Prior knowledge influences interpretations of eyewitness confidence statements: ‘The witness picked the suspect,they must be 100% sure%

When an eyewitness identifies a suspect from a lineup, it is important to know how certain they are about the decision. Even though eyewitnesses are likely to express certainty with words, past research shows that verbal confidence statements (e.g. ‘I’m pretty sure’) are prone to systematic misinterpretation. Until now, no one has examined how an evaluator's prior knowledge, such as which lineup member is the police suspect, influences their interpretation of eyewitness confidence about a lineup identification. Experiments 1 and 3 show that participants perceived the identical statement of confidence as meaning a higher and lower level of certainty, respectively, when the eyewitness's selection either matched or mismatched the police's suspect. Experiment 2 shows that these effects generally persist when the bias manipulation is manipulated between-subjects. Finally, Experiment 3 finds that clarifying the witness's statement with numeric information (e.g. I’m 80% sure) does not eliminate the influence of biasing information.     

Attribution of crime motives biases eyewitnesses’ memory and sentencing decisions

In court, the basic expectation is that eyewitness accounts are solely based on what the witness saw. Research on post-event influences has shown that this is not always the case and memory distortions are quite common. However, potential effects of an eyewitness’ attributions regarding a perpetrator’s crime motives have been widely neglected in this domain. In this paper, we present two experiments (N?=?209) in which eyewitnesses were led to conclude that a perpetrator’s motives for a crime were either dispositional or situational. As expected, misinformation consistent with an eyewitness’ attribution of crime motives was typically falsely recognised as true whereas inconsistent misinformation was correctly rejected. Furthermore, a dispositional vs. situational attribution of crime motives resulted in more severe (mock) sentencing supporting previous research. The findings are discussed in the context of schema-consistent biases and the effect of attributions about character in a legal setting.     

Say it to my face: Examining the effects of socially encountered misinformation

Objectives. Errors in eyewitness accounts can occur when a witness comes into contact with post‐event ‘misinformation’. A common way to encounter misinformation is through face‐to‐face interaction, in particular, via conversation with other individuals who also witnessed the crime. The current research compares this kind of misinformation with the non‐social post‐event narrative method typically employed in laboratory studies. Method. Young (17–33 years) and older (58–80 years) adults viewed a simulated crime event on video and were later exposed to four items of misinformation about it. The misinformation items were either introduced as part of a discussion about the event with a confederate or were embedded within a written narrative about the event that participants were asked to read. A questionnaire containing 20 items about the event was given to participants before and after the experimental manipulation. Results. Participants were less accurate than controls on questionnaire items after encountering misinformation. More importantly, misinformation encountered socially was significantly more misleading than misinformation from a non‐social source. This was true for both young and older adults. Conclusion. Misinformation encountered socially produced more errors than misinformation from a non‐social source. This finding has implications both for applied (forensic) and theoretical understanding of eyewitness memory.     

Reinforced self-affirmation as a method for reducing the eyewitness misinformation effect

The misinformation effect occurs when an eyewitness includes information in their account that is incongruent with the event they witnessed, and stems from being exposed to incorrect external sources. Yet little research has been undertaken on techniques that could protect eyewitnesses from the influence of misinformation, despite the dangerous consequences of distorted testimony. In this article, a method of enhancing self-confidence, called reinforced self-affirmation (RSA), was proven to reduce the misinformation effect in five experiments. First, participants watched or heard an original event take place. They were then exposed to post-event material containing false information about that event, and finally they were given a memory test about the original material. The RSA, which took place either before the post-event material or before the final test, consisted of self-affirmation (recalling the greatest achievements in life) and external positive feedback (simulated ‘good’ results in a memory test or fake favourable results on personality tests). A meta-analysis of all five experiments revealed that the overall effect of RSA on reducing the misinformation was significant (effect size of 0.94), suggesting that this technique has the potential to be developed for practical use to make eyewitnesses less vulnerable to misinformation.     

Lineup Administrators' Expectations: Their Impact on Eyewitness Confidence

This research focuses on how lineup a administrators influence eyewitnesses' postidentification confidence. What happens to witness confidence when a witness makes an identification that confirms the lineup administrator's expectations; what happens when this expectation is not confirmed? In Experiment 1, participant interviewers (n = 52) administered target-absent photo lineups to participant witnesses (n = 52). The interviewers did not view the simulated crime, but were told the thief's position in the lineup. In every instance this information was false (we used a target-absent lineup). A one-way ANOVA revealed that eyewitness identification confidence was malleable as a function of interviewers' beliefs about the thief's identity. In Experiment 2, participant jurors (n = 80) viewed 40 testimonies of Experiment 1 witnesses (2 participants viewed each testimony). Participant jurors judged all participant witnesses as equally credible despite their varying levels of postidentification confidence.

