Political impediments to the resumption of labour migration to Western Europe

This article argues that traditional, labour migration flows to Western Europe are unlikely to resume in the near future and the commitment of the European Community to the free movement of labour is likely to erode as a consequence of anti‐immigrant illiberalism in Western Europe. Anti‐immigrant illiberalism in several, major labour‐importing states is evident in: the semipermanent politicisation of state immigration policy; increasing popular support for xenophobic political forces; the appropriation of anti‐immigrant votes by established political parties of the right; and the abandonment by left‐wing parties of liberal immigration and immigrant‐welfare policies.     

Right‐wing populist parties in Austria and Switzerland: A comparative analysis of electoral support and conditions of success

This article analyses the electoral support and parliamentary representation of right‐wing populist parties in Austria (FPO) and Switzerland (SD, AP/FPS, Lega dei Ticinesi). Contrary to the empirical evidence in many other fields of the political systems in these two Alpine republics, the analysis reveals strong differences rather than similiarities in the electoral support of right‐wing populist parties in both countries. This is explained by the differences in political culture and historic circumstances, performance of the established (governing) parties, party political penetration of social institutions, structure of the party system and the contrasting importance of direct‐democratic structures in the two countries. The exceptional skill of the right‐wing populist leader in Austria can also be seen as a significant factor. In contrast, neither social and economic variables, such as the economic situation, the unemployment rate and the overall number of asylum‐seekers, nor the strength and performance of green‐alternative parties seem to be important factors in explaining the differing success of right‐wing populist parties in Austria and Switzerland.     

Party competition over decentralisation: The influence of ideology and electoral incentives on issue emphasis

Under what conditions is decentralisation a salient issue for state‐wide political parties? It is argued in this article that the extent to which state‐wide parties emphasise decentralisation depends on their strategic considerations: on their overall ideology, on the electoral incentives created by the context in which they compete, and on the interaction between the two. The results of the analysis of party manifestos in 31 countries since 1945 are as follows. First, parties that pay greater attention to cultural matters relative to economic matters tend to talk more about decentralisation. Second, the systemic salience of decentralisation also encourages parties to talk more about decentralisation. Third, the larger the regionally based ethnic groups within a country, the more salience all state‐wide political parties will attach to decentralisation. Finally, only parties that put greater relative emphasis on cultural matters tend to respond to the electoral threat of regionalist parties. The influence of territorial diversity on the salience of decentralisation thus works through two channels and is partly conditioned by political parties’ ideological profile.     

Recalibrating social protection: Electoral competition and the new partisan politics of the welfare state

This article investigates the new party politics of welfare states with a particular focus on electoral competition. The argument is that welfare state politics are no longer just about more or less, but involve trade-offs among ‘new’ versus ‘old’ social rights, and hence social investment versus social consumption. However, party priorities on these issues are highly dependent upon their electoral situation. As electoral competition becomes more intense, parties focus more on vote maximisation than on their traditional policy goals. For left parties, this means focusing more on social investment, which appeals to their growing constituency of progressive sociocultural professionals, and less on defending the traditional income maintenance programmes favoured by their core blue-collar voters. Centre-right parties, on the other hand, should hesitate to retrench old social rights when electoral competition intensifies because they need to prioritise their appeal to culturally conservative working-class voters over their traditional fiscally conservative policy profiles. Using a new dataset and a recently published measure of electoral competitiveness, the article shows that as electoral competition intensifies, left governments are willing to prioritise social investment by reducing pension rights generosity in order to expand programmes for new social risks, while centre-right governments by contrast avoid retrenchment of pension rights and pension expenditures. The findings demonstrate that this relationship is moderated by the presence of a credible radical right challenger, which increases the electoral risk of welfare state recalibration.     

Issue compensation and right‐wing government social spending

It is well‐established that prolonged left‐wing incumbency has a positive long‐term effect on welfare effort in terms of high levels of social spending and reduced levels of economic inequality and poverty. Prolonged left‐wing incumbency also influences the institutional set‐up of welfare states, in particular generating strong support for existing arrangements in countries with large welfare states. The issue ownership literature furthermore shows that the public comes to distrust right‐wing parties as defenders of the welfare state. In countries that have a tradition of left‐wing incumbency it is particularly important for right‐wing governments to compensate for the distrust of the public because of the popularity of the welfare state and strong vested interests. While right‐wing governments on average are negatively associated with social spending, there is a strong positive association between right‐wing government and social spending in traditionally left‐wing countries. It is even the case that right‐wing governments in these countries spend more on social welfare than left‐wing governments. This indicates that right‐wing governments are forced to compensate for the lack of public trust by being even more generous than the left.     

Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?

