Who’s afraid of penal populism? Technocracy and ‘the people’ in the sociology of punishment

Contemporary sociologists of punishment have criticized the rising incidence of incarceration and punitiveness across the Western world in recent decades. The concepts of populist punitiveness and penal populism have played a central role in their critiques of the burgeoning penal state. These concepts are frequently sustained by a doctrine of penal elitism, which delegates a limited right to politicians and ‘the people’ to shape institutions of punishment, favoring in their place the dominance of bureaucratic and professional elites. I argue that the technocratic inclinations of penal elitism are misguided on empirical, theoretical, and normative grounds. A commitment to democratic politics should make us wary of sidelining the public and their elected representatives in the politics of punishment. A brief discussion of Norway’s legal proceedings against Nazi collaborators in the mid-1940s and the introduction sentencing guidelines commissions in Minnesota in the 1980s shows – pace penal elitism – that professional elites may variously raise the banner of rehabilitationism or retributivism. While penal elitism may yield a few victorious battles against punitiveness, it will not win the war.     

Marr v Collie: The Ballooning of the Common Intention Constructive Trust

The decision in Marr v Collie represents a significant expansion of the common intention constructive trust doctrine. Unsupported by authority, it relaxes the requirement that the property be acquired for a ‘domestic’ purpose, and widens the doctrine to encompass all property, whether real or personal. The decision's abrogation of the ‘purpose’ restriction redraws the line between the common intention constructive trust doctrine and the presumed resulting trust doctrine and expands the former to the greatest possible extent. This exacerbates a doctrine already apt to adversely affect both individual litigants and the justice system as a whole, and which creates incongruous theoretical divisions within the law of intentionally created trusts. As the doctrine is reliant on the proposition, unsupported by authority or legislation, that conveyance of a title to land into joint names necessarily gives rise to a trust, it is hoped that a future apex court will reconsider the doctrine's proper scope.     

Adventures in the Copyright Zone: The Puzzling Absence of Independent First Amendment Defenses in Contemporary Copyright Disputes

Copyright law, for most of its history, has been exempt from the requirements of the First Amendment free speech and press clauses. As copyright law has expanded in scope and duration, scholars have begun to raise questions about its First Amendment immunity. This essay examines the fundamental conflict between copyright doctrine and the First Amendment. Although courts have been quick to dismiss the application of free speech standards to copyright disputes, the proper relationship between these two areas of the law is less than clear. The essay explores the current understanding of the intersection of free speech and copyright, largely derived from the work of Professor Melville Nimmer. It analyzes the difficulties with two specific doctrines by which the Supreme Court of the United States has justified copyright's free speech immunity – the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine – then concludes by offering a new approach to applying the First Amendment to copyright law in a more robust manner.     

The Georgia State Litigation: Literal Copying in Education

This case note examines the long‐standing litigation against Georgia State University in relation to the posting, by faculty and library staff, of unauthorised copies of book extracts on the University's electronic reserves and virtual learning environment. The central question in this litigation has been whether these acts of copying fall within the fair use doctrine in US copyright law. In answering this, a key question for the US courts – and one relevant to other jurisdictions with free exceptions for education, such as the UK – has been whether existing and potential licensing activity is relevant to the question of whether an exception applies. This case note discusses how market effect has been analysed in Georgia State, including the recent rejection by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit of a strongly empirical approach to market harm.     

(Non‐)Enforcement of Directors’ Duties in Corporate Groups: Goh Chan Peng v Beyonics Technology Ltd

Corporate groups, a ubiquitous feature of modern business, pose formidable challenges for common law courts relying on traditional corporate law doctrine. Arising out of a corporate group's recent bid to recover millions of dollars in lost profits from a former director and CEO who had diverted a core business, Goh Chan Peng v Beyonics Technology Ltd raised thorny issues of separate legal entity doctrine, single economic unit theory, and reflective loss shared by common law legal systems. Despite finding that the defendant had breached his duties to the ultimate holding company, the Singapore Court of Appeal absolved the faithless director from most of his liabilities, relying on limited domestic precedent to the exclusion of a rich body of Commonwealth jurisprudence – including the House of Lords’ landmark Johnson v Gore Wood decision. This note explores the paths not taken by the court, and highlights the pitfalls of a narrow, autochthonous approach to problems of common law doctrine.     

