Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States

What explains change and continuity in the foreign policy behavior of small states? Given the proliferation of small states over the past century, this topic has received relatively little systematic attention. When researchers do focus on small states, the emphasis has been on external and international factors, and the primary conclusion has been that small states are more likely to bandwagon with threatening great powers than to balance against them. In this article, we suggest that state- and individual-level variables can play a greater role in explaining the foreign policy behavior of small states and that small states sometimes choose to balance rather than bandwagon, especially when elite ideology is deeply embedded in formulating foreign policy. We develop this claim in terms of elite ideas about the identity and purpose of the state and examine its plausibility using primary sources and exclusive interviews with the security and foreign policy elite in Georgia. We find that this approach offers a more plausible explanation for Georgia's otherwise puzzling foreign policy behavior than frameworks that focus on the international or regional system. Although Georgia may be the exception that proves the rule, it can advance an understanding of the conditions under which standard explanations of small-state foreign policy behavior may miss their predictive mark and when incorporating the role of elite ideas can provide additional explanatory leverage.     

The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?

The G20 has emerged as the premier forum for international economic policy coordination. For small EU states, the EU's participation in the G20 represents a particular challenge as they may be faced with decisions in which they had no say. This article looks at the possibilities for small state involvement in the G20 process and analyses the extent to which they can influence the EU's participation in the G20. The article suggests two sets of variables to explain the possibilities for influence of small states in the EU's external relations. Looking into four financial and economic policy dossiers, the article explores the conditions of success of small states' strategies. The article does not contradict that the big member states dominate the EU presence in the G20, but it does argue that small states may successfully use the EU as a foreign policy platform to pursue national objectives. Their influence varies strongly and is bound to a number of conditions.     

Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens

Although many policy-makers and scholars maintain that international norms have altered the motivations underlying state behaviour, this article argues that states continue to pursue national self-interest, but in ways that remain understudied. While traditional realist assumptions explain a great deal of state behaviour, they have not been widely used to account for important alternative tools of state intervention, such as economic and normative strategies. Focusing on the case of Russia's 2014 intervention in Ukraine, this article offers insights into how, and under what circumstances, these tools are used to accomplish traditional state objectives. Guided by the tenets of neoclassical realism, the article argues that in the case of Russia, military force is no longer the sole, or even the primary, means used to accomplish traditional security goals. Such dynamics have significant theoretical and policy implications for contemporary international relations.     

Revolutionary Power and Socialization: Explaining the Persistence of Revolutionary Zeal in Iran's Foreign Policy

Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I use a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In Iranian politics specifically, it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key constitutional positions and pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics.     

Systemic interaction opportunities and war behavior∗

State leaders must often address domestic and foreign-policy concerns simultane-ously, though doing so can be complicated and risky. One way in which leaders can seek to satisfy domestic demands and pursue foreign policy goals simultaneously is by implementing policies that complement one another; i.e., the implementation of one policy influences the ease with which the other policy can be implemented. For instance, one manner in which leaders can placate domestic audiences is via distributive policies such as social insurance payments that provide economic security to individuals. By providing economic security guarantees, leaders may gain greater discretion over other policy areas, including foreign policy. However, while the social insurance effort may satisfy an audience and enable a leader to take foreign- policy action, especially high payment levels may indicate that a leader must devote an inordinate portion of his budget to domestic concerns, making foreign policy more difficult to implement. Thus, guarantees of economic security might provide leaders with greater foreign policy latitude until domestic expenditures reach sufficient levels that foreign-affairs budgets are reduced. We employ zero-inflated event count models to estimate the relationship between social-insurance levels and the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes in which states engage. Our analyses include 69 states between 1975 and 1990. Our models support the hypothesis that lower levels of social insurance lead to greater numbers of disputes, but that, after a certain level of insurance effort is passed, dispute involvement declines. Our findings suggest a differential effect of social insurance on a leader's ability to act in the foreign policy arena and support the notion that leaders may employ the welfare state to enhance their foreign-policy capabilities, though they appear to meet with conditional and limited success.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy

Why do great powers take such different approaches to the issue of nuclear proliferation? Why do states oppose nuclear proliferation more vigorously in some cases than in others? In short, what explains great power nonproliferation policy? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theories of nonproliferation policy. The first, political relationship theory, suggests that states oppose nuclear proliferation to their enemies but are less concerned when friends acquire nuclear weapons. The second, power-projection theory, argues that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to states over which they have the ability to project military power because nuclear proliferation in those situations would constrain their military freedom of action. In contrast, states will be less likely to resist, and more likely to promote, nuclear proliferation to states against which they cannot use force. To test these hypotheses, this article uses evidence from great power nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 2000. While both theories find some support, the power-projection theory performs significantly better. The findings of this article have important implications for international relations theory and US nonproliferation policy.     

Exploring the Civil–Military Interface and its Impact on European Strategic and Operational Personalities: ‘Civilianisation’ and Limiting Military Roles in Stabilisation Operations?