Sweden is no longer a negative, exceptional case regarding the presence of radical right‐wing populist parties. The Sweden Democrats has continually grown stronger, and in 2010 they won seats in the Swedish parliament. However, their electoral support varies considerably across Sweden. This study analyses their electoral support in 290 Swedish municipalities in order to explain this variance. Support is found for the social marginality hypothesis: electoral support for the Sweden Democrats tends to be negatively correlated with the average level of education and with the Gross Regional Product per capita, and positively correlated with the unemployment rate. The ethnic competition hypothesis, that there is a positive correlation between the proportion of immigrants and electoral support of the Sweden Democrats, is also supported.     

The German Federal Election of 2017: How the Wedge Issue of Refugees and Migration Took the Shine off Chancellor Merkel and Transformed the Party System

The 2017 German federal election delivered dramatic electoral decline of the two traditional main parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), who had governed Germany in a ‘grand coalition’ government since 2013. The main reason for this outcome was the decision by Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany's borders for refugees and migrants, an unprecedented policy that abandoned border controls and remained in place between September 2015 and March 2016. This article focuses on how the refugee and migration problem subsequently turned into a wedge issue, splitting most German political parties and handing a major election victory to the main critics of Merkel's decision, namely the rightist Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the right‐wing liberals of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Rather than explaining these developments in isolation, the article highlights how past welfare state retrenchment and fear over future economic prosperity make significant groups of the electorate, including former supporters of left‐of‐centre parties, lose confidence in the ability of the political system to deliver stability and social integration.     

Welfare-Ideological Change in Scandinavia: A Comparative Analysis of Partisan Welfare State Positions in Four Nordic Countries, 1970–2003

During the 1990s, the Nordic welfare states, notably Finland and Sweden, faced serious challenges that triggered a number of welfare restructuring processes. This article focuses on the political determinants of these processes, or, more exactly, it analyses changes in partisan welfare policy positions in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden between 1970 and 2003. The main goal of the article is to chart possible changes in party positions on social policy. Has there been a decline in pro‐welfare attitudes during the period 1970–2003, and if so, how are these changes related to ideological and institutional factors? The data analysed in the article consists of election programmes, and more specifically, textual utterances concerning the welfare state. The results indicate a relatively high degree of stability in partisan support for welfare state expansion and investments in social justice, while market‐type solutions to social problems, on the other hand, have become more salient among parties, especially in the Right. The findings suggest that parties still differ from each other as to welfare‐political positions, indicating that Social Democratic and left‐wing parties remain the foremost defenders of the ‘Nordic Welfare Model’, whereas the Right has become more hesitant towards welfare state expansion.     

Partisan politics,welfare states,and environmental policy outputs in the OECD countries, 1975–2005

Building on the burgeoning literature on the association between the welfare state and the environmental state, this study empirically examines how the politics of the former has affected the development of the latter. We suggest that the size of the welfare state shapes the calculus of environmental policy costs by partisan governments. A generous welfare state lowers the costs perceived by the left‐wing government, as large redistributive spending allows the government to mitigate the adverse impact of the new environmental policy on its core supporters, industrial workers. A generous welfare state also implies diminished marginal political returns from additional welfare commitment by the left‐wing government, which lowers the opportunity costs of environmental policy expansion. To the contrary, because of lower overall regulatory and taxation pressure, a small welfare state reduces the costs of environmental policy expansion as perceived by a right‐wing government. Our theoretical narrative is supported in a dynamic panel data analysis of environmental policy outputs in 25 Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development member states during the period 1975–2005.     

Support for radical parties in Western Europe: Structural conflicts and political dynamics

Why is the populist radical left and right on the rise across western Europe? Integrating theories on changing socio-political conflict with arguments about crises of political representation, we contend that electoral support for radical right and radical left parties is rooted in two distinct sets of socio-structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is in both cases conditioned by the individual political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. Relying on the European Social Survey (ESS) covering the period from 2002 to 2016 and Parlgov data, we show that the lack of responsiveness of mainstream parties to the changing social conflict structure provides critical opportunities for new challengers from both the radical left and the radical right, while voters’ political discontent only works to heighten their success when these parties are in opposition. Our article contributes not only by offering an integrative account of the electoral appeal of the radical right and radical left parties. In emphasising the largely similar nature of short-term, political factors that condition the translation of the different sets of long-term, structural determinants into opting for these parties, critically, this article also contributes to understanding the electoral success of radical challengers across western Europe.     