     

The effects of immediate recall on eyewitness accuracy and susceptibility to misinformation

Eyewitnesses can be influenced by misinformation that they encounter when discussing the event with a co-witness. Some studies have found that an immediate recall of the event can inoculate eyewitnesses against such misinformation; others have found that it increases susceptibility to misinformation. These different findings may be due to methodological factors, so the aim of this study was to investigate the effects of three different recall conditions. An immediate cued recall, free recall or no recall was given to 88 participants after they watched a crime video. They then discussed the video with a confederate who introduced correct and incorrect information about the video. Accuracy and amount of recall was tested one week later. It was found that the immediate-recall questionnaire did not make participants more susceptible to misinformation in comparison to no-recall participants, indeed the data trended the other way, suggesting that immediate-recall inoculated participants against misinformation. Furthermore, the provision of correct post-event information increased memory accuracy, especially after immediate recall.     

Group size,misinformation and unanimity influences on co-witness judgements

Researchers have typically observed the effects of co-witness influence on eyewitness pairs. However, research suggests that individuals are more likely to witness crimes in larger groups. Additionally, there is an abundance of evidence suggesting that social influence is heavily moderated by group size. Therefore, the present study aimed to gain a more accurate understanding of the risks of co-witness influence in relation to unanimity and group size effects. Participants (N = 608) viewed and discussed a CCTV footage of a fight breaking out, with co-witnesses, before giving individual statements, where they were asked to identify which person had started the fight; confederates were used to suggest that the wrong man had started the fight. Results indicated that participants were vulnerable to co-witness influence, but only when exposed to misinformation from a majority of co-witnesses. Misinformation presented by an individual confederate did not have a significant influence over the participants’ responses. This study was the first to investigate the effects of group size on blame attribution. The findings suggest that the true risks of co-witness influence may not be as high as originally predicted from research on eyewitness pairs.     

Eyewitness susceptibility to co-witness misinformation is influenced by co-witness confidence and own self-confidence

If an eyewitness is exposed to a co-witness statement that incorrectly blames an innocent bystander for a crime, the eyewitness can be influenced by this statement and also blame the innocent bystander for the crime. This effect is known as blame conformity. In two studies, we examined whether or not this effect is influenced by the degree of confidence a co-witness expresses in her incorrect statement (Study 1) and an eyewitness’s own level of self-confidence (Study 2). Participant eyewitnesses first watched a crime video featuring a perpetrator and an innocent bystander, then read a co-witness statement about the crime that either correctly blamed the perpetrator, incorrectly blamed the innocent bystander, or blamed nobody (a control condition). They were then asked who committed the crime. In Study 1, participants who read an incorrect statement were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity when the co-witness expressed a high level of confidence, compared to a low level of confidence, in the accuracy of her statement. In Study 2, participants who were lowest in self-confidence were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity. The theoretical underpinnings of these effects are considered.     

Investigating Investigators: How Presentation Order Influences Participant–Investigators’ Interpretations of Eyewitness Identification and Alibi Evidence

Presentation order of ID and Alibi evidence was manipulated for undergraduate participants who conducted a simulated police investigation. Experiment 1 found a recency effect when an eyewitness rejected the investigator’s suspect. Experiment 2 also examined order effects, exploring how participant–investigators evaluated alibi information in addition to eyewitness ID information. When investigators saw the witness identify the suspect but also received a strong alibi for that suspect a recency effect occurred, such that whichever piece of information occurred at the end of the procedure had the strongest impact on investigators. Thus, type of evidence and evidence order both had a dramatic influence on participant–investigators’ decisions.     

Can a witness report hearsay evidence unintentionally? The effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Abstract

When eyewitnesses are exposed to misinformation about an event from a co-witness, they often incorporate this misinformation in their recall of the event. The current research aimed to investigate whether this memory conformity phenomenon is due to change in the witness's memory for the event, or to social pressures to conform to the co-witness's account. Participants were shown a crime video and then asked to discuss the video in groups, with some receiving misinformation about the event from their discussion partners. After a one-week delay some participants were warned about possible misinformation before all participants provided their own account of the event. In Study 1, participants made remember/know judgments about the items recalled, and in Study 2 they indicated the source of their memories. Co-witness information was incorporated into participants’ testimonies, and this effect was not reduced by warnings or source monitoring instructions, suggesting memory change may have occurred. However, there was some indication that remember/know judgments may help distinguish between ‘real’ memories and co-witness information.     

