STAYIN' ALIVE

This article analyzes the rapidly changing face of postmortem reproductive technology and its impact on the family. Postmortem reproduction is being used more frequently, and its implications for the resulting children's inheritance has sparked worldwide debate. This article provides support for posthumously conceived children's ability to inherit from their deceased parent when certain criteria have been met.     

Pat‐Downs But No Hugs: Why Prison Visitation Protocol Should be Changed to Help Keep Familial Structures Intact

In the United States there are almost three million children who have one or both parents incarcerated. Parental incarceration negatively impacts children in several ways. Visitation protocol varies across facilities nationwide with no modification in protocol for minors. Parental rights are disrupted by visitation protocol because of cost‐prohibitive access and extreme security measures. This Note proposes a model statute that would change visitation protocol to facilitate a clear‐cut set of visitation processes that are tailored to ensure prison safety while also fostering and maintaining a positive relationship between a minor child and his/her incarcerated parent.     

Legal Causes and Council in Reproductive Health

To study Judicial determinants of the ordered obstetrical and fertility interventions. Nature, corresponding laws, decisions upon the 37 expounded holdings at the Probate, Trial, District, Appellate, and Supreme Courts are studied in 92 published materials identified through the ACOG, RCOG, SOCG portals, and Legal Scholarship Repository. Hearings are held in the US (83.8 %), Canada (10.8 %) and U.K (5.4 %). Of all the hearings reviewed, 27 % concern mentally impaired, 37.8 %-maternal incompetence, and 21.6 % cases are of criminal nature. The Judicial determinants vary from country to country. In Canada, the ordered medical interventions are effected by the child protection legislation, whereas in the US, by court orders. In majority of cases, orders are obtained by dismissing the patriae petitions for involuntary sterilizations of mentally impaired sui juris adults (57 %); coerced obstetrical interventions (33.3 %), fetal custody (50 %); enforcement of surrogacy contracts (62.5 %) in favor of the Common Humanity Benefit clause; and recognizing the rights to inherit in posthumously conceived children (80 %) pursuant to the Social Security Act, Law of obviousness, Law of inherent anticipation, and Intestacy statute. Current study prioritizes two questions: (1) whether it is justified to override the wishes of a competent patient purportedly in her best interests; and (2) whether the patient’s autonomy and competence is an absolute concept. With the law unsettled as to a woman’s right to assent a treatment and contradict her fetus, parties concerned with fetal rights should consider exercising of screening tools on maternal judgmental fitness jointly developed by medical and legal practitioners. Further, given the advances in gamete conservations, states consider enacting legislation in order to safeguard the orderly administration of estates disrupted by claims from posthumously conceived children. A balance must be struck between the child’s right to inherit, the state’s interest, as well as the interests of prior born children.     

New York State of Mind: Parental Incarceration and Children's Visitation in New York State

The incarceration of a parent has a variety of negative effects on a child's psychological, academic, and developmental success. Children can end up in foster care as a result of the state terminating parental rights due to the parent's incarceration. Despite imprisonment of their parent(s), maintenance of visitation with the parent(s) is still important for their children. However, not all prisons have visitation programs that are suitable to visiting children. This Note proposes a model state statute that will recognize the importance of visitation, implement “child friendly” visitation programs, facilitate training for prison staff, and provide transportation for children in major cities to the prison facilities.     

Why Requiring Parents to Pay for Postsecondary Education is Unconstituional and Bad Policy

For divorced parents, the question of who should pay for their child's college tuition is very difficult, especially when the issue was never addressed in their separation agreement. Consequently, some states allow judges the discretion to extend child support duties for noncustodial parents after considering certain factors. Such factors may lead to the requirement of parental contributions to their child's postsecondary education. While many states have amended their statutes to encompass extended child support, Pennsylvania is the only state to have found their statute unconstitutional. Based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Curtis v. Kline, this Note argues that, in order to diminish inequalities between divorced and nondivorced parents, as well as between children of divorced and nondivorced parents, all states should amend their child support statutes to declare that no parent is obligated to pay for his/her child's postsecondary education, unless voluntarily agreed to, in writing, prior to the child entering college.     

“I WANT MY MOMMIES”: THE CRY FOR MINI‐DOMAS TO RECOGNIZE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN OF SAME‐SEX COUPLES*

In child custody cases, courts will look to the best interests of a child to maintain visitation/custody rights only with the child's biological parent, not third parties. However, with a same‐sex couple, it is inevitable that one parent will not be the biological parent. Thus, when that parent is in a mini‐DOMA state, where same‐sex couples from non‐mini‐DOMA states do not have to be recognized, that parent will be viewed as a third party and lose all visitation/custody rights if the couple separates. This note advocates that mini‐DOMAs allow both the biological and nonbiological parents of a same‐sex couple to have visitation/custody rights of their children if it would be in the best interest of the children to do so.     