Abstract

The paper discusses a still more obvious foreign policy dilemma facing Denmark: On the one hand, Denmark has made a proactive foreign policy decision to pursue a strategy of influence with the European Union as the most important international forum. On the other hand, Denmark has chosen to stay outside the increasingly important cooperation on defence policy within the EU. As a small state, Denmark is opting for a multilateral strategy, but it has deliberately chosen to limit its commitment to the same forum. A combination of adaptation theory and theory of small states informs the analysis. It is argued that the Danish opt-out sends an unclear and inconsistent signal to Denmark's partners which again hampers the possibilities for using Danish coalition power within the EU. Nevertheless, contrary to both theoretical expectations and common sense intuition, there is little to suggest that the opt-out has had negative consequences for Denmark's influence on capabilities in the EU.     

A Fragile Relationship: The United States and the Republic Of Korea

As South Korea became economically and militarily stronger and developed democratic institutions, the country was in a position to assume more responsibilities in its partnership with the United States. The necessary changes could be achieved only with difficulties. The efforts of the US administration to stop the nuclear proliferation by North Korea and South Korea's attempts to develop a policy of engagement towards the DPRK resulted in friction between the allies. The dissonance was amplified by efforts of the Rho Moo Hyun government to pursue a foreign policy that was less dependent upon the United States. The change of atmosphere was underlined by anti-American outbursts in South Korea. A new effort to strengthen the partnership is, however, reasonable. For South Korea the United States is still the indispensable ally as long as an attack by North Korea that probably has nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. For the United States this alliance contributes to maintain America's paramount influence in East Asia. If both countries agree with this rationale they should take steps to accept basic assumptions and policies of the other side. To find a common position towards the nuclear efforts of North Korea is crucial. Even if both sides try to harmonize their policies, success is not guaranteed. Korean nationalism and American dynamics combined with occasional high-handedness are difficult obstacles.     

Transatlantic cooperation,alliance politics and extended deterrence: European perceptions of nuclear weapons

This article discusses the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) debate regarding American nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) in Europe, given the broad spectrum of views on nuclear issues when comparing individual member states. What is striking is the gap between public attitudes – which are broadly hostile to keeping NSNW in Europe – and elite opinion, which privileges the maintenance of NATO commitments to preserve alliance cohesion. To better understand this tension, this article dissects the elements of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe, addressing the difficulties associated with current nuclear-sharing arrangements. For some NATO states, the alliance's nuclear weapons are a political liability, since nuclear sharing clashes with international disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. For other NATO members, maintaining the status quo is preferable, as long as there is no alliance-wide consensus on the question of NSNW. These debates have been put to rest, for now, with NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, which reaffirmed the purpose of the alliance's nuclear weapons. However, these divisive debates point to more fundamental issues in alliance management, namely the credibility of American commitments, the sustainability of extended nuclear deterrence in Europe and the inevitable political tensions these questions provoke at the domestic level for NATO allies.     

The Alliance Politics of Concerted Accommodation: Entente Bargaining and Italian and Ottoman Interventions in the First World War

This article examines the challenges allies face in coordinating diplomatic efforts to accommodate and peel off their main enemy's potential allies. It elucidates the key dimensions, and the underlying coordination dynamics, of this problem of “concerted accommodation,” and it develops propositions about the conditions that shape the efficacy of such efforts. The argument links allies’ strength to their divergent or convergent assessments of the target state's ability to tip the war toward victory or defeat. Divergent assessments foster weak allied efforts that are likely to fail, but when allies agree that the target is a potential “war-tipper,” they will support their concerted accommodation policy with more robust cooperation that is more likely to work. The causal arguments and mechanisms are examined in a paired comparison analysis of two First World War cases: the Entente's efforts to induce (1) Ottoman neutrality and (2) Italian intervention.     

Reproduction Versus Transformation: The Case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ABSTRACT

This article offers a constructive critique of Fehl and Freistein's argument that international organisations (IOs) significantly affect international stratification, either producing, reproducing or transforming inequality. It suggests that without reference to the specific purposes which individual IOs pursue and the forces driving global change, it is impossible to predict either when the goals of IOs and states might diverge, or when a particular IO might promote the reproduction of inequality on the one hand, or its transformation on the other. In particular, divergence between states on the one hand and IOs charged with the management of the global economy on the other is explained by the fact that the IOs concerned are committed to the reproduction of capital on a global scale, and therefore to the continuous transformation of global hierarchies. The argument is supported by a case study of IO support for China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).     

Rationalist state,revolutionist EU and realist war: Austria in international society

This article examines Austria's position as a small, neutral state in the international society as framed by the English School. This examination is chiefly done in the face of the effects of great power conflicts and their impact on Western Europe's society of states. In doing so, the article provides insights to the fundamental puzzles concerning the ways power is managed between states, great and small alike. The article surveys how war (such as in South Ossetia in 2008) and war-like incidents affected Austria's position in the international society and the understanding of its place in great power conflicts between East and West. I argue that neutrality, despite European integration in the context of a peaceful international society, remains a political option for small states such as Austria. This option is especially lively if there is a domestic sentimental attachment to it and sticking to it does not undermine domestic or European and international foreign policy rationale and interests.     

