Low Power,First Offers,and Reservation Prices: Weak Negotiators are Self-anchored by Their Own Alternatives

Although most scholars recommend making the first offer in negotiations, recent research and practitioners' experience have uncovered a second-mover advantage in certain situations. In the current article, we explore this first- versus second-mover dynamic by investigating the circumstances under which negotiators would make less favorable first offers than they would receive were they to move second, focusing on the effects of negotiation power in the form of alternatives. Additionally, we examine the effects of low power on reservation prices and whether these effects could be mitigated using an anchor-debiasing technique. In Study 1, we manipulated negotiators' power in the form of the best alternative to the negotiated agreement and examined its effect on first offers and reservation prices. Our results showed that low-power negotiators would receive more favorable first offers than they would have made themselves when facing either low- or medium-power counterparts. Also, our results suggest that low-power negotiators had less favorable reservation prices than their medium- and high- power counterparts. In Study 2, we investigated whether this effect would persist in the face of anchor-debiasing techniques. Our results showed that while anchor-debiasing techniques did improve their first offers, low-power negotiators would still benefit from making the counteroffer rather than moving first. Our findings uncover the disadvantageous effects of low power on first-offer magnitude while offering practical advice to negotiators.     

Buyer and Seller Differences in Business‐to‐Business Negotiations

The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to examine the differences between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics in face‐to‐face business‐to‐business (B2B) negotiations and second, to explore how negotiators' professed negotiation styles influence buyers' and sellers' use of tactics. The methodology is a multiple case study analysis of eighteen negotiators representing twelve companies in six real‐life buyer–seller negotiations in B2B settings analyzed using qualitative research methods, including both comparative analysis and frequency analysis. We found some difference between buyers' and sellers' use of negotiation tactics, which suggests this question deserves further empirical study. Buyers' and sellers' use of specific tactics differs according to which overall strategy the negotiators chose, and sellers generally use a greater number of negotiation tactics than buyers. The findings challenge previous findings that suggest that B2B negotiations are collaborative and that negotiators communicate in a collaborative manner. The findings also increase our understanding of buyers' and sellers' variable use of tactics in the course of everyday practice as well as the interplay between negotiation tactics and strategies.     

From Lab Experiments to Real Negotiations: An Investigation of International Iron Ore Negotiations

Negotiation researchers have conducted a large number of experimental lab studies to identify the factors that affect negotiation outcomes, but it remains unclear whether those results can be generalized to real‐world negotiations. To explore this question, we analyzed the dynamic international iron ore annual negotiations that took place from 2005 to 2009. We found evidence that supports two important findings from previous experiments. Specifically, we focused on the impact of negotiators’ best alternatives and first offers on negotiation prices using multiple case study analysis. We found that iron ore prices increased more when the gap between the previous year's negotiated price and the price on the alternative spot market, a public market in which commodities are traded for immediate delivery, was larger, which suggested that buyers were sensitive to the strength of this alternative, supporting the literature on the role of alternatives. We also found that the first offer price significantly influenced the final price. Our findings extend two important experimental findings from the negotiation literature to large‐scale business negotiations in the real world.     

Perceptions of Time and Their Impact on Negotiations in the Arabic-Speaking Islamic World

This article examines how perceptions of time affect Arabic-speaking Islamic negotiators and how their attitudes about time, and their corresponding behaviors, may differ from those of their Western counterparts. We begin by identifying cultural differences in the conceptualization of time and then comment on the role of time in negotiations, discussing how time influences bargaining, trust, and negotiation tactics. In the section on tactics, we discuss stall-and-delay tactics, the use of the past as an objective standard, and limits on negotiating the future. Our purpose is to encourage negotiators from the West to be knowledgeable about the way they, as well as negotiators from Arabic-speaking Islamic cultures, conceive of and use time in negotiations. We believe that understanding that the very concept of time is often quite different in these two cultures is an important step in facilitating negotiations that cross these cultural boundaries.     

