ERRATA

The Editors regret that the following mistakes occurred in thetext of the article ‘The Great West African Drought, 1972–74’,by Jonathan Derrick, which appeared in the October 1977 numberof the journal. The main reason for these mistakes was a breakdownin communications between the editors and the author, whilethe article was being processed for publication. P. 540—line 36: The word ‘population’ shouldbe inserted after ‘West-Indian style’. P. 543—line 33: ‘1969–70’ should read‘1970–71’. P. 544—line 34: ‘Ivory Coast’ should read‘Upper Volta’. P. 546, Table: The Maiduguri figures are incorrect and shouldbe ignored (The author apologizes to the source of the statisticsfor this misquotation). P. 548—line 12: ‘eruption’ should read ‘irruption’. P. 564—note 69 refers to the sentence ‘In fact ...for tax’, not to the preceding sentence. P. 569—note 87: ‘Protection’ should be ‘Production’. P. 571—note 94 should be deleted. P. 582—line 34: ‘affected’ should be ‘effective’.      

Cote d'Ivoire: Patriotism, ethnonationalism and other African modes of self-writing

One of the key elements in the political-military struggle thathas wracked Côte d’Ivoire since 2002 has been the‘young patriots’ — youthful supporters ofPresident Laurent Gbagbo who claim to be struggling for thecountry’s ‘second independence’ from the formercolonial power, France. Many of them conceive of their strugglenot just as a political one but as a search for social affirmation.This article examines the politics of Ivorian ‘patriotic’youth in the light of Achille Mbembe’s influential ideason African modes of self-representation.     

THE CROSSING OF THE GYAMAN TO THE CROSS OF LORRAINE: WARTIME POLITICS IN WEST ARICA, 1941-1942

In January 1942 virtually the entire leadership of the Gyamankingdom of the Abron crossed the border into Ghana (then theGold Coast), seeking sanctuary from the Vichy controlled administrationof the Côte d'Ivoire. Leaving the cercle of Bonduku, theGyamanhene, joined by several thousand followers who riskedtheir lives and property, declared that ‘they had lefta dead flag’ and had come to ‘continue war untilvictory and the liberation of France, our dear mother country’.The migration occurred at a time when the Gold Coast was completelyencircled by hostile territory. This passage of the Gyaman courtinto Asante's North West Province is a little-known but extraordinarychapter in wartime politics in West Africa. This paper arguesthat the exodus involved a combination of ‘traditional’and ‘modern’ interests, as the Gyaman leaders skilfullymanipulated the colonial system and the wartime situation totheir own advantage. It reviews not only the sequence of events,but probes the role played by British intelligence organizationsin facilitating, if not encouraging, the migration.     

The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarrelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana's Fourth Republic

Within the literature on Ghanaian partisanship, a healthy debatehas arisen between those viewing Ghana’s two dominantparties as cleaved along socioeconomic lines and those suggestingthat this cleavage runs along ethnic lines. Using election results,constituency maps, census data, and a survey of voters’‘cognitive shortcuts’, this article weighs in withthe debate. The findings suggest that ethnicity matters in Ghanaianelections far more than socioeconomic variables. The findingsdo not, however, lead easily towards the gloomy predictionsthat often accompany ethnic politics. The relationship betweenethnicity and partisanship in Ghana is far more complex. Datapresented here suggest that Asante and Ewe voters are likelyto vote for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and National DemocraticCongress (NDC), respectively, regardless of the candidates theyselect. Voters of other ethnic backgrounds, who make up thevast majority of Ghanaian voters, view the dominant partiesas representative of Asante and Ewe interests but do not themselvesvote as a block and base their evaluations of the ‘Asante’and ‘Ewe’ parties ultimately on things other thanethnicity. It is this latter group of voters that makes Ghanaianelections unpredictable and discourages politicians from turningnational votes into a zero-sum ethnic censes.     

