Incentives for separation and incentives for public good provision

In this paper, I examine how the incentives of regions to unite and to separate are related to the incentives to provide public goods. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods. From a social welfare perspective, there are excessive incentives for separation and for the provision of public goods. When incentives for public good provision are not taken into account, however, these incentives can be misinterpreted as incentives for separation.     

Superfund expenditures and cleanup priorities: Distributive politics or the public interest?

Using data on all final National Priorities List (NPL) sites, this study employs an integrated model of distributive and public interest politics to determine whether the overall pace of cleanup efforts and funding of the 8.5 billion Superfund program over the past eight years reflects self-interested congressional influence or public interest objectives. Despite the fact that both EPA and Congress have substantial incentives to promote the Superfund program, the results indicate that once a site is on the final NPL, there is little committee-based congressional influence over the distribution of site cleanup or funding, although evidence exists that legislators can hasten a site's transition from proposed to final status on the NPL. The chief determinants of cleanup pace and level of funding are the site's Hazard Ranking System (HRS) scores, whether federal funds are financing the cleanup, and whether the site is designated as a state priority.     

Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway

In a paper published in this journal, Cowen (2002) argues that whenever compliance with norms is supported by the forces of esteem, there is “too little” norm compliance. In this paper, we show that Cowen’s logic is flawed – that when the operation of esteem-based norms is formally modelled, no such general a priori conclusion follows. We investigate the conditions that would be necessary to ensure that esteem incentives for public goods contributions generate optimality in public goods supply, and indicate on that basis the conditions for voluntary sub-optimal and supra-optimal public goods provision in the esteem context.     

The effect of incomplete information in a threshold public goods experiment

Fiscal stress and decreasing government budgets have led to renewed interest in voluntary contributions for the funding of public goods. This paper experimentally examines the Provision Point Mechanism (PPM), a voluntary contribution mechanism for the funding of lumpy public goods. Previous research has demonstrated the effectiveness of this mechanism at providing public goods, however all were conducted in an environment of complete information, which fails to capture the uncertainties of the real world. This study tests the efficacy of the PPM in informationally limited settings. We find no significant differences in the rate of successful provisions or level of group contributions when subjects have limited information about the valuations of others than when they have complete information.     

The power of process: State capacity and climate policy

State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policy making, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for effective policy design. California followed this path in climate policy making, setting it on track to meet climate goals. In cases of legislative policy design, bureaucracies set goals and legislatures design policy measures. Since legislators have incentives to respond to vested interests, legislative policy design is vulnerable to regulatory capture. In Germany, legislative policy design in climate policy making is preventing attainment of emissions reduction goals, as industry interests succeeded in blocking key policy measures. Our findings highlight procedural sources of state capacity.     

Energy demand‐side management: New perspectives for a new era

Over the past decade and a half, state governments have assumed greater responsibility over demand‐side management (DSM) operations. Whereas DSM programs formerly were initiated primarily by utilities or state public utility commissions, they are now becoming increasingly state‐initiated and incentivized through funding mechanisms or efficiency‐level mandates. The supporting literature, however, has yet to respond to these changes and to verify that DSM funding or mandates are effective policy mechanisms. Furthermore, the supporting literature has yet to resolve some of the research design and methodological challenges that traditionally plague DSM evaluations. As states continue to expand their energy and climate policy efforts, and the federal government considers the possibility of national decarbonization policies, of which DSM is a key strategy, the need for empirical research on the effectiveness of DSM programs will grow. This essay describes the current status of DSM efforts in the U.S. and explores how these programs affect electricity operations. The relationship between DSM policy and program efforts and the amount of saved electricity is tested with a methodological approach aimed at minimizing the selection bias that is inherent in the nonexperimental research design. Results confirm that state‐run DSM efforts contribute to electricity savings across the country. Public benefit funds coupled with performance incentives are found to encourage utility participation in DSM programs. Energy efficiency portfolio standards and performance incentives effectively promote electricity savings, but public benefit funds without the support of other DSM policies are not significant drivers of either DSM program participation or total DSM electricity savings. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision making results in overspending in some policy domains, whereas too low spending persists in others. We study a model in which delegates from jurisdictions bargain over local public goods provision. If all of the costs of public goods are shared through a common budget, policy makers delegate bargaining to ‘public good lovers’, resulting in overprovision of public goods. If a sufficiently large part of the costs can not be shared, underprovision persists because policy makers delegate bargaining to ‘conservatives’. We derive financing rules that eliminate the incentives for strategic delegation.     