Why Do We Respond to a Concession with Another Concession? Reciprocity and Compromise

All negotiation processes involve an exchange of concessions, and compromise is an agreement based on mutual concessions. Hence the questions investigated in this article: Why are concessions in negotiations always reciprocal? Why do negotiators follow this rule? And why do negotiators achieve these concessions through a process that we call compromise? Is there a connection between conceding and promising? In this article, I examine the structure of concession making and compromise through sociological, anthropological, and etymological lenses to better illuminate this critical negotiation component.     

Beyond Frogs and Scorpions: A Risk‐Based Framework for Understanding Negotiating Counterparts' Ethical Motivations

Managing the flow of valid information is one of the biggest challenges that negotiators face. The high incidence of questionable or unethical negotiating tactics has been well documented, but ways of dealing with the deceptive practices of a counterpart have received comparatively little attention. In this article, we suggest that, in addition to avoidance and confrontation, negotiators typically attempt to manage the unethical tendencies of their counterparts through twelve neutralizing approaches. These approaches are based on four types of perceived risk that counterparts often consider when deciding whether to use ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics: risks to immediate or short‐term goals/tasks; risks to immediate or short‐term relationship(s); risks to future or long‐term goals/tasks; and, risks to future or long‐term relationships. By applying expectancy theory, resource dependency theory, social identity theory, and social network theory to this framework, we have developed propositions related to these twelve neutralizing approaches. We also discuss the opportunities and challenges related to evaluating these propositions in future research.     

Negotiators as Mediators: The Case of 1987–1995 Korea–United States Bilateral Trade Negotiations

Despite their widely recognized benefits, integrative approaches to negotiation have seldom been effectively used in interorganizational negotiations. This study analyzes the 1987–1995 Korea–United States Trade Negotiations, identifying elements in those talks that could have moved the negotiations in a more integrative direction. The role of building relationships — especially between key negotiators — is examined. Informal negotiations between the key negotiators from both sides were crucial in building such relationships, which helped both sides create solutions for mutual gains. This process was realized, inter alia, by the dual role that the key negotiators took on as negotiators and as mediators.     

BABO Negotiating: Enhancing Students’ Perspective‐Taking Skills

Negotiation educators recognize that collaborative problem‐solving is a critical negotiation skill. Negotiation outcomes are often better when negotiators take a collaborative approach to the process, and they are better able to do this when they are able to take the perspective of the person with whom they are negotiating. Over the years, I have developed several techniques to help my students improve their collaboration and perspective‐taking skills. One of these techniques is to use collaborative terminology (BABO = both are better off) rather than more competitive language (win‐win). In this article, I describe the strategies I employ in my negotiation class to increase students’ perspective‐taking capacities and discuss how this focus enhances their ability to negotiate collaboratively.     

Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process

This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-level games approach to understanding international negotiations by considering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-Irish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Ireland shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement. When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the intensity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.     

Enhancing Community Leadership Negotiation Skills to Build Civic Capacity

Most intra‐ and interorganizational decision making entails negotiations, and even naturally talented negotiators can improve with training. Executive trainings for managers and leadership programs for publicly elected officials, public managers, and nongovernmental organizations frequently include negotiation modules. These efforts, however, have yet to reach community leaders who also need to develop their negotiation skills. We propose that members of disadvantaged low‐income communities who lack educational and economic opportunities, and are less able to advocate for their own interest, need to build and strengthen their civic capacity, including their negotiation skills, to become more effective parties to decisions affecting them. While many professionals and executives have access to training, such opportunities are less accessible to the leaders of these disadvantaged communities. Although such leaders draw from their own heuristic knowledge, skills, and abilities, they could also benefit from sharpening their negotiation skills. We propose that the multidimensional understanding of their community that members accumulate through direct experience is indispensable, nontransferable to outsiders, and not teachable through in‐class activities. Leaders with the ability to leverage knowledge and assets to connect effectively to community insiders as well as to outside people, institutions, and resources, however, possess some specific inherent personality traits as well an understanding of social structures, strategies, and agency, which can be taught and learned. Such skills as how to conduct negotiations around the table and away from it and how to identify community members who can help and how to rally them are also teachable. The cases were chosen to illustrate the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) that make these leaders effective in and beyond their communities. We highlight those KSAs that we think are teachable in the framework of a negotiation module in community leadership training to enhance civic capacity for community betterment.     