Under the gaze of the 'big nations': Refugees, rumours and the international community in Tanzania

In most academic literature refugees are portrayed either asthose who lack what national citizens have or as a threat tothe national order of things. This article explores the effectsof being excluded in such a way, and argues that Burundian refugeesin a camp in northwest Tanzania find themselves in an ambiguousposition, being excluded from the national order of things —secluded in the Tanzanian bush — while simultaneouslybeing subject to state-of-the-art humanitarian interventions— apparently bringing them closer to the internationalcommunity. The article explores the ways in which refugees in the camprelate to the international community. Ambiguous perceptionsof the international community are expressed in rumours andconspiracy theories. These conspiracy theories create a kindof ontological surety by presenting the Hutu refugees as thevictims of a grand Tutsi plot supported by ‘the big nations’.Finally, the article argues that refugees — being excludedfrom the nation-state and being subject to the government ofinternational NGOs — seek recognition from the internationalcommunity rather than any nation-state. This does not, however,destabilize the hegemony of the nation-state, as refugees perceivetheir own position as temporary and the international communityas the guarantor of a more just international order in the longrun.     

CAMEROON: A COUNTRY UNITED BY ETHNIC AMBITION AND DIFFERENCE

This paper attempts an answer to the question: What keeps Cameroontogether despite widespread instability in Africa, despite theturbulence of the subregional environment in which it findsitself, and despite its own internal contradictions? The mainargument is that the politics of regional and ethnic balance,the chronic lack of vision as a country, the lack of real commitmentto democracy, the propensity to vacillate on most issues ofcollective interest, together with an infinite ability to developsurvival strategies, have acted to counter all meaningful attemptsto pursue common interests and aspirations. All that appearsto unite Camerooni ans is a common ethnic or regional ambitionto preserve their differences under the delusion of maximizingopportunities. However, as the ‘national cake’ diminisheswith the worsening economic crisis, corruption, mass miseryand ethnicity, making it more illusive for the bulk of smallpeople to claim the same benefits from their connections withthe big—or the not so big—men and women of power,one can legitimately wonder just how much longer the systemcan continue to deflate the disaffected.     

BETWIXT AND BETWEEN: 'TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY' AND DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION IN POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE

The end of civil war in Mozambique has been accompanied by democratizationof political processes, as exemplified by the 1994 multi-partypresidential and parliamentary elections. Under the rubric ofdemocratization, the issue of state decentralization has alsobeen raised. Current political debates focus on what role ‘traditionalauthority’ might play in local governance. Advocates arguethat ‘traditional authority’ constitutes a genuinelyAfrican form of local governance, while detractors suggest thatthese institutions were irrevocably corrupted by their involvementwith the colonial administration. This article challenges notonly the black-and-white framework in which the present-day‘legitimacy’ of ‘traditional authority’has been debated, but also questions the value of the term ‘traditionalauthority’ itself. The article explores the diverse historiesof kin-based political institutions in Mozambique, arguing thatthe meaning and function of ‘traditional authority’has been transformed many times over with changes in the largerpolitical contexts in which local institutions have existed.As a result of historical events, the issue of ‘traditionalauthority’ is, today, intimately bound up with the dividebetween the ruling FRELIMO party and the opposition, RENAMO.Only by approaching the issue of ‘traditional authority’through an understanding of its variegated and contentious historywill policy-makers and Mozambican residents alike be able totranscend existing political divides on issues of local governance.     

'Liberation' or capture: Youth in between 'hakuma', and 'home' during civil war and its aftermath in Southern Sudan

Generational tension and youth crisis have been prominent themesin recent analyses of civil conflict in Africa. Field researchin Southern Sudan in 2004–2006 suggests that the analysisdoes not fit the Sudanese war. This article examines a structuralopposition between the sphere of military/government (the ‘hakuma’)and the sphere of ‘home’. It argues that to be a‘youth’ in Southern Sudan means to inhabit the tensionsof the space between these spheres. While attempting to resistcapture by either sphere, youth have used their recruitmentby the military to invest in their home or family sphere. Theiraspiration to ‘responsibility’ illustrates not generationalrebellion, but the moral continuity in local society, also evidentin discussions of marriage.     