The Impact of Funding Modalities on the Performance of Indigenous Organisations

Governments’ choice of funding modality can produce powerful incentives for organisations to perform in preferred ways, but it can also divert limited resources, narrow accountability, and undermine capability. Through literature review and interviews, the research explored the international literature on public finance management in developing country contexts, and compared this to case studies of Indigenous organisations. The situation in Australia was found to differ in three ways: (1) performance indicators are imposed, rather than negotiated; (2) few existing public funding modalities reward performance or provide incentives; and (3) funding arrangements do not generally require receiving organisations to be accountable to their constituents. Stability and durability of funding modalities, and clarity in functions and jurisdictional boundaries, were also found to positively influence performance. Further research is required to design new performance frameworks that build around the organisation, rather than the grant, with indicators of governance capability and downward accountability to constituents.     

A theory of global public goods and their provisions

This paper develops a general theory of a global public good and its optimal provision. In a national public good problem that researchers have long been acquainted with, government taxation and public expenditure are an inevitable tool for an optimal provision. This paper shows that an efficient provision of a truly global public good through public taxation and expenditure becomes unattainable because of nationally disparate incentives, especially given large uncertainties about the future. This paper describes two alternative approaches. One is a technological solution, which is a high promise but has unresolved issues of uncertainties with regard to developments of necessary technologies. The other is an adaptation framework. This paper shows that the provision of a truly global public good becomes manageable through a framework of adaptation strategies as it overcomes both divergent national interests and uncertainties with regard to needed technologies. Adaptation strategies would unfold triggered by changes in private incentives over a long‐term time horizon in a private–public partnership. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are minorities free riders? Applying the social resistance framework to public goods production in Central-Eastern Europe

One of the key reasons for the scholarly and policy concern about the rising levels of ethnic diversity is its apparently detrimental effect on the production of public goods. Although numerous studies have tackled that issue, there is still much ambiguity as to the precise micro-level mechanisms underpinning this relationship. In this article, a novel theoretical explanation for this relationship is proposed, building on the social resistance framework. This proposition is tested using a new cross-sectional public opinion survey covering 14,536 respondents in 817 neighbourhoods across 11 Central Eastern European countries. Analysing national minorities defined by postwar border changes means one can overcome the endogeneity problem faced by research based on immigrant groups. The findings show that it is the combination of a minority group's discrimination and its spatial clustering that makes minorities reluctant to contribute to public goods. The article constitutes a novel theoretical and methodological contribution to the research on the effects of diversity on public goods provision.     

The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation

The second-order dilemma arises from each individual’s incentive to free ride on a mechanism to solve the public goods provision problem (the first-order dilemma). We show by a voluntary participation game that if the depreciation rate is low, public goods can be accumulated through voluntary groups for provision, and that the accumulation is effective in solving the second-order dilemma. This analysis also shows that population growth increases the accumulation of public goods in the long run.     

Ecomodernist citizenship: rethinking political obligations in a climate-changed world

Green accounts of environmental citizenship typically seek to promote environmental sustainability and justice. However, some green theorists have argued that liberal freedoms are incompatible with preserving a planetary environment capable of meeting basic human needs and must be wound back. More recently, ‘ecomodernists’ have proposed that liberalism might be reconciled with environmental challenges through state-directed innovation focused on the provision of global public goods. Yet, they have not articulated an account of ecomodernist citizenship. This article seeks to advance the normative theory of ecomodernism by specifying an account of ecomodernist citizenship and subjecting the theory’s core claims to sympathetic critique. We argue that state-directed innovation has the potential to reconcile ambitious mitigation with liberal freedoms. However, full implementation of ecomodernist ideals would require widespread embrace of ecophilic values, high-trust societies and acceptance of thick political obligations within both national and global communities. Ecomodernism’s wider commitments to cosmopolitan egalitarianism and separation from nature thus amount to a non-liberal comprehensive public conception of the good. Furthermore, ecomodernism currently lacks an adequate account of how a society that successfully ‘separates’ from nature can nurture green values, or how vulnerable people’s substantive freedoms will be protected during an era of worsening climate harms.     

Foreign aid in the making of economic policy in Sri Lanka, 1977–1983

The paper analyzes the interaction between inflows of foreign aid and the character of the economic policies pursued by the Sri Lankan government between 1977 and 1983. Aid did not support the policies of liberalization and balanced public investment that were preferred by donors. Rather it enabled the Sri Lankan government to push forward with the Mahaweli irrigation scheme on a scale that worked against both liberalization and other components of public investment. The process that led to the adoption and funding of the Mahaweli scheme and continued support for that scheme even after its impact on the overall economic program had become apparent is examined in detail, with particular emphasis on the decisions and behavior of both the Sri Lankan government and of aid donors.     

Comparing the legitimacy and effectiveness of global hard and soft law: An analytical framework

The international norms that are developed as tools of global governance can be placed on a continuum from traditional “hard law” treaties to the vaguest and voluntary “soft law.” In this article we develop an analytical framework for comparing norms on different positions along the continuum, thus for comparing international hard and soft law. We root the framework in both the rationalist and the constructivist paradigms of international relations by focusing on two overarching evaluative criteria: effectiveness and legitimacy. These broad concepts are divided into smaller building blocks encompassing mechanisms through which norms can exert influence; for example, by changing material incentives, identities, and building capacity, and by contributing to building source‐based, procedural, and substantive legitimacy. We illustrate the applicability of the framework with three norm processes of varying degrees of “softness” in global climate governance.     