Rectifying the Course of Rectification

In Daventry District Council v Daventry & District Housing Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1153, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that a contract should be rectified because of a common mistake. This note discusses that decision and recent developments in the law of rectification. It is argued that the approach of the majority in Daventry is unsatisfactory, and that an emphasis upon ascertaining whether the parties have objectively made a common mistake may be inappropriate: rectification should only be granted in order to reflect the parties’ subjective intentions. Such an approach might help to distinguish common mistake rectification from unilateral mistake rectification.     

Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads: A Promising Alliance or a Dangerous Liaison?

The reinforcement of the protection of fundamental rights at the European level and the emergence of the status of Union citizenship are two closely connected phenomena. European citizenship has been and continues to be one of the central arguments in favour of the extension of the scope of EU fundamental rights. This argument arises out of a sentiment that vindicates equality at the core of the citizenship of the Union as a fundamental status. Against this background, this paper examines the different possibilities of interconnection between the traditional doctrine of EU fundamental rights and the jurisprudential construction of the citizenship of the Union. Particularly, it will be discussed whether fundamental rights should be placed at the core of the formula that protects the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance’ of the rights conferred by EU citizenship, inaugurated by Ruiz Zambrano, already latent in Rottmann and substantially refined in an ever‐growing case‐law (McCarthy, Dereci, O. and S., Ymaraga and Alokpa). It will be argued that this formula carries the very valuable potential to reinforce citizenship of the Union as an independent source of rights able to overcome problems such as reverse discrimination. For these purposes, this formula could be considered to encompass not only the absolute deprivation of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights’, but also the existence of serious obstacles thereto.     

Holding Organized Crime Leaders Accountable for the Crimes of their Subordinates

Criminal law doctrine fails to provide an adequate solution for imputing responsibility to organized crime leaders for the offenses committed by their subordinates. This undesirable state of affairs is made possible because criminal organizations adopt complex organizational structures that leave their superiors beyond the reach of the law. These structures are characterized by features such as the isolation of the leadership from junior ranks, decentralized management, and mechanisms encouraging initiative from below. They are found in criminal organizations such as the American Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and even outlaw motorcycle gangs. The paper offers a doctrine that may transcend this shortcoming. Referred to as “leaders’ liability,” this doctrine will be assessed and appraised through a comparison with competing theories such as accomplice liability, Organisationsherrschaft, and conspiracy.     

“Hand-to-mouth” citizenship: decision time for the UK Supreme Court on the substance of Zambrano rights,EU citizenship and equal treatment

UK benefit rules strip Zambrano residence rights, for UK national children and their third country national primary carers, of equal treatment entitlement. These rules are challenged in a case pending before the UK Supreme Court. This piece argues that Zambrano creates an EU-citizenship-based right to reside which necessarily entails equal treatment. UK national children in Zambrano families fall within the scope of EU law so are not prevented by the wholly internal rule from claiming equal treatment with EU national children in Teixeira families. And they are protected by equal treatment as a general principle of EU law, which requires equal treatment with other UK national children. The justifications for automatic unequal treatment put forward before, and accepted with alacrity by, the Court of Appeal, are poorly reasoned and ill-matched with the rules in question – most notably because Zambrano families may have strong connections with the UK. A CJEU reference is likely; a Zambrano right is the right to reside in the Union – it is the right to have EU rights. The substance of EU citizenship is at stake.     

A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape

Although the Supreme Court of the United States has deployed the content-neutrality doctrine at least twenty-three times in the last decade, two recent cases — McCullen v. Coakley and Reed v. Town of Gilbert — demonstrate that disagreement among the justices over the meaning of the doctrine is endangering its utility for First Amendment jurisprudence. This article describes the manifestations of this disagreement and suggests that without further clarification about the doctrine's nature, purpose and application, the venerable First Amendment canon may soon either lose practical tenability or disintegrate into constitutional oblivion. Such an outcome, the article suggests, is both ill advised and avoidable. By taking several practical steps, the Supreme Court can go a long way toward preserving the doctrine's usefulness for upholding legitimate government interests and protecting the freedom of expression.     

Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

Restrictive convenants in the sale of a business: An economic perspective

It is no doubt true that the scope of a doctrine [restraint of trade] which is founded on public policy necessarily alters as economic conditions alter. Public policy is not a constant (Lord Macmillan in Vancouver Malt & Sake Brewing Co. v. Vancouver Breweries Ltd. [1934] A.C. 181 (P.C.) at 189).     

Joint Criminal Enterprise

The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise is in disarray. Despite repeated judicial scrutiny at the highest level, the doctrine's scope, proper doctrinal basis and function in relation to other modes of complicity remain uncertain. This article examines the doctrine's elements and underlying principles. It argues that while joint criminal enterprise is largely used to make individuals liable for offences committed by their associates in excess of the common criminal purpose, its proper function is to police the limits of associate liability and thus to exculpate rather than inculpate. The doctrine governs not only instances of accessorial liability; it also applies where the parties involved are joint principal offenders. As this puts into question the prevalent view that joint criminal enterprise is a form of secondary participation that results in accessorial liability, the article concludes that it is best seen as a doctrine sui generis.     

Thinking like a lawyer/acting like a professional: communities of practice as a means of challenging orthodox legal education

Increasingly, there is pressure upon law schools, in Australia and elsewhere, to impress upon students the significance of the ethical and professional obligations of legal practice. The recent Carnegie Report explicitly looked to law schools “to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like professionals”. Many law students, however, have little appreciation of legal ethics and any concept they may have of professionalism tends to be envisaged as applying only after graduation. In this paper, we explore the idea of a “community of practice”. Lave and Wenger, who coined the phrase, contend that “learning is conceived as a trajectory in which learners move from legitimate peripheral participant to core participant of the community of practice”. We will argue that law students should appreciate that they are entering the legal profession's community of practice and that all aspects of their conduct relevant to professionalism – not only academic integrity, but matters such as time management, teamwork, relationships with peers and staff – relate to this transition into a legal professional community. Such an approach may not only serve to impress upon students the significance of “professionalism” and ethics, but inculcate in them a sense of belonging to a professional community.     

On Incompetent Monks and Able Urbane Nuns in a Buddhist Monastic Code

Most modern scholars seem to assume that Buddhist monks in early India had a good knowledge of Buddhist doctrine and at least of basic Buddhist texts. But the compilers of the vinayas or monastic codes seem not to have shared this assumption. The examples presented here are drawn primarily from one vinaya, and show that the compilers put in place a whole series of rules to deal with situations in which monks were startlingly ignorant of both doctrine and text. One of these examples is particularly interesting for what it suggests about the linguistic sophistication of nuns, and another because it presents a case in which a nun is required to fill an important liturgical role in public and in the presence of monks.     

Constitutionalising the Market,Marketising the Constitution,and to Tell the Difference: On the Horizontal Application of the Free Movement Provisions in EU Law

Ever since the Court's judgment in Walrave, there has been a concerted effort in caselaw and doctrine to limit the horizontal direct effect of free movement provisions to exceptional circumstances. This article suggests that this effort has always been incoherent, and is simply untenable after Viking and Laval. The implications are far reaching, especially in the sphere of the free movement of capital and corporate governance where the Court is well on its way of imposing a model of shareholder primacy on European company law. Full direct horizontal effect will also have important repercussions for private law and its ability to resolve conflicts between economic freedoms and fundamental rights. Given the nature of the free movement provisions, their horizontal effect will sometimes lead to a constitutionalised market and sometimes to a marketised constitution, without there being any principled way of distinguishing between the two. In that light, horizontal direct effect is very unlikely to enhance the effectiveness of internal market law—whichever model of the social market economy it is thought to embody—and is best abandoned.     

