Internal Control and Accountability in Non-profit Human Service Organisations

The welfare state regime operative in Australia is highly dependent on the non-profit human services sector. The sector, as an organisational field, has had a series of characteristics applied to it, which assume its superiority over government in many aspects of service delivery. Nevertheless, knowledge about the internal functioning of non-profits is poor. This article presents an initial exploration into one aspect of internal functioning, internal monitoring and control, suggesting that internal mechanisms for control are weak. As welfare state regimes in Europe and North America are restructured, different models of service financing and delivery are being imported into Australia. This article begins to sketch the organisational conditions onto which developing models are being applied, providing an initial base for informed commentary and evaluation.     

Corporatization in the Public Sector: Explaining the Growth of Local Government Companies

The creation of companies by local governments to provide public services—referred to as “corporatization”—is an example of systemic public entrepreneurship that is popular across the world. To build knowledge of the antecedents of public sector entrepreneurship, the authors investigate the factors that lead local governments to create companies for public service delivery. Using zero-inflated negative binomial regressions to analyze secondary data from 150 major English local governments for 2010–16, the authors find that governments with higher levels of grant dependence and debt dependence are more involved in the creation and operation of companies, as are larger governments. Further analysis reveals that very low and very high managerial capabilities are strongly associated with more involvement in profit-making companies, while local government involvement in companies is more prevalent in deprived areas. At the same time, government ownership of companies is more common in areas with high economic output.     

Devolution,Deconcentration and the Non-profit Sector: Rental Housing Subsidies in the Greater Boston Area

In an effort to promote deconcentration and flexibility, the non-profit sector has been called to play a greater role in the production and management of federally subsidised rental housing in the United States. This paper explores the interjurisdictional distribution of subsidised units in the Greater Boston area and investigates how it is shaped by housing non-profits, controlling for demographic, fiscal, economic and regulatory characteristics. Findings suggest that housing non-profits contribute positively to the proportion of subsidised units in a given municipality. Yet, the geographical concentration of such agencies in poorer and heavily subsidised jurisdictions, due in part to restrictive zoning regulations, prevents them from promoting geographical mobility among assisted households.     

第三部门与社会支持网络的构建——以受歧视和污名人群为例

伴随着我国各项改革的深入和社会转型,国家发生了许多深刻的变化,取得了巨大的成就,同时也滋生了许多社会不和谐因素,比如歧视和污名问题.改革开放既为中国第三部门创造了巨大的发展空间,也使污名和歧视问题日益严峻,导致改革面临重重困境.针对这一问题的研究有助于社会发展和经济发展的顺利进行.在对这一群体构建支持网络的过程中,明显地显现政府失灵和市场失灵,而新兴的第三部门介入该领域成为必要和可能.欲将第三部门与污名和歧视问题结合起来,以第三部门发展所取得的成就为突破口来寻求该问题的解决不失为一种新的途径.通过对目前该领域中第三部门的经验获得、问题所在、未来发展和建议意见等方面的探讨,旨在促进我国歧视和污名现象的减弱和第三部门的完善与发展.     

Reforming Service Delivery in China: The Emergence of a Social Innovation Model

In this paper, I find that the political economy of public goods provision by the local government in Shanghai influenced the decision to transition from the existing public service delivery model based on residency, to a social innovation model where the government contracts with non-profits and private firms to provide services at lower costs and experiment with different levels of provision (购买服务). Contracting also forms a bridge between old governance models and new ones, which potentially allow for a process of administrative modernization without social instability. Contracting for public-goods provision is increasing in prevalence not only in Shanghai but also in many other provinces, and is professionalizing participating organizations and providing public goods to vulnerable populations. While this practice is not yet increasing non-profit participation in the policy process, the creation of access channels that are currently operating solely in one direction may at some future date allow groups to participate in relevant policy areas. Contracting public goods might have the potential of significant effects beyond the term of the contract by increasing pluralism in local public policy and generating more demand for transparency and accountability of government services. As such, this is an interesting bellwether for future political change in China.     

