Deontic Logic and Legal Knowledge Representation*

Abstract. The current literature in the Artificial Intelligence and Law field reveals uncertainty concerning the potential role of deontic logic in legal knowledge representation. For instance, the Logic Programming Group at Imperial College has shown that a good deal can be achieved in this area in the absence of explicit representation of the deontic notions. This paper argues that some rather ordinary parts of the law contain structures which, if they are to be represented in logic, will call for use of a reasonably sophisticated deontic logic.     

Normative Systems,Permission and Deontic Logic*

Abstract. The authors concentrate on the analysis of the concept of permission. After a general account of differing concepts of permission both with regard to different legal theories and to different legal ideologies, they argue in favour of a “radical” imperativism which leaves no place for permissive norms. Thus, in contrast with the logic of normative language (LNL) purported by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the authors figure out a system of deontic logic - supplemented by devices of the possible world semantics - according to which a normative system (N) is conceived as a set of logical consequences of a certain finite set of basic obligations and no room is left either for the concept of weak permission or for the concept of strong permission. Finally the authors raise some criticisms concerning the view maintained by Alchourron and Bulygin on strong permission.*     

The Possibility of Deontic Logic

A recent series of papers, sparked off by a note by Robert Walter (1996), has rekindled the debate over the possibility of creating a logic of normative concepts. The debate correctly centres on ways in which Jørgensen’s dilemma might be resolved (Jørgensen 1937–8), since a means of resolving that dilemma is the only apparently available way in which to establish that a logic of norms is possible. Two separate questions require answers: (i) what is the correct way in which to regard Jørgensen’s dilemma; and (ii) how should one face that dilemma? I shall argue that traditional responses to the first question are inadequate, and I shall then try to expose as flawed two recent attempts to resolve the dilemma. Finally, I shall relate my conclusions in the earlier part of the paper to the wider question of whether a logic of normative concepts is, after all, a possibility.     

The Meanings of the Logical Constants in Deontic Logic

If deontic logic is to cast light on any of the normative sciences, such as legal reasoning, then certain problems regarding its logical constants must be faced. Recent studies in the area of deontic logic have tended to assume that it is our responses to the paradoxes of deontic implication which are fundamental to resolving problems with the use of deontic logic to investigate various branches of normative reasoning. In this paper I wish to show that the paradoxes are of secondary importance; that they are merely by-products of the central issue, namely the ability of certain syntactic forms to embody natural language structures used in reasoning about norms. An investigation of modal syntax is proffered as the best starting-point from which to tackle the questions that still dog the legitimacy of deontic logic. Part I provides some philosophical background to the discussion of deontic logical constants. Part II addresses in greater detail issues concerning the representation of normative concepts; and Part III offers a few remarks on the general issue of deontic logic's fruitfulness as an analytical tool.     

Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems

Abstract .
The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "legal norm" is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "systemic legal validity" is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.     

Practical Logic and the Analysis of Legal Language*

Abstract. One of the theses of the present work is that, at the strictly logical and methodological level, practical logic has neither made, nor can it make any contribution to the philosophy of law, since none of the three branches of practical logic that have been taken into account, namely, the logic of norms, deontic logic and legal logic, seems to be theoretically possible. The contribution of practical logic to the analysis of legal language is assessed in terms of both the instruments of analysis elaborated by practical logic, the artificial languages, and the results obtained in two capital subjects, the negations of norms and the permissions.     

行政法学分析逻辑的认识

行政法学分析逻辑是一个范畴概念,它是指行政法学研究主体在认识和揭示行政法现象时采用的合乎理性的方式以及合理化的技术。行政法学分析逻辑具有使行政法学由学科变为科学、由个别判断到抽象概括、由权威推动变为理论推动、由法律学现象变为社会科学现象等的价值。行政法学分析逻辑的基本特性是整体性、结构性、动态性、开放性、自证性等。行政法学分析逻辑的基本进路包括从主体与客体的逻辑关系进行分析、从表达国家意志与执行国家意志的逻辑关系进行分析、从个体利益与公共利益的逻辑关系进行分析、从行为规则与规范体系的逻辑关系进行分析、从介入元素与设计元素的逻辑关系进行分析。     

On Law and Logic

Abstract. The main purpose of this paper is to explore the role played by logic in the legal domain. In the traditional conception which underlies the movement of codification, judges are able to find in the legal system (the Master System) a unique answer for every legal problem. This entails its completeness, consistency and the possibility of deriving from it the contents of all judicial decisions. Although the ideal model of this conception is supported by important theoretical and political ideals, it has significant shortcomings. The elements of normative systems (Master Systems) are "norms" and not mere "norm-formulations." A "norm" is the meaning attributed to normative linguistic expressions. The set of all normative expressions, such as statutes, codes, etc. forms what is called the Master Book. One of the main problems for the ideal model is the identification of a normative system behind the Master Book. Interpretative arguments are the tools designed to solve these problems. Although the requirements of the model are not totally fulfilled in actual practice, it remains as an effective ideal rational goal behind legal activities linked to adjudication and most theoretical approaches to law.     