Interpretive Filters: Social Cognition and the Impact of Turning Points in Negotiation

A number of studies have shown that certain events that occur during a negotiation can alter its course. Referred to as "turning points," these events are precipitated by actions taken either outside or inside the talks that have consequences for outcomes. In this article, we report the results of two experiments designed to examine the impacts of two types of precipitating actions, external and internal. In the first experiment, which focused on external actions, we found that crises — as opposed to breakthroughs — produced more movement in negotiations in which parties viewed the social climate positively (high trust, low power). We found that parties achieved less movement in negative social climates (low trust, high power).
In the second experiment, which focused on internal actions, we found that cooperative precipitants (factors inducing change) were more likely to occur when parties negotiated in the context of positive social climates. Negotiation outcomes were also influenced by the climate: we found better individual outcomes for negotiations that occurred in positive climates (high trust, cooperative orientations). Inboth experiments, the social climate of the negotiation moderated the effects of precipitating factors on negotiation outcomes. Perceptions of trust and power filter the way negotiators interpret actions that occur outside or are taken inside a negotiation, which can lead to agreements or impasses.     

Sources of Power in Public Negotiations: A Framework Applied to Public-Public and Public-Private Negotiations

The negotiation literature has extensively examined the topic of power and how it can be wielded. Numerous frameworks have been created and utilized in the various treatises on negotiations; analyzing the power differential in any given situation is a common teaching technique. However, despite this focus on the topic, discussions of power have been mainly focused on negotiations in the private sector. As a result, many of the most common frameworks are oriented toward this type of situation, resulting in a clumsy application to a public-sector negotiation. Given the growing importance of negotiations to public-sector leaders, we provide a new structure for analyzing power that can be utilized in such situations. For a municipal leader confronted with a complex public-private partnership, it is important to have the right tools to use when examining the power dynamics at play. After examining several current models of power, as well as other writings on the topic in negotiation and strategy literature, we present a new model. This model divides power into different categories based on whether it stems from formal or informal mechanisms, and then offers several specific forms relevant to the public sector. We then use this new model to examine a case study involving the new mayor of Manchester, New Hampshire and her efforts to negotiate a better response to the opioid and homelessness crisis. This case study illustrates the unique nature of public sector negotiations and provides a roadmap for negotiators looking to use our new framework.     

The Meaning of Intuition for the Negotiation Process and Outcome

Intuition is a useful tool for negotiators, as negotiations are often highly complex endeavors in which people make holistic judgments with incomplete information and no time for deliberation. Therefore, one might expect that intuition greatly influences negotiations and their outcomes and that negotiators would use intuition to their advantage. However, there is almost no systematic research into the meaning of intuition for negotiation. In this conceptual paper, drawing on five interviews of experienced negotiators, we apply general research on intuition to the specific case of negotiation and find that negotiators use intuition specifically for attribution and social interaction. We distinguish different intuition attitudes; identify preparation, time, and negotiation stages as relevant drivers for the use of intuition in negotiation; clarify the distinction between intuition and routine; and shine new light on the concept of domain-specific knowledge.     