Equal opportunities: protecting the rights of AIDS-linked children in the classroom

Within the past few years a number of children have been excluded from attending public school because they are linked to AIDS. School boards have justified their decisions to exclude these children on the basis that protecting the public's health, safety and welfare outweighs the rights of these children. Most courts have rejected this justification and have held that either under the equal protection clause of the Constitution or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, children cannot be excluded from the classroom solely because they are linked to AIDS. This Note discusses both section 504 and equal protection analyses used by the courts. When analyzing a school board's decision to exclude an AIDS-linked child from the classroom, most courts have used a higher level of scrutiny and individualized inquiry in order to ensure that the rights of both the AIDS-linked child and his or her uninfected classmates and teachers are protected. After applying these analyses to a hypothetical case, this Note concludes that both section 504 and the equal protection clause ensure that AIDS-linked children will not be barred from the classroom unless the presence of additional factors increases the risk of these children transmitting the virus to others.     

The rights of donor inseminated children to know their genetic origins in Australia

Twenty years after it was recognised that adopted children have rights to understand their origins, the dawn has finally broken with respect to children conceived as a result of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART), specifically donor insemination (DI). Recipients and practitioners of conception technologies focus their energies and ethical deliberation on the achievement of pregnancy and the successful birth of the child. Law, in contrast, must focus beyond birth to enshrine respect for the rights of the child, who is 'not legally capable of defending [his or her] own future interests.' This article undertakes an assessment of what is in the best interests of a child using empirical studies to ground a position that should be adopted by law in Australia. This article also critically evaluates the current legal position of the various States and Territories with regards to a DI conceived child's rights to know of their form of conception; access to identifying information of their donor; at what age they may access information; the position of DI children born before existing legislation; record-keeping; and finally whether international law grants such children rights. Australian children must enjoy the right in theory and practice to know they were donor conceived and the identity of their donor. It is disappointing that New South Wales, as the most recent State to propose legislation on ART, has not utilised international empirical research on the best interests of DI children or even followed the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) which seems to be far more progressive in recognising how best to protect the rights of DI children. The current legal position is chaotic. States and Territories should confer power on the Federal Government to legislate uniform and explicit regulation of ART for the benefit of DI children.     

A SECOND CHANCE FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: A MODEL STATUTE TO REINSTATE PARENTAL RIGHTS AFTER TERMINATION

There are more than half a million children in foster care in the United States. Some of these children are adopted into loving families, but many are considered hard to adopt and never find a permanent family. Research suggests that the outlook for the teens who exit or age out of foster care without a permanent home or a meaningful adult relationship is bleak. They are more likely to face homelessness, joblessness, drug addiction, early pregnancy, mental health problems, and prison time. With such grim statistics, states should explore every possible permanent family resource for youth in foster care. This Note proposes that, in limited circumstances, it is in the best interest of the child to vacate a final order of termination and reinstate parental rights. It calls for states to adopt a model state statute based on the five state statutes currently in place that already allow for the reinstatement of parental rights.     

The Child's Attorney and the Alienated Child: Approaches to Resolving the Ethical Dilemma of Diminished Capacity

Increasingly lawyers for children follow a model of “client centered” (as opposed to “best interests”) representation in child custody disputes in which the child client defines the objectives of the representation. The client‐centered model, while appropriate in most cases to give voice to the child's preferences in a process that deeply impacts him or her, can create an ethical dilemma for the child's lawyer in cases where a child is truly alienated from the other parent by the actions of the alienating parent. Alienated children strongly and unreasonably express a preference for objectives of representation that might further damage the alienated parent's relationship with the child. The alienated child's objectives may be the result of a campaign of denigration and “brainwashing” by the alienating parent. This Note suggests that when a child is truly alienated from a parent, as diagnosed by a mental health expert, the child may have “diminished capacity” and therefore, the client‐directed model of representation is not adequate. This Note proposes that the Child's Attorney must determine whether the child is of diminished capacity under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and, if so, must treat the client accordingly under Rule 1.14. Specifically, the attorney may, if all other remedial measures are inadequate, override the child's wishes and advocate a position that the child would take, but for the brainwashing of the child used to alienate him or her from a parent.     

Blood Will Not Justify My Relation: Same‐Sex Couples and their Battle for Standing as De Facto Parents

A parent's right to maintain a relationship with his/her child lies within the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; however, this right does not apply to every type of parent. Although the U.S. Supreme Court granted same‐sex couples the right to marry, they still face parental rights issues when their child(ren) are nonbiological or nonadoptive because they lack standing for custody and/or visitation as de facto parents. Moreover, the rise of nontraditional same‐sex‐couple families has been placing states in a predicament, and the lack of uniform rights for de facto parents creates great inconsistency across the United States. The creation of a uniform statute with specific elements distinguishing de facto parents from mere caretakers will grant same‐sex nonbiological parents standing and create uniformity across the United States.     

