Workers' compensation program experience, 1981

Although the workers' compensation program covered more workers and paid more in benefits in 1981 than it did a year earlier, the rise in both of these indicators was slightly smaller than those in 1980 and considerably smaller than the increases that took place in the 1970's. Employers paid $22.9 billion in premiums in 1981, less than 3 percent more than the previous year and the smallest annual increase since 1958. The cost-payroll ratio also showed a 12-point drop in 1981, the first such decline since 1959 and a sharp contrast to the almost 9 percentage point average annual rise in the 1970's. The Black Lung program, which made up more than a fifth of the benefit payments under workers' compensation in 1973, accounted for only about an eighth by 1981.     

Workers' compensation: 1984-88 benchmark revisions.

About 93.1 million workers were covered under workers' compensation laws in 1988--an increase of 11 percent from the 1984 total. Benefit amounts totaled $30.7 billion--an increase of about 56 percent since 1984. Of the total payments made under the workers' compensation program, $17.6 billion went to disabled workers, $1.6 billion to their survivors, and $11.5 billion for medical care. The Social Security Administration (SSA) is interested in measuring economic security in the United States, and workers' compensation plays a large role in that measurement. This article represents one part of our overall effort to determine the roles the various income-maintenance programs play in helping citizens of the United States achieve economic security. The figures presented here provide readers with an opportunity to review workers' compensation program operations during much of the 1980's. Workers' compensation is also important to SSA because that program is directly related to the Social Security Disability Insurance program. Since 1965, Social Security disability benefits have been subject to reduction if the beneficiary also receives workers' compensation and the combined benefits exceed 80 percent of previous earnings. In addition, SSA has been directly involved in providing income maintenance for disability from work-related diseases since 1969 when the Federal Black Lung benefits program was established.     

Recent trends in workers' compensation

Workers' compensation provides cash benefits and medical care to employees who are injured on the job and survivor benefits to the dependents of workers whose deaths result from work-related incidents. Workers' compensation programs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia and federal programs together paid $56.0 billion in medical and cash benefits in 2004, an increase of 2.3 percent over 2003 payments. Of the total, $26.1 billion was for medical care and $29.9 billion was for cash benefits. Employers' costs for workers' compensation in 2004 were $87.4 billion, an increase of 7.0 percent over 2003 spending. Workers' compensation programs and spending vary greatly from state to state. As a source of support for disabled workers, workers' compensation is currently surpassed in size only by Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), which covers impairments of any cause that are significant, long-term impediments to work. Although most recipients of workers' compensation recover and return to work, those with lasting impairments may become eligible for DI benefits, subject to an offset to avoid excessive wage replacement from both programs.     

Changing the method for calculating quarters of coverage: the impact on workers' insured status

The 1977 Social Security Amendments specified that, beginning in 1978, a worker would be credited with one quarter of coverage for a designated amount of annual earnings. For 1978, a worker received one quarter of coverage (up to a total of four) for each $250 in annual earnings from employment or self-employment. Before 1978, a worker who was paid $50 in wages in a calendar quarter was credited with a quarter of coverage. A person who had $400 or more in self-employment income in a year was credited with four quarters of coverage. Some workers received more quarters of coverage under the new provisions than they would have under the old, and other workers received less. Since a worker's receipt of benefits depends on his or her insured status, which is based on quarters of coverage, this change can affect a worker's eligibility for benefits. This study indicates that if $250 in annual earnings had been required for one quarter of coverage in 1977, more than 2.1 million workers would have had a change in their insured status for disabled worker benefits, and about 700,000 workers would have had a change in their insured status for survivor benefits. Those whose insured status was affected were most likely to have had marginal earnings records--for example, they had four to seven quarters of coverage when six were needed. (This effect was expected when the legislation was passed.) This article examines those whose eligibility for benefits was most likely to have been affected.     