When Negotiations Become Routine: Not Reinventing the Wheel While Thinking Outside the Box

In this article, we seek to apply the insights of recent research on routine to the context of repeated negotiations. To demonstrate the link between both concepts, we introduce an analytical framework in which we identify different negotiation situations in which routine can develop. We distinguish two dimensions of the negotiation process: a problem-solving dimension and a communication dimension. Our framework for analyzing the role of routine in negotiation is built around these two dimensions. We define those skills that we argue in repeated negotiations can help negotiators manage particular kinds of negotiations depending on the level and type of routinization that type of negotiation involves. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework is inherently dynamic, which we illustrate with simplified business examples.     

The Curse of the Smartphone: Electronic Multitasking in Negotiations

In this study, we have explored the use of mobile phones during negotiations. Specifically, we examined the effects that multitasking — reading messages on a mobile phone while negotiating face to face — had on the outcome achieved in a negotiation, as well as on perceptions of professionalism, trustworthiness, and satisfaction. Using an experimental design in a face‐to‐face dyadic negotiation, we found that multitasking negotiators achieved lower payoffs and were perceived as less professional and less trustworthy by their partners.     

Building Momentum in Negotiations: Time-Related Costs and Action-Forcing Events

Using the negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland and other case examples, the author develops a conceptual framework for analyzing how negotiators seek to build momentum and overcome stalemate. The framework focuses on the choices negotiators face between taking action and waiting in the hope that counterparts will make concessions, exploring the importance of perceptions of time-related costs and action-forcing events in shaping decision making. The framework highlights the uneven, nonlinear nature of the flow of negotiation processes from initiation to agreement or breakdown, and focuses on the ways negotiators seek to influence the flow by shaping perceptions of time-related costs, structuring action-forcing events, and creating linkages among sets of negotiations.     

What We Have Learned About Teaching Multiparty Negotiation

This article grows out of our experience teaching an advanced course on multiparty negotiation. The main question underlying the course is: “How can experts in two‐party negotiations make themselves effective multiparty negotiators?” In this article, we describe what and how we taught, what we think worked, and what we decided to change after the first year of teaching.     

Structural,Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Preferences are a crucial element for analyzing decision making and negotiations, but knowledge about which factors determine these preferences is sparse. Some quantitative and qualitative studies of European Union (EU) negotiations have assumed that the negotiation conflict dimensions in intergovernmental negotiations reflect market‐versus‐regulation approaches as well as a north–south dimension. In this study, I demonstrate that these findings can be extended to show that the relevant determining factors for negotiation positions are economic structural variables and the degree to which a country benefits from the EU. Furthermore, the domestic interests of EU governments better explain a government's interest in some specific issues, such as consumer protection or fishery policies, than do their partisan preferences. Moreover, I am able to show that in frequent negotiations, such as EU Council of Ministers negotiations, sincere preferences dominate; however, some factors, such as extreme salience, can increase the likelihood that a minister will choose a less sincere strategic position such as an extreme position.     

Improvisation and Negotiation: Expecting the Unexpected

Negotiators must improvise. As the negotiations process unfolds, they work with new information, continually making decisions along the way to achieve favorable results. Skilled improvisational jazz musicians and actors perform in similar ways: they repeatedly practice song chord progressions and notes or scene guidelines before a performance; then, during the performance, they work with the information or the music they hear in order to react and respond, making decisions along the way to produce dazzling music or a compelling scene. In this article, two experts in negotiation, a jazz-improvisation scholar, a former member of an improvisational theater troupe, and a psychotherapist versed in therapeutic improvisational techniques explore the improvisational nature of negotiation.
Several aspects of negotiation are similar to improvisation. Both negotiators and improvisational performers need to have a similar mind-set to be successful, both need to recognize and/or change that mind-set at times, and both must craft creative solutions. But there are some significant differences between improvisational performance and negotiation practice, which this article also notes. For example, personal charisma ("star quality") is a common attribute of successful performers, but not something negotiators may always rely on. Similarly, improvisational artists usually work as a team, while a negotiator is often on his or her own. Nonetheless, the incorporation of improvisation techniques into the negotiation skills repertoire holds great promise for practicing negotiators and is a worthy topic of future negotiation research and teaching.