Dodging the Donor Daddy Drama: Creating a Model Statute for Determining Parental Status of Known Sperm Donors

Despite recent innovations in alternative reproduction technology and the increased use of artificial insemination procedures, courts and legislatures have been unable to develop a clear and consistent test to establish the parental rights and obligations of sperm donors. As a result, there are mixed outcomes in cases where intended parents seek child support from an unsuspecting donor or when donors petition the court for visitation with their biological children. This Note seeks to resolve the ambiguity in determining sperm donors’ parental status by proposing a model state statute that makes nonpaternity the default rule. Under the statute, sperm donors would not be subject to any of the parental rights or obligations of a traditional biological father. However, the presumption of nonpaternity could be overcome if the parties agree, in writing, prior to the insemination. Further, the model statute provides an exception to the default rule if the donor has played an active role in the child's life. Adopting this model statute will not only facilitate a market for sperm donation but also make donor rights and obligations clear from the onset.

Key Points for the Family Court Community
• Today, infants born using artificial reproduction technology (ART) represent more than one percent of children born in the United States annually.
• When a donor is anonymous, the law is clear: the donor is not a legal parent. However, the law regarding known donors is less straightforward. Depending on the state and the particular circumstances, the parental status of a known donor is questionable.
• The ambiguity in the law creates confusion and disagreement among the parties in a donor agreement. By comparing factually similar cases, in which courts interpreted donor statutes with identical language, in completely opposite ways, it is easy to see the unpredictability in ART cases.
• The proposed model statute provides unambiguous legislation that sets out a clear standard to be used in determining the parental status of known donors. If adopted by state legislatures, courts across the country would finally have a consistent rule to apply, leading to less confusion and contradictory rulings.
• The key issue is honoring intentional parentage and the proactive choice to use ART to have a child on one's own terms.

     

SPERM DONOR OR THWARTED FATHER? HOW WRITTEN AGREEMENT STATUTES ARE CHANGING THE WAY COURTS RESOLVE LEGAL PARENTAGE ISSUES IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION CASES

In recent years, the use of assisted reproduction has risen dramatically in the United States, allowing individuals who face various reproductive challenges, including infertility or absence of a heterosexual partner, to conceive biological children. While assisted reproduction has expanded to meet the needs of these parents, the legal system remains years behind, often leading to complicated child custody disputes between the parties. State legislatures have responded to the call for increased regulation of legal parentage in assisted reproduction in varying ways, although one popular statutory approach requires a known sperm provider to preserve his intention to parent in a written agreement with the woman. This article will argue that written agreement statutes are an effective means for resolving parentage disputes because of their ability to protect pre-insemination intent and encourage private ordering of conflicts among the parties. These issues will be explored through the lens of a recent case decided by the Kansas Supreme Court, In Re K.M.H. , where the court enforced a written agreement statute against a sperm provider despite his equal protection and due process challenges.     

Revisiting the legal standards that govern requests to sterilize profoundly incompetent children: in light of the "Ashley Treatment," is a new standard appropriate?

This Note discusses the recent controversy surrounding a six-year-old girl named Ashley, whose parents chose to purposefully stunt her growth and remove her reproductive organs for nonmedical reasons. A federal investigation determined that Ashley's rights had been violated because doctors performed the procedure, now referred to as the "Ashley Treatment," without first obtaining a court order. However, the investigation did not make any conclusions regarding whether the "Ashley Treatment" could present a legally permissible treatment option in the future. After discussing the constitutional rights that the "Ashley Treatment" implicates and the current legal standards in place, this Note examines how courts have applied these legal standards to cases involving extreme requests. Drawing upon legal commentators, this Note concludes that a court could approve a request for the "Ashley Treatment" in appropriate and limited cases where the parents have presented clear and convincing evidence before a court that the benefits that the "Ashley Treatment" would provide to the child and her family outweigh the risks associated with the procedure. This Note argues that those benefits may include extrinsic considerations, but courts should remain cautious when considering such evidence and be sure that the evidence as a whole supports their conclusions.     