Forced confabulation more strongly influences event memory if suggestions are other‐generated than self‐generated

Purpose. Virtually all eyewitnesses to a crime, who eventually testify in court, are interviewed by police officers at least once. How do these interviews affect what the eyewitnesses are subsequently likely to report? The purpose of this study is to compare the relative impact of self‐ versus other‐generated misinformation on confabulated memory about an event. Self‐generated misinformation can occur by encouraging eyewitnesses to guess or speculate about possible answers to questions about which they report having no memory. Other‐generated misinformation can occur by having an investigator suggest an answer to an eyewitness. Methods. After viewing a 5 minutes crime video, participants answered written questions. One week later these same questions were answered again. We specifically focused on individuals' answers to unanswerable questions that probed information not actually presented in the video. If a participant answered an unanswerable question, we know that their answer was confabulated because the information was not presented in the video. Results. If an answer to an unanswerable question was forced confabulated at time 1, that answer was more likely to be repeated at time 2 if it had been other‐generated (suggested in the question) rather than self‐generated (fabricated by the participant). Conclusions. Pressuring eyewitnesses to answer questions about an event, when they indicate that they do not know the answer, can result in false confabulations. Answers suggested by the investigator are more likely to be repeated later than are answers that are simply self‐generated or speculated by the eyewitness. These results are consistent with the reality monitoring framework and ‘recollect‐to‐reject’ metacognitive reasoning strategies.     

How to induce resistance to the misinformation effect? Characteristics of positive feedback in the reinforced self-affirmation procedure

ABSTRACT

The memory misinformation effect consists in the inclusion in witness testimonies of information from sources other than the given event. In the present article, research which aims to make people resistant to misinformation is presented. It is based on reinforced self-affirmation (RSA), a method designed to enhance participants’ self-confidence and therefore make them more willing to rely on their own memories instead of external sources. RSA includes self-affirmation and positive feedback. In the present research, the efficacy of various kinds of positive feedback was explored. The results of Experiment 1 suggested that positive feedback relating to memory (MemRSA) is effective in reducing the misinformation effect, while positive feedback relating to general cognitive ability is not. In Experiment 2, the superiority of MemRSA over inefficient feedback relating to attention was demonstrated. In Experiment 3, MemRSA was again effective, and more effective than inducing convictions about the independence of judgements, but this also reduced the misinformation effect. The results are discussed from the perspective of witnesses who remember the correct information yet rely on external sources due to a lack of confidence in t aforementioned heir memories.     

Providing eyewitnesses with initial retrieval support: what works at immediate and subsequent recall?

The effect of retrieval support on eyewitness recall was investigated in two experiments. Based on the outshining hypothesis, Experiment 1 tested whether retrieval support enhances witness performance (compared to free recall) especially when witnessing conditions are suboptimal (e.g., because witnesses were distracted during the crime). Eighty-eight participants watched a videotaped crime with either full or divided attention and subsequently received retrieval support with the Self-Administered Interview© (SAI) or completed a free recall (FR). One week later (Time 2 – T2) all participants completed a second FR. Unexpectedly, retrieval support did not lead to better memory performance than FR under divided attention conditions, suggesting that retrieval support is not effective to overcome adverse effects of divided attention. Moreover, presence of retrieval support at Time 1 (T1) had no effect on memory performance at T2. Experiment 2 (N = 81) tested the hypothesis that these T2-results were due to a reporting issue undermining the memory-preserving effect of T1-retrieval support by manipulating retrieval support (SAI vs. FR) at T1 and T2. As expected, T1-retrieval support led to increased accuracy at T2. Thus, the beneficial value of T1-retrieval support seems greatest with high-quality T2-interviews. Interviewers should consider this when planning a subsequent interview.     

Does methodology matter in eyewitness identification research? The effect of live versus video exposure on eyewitness identification accuracy

The present study examined the effect of mode of target exposure (live versus video) on eyewitness identification accuracy. Adult participants (N=104) were exposed to a staged crime that they witnessed either live or on videotape. Participants were then asked to rate their stress and arousal levels prior to being presented with either a target-present or -absent simultaneous lineup. Across target-present and -absent lineups, mode of target exposure did not have a significant effect on identification accuracy. However, mode of target exposure was found to have a significant effect on stress and arousal levels. Participants who witnessed the crime live had higher levels of stress and arousal than those who were exposed to the videotaped crime. A higher level of arousal was significantly related to poorer identification accuracy for those in the video condition. For participants in the live condition however, stress and arousal had no effect on eyewitness identification accuracy. Implications of these findings in regards to the generalizability of laboratory-based research on eyewitness testimony to real-life crime are discussed.     

