpetrator perspectives.     

Reply to Marie Breen-Smyth, “Theorising the ‘suspect community’: counterterrorism,security practices and the public imagination”

Marie Breen-Smyth’s recent contribution to the “suspect community” debate misunderstands and misrepresents my own and suffers from several other difficulties besides. I’m grateful to the editor of Critical Studies on Terrorism for the opportunity to make this brief reply.     

“9/11 is alive and well” or how critical terrorism studies has sustained the 9/11 narrative

ABSTRACT

This article argues that despite engaging in a powerful critique of the construction of the attacks of 11 September 2001 (or “9/11”) as temporal break, critical terrorism scholars have sustained and reproduced this same construction of “9/11”. Through a systematic analysis of the research articles published in Critical Studies on Terrorism, this article illustrates how critical scholars have overall failed to extricate themselves from this dominant narrative, as they inhabit the same visual, emotional and professional landscape as those they critique. After examining how CTS has reproduced but also renegotiated this narrative, the article concludes with what Michel Foucault would describe as an “effective history” of the attacks – in this case, a personal narrative of how the attacks did not constitute a moment of personal rupture but nonetheless later became a backdrop to justify my scholarship and career. It ends with a renewal of Maya Zeyfuss’ call to forget “9/11”.     

“Night fell on a different world”: experiencing,constructing and remembering 9/11

This article explores the endurance of the pervasive framing of “9/11” as a moment of temporal rupture within the United States. It argues that this has persisted despite the existence of plausible competitor narratives for two reasons: first, because it resonated with public experiences of the events predating this construction’s discursive sedimentation and; second, because of its vigorous defence by successive US administrations. In making these arguments this article seeks to extend relevant contemporary research in three ways: first, by reflecting on new empirical material drawn from the Library of Congress Witness and Response Collection, thus offering additional insight into public understandings of 11 September 2011 in the immediacy of the events; second, by drawing on insights from social memory studies to explore the persistence of specific constructions of 9/11 and; third, by outlining the importance of categories of experience and endurance for constructivist international relations more broadly.     

“There’s only three things he mentions in a sentence – a noun,a verb and 9/11”: terrorism,fear and the after,after 9/11

In the years since 11 September 2001, pundits, politicians and scholars of terrorism and international relations routinely have declared that 9/11 “changed everything”. This article explores not only how those decisions transformed the United States and the global response to terrorism, but also how both the decisions and response sustained a sense of fear. Further, they made possible, to paraphrase then candidate Joseph Biden’s critique of former New York Mayor Rudy Guiliani, the framing of so much of the global political debate about terrorism, and national security references as simply 9/11 accompanied by a noun and a verb. Finally, the article examines the consequences of this framing for not only our understanding of terrorism, but also our understanding of terrorism and violence within the current global system.     

Effective but inefficient: understanding the costs of counterterrorism

This article analyses state counterterrorism (CT) policy on two dimensions: its effectiveness and its efficiency. It points out that CT is likely to be effective but inefficient. The material weakness of terrorist groups in relation to their state opponents, and different organisational dilemmas, increases the probability of an effective CT policy. However, states frequently overreact to terrorist attacks, which are valued in normative instead of strategic terms. Hence, they spend more resources on CT than justified by the threat posed by the terrorist groups. The article concludes that CT should be framed as an allocation of scarce resources that could be used in other important contexts.