Social Security's special minimum benefit

Social Security's special minimum primary insurance amount (PIA) provision was enacted in 1972 to increase the adequacy of benefits for regular long-term, low-earning covered workers and their dependents or survivors. At the time, Social Security also had a regular minimum benefit provision for persons with low lifetime average earnings and their families. Concerns were rising that the low lifetime average earnings of many regular minimum beneficiaries resulted from sporadic attachment to the covered workforce rather than from low wages. The special minimum benefit was seen as a way to reward regular, low-earning workers without providing the windfalls that would have resulted from raising the regular minimum benefit to a much higher level. The regular minimum benefit was subsequently eliminated for workers reaching age 62, becoming disabled, or dying after 1981. Under current law, the special minimum benefit will phase out over time, although it is not clear from the legislative history that this was Congress's explicit intent. The phaseout results from two factors: (1) special minimum benefits are paid only if they are higher than benefits payable under the regular PIA formula, and (2) the value of the regular PIA formula, which is indexed to wages before benefit eligibility, has increased faster than that of the special minimum PIA, which is indexed to inflation. Under the Social Security Trustees' 2000 intermediate assumptions, the special minimum benefit will cease to be payable to retired workers attaining eligibility in 2013 and later. Their benefits will always be larger under the regular benefit formula. As policymakers consider Social Security solvency initiatives--particularly proposals that would reduce benefits or introduce investment risk--interest may increase in restoring some type of special minimum benefit as a targeted protection for long-term low earners. Two of the three reform proposals offered by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security would modify and strengthen the current-law special minimum benefit. Interest in the special minimum benefit may also increase because of labor force participation and marital trends that suggest that enhancing workers' benefits may be a more effective means of reducing older women's poverty rates than enhancing spousal or widow's benefits. By understanding the Social Security program's experience with the special minimum benefit, policymakers will be able to better anticipate the effectiveness of other initiatives to enhance benefits for long-term low earners. This article presents the most recent and comprehensive information available about the special minimum benefit in order to help policymakers make informed decisions about the provision's future. Highlights of the current special minimum benefit include the following: Very few persons receive the special minimum benefit. As of December 2001, about 134,000 workers and their dependents and survivors were entitled to a benefit based on the special minimum. Of those, only about 79,000 received a higher total benefit because of the special minimum; the other 55,000 were dually entitled. (In effect, when persons are eligible for more than one type of benefit--that is, they are dually eligible--the highest benefit payable determines total benefits. If the special minimum benefit is not the highest benefit payable, it does not increase total benefits paid.) As of February 2000, retired workers who were special minimum beneficiaries with unreduced benefits and were not dually entitled were receiving, on average, a monthly benefit of $510 per month. That amount is approximately $2,000 less than the annual poverty threshold for an aged individual. Special minimum benefits provide small increases in total benefits. For special minimum beneficiaries who were not dually entitled as of December 2001, the average special minimum monthly PIA was just $39 higher than the regular PIA. Most special minimum beneficiaries are female retired workers. About 90 percent of special minimum beneficiaries are retired workers, and 77 percent of those retired workers are women. The special minimum benefit has never provided poverty-level benefits. Maximum payable special minimum benefits (unreduced for early retirement) equal 85 percent of the poverty level for aged persons, down from 96 percent at the provision's inception. Major public policy considerations raised by this analysis include the following: Social Security benefits alone do not protect all long-term low earners from poverty. Low earners with 30 years of earnings equal to the annual full-time minimum wage who retired in selected years from 1982 to 2000 received benefits that were 3.9 percent to 20.1 percent below the poverty threshold, depending on the year they retired. For 40-year earners, the range was 3.9 percent to 15.3 percent below poverty. Furthermore, in 1993, 29.2 percent of retired-worker beneficiaries who were poor had 30 or more years of coverage. The size of the universe of persistently low earners with significant attachment to the covered workforce is unknown. Available research that examines two 28-month periods suggests that only 4 percent to 6 percent of full-time, full-period earners had below-minimum wages for more than 12 consecutive months. Targeting enhanced benefits only toward long-term, regular workers who are low earners is difficult under the current Social Security program. All else being equal, if total wage-indexed lifetime covered earnings are the same for both a full-career low earner and for a high earner who has worked only occasionally, then their Social Security benefits will be identical. Social Security has no information on number of hours worked, hourly wages, or other information that could distinguish between two such persons.     