When is an intervening line‐up most likely to affect eyewitness identification accuracy?

Purpose. Intervening line‐ups affect identification accuracy in subsequent line‐ups. We conducted 3 experiments to investigate the conditions under which viewing multiple line‐ups is more likely to affect eyewitness identification accuracy. Method. In each of the 3 experiments, a forensically relevant factor known to affect the accuracy of face recognition memory was manipulated to assess how the factor impacted the suggestive influence of an intervening line‐up on eyewitness identification accuracy in a subsequent test line‐up. These factors were (a) in Experiment 1, same‐race versus cross race target faces, (b) in Experiment 2, whether the intervening line‐up occurred on the day of the presentation phase (close to presentation) or 1 month later on the day of the subsequent test line‐up (far from presentation), and (c) in Experiment 3, whether the target face was presented for 10 seconds or 60 seconds. Results. In each experiment, factors associated with poorer memory for the target face led to a greater suggestive influence of the intervening line‐up on identification accuracy in the subsequent line‐up, evidenced by lower hit rates and higher false‐alarm rates. Conclusions. These findings suggest that the problem of decreased identification accuracy following the viewing of an intervening photograph is especially of concern when memory for the perpetrator is likely to be poor. Implications of these findings for interpreting line‐up results in the courtroom are discussed.     

Is Age Irrelevant? Perceptions of Young and Old Adult Eyewitnesses

In Experiment 1, we videotaped elderly and younger adults (n = 69) reporting their memories for a crime video. The seniors were significantly less accurate than the younger adults. In Experiment 2, participants viewed the testimony videotapes and rated the elderly as less credible than the younger adults. In Experiment 3, participant-jurors (n = 302) evaluated transcribed testimonies provided by Experiment 1 participants. The ostensible age of the witnesses was manipulated. Thus, some participants read a senior's testimony believing it was provided by a younger adult and vice versa. Participants were apparently not biased by negative stereotypes of seniors' eyewitness capabilities.     

Inconsistencies across repeated eyewitness interviews: supportive negative feedback can make witnesses change their memory reports

Past work shows that direct negative feedback and suggestive questioning can lead eyewitnesses to change their memory reports. Applying Gudjonsson’s [2003. The psychology of interrogations and confessions: A handbook. West Sussex: Wiley] model of interrogative suggestibility to interviews with witnesses, the present two experiments examined how indirect negative feedback delivered in a supportive manner from an interviewer can make witnesses change what they report they remember experiencing. After viewing a video of a crime, participants were interviewed twice, with either supportive negative feedback (i.e. with the interviewer sympathetically suggesting why many people’s memory may be inaccurate) or neutral feedback between the two rounds of questions. Results showed that people given supportive negative feedback changed significantly more of their responses than those given neutral feedback. Lower confidence ratings were associated with greater response change, but overall, despite having changed more responses, people given supportive negative feedback did not have reduced confidence or perceived accuracy. Type of feedback did not impact accuracy, and accuracy was not systematically related to confidence or perceived accuracy. Given the role that eyewitness reports play in the criminal justice system, better understanding factors that impact consistency and reliability is vital.     

Intoxicated eyewitnesses: Better than their reputation?

According to law enforcement, many witnesses are intoxicated either at the time of the crime, the interview, or both (Evans et al., Public Policy Law 15(3):194-221, 2009). However, no study to date has examined whether intoxicated witnesses' recall is different from sober witnesses' and whether they are more vulnerable to misinformation using an ecologically valid experimental design. Intoxicated, placebo, and sober witnesses observed a live, staged theft, overheard subsequent misinformation about the theft, and took part in an investigative interview. Participants generally believed they witnessed a real crime and experienced a real interview. Intoxicated witnesses were not different from placebo or sober witnesses in the number of accurate details, inaccurate details, or "don't know" answers reported. All the participants demonstrated a misinformation effect, but there were no differences between intoxication levels: Intoxicated participants were not more susceptible to misinformation than sober or placebo participants. Results are discussed in the light of their theoretical and applied relevance.