Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

Between the Law: The Unmaking of Empire and Law's Imperial Amnesia

Asian victims of Japanese imperialism have filed lawsuits against the Japanese government and corporations since the 1990s, which became prime sites for redress decades after Japan's defeat in World War II. As this ethnography demonstrates, this process paradoxically exposes a legal lacuna within this emergent transnational legal space, with plaintiffs effectively caught between the law, instead of standing before the law. Exploring this absence of law, I map out a post‐imperial legal space, created through the erasure of imperial and colonial subjects in the legal framework after empire. Between the law is an optic that makes visible uneven legal terrains that embody temporal and spatial disjuncture, rupture, and asymmetry. The role of law in post‐imperial transitions remains underexplored in literatures on transnational law, legal imperialism, postcolonialism, and transitional justice. I demonstrate how, at the intersection of law and economy, post‐imperial reckoning is emerging as a new legal frontier, putting at stake law's imperial amnesia.     

Legal Compliance in Street‐Level Bureaucracy: A Study of UK Housing Officers

Street‐level bureaucratic theory is now at a fairly mature stage. The focus on street‐level bureaucrats as ultimate policymakers is now as familiar as it is important. Likewise, the parallel sociolegal study of the implementation of public law in public organizations has demonstrated the inevitable gap between law‐in‐the‐books and law‐in‐action. Yet, the success of these advances comes at the potential cost of us losing sight of the importance of law itself. This article analyzes some empirical data on the decision making about one legal concept—vulnerability in UK homelessness law. Our analysis offers two main contributions. First, we argue that, when it comes to the implementation of law, the legal abilities and propensities of the bureaucrats must be taken into account. Bureaucrats' abilities to understand legal materials make a difference to the likelihood of legal compliance. Second, we must also pay attention to the character of the legal provisions. Where a provision is simple, it is more likely to facilitate legal knowledge and demands nothing of bureaucrats in terms of legal competence. Where the provision is also inoffensive and liveable, it is less likely to act as an impediment to legal conscientiousness.     

Positivism,Legal Validity,and the Separation of Law and Morals

The essay discusses the import of the separability thesis both for legal positivism and for contemporary legal practice. First, the place of the separability thesis in legal positivism will be explored, distinguishing between “standard positivism” and “post‐Hartian positivism.” Then I will consider various kinds of relations between law and morality that are worthy of jurisprudential interest, and explore, from a positivist point of view, what kind of relations between law and morality must be rejected, what kind of such relations should be taken into account, and what kind of such relations are indeed of no import at all. The upshot of this analysis consists in highlighting the distinction between two different dimensions of legal validity (formal validity and material validity respectively), and in pointing out that the positivist separability thesis can apply to formal validity only. On the other hand, when the ascertainment of material validity is at stake, some form of moral reasoning may well be involved (here and now, it is necessarily involved). The essay concludes with some brief remarks on the persisting importance of the positivist jurisprudential project.     

Universal Legal Concepts? A Criticism of “General” Legal Theory

Abstract. General theory of law (general jurisprudence, allgemeine Rechtslehre) has often claimed to deal with general or universal concepts, i.e., concepts which are deemed to be common to any legal system whatsoever. At any rate, this is the classic determination of such a field of study as provided by John Austin in the nineteenth century—a determination, however, which deserves careful analysis. In what sense, indeed, can one assert that some legal concepts are common to different legal systems? And, above all, in what sense can one assert that some concepts are common to different languages and cultures? My paper sets out to discuss such questions—although, obviously, they are too complicated to be answered in a single paper. The first section reconstructs the Austinian argument for general jurisprudence by placing it in its historical context. The second section tries to apply to legal concepts some suggestions derived from the contemporary debate on conceptual relativism. The third section, returning to the Austinian problem, comes to the following conclusion: Even if conceptual relativism were true and there were no general or universal legal concepts, this would not invalidate in any way the didactic and scientific value of (general) theory of law.     

Inclusive Legal Positivism,Legal Interpretation,and Value‐Judgments

In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism. The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism. I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the value‐freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding section, how a constructivistic version of inclusive positivism could legitimately acknowledge the presence of value‐judgments in the cognitive activities of jurists and legal theorists.     

Living legal fictions: constituting the state or submerging the signifier?

This is an inquiry into the ways the state is constituted as an effective legal fiction. It is based on the premise that the state was not constituted, once and for all, some three centuries ago (as Bourdieu suggests) but that the existence of the state relies on continuing legal and social processes. The focus is on the translation from the legal to the social, specifically the semiotic interaction between law, space and daily life in the dynamics of this on-going mise en scène. This requires re-thinking a number of semiotic issues: first, Lefebvre’s challenge to a semiotics which neglects the place of the material (body, space) and, second, a challenge to Lefebvre’s assertions that the state operates in a realm of freedom in switching ‘at will’ between codes. Third, it is possible to question the conditions by which the state operates as a ‘floating signifier’, which maintains its domination by overwhelming us with its excess meanings. The inquiry proceeds by analysing the legal semiotics of space in different settings: the axis as an expression of legal and state power, from the courtroom to the capital city (Rome, Washington, Canberra), and street names with legal referents (Montréal and Mexico City, in addition to the above). After considering these self conscious attempts at meaning-making, the article concludes that the legal constitution of the state in urban space is not determined by a single wilful semiotic regime, but (taking insights from de Certeau) is contingent upon the interpretations and enactments of people who use the spaces. Except in the controlled environments of the courtroom and the planned capital city, everyday life is continually reconstituting the meanings of law and the state.     