ALMOST,BUT NOT QUITE: THE FAILURE OF NEW YORK'S GET STATUTE

The quandary of Jewish women unable to remarry because of their husbands’ refusal to grant them religious divorces is a real problem affecting real people. Husbands are wielding this lopsided power to “extort” money from their wives, obtain favorable child custody settlements, property settlements, and child support payments. The burgeoning divorce rate is certain to exacerbate this problem. Already, this situation has garnered international attention. In the wake of New York's legislative attempt to remedy this problem, countries, including the United Kingdom and Australia, have promulgated legislative solutions to this dilemma. New York is the only state in the United States to pass such a statute. Unfortunately, New York's statute is flawed because it is of limited applicability and still allows for situations in which the Jewish wife is civilly divorced but religiously married. This Note proposes amending New York's statute to make it applicable to any and all divorce proceedings and to any barrier to remarriage. This Note will further recommend that the proposed amended statute should be adopted worldwide.     

Fostering permanency of children in out-of-home care: psycho-legal aspects

Over the past 20 years increasing interest has been given to children's rights that grant special protections to children living apart from their biological parents. The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 was promulgated to prevent unnecessary removal of children from their original families and to ensure permanency when return to their families could not be secured. The psychiatrist's role in this process has been to ensure that effective interventions occur prior to the child being removed from home and that every effort is made to return the child to his or her family of origin once placement has been made. In the event that the child cannot return home, the psychiatrist can assist the court by providing grounds for termination of parental rights and by otherwise ensuring that the child's best interests are protected.     

Keeping the Family Together: Why New York Must Amend Evidence Rules to Protect a Parent's Right to be a Parent

In New York, hearsay statements made by children may be admissible in a child protective proceeding. Under Article 10 of the Family Court Act, an out‐of‐court statement only requires corroboration to support the statement's reliability. The Family Court has the choice to determine what evidence will be sufficient for corroboration. In comparison to other statutes from different states, New York's statute is very broad. This Note proposes amending the current evidence statute under Article 10 of the Family Court Act to strengthen the standard for admitting hearsay statements in child protective proceedings.     

WHEN JAIL FAILS: AMENDING THE ASFA TO REDUCE ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS

The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) requires states begin termination proceedings when a child resides in foster care for fifteen out of the last twenty‐two months. Many states interpret this to mean that an incarcerated parent is unfit when they leave their child in foster care just because they are separated from their children. Parents and children can still have meaningful relationships even when separated. Thus, parental unfitness should depend on many factors such as the relationship with the child, age of the child, and ability to provide support for the child—not just the time spent away from the child. This Note advocates for the amendment of ASFA to include factors courts should consider when terminating the parental rights of incarcerated parents and encouraged states to focus not on a time frame for termination, but rather consideration of circumstances relevant to each individual family. States should incorporate the factors into their state laws. Further, states should actively work with prisoners and their children to help maintain contact and if possible, reunify families after incarcerations. These services will help prevent the need for termination after a parent completes their sentence and will help to reduce recidivism.     

WHO'S YOUR DADDY?: THE INHERENT UNFAIRNESS OF THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION FOR CHILDREN OF UNMARRIED PARENTS*

Many states have marital presumptions of legitimacy, which provide children born to married parents with protection against paternity lawsuits questioning their legitimacy. However, most states do not have legitimacy presumption statutes for unmarried couples. This lack of equality between married and unmarried couples makes it so that children born to unmarried parents, who have developed a psychological bond with a man they have always thought to be their father, are not afforded the same protection as other children in similar situations, simply because their parents were not married at the time of their birth. Therefore, this Note advocates for states to amend their paternity statutes to provide protection against nonpaternity lawsuits to psychological fathers and their psychological children. State statutes should provide a psychological father with the right to be declared the legal parent of his psychological child in cases where the child's legal father has been substantially absent from the child's life.     

Identity, genealogy, and the social family: the case of donor insemination

In this paper I discuss whether or not biographical information concerning the sperm donor should be disclosed to children conceived through donor insemination. Policies of disclosure for example in the context of adoption, have been justified on the basis of a notion of identity which emphasizes genetic ties. This notion of identity and the policies of disclosure of information concerning biological parents based on it, have been criticized by many writers, including feminists, as reinforcing explanations of human organization and development based on biological determinism rather than on ideas such as social construction. Further, this notion of identity is seen to emphasize the importance of genetic parenthood over the commitment involved in bringing up a child as a social parent. While agreeing with these criticisms of that particular notion of identity, I argue that the notion of identity as a whole should not be summarily rejected. Rather, it should be re-interpreted using a sociological approach incorporating the notion of narrative. This second narrative notion of identity is developed with reference to the situation of some groups of children, who like those born from donor insemination, generally do not have any knowledge of their biological parent[s], for example adoptees, the children of the disappeared in Argentina and child migrants. In this paper, policies of disclosure which allow these children to gain some knowledge of their biological parents are discussed in light of the two notions of identity. It is argued that disclosure may be justified on the basis of a narrative notion of identity. This allows for the rigid dichotomy created between biological determinism and social construction: the importance of social parents to the child is emphasized, however the desire a child may have to know something about her or his biological parent is not denied or dismissed.