The Future of International Investment Regulation: Towards a World Investment Organisation?

With growth in foreign investment and in the number of companies investing in foreign countries, the application of general principles of public international law has not been deemed adequate to regulate foreign investment and there is, as yet, no comprehensive international treaty on the regulation of foreign investment. Consequently, states have resorted to bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional trade and international investment agreements (IIAs) and free trade agreements to supplement and complement the regime of protection for foreign investors. In the absence of an international investment court, states hosting foreign investment or investor states have opted for investor-state dispute settlement mechanism (ISDS). This mechanism has brought about its own challenges to the international law of foreign investment due to inconsistency in the application and interpretation of the key principles of international investment law by such arbitration tribunals, and further, there is no appellate mechanism to bring about some cohesion and consistency in jurisprudence. Therefore, there are various proposals mooted by scholars to address these challenges and they range from tweaks to BITs and IIAs, the creation of an appellate mechanism and the negotiation of a multilateral treaty to proposals for reform of ISDS only. After assessing the merits and demerits of such proposals, this study goes further, arguing for the creation of a World Investment Organisation with a standing mechanism for settlement of investment disputes in order to ensure legal certainty, predictability and the promotion of the flow of foreign investment in a sustainable and responsible manner.

     

Bilateral Investment Treaties,Credible Commitment,and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?

A long line of research, beginning with Macaulay's (1963) well‐known study of “Non‐Contractual Relations in Business,” suggests that the formal trappings of domestic law often have effects on private behavior that are, at best, “indirect, subtle, and ambiguous” ( Macaulay 1984 :155). Law and society scholars have spent somewhat less time exploring whether international law's effects on behavior are similarly attenuated. In this article I examine whether foreign investors take the presence of strong formal international legal protections into account when deciding where to invest. I focus on whether the presence of bilateral investment treaties, or BITs, meaningfully influences investment decisions. I present results from a statistical analysis that examines whether the formally strongest BITs—those that guarantee investors access to international arbitration to enforce investors' international legal rights—are associated with greater investment flows. I find no clear link between treaty protections and investment, a finding consistent with past law and society research but in tension with claims common in the BIT literature that the treaties should have dramatic effects on investor behavior.     

双边投资条约与发展中国家——兼论中国应对之策

双边投资条约遍及全世界,发展中国家与发达国家之间签订的双边投资条约数量比重最大。发达国家通过双边投资条约努力推广其投资自由化理念,强调发达国家海外投资保护政策,推行高标准的投资保护政策;发展中国家假定通过双边投资条约可以吸引更多的外国直接投资流入而接受发达国家的投资策略并积极主动参与双边投资协定的签订,从而导致国际投资法制向发达国家预定轨道行进,发展中国家主权、经济均受到不同程度的影响;为摆脱此两难局面,发展中国家应谨慎从事双边投资条约的谈判与签订之工作,制定本国的双边投资条约范本,重构发展中国家集体力量,割断有利于发达国家投资策略的习惯国际法的形成,维护发展中国家的经济主权与投资带来真实利益。     

The Last Bite of the BITs—Supremacy of EU Law versus Investment Treaty Arbitration

According to Article 267 TFEU, national courts of the EU Member States can (and sometimes must) ask for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on the interpretation and application of Community law, including international treaties and recommendations, and on the validity of Community secondary legislation. In this way, it is ensured that EU citizens are treated equally throughout the Union. However, this is not applicable when it comes to arbitral proceedings, be they commercial or investment arbitrations. The Court does not accept references for preliminary rulings from arbitral tribunals. For this reason, respondent states in international arbitral proceedings have argued that arbitration and EU law are utterly incompatible. In their submissions as respondents in arbitral proceedings, EU Member States have argued that, as a result of EU accession, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been automatically terminated. In subsidiary, they sometimes claim that, due to their incompatibility with EU law, BITs cannot apply. But if BITs are not applicable anymore, there are few remedies left for investors within the EU.     

Foreign Investors in the EU—Which ‘Best Treatment’? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law

Abstract: This article discusses the main interactions between bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and EU law. The European Commission identified a number of incompatibilities in BITs signed by eight recent Member States with the USA, proposing solutions for their adjustment in conformity with EU law, but was this step sufficient? The risk of disputes remains, as long as the proposed adjustments do not achieve legal force and as long as other BITs still need to be harmonised with EU law. Moreover, provisions in BITs that are not in conflict with EU law could still be challenged if the application of certain EU requirements by Member States interferes with foreign investors' rights. To avoid such risks, coherence between different commitments and practices of the Member States is needed and coordination at the EU level is highly desirable.     