Sharia and control over territory: conflicts between 'settlers' and 'indigenes' in Nigeria

Introducing Islamic laws is a means of setting up claims overterritory in which the will of Muslims reigns supreme. Thishas led to violent conflicts, especially in parts of the MiddleBelt of Nigeria, where Muslim ‘settlers’ from thenorth, most of them Hausa and Fulani, have clashed with indigenousethnic groups which are largely Christian and ‘traditionalist’.The call for Sharia is popular among the migrants, as it providesthem with a divine mission: they have to assume supremacy overthe local non-Muslim population in order to shape public institutionsaccording to what they see as the will of God. The ‘indigenes’,however, have little interest in a religious confrontation.As ‘sons of the soil’, they want to defend theirancestral land against ‘foreign tribes’; they thereforeemphasize ethnic, not religious, antagonisms.     

The geography of regime survival: Abacha's Nigeria

This article examines the state-creation process in Nigeriain the context of military regime survival in the 1990s. Nigeriaentered a period of protracted political crisis following theannulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election and theentrenchment of the Abacha military government. The southwest,or Yorubaland,was the hotbed of opposition to continued militaryrule. This research shows how the Abacha government utilizedthe neo-colonial strategy of ‘divide and survive’to fragment opposition in Yorubaland, and how the governmentdivided regional opposition both socially and spatially. A localcoalition of Ekiti elites chose statehood over solidarity withtheir fellow Yorubas opposing Abacha, particularly those alignedwith Afenifere and the Oduduwa People’s Congress. Newstate movements — like that for Ekiti State — promotedmore local identities at the expense of pan-Yoruba solidarityand unified opposition to the regime. The article is based onsix months of fieldwork in Nigeria in 2002, including a casestudy of the movement for the creation of Ekiti State. Overall,it seeks to contribute to our understanding of the geographyof regime survival.     

Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).     

Informal moves, informal markets: International migrants and traders from Mzimba District, Malawi

International migration from Malawi has changed profoundly sincecentrally organized mine migration to South Africa ended inthe 1980s. Contemporary movements are more diverse and lesstied to labour, as informal trade has developed alongside. Thisarticle replaces a common ‘productivist’ perspectiveon migration with a decentralized approach, using ethnographicobservation and anthropological case studies to understand interrelatedflows of people and goods. It shows how in an emergent informalmarket for South African goods in Mzimba, Malawi, price informationdoes not structure trade practices. Historical continuitiesin the socio-cultural organization of illegal migration, ratherthan liberalized market forces, shape this economic configuration,including price formation. The research for this article was financed by the NetherlandsFoundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO).Data were collected in Mzimba district, Lilongwe, Blantyre (Malawi),and Johannesburg (South Africa) in the period from April 2004to March 2005. ^1. Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and dependence in BlackAfrica: historical origin’, Journal of Peace Research9, 2 (1972), pp. 106, 115. ^2. David A. McDonald, Lephophotho Mashike, and Celia Golden, ‘Thelives and times of African migrants and immigrants in post-apartheidSouth Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.), On Borders:Perspectives on international migration in southern Africa (St.Martin’s Press, New York, 2000), pp. 168–95. ^3. In the 1990s, migration to South Africa has expanded enormously,and alongside it, regional trade. See Jonathan Crush and DavidA. McDonald, ‘Transnationalism, African immigration, andnew migrant spaces in South Africa: an introduction’,Canadian Journal of African Studies 34, 1 (2000), p. 2. Theincrease in regional trade is difficult to quantify as muchof this trade is informal in nature and does not appear in officialfigures. ^4. See, among others, Jonathan Crush, Alan Jeeves, and David Yudelman,South Africa’s Labor Empire: A history of black migrancyto the gold mines (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1991). ^5. Dunbar Moodie, Going for Gold: Men, mines, and migration (Universityof California Press, Berkeley, 1994). ^6. Harold Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and cheap labour-power in SouthAfrica: from segregation to apartheid’, Economy and Society1, 4 (1972), p. 433. ^7. For an example of this phenomenon in another context, see JensA. Andersson, ‘Administrators’ knowledge and statecontrol in colonial Zimbabwe: the invention of the rural–urbandivide in Buhera district, 1912–80’, Journal ofAfrican History 43, 1 (2002), pp. 119–43. ^8. See the numerous interesting studies published by the SouthernAfrican Migration Project (URL: http://www.queensu.ca/samp). ^9. Hopes for a re-opening of TEBA remained alive, though, and werefed by election promises in Malawi’s first multipartyelections in 1994. See among others ‘More light on TEBA;not in UDF manifesto’, Malawi News, 5–11 November1994, p. 4. See also Wiseman C. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi governmentand South African labour recruiters, 1974–92’, Journalof Modern African Studies 34, 4 (1996) pp. 623–42; WisemanC. Chirwa, ‘ "No TEBA. . . forget TEBA": the plight ofMalawian ex-migrant workers to South Africa, 1988–1994’,International Migration Review 31, 3 (1997), pp. 628–54. ^10. Chirwa, ‘The Malawi government’, p. 627; JonathanCrush, ‘Migrations past: an historical overview of cross-bordermovement in southern Africa’, in David A. McDonald (ed.),On Borders, p. 15. Labour recruiting agencies competing forlabour in (colonial) Malawi were the Witwatersrand Native LabourAssociation (WNLA), and the (Southern) Rhodesian Native LabourBureau (RNLB). The agencies were later renamed as The EmploymentBureau of Africa (TEBA) and the Rhodesian Native Labour SupplyCommission, respectively. ^11. F.E. Sanderson, ‘The development of labour migration fromNyasaland, 1891–1914’, Journal of African History2, 2 (1961), pp. 259–71; G. Coleman, ‘Internationallabour migration from Malawi, 1875–1966’, Journalof Social Science (University of Malawi) 2 (1972), pp. 31–46;Robert B. Boeder, Malawians abroad: The history of labor emigrationfrom Malawi to its neighbors 1890 to the present (PhD thesis,Michigan State University, Ann Arbor, 1974). ^12. Robert E. Christiansen and Jonathan G. Kydd, ‘The returnof Malawian labour from South Africa and Zimbabwe’, Journalof Modern African Studies 21, 2 (1983), p. 311. ^13. Ibid, p. 324. ^14. J.K. van Donge, ‘Disordering the market: the liberalisationof burley tobacco in Malawi in the 1990s’, Journal ofSouthern African Studies 28, 1 (2002), p. 105. This is not tosay that tobacco production solely relies on migrant labour. ^15. In the period 1977–1998, average annual intercensal growthrates in rural areas were highest in tobacco-producing areassuch as Kasungu District (4.4 percent) in the Central Region,and Traditional Authority (TA) Mpherembe (5.3 percent) in MzimbaDistrict in the Northern Region. Lowest growth rates were concentratedin the poor and densely populated southern districts, such asChiradzulu (1.4), Mulanje (1.6), Phalombe (1.5), and Thyolo(1.7). See Figure 2. ^16. In western Mzimba, and possibly elsewhere in the Northern regionwhere average education levels are higher than in the rest ofMalawi, people look down upon labouring in the low-paid tobaccosector. For figures on education levels, see T. Benson, J. Kaphuka,S. Kanyanda, and R. Chinula, Malawi: An atlas of social statistics(National Statistical Office of Malawi/IFPRI, Zomba/Washington,2002), p. 51. ^17. Bridget O’Laughlin, ‘Missing men? The debate overrural poverty and woman-headed households in Southern Africa’,Journal of Peasant Studies 25, 2 (1998), p. 10. ^18. ‘91 Malawians deported’, The Daily Times, 9 December1994, p. 1. This is not to