Workers' compensation: coverage, benefits, and costs, 1982

Workers' compensation provides medical care and income maintenance protection to workers disabled from work-related injury or illness. This program is of considerable interest to the Social Security Administration (SSA) from several perspectives. For example, since 1965 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) benefits and workers' compensation payments have been integrated. Information on the experience under workers' compensation provides a framework for examining questions concerning gaps and overlaps in the Nation's social insurance system. In addition, since December 1969 SSA has administered claims filed through 1973 under part B of the Black Lung program--the program providing income maintenance protection to coal miners disabled by pneumoconiosis. The workers' compensation experience reported here consists of information on benefits for work-related injury and disease, including data on the combined benefits paid under the entire Federal Black Lung program administered by the Labor Department and SSA.     

Cash benefits for short-term sickness, 1948-81

At least three-fifths of all workers are under some kind of formal plan offering income replacement during temporary periods of illness, even though there is no national sick-pay program. In 1981, income loss due to short-term non-work-related disabilities totaled +41.3 billion. Sick-pay benefits were +15.6 billion, representing 38 percent of the income that otherwise would have been lost. The replacement rate has been fairly stable since 1974, following earlier periods of uneven increases from the 17 percent recorded for 1948, the first year of this series. This article includes estimates for 1980 and 1981 and revisions for 1978 and 1979 of the income loss and benefits arising from short-term sickness. Also included are the losses and benefits for the first 6 months of long-term disability.     

Actuarial status of the HI and SMI Trust Funds

This article is adapted from the Summary of the 1985 Annual Reports of the Medicare Board of Trustees. It presents the actuarial status of the Hospital Insurance (HI) and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Funds. Two actions favorably affecting the financial status of the HI Trust Fund have occurred since the publication of the 1984 Reports: (1) Fiscal year 1986 hospital payment rates will continue at the same level as in fiscal year 1985, and (2) the level of the annual increase in the rates that can be granted without specific justification has been reduced. Despite these two actions, the Board found that the present financing schedule is barely sufficient to ensure payment of benefits through the late 1990's if the assumptions underlying the estimates are realized. The Board found the SMI program to be financially sound, but it noted with concern the rapid growth in the cost of the program. For both HI and SMI, the Board recommends that Congress consider ways to curtail the rapid growth in program costs.     

Social Security Amendments of 1977: legislative history and summary of provisions

This article describes the legislative history of the Social Security Amendments of 1977 and contains a summary of the amendments. The major provisions revise the benefit structure so that future replacement rates--initial benefits as a percent of previous earnings--will be relatively stable and revise the tax structure to restore the financial soundness of the program in the short range and into the 21st century. Other significant provisions include: An increased special minimum benefit for long-term workers with future automatic adjustment to prices; a minimum benefit frozen at the December 1978 level (roughly $121) with automatic adjustment only for those on the rolls; a higher retirement test exempt amount of beneficiaries aged 65 and over; an annual measure of "quarter of coverage" and other changes in annual wage reporting provisions; and authorization for agreements with foreign countries for limited coordination between social security systems.     

The impact of changing financial work incentives on the earnings of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries

SSDI beneficiaries lose their entire cash benefit if they perform work that is substantial gainful activity (SGA) after using Social Security work incentive programs. The complete loss of benefits might be a work disincentive for beneficiaries. We report results from a pilot project that replaces the complete loss of benefits with a gradual reduction in benefits of $1 for every $2 earned above an earnings disregard level. Beneficiaries who volunteered to participate in the project were randomly assigned to a group receiving the new program or to a control group. The policy led to a 25 percent increase in the percentage of beneficiaries with earnings above the annualized SGA amount, or $11,760 in 2009 dollars. It did not result in a reduction in benefit payments. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Variation of employee benefit costs by age

