The decentralisation of city government and the restoration of political trust

Abstract

‘Local politics’ has specific features that are conducive to the generation of trust, more so than ‘centralised politics’. Local politics is characterised by processes that occur on a small scale, within institutions that enjoy a certain autonomy, that are imbedded in a social community with which the citizens can identify, and that offer the possibility of more democratic participation. Where is the threshold between local and central politics? Clearly, if a city grows to the size of almost half a million inhabitants, as was the case in the port city of Antwerp, it becomes too large for local politics. It also becomes vulnerable to the lure of political distrust, as was manifested by the amazing rise of the extreme right in the 1990s. At least this was the theory that prompted the political leaders of the city to introduce a certain degree of decentralisation. To a certain extent they were right. Our evidence shows that the district councils generate more trust than the city council. Moreover they generate trust among sections of the population that were and remain distrustful of central politics. Will this capital of local political trust overflow into the trust in the higher authorities? Some of the data point in that direction but they are far from conclusive. Anyway it is too early to tell. The decentralisation reform in Antwerp is an interesting experiment but a very recent one.     

Local Government Modernisation in England: A Critical Review of the LGMA Evaluation Studies

New Labour has subjected English local government to an unparalleled period of reform. This article reviews the Local Government Modernisation Agenda evaluation studies commissioned by central government. The review identifies valuable insights from the studies into the contemporary state of English local government, central government and central–local relations. However, the studies also illustrate the need for research on public service reform to include analyses of the political origins of reform policies and the political–bureaucratic issues involved in their implementation. It is also argued that future research needs to rediscover the value of studying local politics ‘in the round’, the impact of socio-economic and non-local factors on local policy outcomes and the role of new sources of policy influence in the channels of central–local relations.     

Decentralisation,Governance and the Structure of Local Political Institutions: Lessons for Reform?

Many governments are devolving power to elected local councils, hoping to improve service delivery and citizen representation by bringing officials closer to the people. While these decentralisation reforms hold the promise of improved governance, they also present national and sub-national leaders with a complex array of options about how to structure newly empowered local political institutions. This article draws on cross-national experience and the latest research to identify the trade-offs inherent in structuring local political institutions. The study's specific interest is in the impact of strong, locally elected councils on governance and representation. Proceeding from an empirical basis that competitive elections are vital for the legitimacy and efficiency of local political institutions, the analysis first questions the impact of four institutional features – central versus local control, local executive versus local council authority, local council structure, and the role of parties – on service provision and fiscal solvency. The article's second section analyses the impact of decentralisation on political representation, with a particular focus on the role of institutional design in combating the threat of extremist parties. A final section summarises empirical findings and advances some policy-relevant conclusions.     

Grounding the State: Devolution and Development in India's Panchayats

Decentralisation is commonly defended on the grounds that it will bring government closer to people, thereby creating political structures that are more transparent and accountable to poor and marginal groups in society. However, a problem that is well recognised in the decentralisation literature is that the devolution of power will not necessarily improve the performance and accountability of local government. Indeed, in many cases, decentralisation simply empowers local elites to capture a larger share of public resources, often at the expense of the poor. Reflecting on these relatively long-standing problems, an important strand of scholarship has argued that central government can play a central role in counterbalancing the forces that tend to disfavour the poor. In this article, we aim to inform this scholarship by reflecting on the interface between local government and local people in two Indian States: Andhra Pradesh (AP) and Madhya Pradesh (MP). Drawing upon 12 months of primary research, we argue that although the government of AP did not devolve power to the extent that proponents of decentralisation would have liked, its populist approach to certain forms of poverty reduction empowered the poor in ways that the more ambitious decentralisation agenda in MP did not. This, we argue, was due in part to the fact that MP's decentralisation process failed to challenge the well-entrenched power of the village chiefs, the sarpanches. But the discrepancy can also be explained in terms of the historical evolution of ‘development populism’ in AP. In particular, we argue that the strong performance of programmes aimed at subsidising rice for low income households and providing credit to women's ‘self-help groups’ (SHGs) was part of the State government's wider political strategy of enhancing and maintaining electoral support among women, scheduled castes and the poor.     

HRM Reform in Decentralised Local Government: Empirical Perspectives on Recruitment and Selection in the Philippines and Thailand

Over the recent decades decentralisation has been an influential process for public sector reform. Like many countries in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand have experienced a transitional period of decentralisation since the 1990s, but its corresponding results are considered to be poor, allowing for an increase in corruption associated with local elites and other interested parties. This article addresses the problem by focusing on Human Resource Management (HRM), with an emphasis on recruitment and selection in decentralised local governments, as there exists limited research in this area. Despite similar outlook of decentralisation reforms in these countries, the comparative analysis will illustrate differences in HRM policy arrangements between the central and local government, which reflect on the roots and backgrounds of the reform initiatives in each country. Moreover, empirical case observations at the local level from four case cities will present positive HRM practices, as well as the negative ones. Such evidence cannot be explained by contemporary theories on decentralisation, most of which doubt feasibility of the reform in developing countries.     