suggest that the South African governmentdid not deport Malawians before 1994. See Boeder, Malawiansabroad, p. 155, for an example from the 1930s. ^19. Information obtained by the author from the Malawian consulatein Johannesburg, South Africa, March 2005. ^20. Before 1994, transport in Malawi was highly problematic as government-controlledbus services were limited. With liberalization, matola (pick-upsand lorries) greatly improved rural transport, while minibusservices and foreign bus companies facilitated respectivelyrural–urban and international mobility. Exchanging foreigncurrency was equally problematic before liberalization; withouta passport and proof of recent travel, banks could refuse toexchange. ^21. Deanna Swaney, Mary Fitzpatrick, Paul Greenway, Andrew Stone,and Justin Vaisutis, Lonely Planet Southern Africa (Lonely Planetpublications, London, 2003), p. 222. ^22. Zimbabwe’s decreased popularity is also evidenced by thenumerous Zimbabwe-born youths of Malawian descent waiting forthe processing of a Malawian passport at the Department of Immigrationin Blantyre. ^23. The persistence of unequal sex distributions in the extremenorth of the country is a further indication of the popularityof Tanzania as a destination for, especially, male migrants(see Figure 2). ^24. Mzimba’s transport sector thus emerged before economicliberalization. In the 1980s, some South Africans started thebusiness by investing in vehicles and using Mzimba drivers.By the early 1990s, the South Africans had left the businessaltogether and Malawians took their place. ^25. R.R. Kuczynski, Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire,Vol. II: East-Africa (Oxford University Press, London, 1949),pp. 564–68; Leroy Vail and Landeg White, ‘Tribalismin the political history of Malawi’, in Leroy Vail (ed.),The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (James Currey,London, 1989), pp. 151–92; Leroy Vail, ‘The makingof the "Dead North": a study of the Ngoni rule in northern Malawi,c. 1855–1907’, in J. B. Peires (ed.) Before andafter Shaka: Papers in Nguni history (Institute of Social andEconomic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1978), pp.230–67. ^26. John McCracken, Politics and Christianity in Malawi, 1875–1940(CLAIM, Blantyre, 2000), p. 152. See also Sanderson, ‘Thedevelopment of labour migration’, p. 260. ^27. For instance, figures for the 1930s suggest that fewer Malawianswere working in mining related jobs (recruited through WNLA)than in other sectors of the South African economy, notablydomestic services and industry. See Boeder, Malawians abroad,p. 168. ^28. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004.For an earlier account of Malawian migrants’ travel problems,see E.P. Makambe, ‘The Nyasaland African labour "Ulendo"to Southern Rhodesia and the problem of the "highwaymen," 1903–1923’,African Affairs 79, 317 (1980), pp. 548–66. ^29. Interview with Charles Makamo, Mzimba district, 16 July 2004. ^30. Records of the Employment Service Division of the MGLR suggestthat entering into official labour contracts when already inSouth Africa was common in the early 1970s. The numerous ‘typical’Ngoni, Tumbuka, and Tonga names (such as Jere, Makamo, Kumwenda,Chirwa) appearing on these lists further suggest that, in particular,migrants from northern Malawi were familiar with this procedure.Malawi National Archives, file: 14 ESD/SU/34, Lists of Malawiansentering into contracts of employment, 1969–1975. ^31. The aim of anthropological case studies — also referredto as the ‘case-study method’ — is not topresent representative cases, but to illuminate wider socialpatterns and processes through the study of the particular.Here, the cases are used to illustrate the social processesat work in new social phenomena. See Max Gluckman, ‘Ethnographicdata in British social anthropology’, The SociologicalReview 9 (1961), pp. 5–17. ^32. Malawians advertise their services in daily newspapers or neighbourhoodweeklies, under categories such as ‘domestic workers’or ‘gardeners’. Often they explicitly state theirMalawian origin. ^33. This development seems to be confirmed by population figures(see Figure 2): TA M’Mbelwa in western Mzimba was Malawi’sonly TA where male absenteeism increased in the period 1987–98. ^34. In 2004, all booking-offices in Mzimba district have been closed.Stories of cheating transporters who suddenly disappear withthe money paid in advance have made people more cautious. ^35. The term is seen locally as a reference to the brand name —Caterpillar — of big ground-work machinery used for roadconstruction. ^36. Alongside the market for South African goods thus developedan informal money-transfer market, as illegal immigrants haveno access to South Africa’s banking system. Transporterscarry cash remittances of migrants, while migrant businessmenhave set up more sophisticated money transfer systems, operatingsimilarly to official agencies such as Western Union (whichdoes not operate in South Africa). ^37. Lindela is a repatriation centre near Johannesburg for illegalimmigrants awaiting deportation. See SAHRC, Lindela at the Crossroadsfor Detention and Repatriation: An assessment of the conditionsof detention (South African Human Rights Commission, Johannesburg,2000). ^38. For example, an ongoing survey among international bus passengersleaving Lilongwe for Johannesburg indicates that 61 percentof the travellers originating from Mzimba district (n = 294),expects to be accommodated by a relative upon arrival. ^39. Due to lack of uniformity in the products traded, reliable pricecomparisons between the Johannesburg and Mzimba markets aredifficult to make. Common model mobile phones, such as the Nokia3310, are an exception. In 2005, a used Nokia 3310 fetched some300–400 rands in Johannesburg, which amounts to 5,700–7,600Malawian kwacha. In Mzimba, these phones are usually sold for5,000–6,000 kwacha.     

