论越权刑法解释

在当代中国,越权刑法解释问题已经成为类推制度寿终正寝之后罪刑法定主义的最大敌人,极大地损害了刑法的人权保障机能.刑法解释有权力和权利两种不同层面的存在样态,刑法解释的对象是刑法条文背后的刑法规范,对刑法立法而言具有从属性特征."越权"包括越实有职权和越解释权两种类型.越权刑法解释包括越权刑法立法解释和越权刑法司法解释两大类.本文进一步探析了越权刑法解释的成因,进而提出了包括建立撤销机制等在内的一系列应对方案.     

宪法解释:一种拯救中国宪法权威性的方法--读范进学教授著《宪法解释的理论建构》

依法治国的前提是依宪治国。在当下中国,依法治国方略虽然被写进了宪法,但宪法却没有得到很好的适用,宪法仍然缺乏必要的权威性。《宪法解释的理论建构》一书充分论证了“释宪演进模式”较之“立宪演进模式”在提高宪法权威方面的优越性,并从界定宪法解释的概念入手,对宪法解释的场合、主体、目标和原则做了令人信服的论证。尽管《宪法解释的理论建构》没有解决宪法解释的方法等技术层面上的问题,但该书对宪法解释主体的界定和对解释原则的论证已经为宪法解释的技术性研究扫清了理论障碍。     

《合伙律师事务所管理办法》解读

2004年6月16日司法部颁布《合伙律师事务所管理办法》(以下简称《办法》),原《合伙律师事务所管理办法》同时废止。现就该《办法》作一解读。本次修改本着“大改”的思路,根据加强合伙律师事务所管理的需要增加了一些内容,同时也对《办法》的结构框架、条文排列、文字等进行了修改。以设“章”的方式,解决原《办法》结构不够鲜明、条文排列逻辑性不强等问题,修改了一些不够准确的文字。(一)关于合伙人。一是提高了担任合伙人的条件。原《办法》规定的担任合伙人的条件是:具备律师资格和三年以上的执业经历,且品行良好。很多人认为条件偏低,…     

论检察权的定位——兼论我国检察机构改革

作为国家权力体系中的一种过渡性权力,检察权兼具行政权与司法权的双重属性.与此相适应,检察权的运作也遵循着检察一体与检察独立的双重机制.检察一体,包括组织一体和心理一体两个层面;而检察独立,则包括组织独立与功能独立.检察权独立行使,是其承担法律监督功能的基础.为此,必须通过相关制度设置,从资源、身份、资质、权利等方面保障检察权的独立行使.在我国,虽然<宪法>规定检察机关依法独立行使职权,但是由于宪法和法律对保障检察机关组织独立的具体措施缺乏规定,致使检察机关独立行使职权面临着诸多障碍,其中主要是检察权地方化问题.因此,当前我国检察机构改革的方向应当是保障检察权的独立行使.     

论个案事实在刑法规范解释中的作用——以《刑法》第263条规定的“入户抢劫”为分析视角

刑法规范解释不仅仅是为了理解规范,更重要的是适用规范。解释必然就会有个案事实参与其中并对规范解释发挥作用。刑法规范只有通过个案事实,才能由抽象变为具体,由模糊趋向明确,进而逐步确定规范对事实的涵摄量,并在此基础上不断衍生出规范适用的经验规则。     

《国家司法考试应试规则》解读

2005年7月29日,司法部发布《国家司法考试应试规则》(以下简称《规则》),自9月1日起施行。现就该《规则》作一解读。一、起草的必要性为加强对应试人员的管理,严肃考场纪律,并与《国家司法考试违纪行为处理办法》相对应,此次将原属规范性文件的《考场规则》(2004年7月1日印发)提升为部颁规章,名称定为《国家司法考试应试规则》。二、需要说明的几个主要问题(一)关于应试人员交卷出场的时间限制的问题。为了防止应试人员串通作弊,将原第四条第二款“考试开始后30分钟内应试人员不准交卷出场”中的“30分钟”改为“60分钟”。(二)关于考试用笔…     

论国家与市场规则

在现代市场经济条件下 ,市场规则是市场秩序的基本准则 ,反映市场运行机制的客观要求。国家必须以法律的形式保障其成为各市场主体共同遵守的行为规范 ,从而使我国社会主义市场经济正常有序地健康发展。     

我国司法终极性的缺失与确立

现代司法权的一个重要特征是它具有终极性。司法的终极性使得诉讼成为解决社会纠纷的最后手段。但在我国,司法机关的权力受到了严格限制,人民法院尚不能够成为民众保护自身权益的最有效地方。提高司法机关的宪政地位以及扩大司法机关的权力对当今的司法改革是必要且必须的。     

论法律实证主义的权威理论

一直以来,法律权威问题作为一个潜在话题存在于法律实证主义与自然法学关于法律与道德问题的争议中.法律实证主义者在为法律权威寻找经验性基础的过程中,发展出三种不同的权威观,即奥斯丁的强制性权威观、哈特的内在面向权威观与拉兹的服务性权威观.三种权威观体现了法律实证主义权威理论的三个特点,即法律权威是一种特殊的实践权威,从外在面向权威观到内在面向权威观的转向,以及法律权威事实面向与规范面向的结合.     