Health care, pension, and disability plans account for the bulk of employers' benefit costs, as defined in this article. Because those costs tend to rise as employees get older, the age structure of the workforce affects not only employers' costs but ultimately their competitiveness in global markets. How much costs vary depends in large part on the structure of the benefits package provided. The method a company chooses to finance benefits generally varies with its size. This article focuses primarily on the benefit practices of large, private employers. In the long run, such employers pay the costs associated with the demographics of their workers, whereas small employers can often pool costs with other companies in the community. In addition, small employers often offer fewer benefits, and the costs and financing of those benefits are subject to the insurance markets and state regulations. The discussion of benefit packages is illustrated by case studies based on benefits that are typical for three types of organizations--a large traditional company such as steel, automobile, and manufacturing; a large financial services company such as a bank or health care organization; and a medium-sized retail organization. The case studies demonstrate the extent to which the costs of typical packages vary and reveal that employers differ radically in the incentives they offer employees to retire at a specific time. An employer can shift the variation in cost by age by changing the structure of the benefit program. The major forces that drive age differences in benefit costs are the time value of money (the period of time available to earn investment income and the operation of compound interest) and rates of health care use, disability, and death. Those forces apply universally, in the United States and elsewhere, and they have not changed in recent years. However, the marketplace and the prevalence of various types of benefit programs have changed, and those changes have generally resulted in less cost variation by age and more frequent employer selection of benefit packages that exhibit less variation by age.     

The growth in Social Security benefits among the retirement-age population from increases in the cap on covered earnings

Analysts have proposed raising the maximum level of earnings subject to the Social Security payroll tax (the "tax max") to improve long-term Social Security Trust Fund solvency. This article investigates how raising the tax max leads to the "leakage" of portions of the additional revenue into higher benefit payments. Using Health and Retirement Study data matched to Social Security earnings records, we compare historical payroll tax payments and benefit amounts for Early Boomers (born 1948-1953) with tax and benefit simulations had they been subject to the tax max (adjusted for wage growth) faced by cohorts 12 and 24 years older. We find that 43.2 percent of the additional payroll tax revenue attributable to tax max increases affecting Early Boomers relative to taxes paid by the cohort 12 years older leaked into higher benefits. For Early Boomers relative to those 24 years older, we find 53.5 percent leakage.     

Postwar changes in the income position of the aged

Since the war the relative number of aged persons with income from employment has declined, while the proportion with income from social insurance benefits has increased. Despite the fact that social insurance benefits yield a lower average income than do earnings, the averaged aged person's income in 1952 was higher in both current dollars and dollars of stable purchasing power than it was in 1945. The improvement is the result of several factors, including larger earnings by aged workers, increased benefits paid retired workers and their aged survivors under social insurance and related programs higher old-age assistance payments and the rise in the relative number of persons with money income. The growth in the average aged person's income, however, has been at a rate lower than that of the average income of the population as a whole. As a result the average person has had a smaller share in total consumer income in each of the years since 1945 that he had in that year.     

Public social welfare expenditures, fiscal years 1965-87

The years from 1965 to 1976 were a period of great expansion in social welfare expenditures under public law. The entry of the Federal Government into the fields of health care and education was responsible for much of the growth in the first part of this period; high inflation produced increased spending in the later years. From 1977 to 1987, the rate of growth in social welfare spending slowed considerably. In fact, since 1983 the dominant characteristic of such expenditures has been their stability. Although the amount of money spent was higher in each year, little change occurred in the relative size or the apportionment of the funds. The 1987 expenditures continued this pattern. The total amount spent, $834.4 billion, represented an increase of 6.6 percent over the previous year. This amount equaled 18.8 percent of the gross national product. In constant dollar terms, the increase from 1986 to 1987 was 1.7 percent. The Federal Government provided 60-62 percent of all social welfare funding from 1980 to 1986. In 1987, this share fell slightly--to 59.9 percent. The programs for social insurance, public aid, veterans, and housing were primarily Federally funded, while education was largely a State and local responsibility. Governments at all levels spent 53.4 percent of their funds for social insurance purposes in 1987, slightly more than in 1986. However, the experience at different levels of government varied considerably. Federal spending increased 2 percent as a percent of all Federal expenditures, while State and local spending decreased about 1 percent.     