The relationship between Kenneth Koma and the Botswana Democratic Party, 1965-2003

This article assesses the weaknesses of opposition in Botswanathrough the case of Kenneth Koma, the influential Presidentof the Botswana National Front (BNF) from 1977 to 2001. Thisis done by examining the perception that from 1997 Koma's relationshipwith the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) destabilizedand weakened the opposition in the country. The article challengesa view, held by some of his detractors in the opposition, thathis leadership style was out of tune with global trends. Italso argues that what some people have viewed as ‘tribalism’— the domination of the BDP leadership by members of theBangwato tribe (of which Koma is also a member) — seemsto be primarily a matter of expediency. This alleged tribalismis used by Koma's critics as a smear. The article analyzes therelationship between Koma and the BDP at both political andpersonal levels. At the political level, Koma's failure to keepthe BNF united has been capitalized on by the BDP to tightenits grip on power. At the personal level, Koma has used hisconnections in the BDP to advantage in his business dealings.Koma's cult status and his personal and political choices havetherefore significantly contributed to de facto one-party rulein Botswana.     

A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political, and Business Perspectives

It has been suggested that Africa is experiencing a ‘NewScramble’ thanks primarily to its oil and gas wealth,with the United States and the People’s Republic of Chinaactively competing for access to Africa’s resources. Thisarticle aims to scrutinize the claim that Africa is facing aNew Scramble, analysing the nature of the economic and politicalchanges at work, the importance of Africa’s oil, and thepolitical and economic forces behind the new oil rush. The articlestarts with an overview of the phenomenon labelled by some asthe ‘New Scramble’. The main body of the articleevaluates the existence of a New Scramble from three subjectperspectives: history, international relations, and businessstudies. Finally, by analysing the likely impact on the economiesof oil-producing states, it considers whether we should dismayor rejoice over the ‘New Scramble for Africa’. Itconcludes that the existence of a New Scramble or a US–Chineserace for Africa should be treated with some caution and thatthe use of terms such as ‘scramble’ and ‘race’is perhaps misleading, while the economic impact of oil investmentsis likely to be bleak.     