A GOODS AND SERVICES TAX (GST) AND THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR: SOME CANADIAN REFLECTIONS

Abstract: In recent years, several Pacific Rim nations have introduced a goods and services tax (GST), similar (in some respects) to European value-added tax (VAT). Countries with GST include New Zealand, Western Samoa and Canada. In the 1993 Australian federal elections, a major issue was whether or not to introduce GST.
New taxes are seldom popular, but particularly in Canada the introduction of GST caused extraordinary concern in the small business sector which was faced with compliance costs exceeding $1 billion. This article is a case study of the Canadian experience, with some comparisons made with some features of other systems. Findings suggest that, in Canada, the smaller businesses which are registered for GST are burdened by an unproportional share of the burden. Managerial time of entrepreneurs is being used for increased accounting and paperwork requirements.
An understanding of GST and its difficulties may assist the small business sector in Australia and elsewhere in the Pacific Rim to be better prepared for GST-type taxation. It may also assist the sector in voicing its concerns to government, such that the policy-makers responsible for taxation matters may be responsive to the needs of the small business sector.     

Government-to-Government Contracting: Stewardship,Agency, and Substitution

ABSTRACT

This paper provides empirical evidence detailing the distinctive nature of service delivery provided through contracts with other governments. The results of a survey of Ohio city and county managers both confirm and stand in contrast to implications derived from stewardship theory. Consistent with stewardship, our data demonstrate that contracts with public sector service partners generate less intensive monitoring by contracting governments than do services contracted with private entities. In contrast to stewardship theory, we find that contracting governments do not use other governments for services requiring intensive monitoring. In an era of accountability and results-oriented management, reliance on trust may not satisfy constituents who seek evidence of effective service delivery. The inability of the contracting government to affect another government's service delivery reduces the attractiveness of that government as a contracting partner. If the tools of stewardship prove to be inadequate, the imposition of carrots and sticks appropriate for a principal-agent relationship could undermine the trust central to stewardship. Given these tensions, it is not surprising that governments are contracting less with other governments.     

Explaining Levels of Local Government Involvement in Service Delivery: The Dynamics of Cross‐Sector Partnerships in Malawi

This study explores how local governments and their development partners—that is, donors, non‐governmental organisations and private companies—structure their partnerships as they work together to provide services to communities. Cases of collaboration between four organisations working in the rural water supply sector and six local governments in Malawi are studied. Using a cross‐case qualitative methodology, we illustrate how power and control translate into practices, leading to different levels of local government involvement in service delivery. This study contributes to the literature on cross‐sector partnerships in particular by developing empirically‐based propositions that help explain the dynamic trajectories that partnerships between local governments and their development partners can take. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

三方互动：规范我国地方政府间竞争的思考

在我国当前的制度环境下,地方政府在竞争中可以采取4种策略:约束“掠夺之手”、减少公共品的供给、将危机转嫁给不具流动性的要素、树立壁垒干预市场。规范地方政府间竞争应当避免地方政府采用第3、4种策略。为限制地方政府树立壁垒干预市场,从中央层面来看,需要建立全国统一大市场,推行以公平为基础的政策、制度化中央与地方的权力分配;从地方层面来看,需要转变地方政府职能,加强地方公共财政建设,构建地方特色;从社会层面来看,为限制地方政府转嫁竞争危机,需要充分发挥居民在地方政府间竞争中的裁决作用,发挥民营经济的力量以及发挥第三部门的力量。     

Financial Reporting by Australian Nonprofit Organisations: Dilemmas Posed by Government Funders

Nonprofit organisations comprise a growing and important sector of the Australian economy. This sector is being used by governments to an increasing extent for the delivery of services. The most common manner in which nonprofit organisations are funded by government is through the provision of grants, contracts or service agreements. Nonprofits discharge their accountability for these funds through reporting guidelines issued by the government funders. This article examines the financial accountability requirements of government funders, in one jurisdiction in Australia to support the central argument that the emphasis on ‘upward and external’ accountabilities serve as a functional and control tool on the sector. This emphasis detracts from the development of the ‘downward and internal’ mechanisms of accountability which are the essential building blocks for the strategic development of the capacity of the sector to respond to calls for greater accountability.     