论国际航空私法条约适用的强制性

条约的适用是国际法上一个重大的理论问题,也是国内法院在司法审判中必须面对的实践问题。1929年《华沙公约》建立了强制性适用原则,只要是公约定义的国际运输,必须适用公约。这一原则被其后包括1999年《蒙特利尔公约》在内的国际航空私法条约予以继承和保留,成为国际航空私法条约的鲜明特色。以《华沙公约》为代表的国际航空私法条约,其适用并未完全遵循国际法传统的条约适用理论,当事人国籍国是否批准条约并不是适用的前提条件,而是取决于航空运输合同所确定的始发地点和目的地点所在的国家是不是公约的缔约国或当事国,并以此为基础,建立起国际航空私法条约自身不同于其他国际法条约的适用理论和规则体系。"地点标准"是《华沙公约》适用的核心标准,其在一定程度上突破了条约适用的一般理论,是对条约适用一般理论的发展,是条约适用上的重要创新。司法实践中,应抛弃固有思维,从条约文本规定出发,才可避免法律适用上的错误。     

No More Negotiated Deals?: Settlement of Trade and Investment Disputes in East Asia

Many argue that East Asian countries have come to adopt ‘aggressivelegalism’ in trade and investment policy, in the sensethat they have come to settle their trade and investment disputesthrough the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO andthe other third-party procedures. Scrutiny of the dispute casesof these countries shows, however, that East Asian legalismis not so aggressive, that it varies country by country, andthat there still exists room for negotiated deals in settlingtrade and investment disputes among them. On the other hand,the recent move toward regional integration through free tradeagreements (FTAs), economic partnership agreements (EPAs), andbilateral investment treaties (BITs) in East Asia may lead tothe adoption of a more aggressive legalism in the region, inparticular in settling investment disputes, disputes relatingto intellectual property rights, and trade remedies.     

论国际投资条约仲裁的正当性缺失及其矫正

随着投资条约仲裁案件不断攀升,国际投资法以及投资条约仲裁凸显其重要性。但由于投资争议的特殊性、有关实体法的模糊或缺失、程序法的缺陷,出现了投资条约仲裁的正当性危机。实际上危机一说有夸张之嫌。经过制度化的改良,如通过增强仲裁程序透明度、允许法庭之友参与仲裁程序、合并审理、遵循先例、加强投资条约仲裁的公共功能等,投资条约仲裁制度的正当性缺失可在相当程度上得以矫正。同时,在国际投资实践中还应该细化投资条约的核心内容、限制管理国家风险、推动ADR和DPPs,以有效地防止争议发生和降低争议解决成本。     

投资条约仲裁制度改革的中国选择

投资条约仲裁制度有利于投资者保护,但其也存在易于导致东道国与投资者权益保护失衡等问题。中国应顺应国际上的改革大势和潮流,从实体规则和程序规则两个方面对投资条约仲裁制度进行改革,采取包括维护东道国的管理权、缩减仲裁庭自由解释条约的空间以及加强缔约国对条约解释的控制权等措施,以确保其能平衡保护投资者与东道国的权益。欧盟倡导的投资法院制度虽然对争端当事人的意思自治有一定的限制,但是能纠正投资条约仲裁制度的某些重要缺陷,中国可考虑在与欧盟的双边投资协定谈判中探索接受并改进这一制度的可能性。     

全球治理视野下国际投资法治的困境与变革

国际投资是全球经济增长的重要引擎。国际投资法治建设亟待加强,以促进国际投资自由化便利化、构建公正合理的国际投资秩序、推动全人类的共同繁荣和可持续发展。当前,国际投资法治建设以双边和区域安排为主导,缺乏多边统筹,不成体系,导致投资法治的功能缺失,滞约了国际投资发展。与此同时,国际投资格局发生深刻变化,投资条约内容的趋同和共商共建共享的全球治理理念的创新为国际投资法治建设提供了良好契机。为此,我们应创新国际投资法治变革的路径,以多边投资实体规则为国际投资法治建设的主要内容,推动国际投资法治的变革。     

Bilateral investment treaties: an empirical analysis of the practices of Brazil and China

Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have proliferated, particularly in the last two decades. Among the large emerging markets, Brazil and China are the largest emerging countries in South America and Asia, respectively. Foreign investors have mostly perceived these two countries as the sought-after places with great potentialities and attractiveness. However, Brazil and China have adopted completely different strategies regarding BITs. The objective of this paper is to make an empirical and comparative study of the experiences of Brazil and China by answering the following questions: Why did the two large emerging economies adopt such different positions concerning BITs? Does the hostile approach or the proactive approach depend exclusively on economic and political factors? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the BITs? Do the practices of Brazil and China reflect the problems or the positive impacts of the existing BITs?     