The experience of civil partnership dissolution: not ‘just like divorce’

Between 2012 and 2014 I interviewed some of the earliest civil partners to dissolve their partnerships about their experience of dissolution. When I presented my findings, most family lawyers responded that dissolution was ‘pretty much like divorce’. And so it was, in many respects; but I thought that such comments missed an important difference. This article focuses on the legal understandings of gays and lesbians who have undergone dissolution of their civil partnerships, and on their experiences of it. This seemed to me significant for three reasons. First, the experiences of lesbians and gay men have historically been marginalised, pathologised or absent from legal accounts and the dominant legal consciousness. In this research they would be put centre-stage. Second, the institution of civil partnership – transient though it may turn out to be – deserves study as the point of entry into legal recognition and regulation of same-sex couples’ relationships in the UK. And, third, it is this precise history that makes it different from marriage, and dissolution different from divorce, whatever the similarities in legal treatment.     

Creative Commons Licences,the Copyright Regime and the Online Community: Is there a Fatal Disconnect?

Creative works on the Internet (online works) present challenges to the traditional copyright model. Creative Commons licences are one response to these challenges. Despite the many positive features of Creative Commons licences, certain aspects have attracted criticism. The flaws in Creative Commons licences are a symptom of a broader failure of the copyright system itself to engage with the community. Creative Commons licences operate within the traditional copyright model, despite having some resonance with a developing copyright paradigm. Yet many concepts of copyright are not understood by the wider community; indeed, some remain a source of ongoing debate within the legal academy. Furthermore, there is evidence that community norms and expectations in relation to online works conflict with the legal environment provided by copyright law. The author argues that until these issues are addressed, an attempt to reconceptualise the legal environment by working within its constraints is unlikely to be successful.     

The Inevitability and Indeterminacy of Game‐Theoretic Accounts of Legal Order

How is legal order possible? Why do people comply with law when it prevents them from doing what they think best? Two important books show how these questions can—and from some methodological perspectives must—be answered in the form of game‐theoretic accounts that show how legal compliance can be compatible with the broad self‐interest of officials and citizens. Unfortunately, however, these books also serve to demonstrate that game‐theoretic accounts along these lines lack the resources to explain how real‐world legal systems emerge and evolve or the various institutional shapes these systems take. The fundamental limitation of game theory, in this context and more generally, is its inability to predict or explain the size and shape of cooperative equilibria.     

论空间视角下的流域治理法律机制

流域治理法律机制关注法律作用于流域治理的系统性、动态化过程。作为法律机制的作用对象,流域是以水为核心要素和纽带形成的特殊空间。这一空间特质对流域治理法律机制具有塑造作用,其具体表现在法律机制的维度、边界、组织结构和具体手段等四个方面。但是,囿于传统一元空间观下对流域的"水系空间"定位,法律机制的上述四个方面分别存在整体性、系统性、协同性、实效性问题。当前,中外流域治理的最新发展经验表明,作为一个"社会--生态系统",流域应当升级为多元空间观下的"国土空间"。有鉴于此,流域治理法律机制亦需相应地对上述四个方面加以完善,以实现流域治理的法治化。     

Face-work in Chinese routine criminal trials

This article examines the performative aspect of face-to-face interactions among various legal actors and defendants in routine criminal trials in China. Using 105 trial videos as empirical data, the author develops a face-work framework to understand how an individual judge's “face”—signifying judges' legal and political roles, and their professional status—is established, protected, and enhanced during courtroom interactions. The study shows that the legal face of judges can be established by some characterizations of the nature of criminal trials such as the demarcation of legal space, the speed of the trial, and the apprising of rights to the defendants. Nevertheless, the legal face can also be disrupted by trial interactions due to judges' lack of judicial authority. Hence, Chinese judges maintain their authority through the establishment of their political face. They also use both their political face and legal face to establish their situational professional status. These interactions often lead to punitive and coercive measures against defendants in trials. While the article focuses on routine criminal trials in China, the face-work framework has the potential to explain courtroom interactions in other types of social contexts and legal proceedings.     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

The Space of Law and the Law of Space

This essay investigates the interconnections between early Greek cosmology and legal theory. In particular, it demonstrate that spatial and legal concepts developed hand in hand, and that it would be mistaken to assume that legal terminology in cosmology, and/or spatial terminology in legal texts, are best read metaphorically. This state of affairs may be contrasted with contemporary legal theory, which often employs spatial terms metaphorically. The principal authors I␣consider are Solon, Anaxamander, Heraclitus and Parmenides. The essay concludes that justice and space/place were, for the Early Greeks, often equated—that distinct differing meanings for the two were not yet clearly established, and so, in a sense, there was both a spatial component to law, and a legal component to space.     