Breaking Free from Europe: Why Africa Needs Another Model of Regional Integration

Support for regional economic integration in Africa runs high amongst the continent's international development partners and African elites. However, its expression in European forms of economic integration is not appropriate to regional capacities and in some cases may do more harm than good. This lacuna is exacerbated by technical and theoretical analyses rooted either in economics or international relations literature. This article sets out to reconceptualise the foundations of African economic integration by reviewing key debates within each literature and comparing the results across disciplinary boundaries. Overall, it is concluded that a much more limited approach is required, one that prioritises trade facilitation and regulatory cooperation in areas related primarily to the conduct of business; underpinned by a security regime emphasizing the good governance agenda at the domestic level. Care should be taken to design the ensuing schemes in such a way as to avoid contributing to major implementation and capacity challenges in establishing viable and legitimate states. In doing so, the presence of regional leaders with relatively deep pockets – South Africa in the Southern African case – points to the imperative of building such limited regional economic arrangements around key states.     

Russia's economic and strategic interests in North-East Asia

  Since the middle of the 1990s and especially after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency Russia started to pursue an active foreign policy in North East Asia, an area considered vital for Russian national political, economic and strategic interests. While continuing to use every available method to conduct this policy Moscow placed special emphasis on promoting economic cooperation with the neighboring states, not in the least because of the development needs of Siberia and the Russian Far East. The current trends on the world energy market as well as the growing energy requirements of Russia's neighbors help to make at this stage exploration of Russian rich energy resources in East Siberia and around the Sakhalin Island to be one of the most attractive areas of regional economic cooperation. Even though these developments help to meet some of the current Russian requirements in foreign investments and modern technologies Russia is clearly interested in extending the scope of regional cooperation to other areas as well. In particular, Russia is interested in promoting its industrial exports. Another prospective area of its cooperation with regional states may cover joint transport projects – from construction of international gas and oil pipelines to linking Russian and Korean railway systems.     

The United States,the Israeli Nuclear Program,and Nonproliferation, 1961–69

As was evident from the intense reaction to Donald Trump’s comments during the 2016 presidential campaign about nuclear proliferation, many analysts believe that the United States has consistently given the goal of nonproliferation a top priority since the beginning of the nuclear age. That conviction, in turn, plays a major role in policy debates among experts in this area. In this article, I show that nonproliferation does not necessarily take precedence over other important US geopolitical interests through a close examination of American policy toward the Israeli nuclear program during the 1960s. Although nonproliferation goals certainly came into play, US officials repeatedly gave priority to other key objectives and, to a real extent, even believed that Israel’s nuclearization could hold certain strategic advantages. This finding, of course, has important theoretical implications for the basic question of whether international politics still works essentially as it did in the pre-nuclear era, as well as for policy debates over nuclear proliferation.     

Re‐evaluating US strategic priorities in the Caspian Region: balancing energy resource initiatives with terrorism containment

In the aftermath of September 11, US strategy has shifted in the Central Asian region from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post‐Soviet states to ensuring their stability in light of the dual impacts of energy development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although US–Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward US and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region's energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximising Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, US policy is increasingly prioritising Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region's ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region's energy resources has therefore become a critical US security concern. Yet, by failing to engage with Russia in a meaningful cooperation that could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of either in offering the Central Asian states the kind of support they need to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.     

The Path of Least Resistance: Mainstreaming “Social Issues” in the International Monetary Fund

This article traces efforts to mainstream social issues in the institutional architecture of the IMF, attributing the lack of progress in this area mainly to the Fund's organisational culture, which steers the IMF towards the path of least resistance when it comes to policy innovation. Whereas the IMF is frequently portrayed as a puppet of powerful member states, this article identifies the Fund's organisational culture as the central factor explaining the slow pace of mainstreaming social issues in the Fund’s architecture. In the absence of member state leadership on this issue, and in light of committed management’s limited room for manoeuvre, IMF staff enjoyed much leeway to pursue an approach that was most suited to their skill set, ideological orientations and the Fund's core mandate. Due to the Fund's strictly hierarchical structure, its recruitment policies, insufficient self-evaluation and reluctance to seriously engage with reform initiatives emanating from civil society, social issues are far from being mainstreamed in the Fund's daily operations.     

Between NATO and a hard place: defence spending debate in Germany and Czechia

Defence spending has become a primary issue in the context of NATO. The question of fair burden-sharing and development of new capabilities in reaction to the changing security environment led NATO members to aim to spend 2% of GDP on defence by 2024. While some allies have managed to reach the level quickly, others seem not to be able or willing to do so. We know little, however, how the international commitment is reflected and referred to in individual member states. This article shows how size played a role when the 2% pledge was discussed in domestic politics, even if the resulting policy may be very similar. Based on expert and political debates in Germany and Czechia, it demonstrates that external expectations and the question of status play a crucial part in the small state’s reasoning whereas it is mainly internal drivers that shape the big state’s decisions.