Workers' compensation: a background for Social Security professionals

This article provides a brief history and background of workers' compensation programs for occupationally injured and ill workers in the United States. It presents the basic principle involved in workers' compensation and briefly discusses the disability benefits to which workers are generally entitled. It also discusses why there are settlements in this disability program and the availability of information about the amounts paid in workers' compensation cases for obtaining an offset for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits paid to the worker. Finally, the article explains the rationale behind the public policy on coordination of Disability Insurance and workers' compensation in the new paradigm of disability and return to work.     

Economic security, 1935-85

The economic well-being of both working and retired persons has improved significantly since the Social Security Act was passed in 1935. More people are employed now than at any time since then, despite declining employment among the aged and more years of school attendance among the young. The ratio of non-workers to workers--a broad measure of dependency--is lower now than at any time since the 1930's. Social security has grown and matured to become a strong foundation of retirement income, and other work-related employee benefits have grown in tandem with social security. Employer contributions for social insurance and related employee benefits have grown from being about a 1-percent supplement to aggregate wages and salaries in 1929 to nearly 20 percent today. Social security and Medicare account for just over a fourth of employer contributions, while other public and private retirement systems represent just over another fourth. The balance of benefits for active workers includes group health and life insurance, unemployment insurance, workers' compensation, temporary disability insurance, and related benefits. Pay for holidays, vacations, and sick leave is estimated to have increased from less than 1 percent of aggregate pay in 1929 to about 10 percent today. The improved economic status of the aged has been documented by a series of surveys beginning in 1941-42 and carried out from time to time until 1972 and biennially since 1976. The earlier surveys were supplemented with estimates from record data and tables from the Bureau of the Census. The income of the aged as a whole has grown by about 75 percent over the past 2 decades after taking inflation into account. The income of the aged as a whole grew faster than that of the nonaged in the 1970's and early 1980's when real social security benefits increased faster than inflation and wages lagged behind it. New beneficiaries in 1982 were in better health and were more likely to retire because they wanted to than was true of their counterparts in the early 1940's. Not only have benefits continued to be the main component of income of the aged as total incomes have grown, but also benefits have become much larger in relation to average earnings than used to be the case. Retired workers are much more likely now than in the early 1940's to have other pensions or income from assets to supplement benefits.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Recent trends in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program

Earlier analysis documented the rapid growth of the Disability Insurance (DI) program from 1966 to 1975; this article discusses trends since 1975. Over the decade of the 1970's, the population insured for disability increased by 34 percent, and women as a proportion of the insured population rose from 32.4 percent in 1970 to 39.1 percent in 1980, reflecting the increase in female labor-force participation. Of disabled workers receiving benefits, the proportion that were women rose from 28.4 percent in 1970 to 32.4 percent in 1979. Although inflation caused total benefit costs to rise over the entire period, the number of DI beneficiaries began to decline in 1978. Disabled-worker awards reached a peak in 1975 and fell subsequently so that the 1969 and 1981 figures are approximately equal. Relative to 1970, the fraction of awards going to women increased, the share for persons aged 50-54 rose, and the proportion received by those aged 60-64 declined. Decreased in total awards, and hence recipients, stemmed primarily from higher rates of denial at both the initial application and the reconsideration stages. Higher denials were countered by substantial rises in the number of hearings and reversals by administrative law judges (ALJ's). in 1980, only 65 percent of all awards came from initial applications, while over a fourth resulted from ALJ reversals. In future years, recent legislative changes may be expected to curtail program expansion further.     

SSI: trends and changes, 1974-80

By the end of 1980, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program was making monthly cash assistance payments, averaging $170, to almost 4.2 million aged, blind, and disabled persons. When SSI payments began in January 1974, the number of recipients was 3.2 million and the average payment was $117. Since 1975, both SSI payments and Social Security benefits have been automatically adjusted each year to correspond with increases in the Consumer Price Index. A number of other trends in addition to growth can be discerned in the size of the population served, as well as in their categorical, geographic, and age distributions. This article discusses some of these trends and changes, using program data for the end of each calendar year through 1980. It also presents a brief summary of the program at the end of that period.     