Control over Personal Data in a Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez

In the Google Spain judgment, the Grand Chamber of the EU Court of Justice determined the circumstances in which a search engine is obliged to remove links to data pertaining to an individual from the results displayed. The Court also considered the material and territorial scope of the EU data protection rules. This note argues that the Court's findings, which have been heavily criticised, are normatively coherent. The broad scope of application of data protection rules and the right of individuals to have their data deleted when certain conditions are fulfilled both play a part in granting individuals effective control over their personal data – an objective of EU data protection law.     

Immediate Effect of Community Law in the New Member States: Is there a Place for a Consistent Doctrine?

Abstract: Extension of the acquis to the new Member States raises a number of questions relating to the temporal reach of Community rules. This paper examines a general doctrine underlying the solutions. It presents a classic intertemporal doctrine, which has influenced early jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Then, it comments upon the cases brought before the Court in the context of the 1995 enlargement, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and also the Europe Agreements. These cases evidence substantial differences in the attitudes taken by the national courts, the Advocates General and the Court. One reason for divergence is that the line of reasoning adopted by the Court carries several interpretative difficulties characteristic of the classic doctrine. Secondly, controversies arise in the instances where the Court takes a proactive attitude, which is difficult to reconcile with the traditional scheme. It is argued that greater attention to the structure underlying the reasoning would help to strengthen justification of the Court's solutions and enhance their predictability. This is the more important, as the forthcoming accessions are likely to bring new disputes relating to the effects of Community law in time.     

The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA

In its 2006 National Security Strategy, the USA reaffirms thecontroversial doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as crucialin the "war on terror" proclaimed after the attacks of 9/11.But it does not provide a detailed examination of pre-emption.The questions left open in the 2002 US National Security Strategyas to what will trigger pre-emptive action, when action againstnon-State actors will be permissible and what degree of forcewill be proportionate in pre-emptive action are still unresolved.The promise that "The reasons for our actions will be clear,the force measured and the cause just" does not offer much inthe way of specific guidance. It is very striking that in thiscontext, the US strategy makes no reference to internationallaw or to the role of the UN Security Council. The other mainfocus of the strategy is on the "promotion of democracy", butit does not go so far as to assert any legal right to use forcefor this purpose, and it makes only passing reference to humanitarianintervention. The EU 2003 Security Strategy provides a markedcontrast in that it does not adopt the doctrine of pre-emptiveself-defence, does not expressly identify "rogue States" anddoes profess respect for international law and for the roleof the UN. Other States have not generally shown themselveswilling to accept a Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence.They agree that there are new threats facing the world frominternational terrorists and the danger of proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, but the 2005 World Summit showedclearly that there is no general acceptance of pre-emptive action.Moreover, the International Court of Justice still follows acautious approach to self-defence. The 2006 National SecurityStrategy largely reaffirms the doctrines of the earlier 2002Strategy, but whereas the focus in the 2002 Strategy was onthe threat posed by Iraq and North Korea; attention has nowshifted to Iran and Syria, accused of being State sponsors ofterror by Hizbollah and Al-Qaida. The article ends with a discussionof the recent conflict in Lebanon: this raised the crucial questionwhether the war on terror gave Israel a wide right to use force,even a pre-emptive right. The conflict highlights dramaticallythe practical significance of the divisions on the scope ofthe law of self-defence with regard to action against non-Stateactors, pre-emption and proportionality.     

The Public Trust as an Evolutionary Doctrine: How the Trust can be Used to Allege an Injury Under Standing

The public trust doctrine provides protection of public access to resources, such as navigable waterways, protected under the public trust. The doctrine has evolved over time to protect natural resources such as tidelands, submerged waterbeds, wildlife, and climate change. Juliana v. United States is a groundbreaking trust case that moves the application of the trust to the management of climate-change regimes. Although the doctrine has been criticized as a façade, forestalling real recourse for change, it can be used to show standing for current and future generations. Accordingly, Juliana outlines how this doctrine is not just evolutionary it is also revolutionary.