社区公共物品与社区治理--论城市社区"四轮驱动、一辕协调"的治理结构

城市社区日益成为社会公共物品供给与消费的基本单元.然而,在既有的政府垄断性供给体系下,社区普遍存在公共物品供给短缺.改革传统的管理与服务方式,建立新的公共物品供给体系,满足社区不断增长的需求,已成为城市社区建设的中心任务.在众多的创新实践中,"社区治理"不失为一种可行的思路.本文遵循社区治理的理念,尝试将其深化并落实到体制层面,提出"四轮驱动、一辕协调"的社区治理结构与运作模式,并建议首先在"危改回迁社区"中试点.     

Privatization and corruption: Patronage vs. spoils

We examine the issue of privatization of those public goods that can be provided in-house or contracted out. Such privatization appears straightforward, yet history shows otherwise. For example, the private contracting system for street cleaning in 19^th-century New York City was a failure, despite the safeguards instituted to ensure competition. The contract system was criticized for corruption, while in-house provision suffered from patronage abuses. We present two variations of the “rotten apple” theory to capture the salient features of the New York experience. The public officials and contractors were both operating under high-powered incentives, which invited opportunism. When players act strategically, the adverse effect of opportunism increases. Since the amounts of spoils can be larger than political contributions, contracting-out ends up being more costly, even though competition promotes productive efficiency. Another advantage of in-house provision is that incentives can be made low-powered by depoliticizing of the system.     

Fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks

At least to some extent due to pressure from international donors, many countries have become more fiscally decentralized the underlying premise being that greater decentralization might improve the provision of local public goods and services. We test this proposition by determining whether relatively more decentralized countries fare better when natural disasters strike in terms of its effects on the population. Overall, we find evidence supporting our maintained hypothesis, though the effect appears much more robust in developing countries.     

Informal Accountability, Socially Embedded Officials, and Public Goods Provision in Rural China: The Role of Lineage Groups

In recent studies, analysts have found that so-called “informal accountability” exerts significant influence on public goods provision in rural China. According to these studies, such informal accountability may be formed through the embedment of local officials in social groups. However, there seems to be no agreement on the identification of such embedment and the conditions under which this embedment can influence public goods provision. To advance the literature of this debate, this study examines village officials who are embedded in such social groups as lineage groups and explores their role in shaping public goods provision in rural China based on a unique set of nationwide-survey data. Using a direct measure of social embeddedness of village officials, we have found that the embedment of village officials in a social group can be identified through a direct measure designed in this study and that the embedment has a positive effect on public goods provision in rural China. Finally, we draw some important policy implications from our findings.     

Taken for Granted? Managing for Social Equity in Grant Programs

Managing for social equity performance has long been a goal without much guidance for public managers. We examine social equity performance in the context of indirect governance through the administration of grant programs and, more specifically, the matching of policy responses (grant funding) to social needs. Grant program managers must allocate funding to match needs while also ensuring accountability, but common administrative models that rely on competition can undermine social equity performance. We develop a unique framework to analyze the relative social equity performance of four models of grant administration in general. These models are defined by whether competitions or formulas are used to select grantees and to allocate funding. We test the implications of the framework in an analysis of funding distributions from the nonentitlement Community Development Block Grant program in four states. Our findings suggest that social equity in grant programs is better served when grantors do not rely solely on competitive grant contracting in the selection and distribution of grant funds, which is typical in grant administration. However, policy makers and managers can design institutional arrangements that utilize competition, but in a manner that does not create a bias against more socially equitable funding decisions.     

Reinventing Reforms: How to Improve Program Management Using Performance Measures. Really

This paper looks at the design and use of incentivized performance measures to motivate managerial efficiency and promote greater program effectiveness. It starts off by looking at recent reforms like the Government Performance and Results Act to understand why they were largely unsuccessful in altering the decision‐making process of government agencies. One problem was that performance measures have been both numerous and complicated, thereby making their role in management and oversight difficult. Equally important, no external incentives were attached to program accomplishments. The paper then examines what elements would be needed to build a management system that encourages both more efficient and more effective agency behavior. The goal of performance budgeting is to develop performance measures that display the progress of a program toward its stated objectives. Assessments based on these measures may then call for rewards or punishments. As such, it also may encourage program managers toward improved performance. The paper examines the pitfalls and complexities dealt with by Congress and Office of Management and Budget in the process. For example, a performance system must distinguish between funding program needs, as warranted by sectoral indicators, and management concerns. It must also unambiguously tie incentives to performance measures to motivate agencies, while building in commitment devices for the principals. Incentivized performance measures may not be appropriate in all conditions, but may be helpful for motivating managers and improving program performance in particular circumstances.