Estimating mortgage prepayments and defaults in older federally assisted rental housing and the possible costs of preventing them

Abstract

An issue now facing the federal government is whether and, if so, how to intervene to prevent mortgage prepayments and defaults on federally assisted low‐income rental units. This paper presents the preliminary estimates of the potential scope of the problem in terms of the possible incidence and timing of these actions, and the costs of preventing them. The estimates are based on modified versions of the model developed for the National Low Income Housing Preservation Commission's study, Preventing the Disappearance of Low Income Housing.

An intermediate version of the modified model predicts 45 percent fewer defaults, 154,000 versus 280,000 units, and 45 percent lower total costs for preventing defaults, $4.6 billion versus $8.4 billion. On the other hand, 16 percent more prepayments are predicted, 283,000 versus 243,000 units. Estimated total costs for preventing prepayments are 17 percent lower, however — $8.5 billion versus $10.3 billion.     

The widow(er)'s limit provision of Social Security

Widow benefits have been a part of the Social Security program since the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act (widower benefits were added later). For many years, the Social Security law called for paying a widow(er) a fraction of the deceased worker's primary insurance amount (PIA). However, the worker--while alive--may have received the full PIA as his or her retirement benefit. Over time, arguments were made that a widow(er) should be treated as generously as his or her spouse was. The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act allowed for a widow(er) to receive a full PIA, subject to actuarial reductions if the widow(er) benefit was claimed before the normal retirement age (NRA) and subject to a new provision of the law commonly referred to as the widow(er)'s limit. Generally, the widow(er)'s limit specifies that if a worker received reduced retirement benefits (because the worker claimed benefits before the NRA), then the worker's widow(er) cannot receive a monthly benefit equal to the full PIA. Rather, the widow(er)'s benefit is generally limited to the amount the worker would receive if he or she was still alive. The limit provision appears to be motivated by the overall intent of the 1972 Congress to pay a benefit to a widow(er) that was comparable with what the worker received. A number of changes to the limit provision have been discussed. This article looks at the following options: Abolishing the limit, Raising the limit by requiring that it never be set below the average PIA among all retired-worker beneficiaries. Adjusting the limit for some widow(er)s--that is, only persons who are widowed before the NRA (the ARLA option), Making a simpler adjustment to the limit by abolishing it for persons who are widowed before age 62 (the SARLA option), and A proposal by Robert J. Myers that would make modest adjustments to the limit for cases in which the worker died before the NRA. The most fundamental change--abolishing the limit--would increase benefits for about 2.8 million widow(er)s and would cost about $3.1 billion a year. Most of the additional government expenditures would not go to the poor and the near poor. Another change would be more successful in aiding low-income widow(er)s: requiring that the limit amount never be set below the average PIA among all retired-worker beneficiaries. About 58 percent of the government expenditures from that option would be received by the poor and the near poor. Overall, 1.2 million widow(er)s would be helped, and the cost would be about $816 million a year. Although the limit provision is consistent with the overall intent of the 1972 Congress, it can have effects that may have been unintended and that some policymakers might consider unusual. Persons who delay receipt of Social Security benefits usually receive higher monthly benefit amounts, but a widow(er) who faces a limit cannot increase his or her monthly benefit through delayed receipt of benefits. Thus, many persons who are widowed before the NRA face strong incentives to claim benefits early. That is somewhat unusual because the actuarial adjustments under Social Security are approximately fair, so there are no cost savings to the Social Security program from "forcing" a widow(er) to claim early benefits as opposed to allowing him or her to delay receipt of benefits in exchange for a higher monthly amount. And many widow(er)s would be better off if they could use the Social Security program to, in effect, save (that is, delay receipt of benefits in exchange for a higher amount later). This article analyzes two other options that would provide widow(er)s with additional filing options under Social Security. The ARLA option would ultimately help about 229,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be small (about $69 million a year). The SARLA option would help about 117,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be about $41 million a year. Robert J. Myers, a former Chief Actuary of Social Security, has offered a proposal that would provide relief from the widow(er)'s limit in cases in which the worker dies shortly after retirement. That proposal would help about 115,000 widow(er)s, and the cost would be low (about $57 million a year).