Local government grants and income tax revenue: Redistributive politics in Norway 1900–1990

An important aspect of the welfare state is public provision of private goods, primarily education and health care. In Norway the provision of these services has been organized through the local public sector. The development of the welfare state has to a large extent been the development of welfare communes. The important revenue sources of the local and county governments, grants and income tax revenue, have been controlled nationally, and the paper addresses the determinants of these revenues during 1900–1990. The approach combines a demand model of local public services emphasizing price and income-elasticities with a political economy model of central government ideology and strength. The decision making is understood as bargaining between the government and interest groups, and the political structure consequently is of importance for the policy outcome. The analysis shows how politics matter, and the results indicate that a minority coalition government implies 30% more grant and income tax revenue to local and county governments than one party majority in the long run.     

Immigrant-Serving Non-profit Voter Mobilization in Off-Cycle Elections: An Institutional Explanation of Differential Political Participation Patterns

Abstract

Immigrants in the USA tend to vote less than other groups, and immigrants vote at even lower levels during off-cycle elections. The aim of this article is to analyse whether these same patterns can be observed in the electoral activities of non-profit organizations that represent immigrants. I argue for a theory of reflective non-profit representation to explain how immigrant-serving organizations make decisions about electoral activities. By analysing original survey data collected in 2012 and 2013, the article finds that immigrant-serving non-profits are less likely to mobilize immigrants in off-cycle compared to on-cycle elections, and less likely to mobilize voters than organizations serving other communities. These findings suggest that immigrant voting could increase if non-profits increased their political involvement, reimagined their identities to include politics as a part of their mission, and generated new revenues to support these activities.     

Intergovernmental Grants: A Formal Model of Interrelated National and Subnational Political Decisions

Intergovernmental grants are based on the interrelated choicesof: (i) the national government deciding whether to offer thegrant; (ii) the national government determining grant conditions;(iii) the subnational government deciding whether to acceptthe grant; and (iv) the subnational government determining policy,including spending levels, upon grant receipt. Empirically andtheoretically, scholars often study these decisions separately,leading to an incomplete understanding of grant-related behavior.This article develops a noncooperative game theoretic modelthat simultaneously captures all four of these decisions. Thisapproach helps to better explain puzzles surrounding intergovernmentalgrants, including the ‘flypaper effect,’ asymmetricresponses of recipient governments to grant increases and decreases,the grant-acceptance decisions of subnational governments, andtradeoffs between the size of grants and the strings that areattached.     

Political Ideology and Social Services Contracting: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design

Theoretical perspectives on the ideological influences on government contracting predict that local governments controlled by right-wing political parties will contract out a higher proportion of services than those controlled by left-wing parties. However, empirical evidence on the impact of political ideology on contracting out remains inconclusive. To cast new light on this important issue, the authors apply a quasi-experimental research design to contracting choices in children's social services in English local government. Because local governments in England are largely divided along partisan lines, it is possible to estimate ideological effects using a regression discontinuity design that captures changes in political control at 50 percent of the seats gained in local elections. The regression discontinuity estimates reveal that left-wing controlled local governments exhibit a marked aversion to private sector involvement in service provision and a clear preference for in-house service provision. These results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications.     

Adjusting to New Ways of Working: Experiments with Service Delivery in the Public Sector

In response to the perceived failure of both the state and market models of service delivery, governments have embarked on a reform program that draws on the community sector to expand the suite of available policy and service delivery arrangements. This paper explores and identifies the nature of changed relationships between government and the community sector. It uses a case study that examines the operation of a new type of community organisation, and analyses the affectivity and outcomes from the experience of a community based networked arrangement. Although there is evidence of a shift to more relationship‐ oriented models of operation because of either mandate or preference both community and government sectors have found it difficult to make the necessary adjustments to these new ways of working. Community has begun the shift to this new relational approach but finds it difficult to sustain the momentum and tends to revert to more independent and competitive modes. Governments find it difficult to make the necessary adjustments to power‐sharing and resource allocation and continue to operate as ‘business as usual’ through the traditional bureaucratic authority of command and control. In this way, the rhetoric of collaboration and partnership between government and the community sector is not necessarily matched by policy and action supporting the practice of ‘new ways of working’ although these ‘experiments in service delivery’ have opened the way for adopting more innovative and effective approaches to service delivery.     