The Relational Conception of Practical Authority

I argue for a new conception of practical authority based on an analysis of the relationship between authority and subject. Commands entail a demand for practical deference, which establishes a relationship of hierarchy, vulnerability, and responsibility that involves a variety of signals and commitments. In order for this relationship to be justified, the subject must be under a preexisting duty, the authority’s commands must take precedence over the subject’s judgment regarding fulfillment of that duty, the authority must accept the position and responsibilities of command, and the authority must be sufficiently trustworthy relative to how vulnerable the subject makes herself by deferring. This results in an instrumentalist conception of practical authority that can be favorably compared to Joseph Raz’s influential service conception. The relational conception’s main advantage is that it focuses on the authority as much as the subject, requiring that the authority accept responsibility for the relationship and be sufficiently trustworthy. This allows the relational conception to avoid problems that the service conception faces and illuminates institutional authority.     

The Totemic Authority of the Court

This article examines the place of the court within civil religion. It is argued that every civil religion is rooted in a magical anchor that in contemporary democratic civil religions is provided by the court. While in most institutions of civil religion totemic authority is represented, in court it is present. Therefore, court proceedings are occurrences of magic: they are performances (rituals and ceremonies) during which the sacred Thing is present. In court, the law itself and the clerical community to which it was entrusted assume the characteristics of the sacred Thing. The law appears under two facets: on the one hand, it is a norm and a word while, on the other hand, it is a Thing devoid of meaning and reason. Formalism is a magical mode of thinking that treats law as a timeless and meaningless Thing. In the course of the argument, the distinctions between ceremony and ritual, between social structure and communitas, and between religion and magic are reformulated, and the concepts of zone of familiarity and clerical community are laid out in a nutshell. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

对高利贷的法律规制

民众对财富的渴望会随着我国市场经济的发展而愈发强烈,以高利贷为代表的民间金融在和国家博弈的过程中潜滋暗长。时至今日,资源分配的不均衡、金融市场的高度管制、中央和地方政策的摇摆、法律规制的混乱共同造就了高利贷之患。整体主义的法律治理思路能够促进各部门法在该问题上的合作,以经济法和经济政策为基础解决民间借贷失控的制度根源,纾解民营企业对资本的饥渴,严惩制度外的高利贷违法犯罪活动。     

论审判权与执行权关系的良性构建

进一步深化民事审执关系改革,应充分认识执行权的司法权本质,并在制度设计上注重其行政性特点。因此,二者在职能配合与职责分立上,必须在立法上为执行权正名;充分认识审执兼顾,避免机械办案恶果;深化执裁分立。从执行权自身特点出发,应注重纵向上管理方式的改革,横向上构建执行官的单独序列以及推行执行警务化的试点。     

Authority and Authorisation

The core of Kelsen's strong views onauthority emerging from his concept of law is this:Authority of law, authority in law andauthority about law are one and the same thing.The conceptual problems suggested by these threedifferent prepositions must and can be solved in onefell swoop. Kelsen's core view will first be probed bygiving an account of what is a promising approachoffered in a fairly early text, Das Problem derSouveränität, namely, what it means to`set' or `posit' the law. Inevitably, this leadsto an interpretation of the Grundnorm, one thatintends to accommodate as many Kelsenian emphases aspossible. The Grundnorm will be presented as ashield against hypostatising authority. From there,some characteristics will be inferred of the type ofauthority that arises from Kelsen's account of legalknowledge, which will be called, somewhat polemically,authority without an author.     

Authority and Representation

The act of `setting the law' enjoysa central position in Kelsen's theory of authority.His analysis of this act criticizes, amongst others,the assumption of natural-law doctrines that norms areobjective when they duplicate a content given directlyto cognition and independently of the act whereby thenorm is enacted. Correctly, Kelsen attacks the conceptof representation underlying this assumption as anexample of metaphysical dualism and a copy theory ofknowledge. Does, then, an alternative understanding ofauthority require scrapping representation from atheory of positive law? Or does it requireinterpreting representation differently? Following thesecond path, this paper reconstructs the act ofsetting the law in terms of the critical concept ofrepresentation developed by Ernst Cassirer andsuggests how, thus reconstructed, the structure ofthis act can account for the law's authority and itscontingency.

     

The role of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority

The recent publicity surrounding Diane Blood and the theoretical possibility of cloning human beings has highlighted yet again the important role of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA). It will be remembered that Mrs Blood sought to establish a right to be inseminated with her dead husband's sperm without his written consent. The HFEA, following the strict letter of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, withheld its permission for the procedure. Following a Court of Appeal decision to allow Mrs Blood access to treatment abroad the Department of Health commissioned an independent ethicist to address the relevant issues. The use of such an expert which avoids any potential conflicts of interest, when the body has many members with the relevant expertise, is another example of how important the HFEA's integrity is viewed. It strives to act in an exemplary manner in the often hostile environment of uninformed public concern and against a backdrop of a statutory framework that is generally thought to suffer from a democratic deficit. This article will provide an outline of HFEA's background, structure and manner of operation in an attempt to demonstrate that it offers a model of regulation for the new reproductive technologies despite the constraints it faces.