Decentralisation and recentralisation in the historical development of the local government system in zimbabwe

Local government as an institution constitutes one of the many resources at the disposal of central government for achieving certain ends. The local government system is therefore a means directly related to some perceived ends although in certain cases it can also be pursued as an end in itself. In many countries including Zimbabwe the ends of local government are often unclear and multidimensional including the promotion of local democracy and participation in national politics and development; providing structural framework for the provision of local services, promoting local administrative efficiency and in rather few cases, providing a framework for local economic development.

In many countries local government system is used to either strengthen a top-down hierarchical approach or a bottom-up or horizontal approach to administration and national economic development. Such goals of local government inevitably result in different types of philosophy, administrative theories and strategies, decentralisation models, organisational structures, centre-local relations and the nature of powers ceded to local government by central government. The main theme of this paper is that within the context of Zimbabwe, there has been a major discrepancy between the largely territorial goals or ends to be achieved by post colonial local government transformation and its continuing functional organisation inherited from colonialism. This contradiction is described in the title as decentralisation and recentralisation.     

Towards Strong Local Governance: Current Reform Scenario in Fiji

This article examines how the historical context of poor central-local relations and inefficient service delivery structure is used by the current military-led government in Fiji as a ploy for its local government reform agenda. Based on an analysis of secondary information on local government structure and a review of the reforms undertaken by the Review/Reform Committee, this article identifies the concentration of economic and political power at the central level as one of the major obstacles towards empowering local governance in Fiji. The article emphasizes the need for effective institutional reforms to devolve governance and resources from the centre to the grassroots.     

Co-opting Good Governance Reform: The Rise of a Not-so-Reformist Leader in Kebumen,Central Java

Challenging the existing literature, which tends to downplay the impact of good governance reform in post-Suharto Indonesia, the article suggests that greater intervention by international donors, combined with the process of decentralisation, has influenced the dynamics of political competition at the local level. It suggests that the increasing availability of international aid has provided local elites with an option to engage in a new form of patronage politics that relies less on old instruments, such as money politics and violence. By selectively committing themselves to good governance reform, Indonesian local elites can now seek a new source of power in the form of support from international donors, with which they can raise their profiles as ‘reformists’ and consolidate power, only to engage in familiar, if less blatant, forms of patronage politics. The article highlights such a dimension of local politics with reference to the case of Kebumen's former regent, Rustriningsih.     

An empirical assessment of local autonomy and special district finance in the US

In this article, we interpret local autonomy as a dimensional concept that includes local government importance, local government discretion, and local government capacity. Using longitudinal data from 1962 to 2012 covering all 50 states in the US, we examine how different dimensions of local autonomy affect the expenditure levels and debt levels of special districts. We find that the levels of debt and spending in special districts are lower when local governments have greater revenue diversification. However, fiscal decentralisation in the dimension of local government importance promotes the growth of special district finance. Moreover, our findings on local government discretion suggest that imposing too many fiscal constraints can affect the fiscal independence and capacities of local general-purpose governments. These constraints may also lead to the more extensive use of the fiscal power of special districts that are not subject to fiscal limits.     

Decentralisation and government provision of public goods: The public health sector in Uganda

While many developing countries have devolved health care responsibilities to local governments in recent years, no study has examined whether decentralisation actually leads to greater health sector allocative efficiency. This paper approaches this question by modeling local government budgeting decisions under decentralisation. The model leads to conclusions not all favourable to decentralisation and produces several testable hypotheses concerning local government spending choices. For a brief empirical test of the model we look at data from Uganda. The data are of a type seldom available to researchers–actual local government budgets for the health sector in a developing country. The health budgets are disaggregated into specific types of activities based on a subjective characterisation of each activity's ‘publicness’. The empirical results provide preliminary evidence that local government health planners are allocating declining proportions of their budgets to public goods activities.     

The Depoliticisation of Development and the Democratisation of Politics in Tanzania: Parallel Structures as Obstacles to Delivering Services to the Poor

Local democracy and the involvement of local communities in the provision of social services are central issues in the local government reforms that are presently being implemented in many developing countries. At the same time, institutions that run parallel to local authorities, such as social funds and various user-committees, are established to improve accountability and participation. By focusing on actual political processes rather than administrative, legal and fiscal aspects of decentralisation, this article traces the breakdown of two development projects in Tanzania to the existence of parallel structures. It suggests that user-committees and social funds should be integrated in local authority structures to avoid fragmentation of participation and to enhance local democracy.     

Developing the representational role of elected members: Local involvement,local action in a Birmingham ward

This article focuses on the developing representational role of elected members in Birmingham as part of the wider modernisation agenda. It describes and analyses ‘Local Involvement, Local Action’, a local authority initiative to enhance democratic participation that was set up just prior to the publication of new political management arrangements. This initiative is typical of many local authority approaches, combining a desire to enhance the contribution of local citizens with a decentralisation programme to devolve decision making to the sub‐local level and begin to ‘join‐up’ the actions of a variety of local partners at neighbourhood level. The article highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the LILA initiative and identifies the wider potential and limits of such decentralisation initiatives to enhancing the representational role of elected members.     