The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts

Somalia's catastrophic humanitarian crisis of 2007, in whichup to 300,000 Mogadishu residents were displaced in fightingpitting Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG)forces against a complex insurgency of clan and Islamist opposition,was the culmination of a series of political miscalculationsand misjudgements on the part of Somali and external actorssince 2004. They resulted in a cascading sequence of politicalcrises which plunged Somalia into increasingly intractable conflicts.This ‘tragedy in five acts’ includes the flawedcreation of the TFG in late 2004, which emerged as a narrowcoalition rather than a government of national unity; the failureof a promising civic movement in Mogadishu in summer of 2005to challenge the power base of warlords and Islamists in thecapital; the disastrous decision by the US government to encouragean alliance between its local counter-terrorism partners inMogadishu, producing a war which led to the victory of the Councilof Islamic Courts (CIC) in June 2006; the radicalization ofthe CIC over the course of 2006, which guaranteed a war withEthiopia; and the Ethiopian offensive against the CIC in late2006, leading to its occupation of the capital, a complex insurgencyagainst Ethiopian forces and armed violence which produced whatthe UN described as a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’.In virtually every instance, key actors took decisions thatproduced unintended outcomes which harmed rather than advancedtheir interests, and at a cost in human lives and destructionof property that continues to mount.     

SOUTH AFRICAN LAND REFORM: CASE-STUDIES IN 'DEMAND' AND 'PARTICIPATION' IN THE FREE STATE

This article offers an ethnographic cross-section in one provinceof South Africa's new land reform programme. ‘Demand’and ‘participation’ are the rhetorical keywordsof the programme. Demand for land redistribution, however, cannotbe understood in abstraction from the political and economicconditions of its supply. Similarly, ‘participation’is a managed process involving many institutional intermediaries.A series of illustrative case-studies is presented, relatingto the allocation of state-owned land; state-facilitated ‘market’access to privately-owned land; the reconstruction and partialprivatization of a para-statal development agency, which havebrought into question the viability of a ‘community conservation’project and also exposed the agency to political cross-fire;and, finally, some intricacies of the possibility of land restitutionto people dispossessed under apartheid, which raises the questionof whether the concept of indirect racial discrimination maybe applied in the South African context. Several contradictionsof the process of land redistribution are analysed: for example,the massive financial costs, direct and indirect, of bringingprojects to fruition in the short term, without resolution ofthe need for long-term support; the divergence between nominaland actual beneficiaries; political and institutional conflicts,both inside and outside the state; and routine incompatibilitybetween the diverse aspirations of beneficiaries and the ‘businessplans’ required by bureaucrats and suppliers of credit.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

Social capital, social liabilities, and political capital: Social networks and informal manufacturing in Nigeria

This article addresses the question of why social networks havefailed to promote economic development in Africa when they havebeen associated with economic growth in other parts of the world.Detailed field research traces the role of social networks inthe economic organization of two dynamic informal enterpriseclusters in the town of Aba in south-eastern Nigeria, an arearenowned for the density of its popular economic networks andfor the rapid development of small-scale manufacturing underNigeria’s structural adjustment programme. Focusing onthe role of embedded social institutions and their restructuringamid the competitive pressures of rapid liberalization, I considerthe extent to which social networks in Aba constitute ‘socialcapital’ capable of promoting economic development inthe context of ongoing liberalization, ‘social liabilities’that undermine accumulation through a social logic of redistributionand parochialism, or ‘political capital’ throughwhich popular forces are incorporated into the ‘shadowstructures’ of predatory states. This article challengesthe essentialism of much of the contemporary literature on Africansocial networks, arguing for a sharper focus on the specificinstitutional capacities of indigenous economic institutions.It calls for greater attention to the role of rapid liberalizationand state neglect in explaining the developmental failures ofAfrican informal enterprise networks.