‘Not without the Consent and Goodwill of the Common People’: The Community as a Legal Authority in Medieval Sweden

The article investigates the legal authority of the people in later medieval Sweden. Three features are especially focused on. The first aspect of communal legal authority is the representation and participation of the local laity in the judicial process as co-judges, members of the nämnd, the Swedish equivalent of the jury, or town councillors. They also acted as surveyors, compurgators and inspectors in legal disputes. The second aspect is the role of the community, the people of the province, as lawmakers. Finally, the article looks at the role of medieval Swedish communities in choosing judges, juries and parish priests as well as electing kings. The article argues that the legal authority of the people in medieval Sweden was influenced by and reformulated through the church by learned doctrines on majority decisions and the quod omnes tangit maxim. After the Middle Ages, the nämnd and the representation of the peasant estate at parliament became some of the constituents of the national legal identity of Sweden vis-à-vis other countries.     

Creating Legal Space for the Unborn

This article explores how the unborn moved from inhabiting an implicit mother-centric space, tacitly expressed in the Irish constitutional order, to a separate legal space created first by the Eighth Amendment and later through public discourse, judicial interpretation and failed constitutional referenda. The article opens with a brief examination of the relationship between law and space in recent scholarly works. It goes on to assess the impact of post-colonial and gender discourse in producing the first legal space in which the unborn was tacitly understood. This is followed by an exploration of how cultural and gender rhetoric gave birth to a definite legal space in which the right to life for the unborn was protected by the Constitution and the government’s subsequent attempts to solve the legal limbo by shifting the debate to the social policy space. The paper concludes by discussing the extent to which a wider, more universal space, that of human rights discourse, may have an impact on the legal space created for the unborn, by either protecting or weakening its right to life.     

Law,culture and massively multiplayer online games

Massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) are now a major international phenomena. Millions of people can play together online, readily navigating boundaries between nations, languages and legal jurisdictions. The communities around some of these games are huge, of a size equivalent to a large city or small nation. This article explores three themes, labelled for conceptual purposes ‘games as legal spaces’, ‘games need lawyers’, and ‘lawyers need games’. It argues that games are inherently legal spaces, infused with legal-ness in a variety of ways; that more direct engagement from the legal community would be of tremendous value in making these systems, and the entertainment spaces which they regulate, ‘better’; and that we have a great deal to learn about law and about the regulation of the online space from games. The article concludes with the proposition that there is an opportunity for impactful knowledge exchange between legal scholars, MMOG developers and publishers, and the gaming community.     

Goodbye van Gend en Loos,Hello Bosman? Using Network Analysis to Measure the Importance of Individual CJEU Judgments

It is generally agreed that some judgments by the Court of Justice are more important than others, but the ability of traditional legal methods to identify such judgments is inherently limited. In this article, we apply various tools developed in network analysis to identify which judgments are the most important as legal precedents. The study reveals that certain well‐known judgments, like van Gend en Loos, have limited importance as precedents, while other judgments, like Bosman, PreussenElektra and Schumacker, are likely overlooked.     

Viral Contagion and Anti-Terrorism: Notes on Medical Emergency,Legality and Diplomacy

The dominant imagery in current international relations seems to betray the emergence of an imperialist imaginary that differs markedly from an earlier one. This paper traces the main outlines of this emerging imaginary that has left notions of Empire as spheres of integrative production firmly behind, and is now geared towards imagining Empire as a complete, organic body of free-but-organic-and-therefore-orderly flows that however needs to be kept intact by means of epidemiological interventions aimed at excluding or neutralizing viral entities. Dealing with terrorism, or invading states that allegedly breed them, in this imaginary, is first and foremost a matter of medical necessity and urgency. The legal and diplomatic 'logic' of UN resolutions (Resolution 1441 for example), in this imaginary space, can only be imagined as being of secondary importance. Cooperation and `cosmopolitan' negotiation, as alternatives, disappear in this imaginary that projects an imperialist globalism of epidemiological purity.     

The Ethic of Diversity: Local Law and the Negotiation of Urban Norms

Toronto prides itself both on being diverse and on celebrating rather than merely tolerating diversity. Urban diversity has been studied by demographers, sociologists, and planners, but sociolegal analyses of the negotiation of diversity are scarce. The study described here has three elements: a study of the Toronto Licensing Tribunal, a challenge to the property standards by‐law, and a campaign to reform the rules governing street food. The key substantive finding of the research is that municipal legal processes, in a city that takes pride in its diversity, still work to effect and naturalize distinctly ethnocentric norms. The content of (some) norms is subject to revision but the normative power of law as such remains unchallenged. Methodologically, the article, inspired by Bruno Latour and Actor Network Theory, shows the usefulness of treating local legal processes as a series of networks in which nonhuman objects (such as weeds, courtroom Bibles, and hot dogs) can sometimes be protagonists of legal dramas rather than mere objects.