法律方法论体系的“逻辑”问题

法律方法论体系属于实用法学中的基础理论问题。对其进行研究是建构法律方法论学科的逻辑基础。从司法的视角看，法律发现、法律解释、法律论证、价值衡量、法律推理以及支持这些方法的诸多法学原理构成了法律方法论体系。这一体系与过去建构在法律原理分析基础的法律运用有很多的区别，是一种开放性的法律方法体系，更能体现法律方法的艺术性。     

论法理学的范畴逻辑体系

文章详细论述了权利、义务、权力三大范畴之间的内在联系和源于权利的一元化衍生关系,并指出在确定权利是法理学的基石范畴以及权利与义务的关系是法的最基本矛盾关系的同时,也应确认并全方位地研究行为与规范、权利与权力等都是法理学的基本范畴和基本矛盾关系。因此,法理学的范畴逻辑体系(的基本框架)就应是以行为为逻辑起点,以权利为逻辑中项或中轴,以义务及权力为逻辑张量或张力,以规范性和强制性为逻辑条件,从而以建成法治国家,实现法治社会,并以实现社会全面进步和人的全面发展,最终实现“自由人联合体”为逻辑目标或目的。文章并认为张文显教授和童之伟教授关于法本位问题和法学基石范畴问题的争论中,其双方的观点和理论实际上是可以相互弥补而使其能得以更加完善的。     

论指导性案例援引的经验主义逻辑

司法经验是凝聚法官智慧、传承司法技艺的重要渠道,也是司法机关确保同案同判、实现个案公正的内在路径之一。我国司法机关援引指导性案例,实质上是将司法经验同司法裁判相对接。而案例援引过程也暗含了类比推理、归纳推理和演绎推理等法律推理方法,确保了司法经验、司法智慧与法律规则的科学融合。但目前急需矫正案例指导制度的建构理性同指导性案例援引的经验主义之间的矛盾。     

法律论证中的逻辑理性

法律论证中的逻辑理性,是指追问以及追求法律的逻辑性或法律在逻辑上的合理性。逻辑理性在法律论证中有重要的作用,它既可以为法律思维提供基本的思维框架和模式,具有建构性功能;也可以为法律论证提供公正的平台。但是,逻辑理性在法律论证中也有一些局限性,这说明在法律论证中,只有逻辑理性是不够的：还需要实践理性和价值理性的补充。它们三者既有联系又有区别,它们的关系体现了合理与合法的关系,其有机统一对构建以法治为基础的和谐社会有积极的意义。     

The Logic of Time in Law and Legal Expert Systems*

Abstract. Research on an expert system regarding unemployment insurance law has pointed to the difficulties of explicitly representing temporal relations. The question has been addressed in the artificial intelligence literature with respect to planning systems and linguistic analysis. The approaches adopted do not appear to be directly transposable to legal discourse. The problem seems so far to have escaped notice amongst researchers attempting to develop legal expert systems. The paper explores in a preliminary way how lawyers use temporal concepts. It is submitted that “legal time” only partly overlaps with real time. A sketch of a formalization of temporal relations in law, following J. F. Allen's approach, is presented.     

国家所有权行使的理论逻辑

国家所有权的行使,是国家所有权的权利主体通过代表人的积极行为,支配特定的客体,从而使所有权的利益得到实现的行为。国家所有权的行使是有权主体代表国家行使所有权,经济学界的委托—代理理论不适合大陆法传统的当代中国。国有财产有多种类型,应当根据其性质和功能确立国有财产所有权行使的多元机制。国务院以外的机构代表国家行使所有权,尤其是地方政府代表国家行使土地、矿产资源所有权,应当有法律的明文授权。国家所有权的行使者必须接受人民的监督。     

讯问中的问题逻辑研究

本文从问题逻辑的基本原理出发,分析了问题的几种结构形式、应答域预设的逻辑特征、问题真假的理解以及不同问题之间的逻辑联系。研究了讯问中问题的逻辑特征,借鉴讯问的几种方法,为科学讯问提供了逻辑参考。     

论权利思维的逻辑属性

权利的思维是以理性逻辑为指引的思维，它强调理性化的权利是法律的基石，权利的理性化要求法律不但要关注入，而且要因应人的全面自由与发展的理性需求。其思维的基本逻辑属性是，权利的思维是理性的，它是理性思维逻辑的产物；权利的思维是合法的，是以法律为基本标准的思维；权利的思维是实践的，体现了法治实践理性的基本要求；权利的思维是属人的，是体现以人为本的价值观的法律思维模式；权利的思维是发展的，是体现人与社会发展的的价值导引。     

论国际法的财产权逻辑

财产权与主权的关系、财产权与国际和平及发展的关系、全球化背景下国际法实践的基本趋势,以及财产权内涵的确定性都表明,在理解国际法方面,财产权逻辑可以构成传统主权逻辑之外的另一进路。迄今为止,国际法的财产权逻辑在权利主体、规制标准以及保护手段方面发生了重要变化,而在财产权观念方面并未发生明显变化,这对于以往以及未来的国际和平与发展都具有重要的影响。财产权逻辑的进路促使人们认识到国际法实践在主权之外还存在着或许更为绵长的动力,即财产权,从而有助于国际社会借鉴国内成熟的财产权法律经验,以国际法基本宗旨为基本依据,解构并重构现行国际法财产权逻辑,以切实实现并长期维护国际和平与发展,进而推动国际法治。     

论法律逻辑学与法律思维能力的培养

法律思维能力是法律职业能力结构中的决定性因素.法律逻辑是训练法律思维的必要的、有效的工具.法律逻辑有助于准确掌握和运用法律概念,合乎逻辑地建立和把握命题并进行法律推理,对即将作出的法律裁决或法律意见进行逻辑论证.为达到将逻辑理论知识转化为法律思维能力之目的,法律逻辑学应在教学内容和教学方法等方面进行改革.