Analysing Local Political Management in Spain

This article examines the strong mayor form of local political management in Spain. Drawing on empirical research conducted with members and officers in a Spanish municipality, the system is analysed according to leadership, representation and responsiveness, accountability, scrutiny, and decision-making. It finds that the model underpins concentrated individualised leadership exercised by the mayor. Representativeness and responsiveness in the system are hampered by the absence of electoral divisions within the municipality, meaning citizens do not have their own councillor, and by there being no institutionalised system of citizen participation or decentralisation. Elections every four years serve to hold incumbent mayors to account, and the full council has the power to recall the mayor, though such a recall is unlikely. There is little detailed scrutiny of the performance of the municipal government. It is argued that the security of tenure enjoyed by Spanish mayors is unlikely to be replicated in England, and that there is some concurrence in Spain with reform trends observed elsewhere.     

Local climate governance and policy innovation in China: a case study of a piloting emission trading scheme in Guangdong province

This paper investigates how piloting programmes in China can promote local policy innovations. By using one of the piloting emission trading schemes (ETS) in Guangdong province as a case study, it is argued that the main features of the piloting experiments, particularly in the climate change domain, are largely different from previous local marketization experiments that dominate the reform period of China. Whereas previous experiments are often characterized as bottom-up or indigenous initiatives with strong patronage relations to the pro-reform politicians at central level, the current piloting programmes are often crafted in a top-down fashion that is often misaligned with local market or corporate interests. Hence, local policy innovations are designed, developed and brokered by the local state officers, in order to bridge this central–local interest gap. As a result, successful implementation of these policy innovations largely depends on local political traditions, bureaucratic culture and perceptions of distinctive development needs.     

The effects of fiscal decentralisation on the strength of political budget cycles in local expenditure

In this article we analyse the effects of political business cycles and fiscal decentralisation on the expenditure categories of Polish municipalities. We find convincing evidence demonstrating the impact of strong political business cycles in almost all expenditure categories, particularly for the categories of expenditure relevant to electoral success, such as infrastructure and social programmes. We find evidence that transfers to municipalities increase the strength of the electoral cycle.     

Keeping a watchful eye in times of turmoil? How repeated structural reform leads to more attention to political signals

An important rationale for the creation of semi-autonomous agencies is to create some distance between politics and administration. As such, agencies are expected to shield policy implementation from the daily concerns of political life. However, political actors and politically controlled ministries still influence agencies in various intended and unintended ways. This article focuses on intensive long-term series of structural reforms and how they may undermine the original design philosophy underpinning agencification. We utilize a dataset combining staff surveys and a structural reform database to perform multilevel analyses of employees nested in organizations. We find that the frequency with which agencies have experienced structural reform affects the weight that employees attach to signals from political and ministerial principals. Frequent structural reform may lead to heightened perceptions of the importance of political signals. Hence, frequent structural reforms may increase the risk of political influence on agencies that were designed to operate impartially.     

OUTCOME-BASED PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND THE BALANCE OF POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

We argue that direct democracy forms a specific context for NPM reform, with the voting population as a third agent beside legislature and executive constituting a considerable limit to the legislature's political steering capacity. In this context we expect that NPM will lead to a shift in political power between sovereign, legislature and administration. This article investigates the possibilities of outcome-based public management to ameliorate public action under these circumstances. The findings of the analysis of the NPM reform in the Swiss city of Bern indicate that problems of outcome-based public management are accentuated in a direct democratic system. The puzzling finding is that while the political players themselves see a shift in power between the electorate, legislature and executive, they are doing nothing to compensate this shift.     

State transformation and cross-border regionalism in Indonesia’s periphery: contesting the centre

Abstract

This article examines how the decentralisation and fragmentation of the Indonesian state and resultant central–local dynamics affect cross-border regionalism in Indonesia’s periphery. It argues that cross-border regionalism projects are best understood as sites for scalar contestation over regulatory control between central and local government. Moreover, scalar contestation around cross-border regional projects is characterised by the struggles to control relationships with transnational capital between elites operating at different tiers of the state. When elites at different scales have conflicting interests and strategies, this can cause policy incoherence, inhibiting the development of cross-border regionalism. Conversely, when they align, and intersect with the interests of transnational business, cross-border regionalism can succeed. To illustrate the argument, this article utilises the comparative case studies of the Batam free trade zone and West Kalimantan–Sarawak cross-border cooperation.     

Light,dark and the powers that be: a hydroelectric project in Butembo

Despite its major importance in international trade, the city of Butembo in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo is deprived of such basic urban infrastructure as electricity. Private and public actors have attempted to bring power to the city, but their efforts have remained fruitless. Analysis of these failed projects to electrify the city offers a glimpse of local power relations. Why, rather than cooperating, do various local power holders counteract each other? Will gaining credit for bringing electric power to the city in turn yield political power over its future? With a special focus on a hydroelectric dam that was built but never functioned, this article sheds light on the way in which the citizens of Butembo relate to different bodies of authority. I argue that the hydroelectric dam gradually became a tool in a larger political strategy.