建立国际投资仲裁的上诉机制问题析评

近年来,国际投资仲裁案件迅猛增加,不仅使东道国主权面临挑战,也引起出现有投资条约的诸多设计缺陷所导致的仲裁合法性危机。改造投资仲裁机制已经不再仅仅停留在学术争鸣阶段而是迅速发展到具体的条约改革实践阶段。其中,建立仲裁的上诉机制就是这种改革实践的一种具体表现。建立仲裁的上诉机制是对传统投资仲裁体制的重大变革,尚存在许多理论争议和政治及法律障碍,但由于这种改革已经进入实践阶段并由美国积极倡导,势必对国际投资争端解决的未来发展趋势产生重要影响。     

南海领土争端中的国际法渊源适用探析

南海领土争端主要包括岛礁归属与海域划界两个方面.不同的国际法渊源在南海领土争端的法律适用中具有不同的作用.目前,中国主要倚重以国际习惯为代表的传统国际法规则,周边国家则大多根据《联合国海洋法公约》对抗甚至否认中国对南海岛礁及其附近海域的主权.借助国际法渊源理论,对南海领土争端中可能适用的各种法律渊源加以界定和分类后,可以确定国际条约与国际习惯的适用顺位是问题的核心,而国际习惯在解决南海领土争端问题上的优先地位应予尊重.     

ECJ倡议的内在缺陷及国际投资法体系的变革方向

从发展中国家和发达国家的角度来看,ECJ都是一种有瑕疵的建议.它的缺点对于发展中国家来说尤为严重,因为它从根本的角度忽略了发展的层面.发展中国家运用现有的双边协定比接受ECJ的多边协定更加适当.虽然现有的乌拉圭FDI体制相比于ECJ更加恰当,但是从发展的角度讲,前者有着重大缺陷,国际社会应当对此缺陷给予即时关注并采取补救措施.     

气候变化背景下国际投资规则的发展趋势及我国对策研究

传统国际投资条约与应对气候变化存在一些矛盾和冲突,因此应实现国际投资条约与气候变化应对条约之间的衔接,兼顾投资自由化与政府管制.要实现这一目标,最佳方式是通过改变国际投资条约以顺应应对气候变化的低碳运动,改变国际投资条约将促进和保护投资作为唯一重心的现状,并采纳环境保护等其他领域的国际法规则.近年来国际投资领域呈现可持续发展的投资政策趋势.目前一些投资保护协定范本和新签订的双边和区域性投资协定已经纳入并不断完善环境保护等有关东道国管制外资内容的条款,逐步实现投资者利益与东道国利益保护的平衡.我国对现有国际投资条约进行调整、修订以及新投资条约的谈判,应考虑国际投资条约的这一发展趋势,以顺应国际投资的可持续发展政策.     

国际投资仲裁中最惠国条款的适用和管辖权的新发展

国际投资仲裁中某一投资条约规定的最惠国条款能否延伸适用于其他投资条约规定的仲裁程序是近年来的一个热门话题,仲裁裁决的实践给出了两种完全不同的答案,并且依据《维也纳条约法公约》对有关条款进行解释几乎是所有仲裁庭必做的工作.但是近两年的裁决似乎有一种将最惠国条款扩大适用于仲裁程序的趋势,尽管不同仲裁庭甚至同一仲裁庭的不同仲裁员对于同一问题可能会有不同的观点.我国签订的投资条约应当明确最惠国条款和仲裁程序的适用范围,以及规定条约不溯及既往原则等.     

Parallel Proceedings in Investor‐State Treaty Arbitration: Responses for Treaty‐Drafters,Arbitrators and Parties

Parallel investment treaty arbitrations present a demonstrated risk of inconsistent awards. This article examines several ameliorative responses to parallel investment treaty proceedings, executable by treaty‐drafters, arbitrators and parties themselves. The unique jurisdiction mechanics and applicable law in investment treaty disputes frames the responses available. Despite the unique context within which parallel investment arbitrations occur, the challenges they pose to party interests, to principles including legal fairness and to the effective pursuit of dispute resolution closely resemble those posed by parallel proceedings in other domestic and international legal fora.     

China’s Stance on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Evolution,Challenges, and Reform Options

Netherlands International Law Review - China is one of the most active states in concluding bilateral investment treaties (BITs) globally. Its BITs can be categorized into three generations based...     

Flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. In this paper, we investigate the rules under which the contents of treaties may be changed, such as rules for adoption and entry into force and rules for dispute resolution. In the first part of the paper, we describe how frequently these rules are used in practice and how they are typically combined, based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented by a two-dimensional property space. The detected underlying dimensions express varying degrees of institutionalisation and flexibility, respectively. In the second part of the paper, we place amendment rules into the framework of a formal model in the incomplete contracts tradition. It is shown that there exists a trade-off between the risk of too little flexibility, which leads to frequent inefficient breach of the treaty, and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily.     

论国际投资争议的“强制性仲裁”

传统理论与实践都认为，自愿性是仲裁的基础和核心。但随着国际社会与国际交往的发展。在国际投资领域已经开始出现了强制性仲裁。国际投资领域中的强制性仲裁的出现，对于国际商事仲裁的发展具有一定的影响，是国际商事仲裁发展的新动向，而且随着发达国家通过投资条约及其他国际条约日益加强对投资者的保护。以及发展中国家日益加强对外国投资的吸引力度，强制性仲裁可能会有更大的发展。其所涉及范围也可能从投资领域扩及到其他领域。