Voters' Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short‐term Opportunities of Anti‐immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden

In contrast to previous studies on the political opportunity structures of anti‐immigrant parties, this article argues that voters’ perceptions of policy convergence between mainstream alternatives affect their short‐term propensity for supporting such partisan challengers. Drawing upon leading research in the field, two hypotheses about voters’ perceptions of policy convergence, in two policy areas (economic redistribution and immigration), are presented. The main findings in the article suggest that policy convergence between mainstream parties has a more immediate impact on the electorate than commonly recognised. Using unique data from Sweden, the article shows that perceived convergence between Swedish mainstream parties in the field of immigration policy increases potential support for the anti‐immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats (SD). Yet the results are the opposite when it comes to perceptions of convergence in the field of economic‐distributive policies. In contrast to widespread assumptions, the article thus finds that policy convergence between mainstream parties only appears to create short‐term opportunities for anti‐immigrant parties if it takes place on their own policy turf. These results indicate, in other words, that the potential electorate of the SD – which is a wider group than hard‐core xenophobes – is largely driven by preferences about immigration policy, rather than the short‐term urge to protest against mainstream parties. The article, therefore, concludes that the cordon sanitaire to isolate the SD in Sweden – which is underpinned by de facto convergence between mainstream parties on immigration policy – could improve, and is unlikely to curb, the short‐term electoral opportunities of this party.     

Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party

This article develops a theoretical distinction between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism in order to analyze how electorally successful populist right‐wing parties transmit social policy preferences with significant redistributive implications for the shape of the welfare state. Direct welfare chauvinism occurs as a result of legislative changes that explicitly exclude recipients from social protection or reduce the level thereof on the basis of ethnicity. Indirect welfare chauvinism is the result of policy measures that apply to both natives and immigrants, but which deliberately negatively affect immigrants the most. Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis of labour market reforms in Denmark, where one of the most successful populist right‐wing parties in Europe – the Danish People's Party – held a pivotal position in the period 2001–11, the article traces the intentions and deliberate policy‐making strategies of the party. It shows that the distinction between direct and indirect chauvinism is a useful theoretical tool for understanding how the Danish People's Party can fulfill the expectations of both its electorate and its coalition partners, even if they point in different directions.     

Ethnic politics and public sector management in Trinidad and Guyana

Representativeness and diversity in public institutions are among the principles of good and democratic governance, but a commitment to achieving ‘balance’ is far easier said than done, particularly in the context of small, ethnically divided societies in which political mobilization is based on ethnic identity. Trinidad and Guyana are two such societies in which political power was held for a long time by a dominant ethnic group and has recently been transferred to the former ‘out group’. Specifically, politics in both territories was dominated by parties that are identified with the urban African populations, whereas the main opposition parties drew their electoral support almost exclusively from rural Indian groups. In both cases the Indian ‘out group’ accused the African ‘in group’ of favouring members of the latter group—and, conversely, of discriminating against the Indians—in the allocation of resources which are in the gift of the state. Also in both countries, democratic elections have resulted in regime changes after three decades of near one‐party rule. The issue of employment in the public service has become critical as the two groups battle for scarce resources, and the public service is described as a ‘theatre of inter‐ethnic drama’. The article takes the view that managing ethnic and cultural diversity is tantamount to managing unproductive tensions that threaten to undermine confidence and morale among public officials. This impacts negatively on their levels of job satisfaction, the quality of the work environment and, ultimately, on performance and output. It breeds suspicion among co‐workers and has the potential to degenerate into ethnic strife that can cripple the public sector and affect the overall goal of national development. The article examines existing legal/constitutional and institutional provisions for conflict management and resolution, but ultimately suggests the need for well‐conceived confidence‐building measures such as public scrutiny of the personnel function and the reintroduction of ethnicity as a category on official government personnel records. The main theoretical conclusion is that while equality of opportunity must be guaranteed, the notion of a representative bureaucracy has many practical limitations that make it unworkable in Trinidad and Guyana. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Demassified Mass Parties or Overloaded Cadre Parties? The Impact of Parties on Electoral Outcome in Finland*

This article examines the frequently cited hypothesis of the changes in modern party organizations towards the catch-all model, and of the attempt of political parties to counter threats of electoral failure by intensifying membership support. The results indicate that in Finland former mass parties have been demassified and cadre parties have been overloaded. However, there are differences in party alignments and in the internal organizational structure of the parties that make a strict application of the catch-all concept problematic The findings also give evidence of a threat of declining electoral success that has implications for the membership support in the parties in very special situations. The threat from other parties seems to have only little or no effect on the membership figures. But when this threat is combined with a steady erosion in the traditional social bases of the parties, then the party response can be strong for the purpose of widening the electoral market by personal influence, as was the case with the rural Center party in Finland.     