The robustness of quadratic voting

Combining local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in a German state, we study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a quasi-experimental framework. We hypothesize that state governments pursue two distinct goals when allocating grants to local governments: (1) helping aligned local parties win the next election and (2) buying off unaligned municipalities that may obstruct the state government’s policy agenda. We argue furthermore that the relative importance of these two goals depends on local political conditions. In line with this argument, we show empirically that the effect of political alignment on grant receipts varies depending on the degree of local support for the state government. While previous contributions find that aligned local governments always tend to receive larger transfers, our results imply that the political economy of intergovernmental transfers is more intricate.     

Employment,privatization, and managerial choice: Does contracting out reduce public sector employment?

We examine the effects of governments' use of alternative service provision on public employment using panel data from a nationally representative sample of local governments. We model the effects of alternative service provision on the size of the public workforce and hypothesize that alternative provision jointly impacts both full‐ and part‐time employment. We find evidence of an inter‐relationship between these employment types. Our results from seemingly unrelated and 3SLS regressions indicate that full‐time employment in the public sector declines when additional services are provided by for‐profit providers, while part‐time employment increases. The net employment effect in the public sector is negative when government services are moved to the for‐profit sector. These combined effects result in a compositional shift toward more part‐time public sector employment. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Fiscal decentralization and government size: An extension

This paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism — intergovernmental collusion in the form of intergovernmental grants. Grants, it is argued, serve to encourage the expansion of the public sector by concentrating taxing powers in the hands of the central government and by weakening the fiscal discipline imposed on governments forced to self-finance their expenditures. The results reported suggest that intergovernmental grants do encourage growth in the public sector. The results offer further support for the use of monopoly government assumptions in public sector modeling.     

Relationship between R&D grants,R&D investment,and innovation performance: The moderating effect of absorptive capacity

The main sources of regional innovation investment in China are government direct investment and indirect grant. The positive relationship between innovation investment and regional innovation performance has been recognized by scholars, but the relationship between direct investment, indirect grant, and innovation performance and the mechanism of their impact on innovation performance need to be clarified. This study uses 5‐year data from China regional innovation, using multiple regression analysis, found that government grant and actor's investment can facilitate performance, but the government grant for innovation investment has a crowding‐out effect, absorptive capacity positively moderated the relationship between Research and Development (R&D) and innovation performance but play a negative moderate role between government grant and innovation performance. On the basis of the empirical result, China's regional governments need to focus on institutional and environmental development in the future, pay more attention to the structural problems of innovation input, promote flow of talents orderly, and rationally build regional knowledge chain, so as to enhance efficiency of innovation more effectively.     

Local Government Restructuring: Privatization and Its Alternatives

Local government restructuring should no longer be viewed as a simple dichotomy between private and public provision. A 1997 survey of chief elected township and county officials in New York shows that local governments use both private and public sector mechanisms to structure the market, create competition, and attain economies of scale. In addition to privatization and inter‐municipal cooperation, two alternative forms of service delivery not previously researched—reverse privatization and governmental entrepreneurship—are analyzed here. Logistic regression on the 201 responding governments differentiates the decision to restructure from the level and complexity of restructuring. Results confirm that local governments are guided primarily by pragmatic concerns with information, monitoring, and service quality. Political factors are not significant in the restructuring process and unionization is only significant in cases of simple restructuring (privatization or cooperation used alone). Fiscal stress is not a primary motivator, but debt limits are associated with more complex forms of restructuring. Restructuring service delivery requires capacity to take risks and is more common among experienced local officials in larger, higher‐income communities. Restructuring should be viewed as a complex, pragmatic process where governments combine public and private provision with an active role as service provider and market player. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.