The Rise of the Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European Countries: The Case of European Parliament Elections

While the 2014 European Parliament elections were marked by the rise of parties on the far right‐wing, the different patterns of support that we observe across Europe and across time are not directly related to the economic crisis. Indeed, economic hardship seems neither sufficient nor necessary for the rise of such parties to occur. Using the cross‐national results for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 EP elections in order to capture time and country variations, we posit that the economy affects the rise of far right‐wing parties in more complex ways. Specifically, we compare the experience of high‐debt countries (the ‘debtors’) and the others (the ‘creditors’) and explore the relationship between far right‐wing party success on the one hand, and unemployment, inequality, immigration, globalisation and the welfare state on the other. Our discussion suggests there might be a trade‐off between budgetary stability and far right‐wing party support, but the choice between Charybdis and Scylla may be avoided if policy‐makers carefully choose which policies should bear the brunt of the fiscal adjustment.     

The Majority‐Minority Divide in Attitudes toward Internal Migration: Evidence from Mumbai

Rapid urbanization is among the major processes affecting the developing world. The influx of migrants to cities frequently provokes antagonism on the part of long‐term residents, manifested in labor market discrimination, political nativism, and violence. We implemented a novel, face‐to‐face survey experiment on a representative sample of Mumbai's population to elucidate the causes of anti‐migrant hostility. Our findings point to the centrality of material self‐interest in the formation of native attitudes. Dominant group members fail to heed migrants' ethnic attributes, yet for minority group respondents, considerations of ethnicity and economic threat crosscut. We introduce a new political mechanism to explain this divergence. Minority communities facing persistent discrimination view in‐migration by coethnics as a means of enlarging their demographic and electoral base, thereby achieving “safety in numbers.” Our article sheds light on the drivers of preferences over internal migration. It also contributes insights to the international immigration literature and to policy debates over urban expansion.     

Do Politics in Europe Benefit from Politicising Corruption?

In this article, two unexplored trends in European electoral politics are highlighted. Using newly collected data the article tracks the politicisation of corruption in electoral campaigns from 1981 to 2011, an electoral strategy that has been increasing over time in most European countries. It then empirically tests two aspects of this campaign strategy. First, what are the factors that are systematically associated with a party’s decision to politicise corruption? Second, what are the electoral effects in terms of relative vote share for parties that politicise corruption? Using an original data-set that employs multi-level data (parties nested in countries) the results demonstrate first that politicisation of corruption occurs systematically more often among established parties from the main opposition, new parties and parties on the political right, and occurs as a function of country-level corruption, district magnitude and public party financing. Second, it is found that the main opposition and new parties that use such a campaign strategy make significant electoral gains relative to the previous election compared to parties that do not politicise corruption. Yet gains are offset in low-corruption countries. The findings demonstrate salient implications for research on party systems, corruption studies and democratic legitimacy, among other areas of investigation.     

Who's to blame? How performance evaluation and partisanship influence responsibility attribution in grand coalition governments

This article examines a neglected but fundamental facet of electoral accountability: responsibility attribution under grand coalition governments. Contrary to much of the existing literature that focuses on retrospective voting, this article focuses on responsibility attribution testing the effect of perceived performance of the government and partisan attachments for parties in grand coalition governments. Novel survey questions on responsibility attribution from Austria and Germany show that when the lines of responsibility are blurred, partisanship functions as an important heuristic for all voters including supporters of opposition parties. These findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability and political representation in grand coalition governments.     

Electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe: A hierarchical selection model

The paper examines determinants of electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in central and eastern Europe. The application of a hierarchical selection model shows that the strategic entry of minority parties depends on their expected electoral success due both to observed and unobserved factors. Drawing on formal models of electoral entry, the electoral success of new (or niche) parties is expected to be influenced by the costs of entry (determined by electoral thresholds) and the potential for electoral support. The latter depends on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand, measured here as the size of ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues. In line with these expectations, parties only run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold. This finding would have been overlooked by a naïve model of electoral success which does not take self-selection into account.     

The political geography of electoral autocracies: The influence of party strongholds on political beliefs in Africa

In electoral autocracies, why do some citizens view the state as autocratic, while others see it as democratic and legitimate? Traditionally, indicators such as income and education have been the most important factors to explaining how different types of citizens understand politics. This article argues that in electoral autocracies, we must also take into account the role of political geography. In these types of regimes, opposition parties are often one of the only actors that provide information about the authoritarian nature the government, but their message tends to get quarantined within their strongholds. I argue that regardless of income, education, ethnicity, access to government spending, or even partisanship, citizens living in opposition strongholds should be far more likely to view the state as autocratic and illegitimate than citizens living in ruling party strongholds. I find evidence for this theory using Afrobarometer survey data paired with constituency-level electoral returns from five electoral autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa.