A political genealogy of political economy

If, at the end of the eighteenth century, political economy became the prevailing representation of economic phenomena, this was due to the fact that, better than other economic or political discourses, it constructed a political framework in which three forces could co-exist. These forces were those that all the authors of this century tried to articulate: the state, capitalism, and those who tried to protect themselves from their power.     

Liberalism and the anxiety of belief

Anxiety about perceived threats to liberal freedom has played a double role in liberalism. On the one hand, such anxiety has driven the development of liberal institutions aimed at safeguarding freedoms. Yet another, problematic, side of this anxiety can also be found in the history of liberalism and in the policies and practices of contemporary liberal states. From the beginning, liberal intolerance of those perceived to be connected, through religious affiliation or beliefs, with arbitrary or absolute power and therefore deemed to pose a threat to the existing order has justified social exclusion and, in many cases, systematic violence. Rae’s article examines the theoretical and political roots of this distinctive form of liberal anxiety, tracing the connection between anxiety about Catholicism and Catholics in John Locke’s time and contemporary anxieties about the relationship between Islamism and Muslims in liberal states.     

全球化视野下的学校教育

文化作为一种古老悠久的社会现象,与教育有着密切的关系。没有文化,就不会有教育;如果抽去了文化,教育就不仅失去其内容,而且会失去其作用。在目前的全球化语境下,教育应该继承和发扬中华传统文化,重视与异质文化的交流和理解;同时也要警惕“殖民文化”,抵御“文化侵略”。     

Religion and Politics in Western and Islamic Political Thought: A Clash of Epistemologies?

Early Christianity viewed religion and politics as largely separate; early Islam viewed them as largely concurrent. But from the eighth to the eleventh centuries each modified their original position, so that they almost converged. However, they subsequently diverged again. This was because, in the West, political thought became secularised following the eleventh-century papal reform movement and then the Protestant Reformation. Muslim thinkers, on the other hand, beginning with al-Mawardi (974–1058), sought to restore the subsumption of politics into religion, notably during the sixteenth-century Shi'ite revolution in Iran. While today the West views religion and politics as largely separate categories, Muslims see them as necessarily intertwined; attempts to separate them have so far largely failed. Hence Muslim political thought is based primarily on revelation (interpreted in various ways), while Western political thought is based on philosophy.     

From Islam en France to Islam de France: contradictions of the French left's responses to Islam

ABSTRACT

The political class in France, especially the left, has been profoundly shaped by the revolutionary heritage of 1789. Determined to combat the determinisms that fractured French society under the ancien régime, such as religion, the individual was reconfigured, first as a citizen and then, by the left, as indistinguishable from a class, the proletariat. While in both cases the conceptualization of the individual had the benefit of unity and clarity, the abstract nature of these notions too often left out those very factors that are most significant to those individuals themselves for their self-definition. Moreover, the social transformation of France since the 1960s has exposed the culture-specific conditioning that underlay the apparent neutrality of the conceptualization of the individual bequeathed by 1789. Raymond explores how the left has struggled with its intellectual heritage in its relationship with minorities, especially Muslims, from the xenophobic populism of the Communists in the early 1980s to the recognition proposed by some Socialists during their last period in government. Paradoxically, the institutional accommodation reached with the Islamic community by the centre-right governments of the past decade, notably the creation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith) in 2002, built on the initiatives of previous Socialist administrations. They set the course for a better integration of the Muslim community by transforming Islam en France (Islam in France) into an Islam de France (French Islam). But in spite of the initial impetus given by the Socialists to the institutional assimilation of Islam, their reactions to the emergence of a French Islamic identity remain contradictory. The question therefore persists as to whether the left in France, impregnated by a historically conditioned secularism, can be reconciled with a community defined by its faith through the emergence of a ‘Gallican’ Islam, or whether the time has come for a fundamental reappraisal of the ideology of the French left, and even the Republic itself.     

城市公共外交研究——以中国扬州为例

如今公共外交越来越受到全球各国的重视。随着全球化发展的加剧、城市化进程的加速以及互联网技术发展带来的国家观念弱化的现实背景下,城市在全球发展中的作用也越来越大,城市公共外交也就由此进入研究的视野。从城市公共外交出现的背景、公共外交的内涵、开展城市公共外交的内外因素、扬州的城市公共外交实践等方面对全球传播视域下的城市公共外交做一些梳理,希望由此引起人们对城市公共外交的更多关注。     

Culture without the State? Reinvigorating Ukrainian Culture with Diasporic Efforts

This article explores the efforts of diaspora groups to reinvigorate culture. Cultural policy studies tend to focus on efforts of the state to fund and support the maintenance, enhancement, and preservation of national culture(s). This article contributes to this area of research by noting the effects of diaspora groups in achieving many of the same ends as official cultural policy through unofficial means. Using Ukraine as an interpretive case study, the article explores diasporic efforts to respond to a lack of cultural policy at home by invigorating Ukrainian culture abroad. Through the use of social networking tools, Ukrainian diaspora groups in the United States and Canada have been successful in maintaining their culture without the state. This study suggests that cultural policy research should involve not only official state‐centric efforts, but nonofficial diaspora‐centric efforts of cultural invigoration.     

Forming Political Culture and Marketing Strategies in a Central-European Setting

ABSTRACT

Having analyzed the different strategies used in the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary election campaigns with reference to the 1990 and 1994 campaigns, we can conclude that the Hungarian election conventions and culture are still in a state of experimentation and exploration. In contrast with American election traditions, in Hungary, not the individual (with the exception of the Alliance of Young Democrats), but the party image is what counts, though, in this respect, considerable changes could be observed during the last few years. The Hungarian political palette is much too fragmented, and this sets a barrier to the necessary desire for creating a suitable forum for the debate of the party leaders and for the declaration of party politics. At present, the party programme reaches the citizens just in implicit, hidden, often symbolic forms of messages.

While the symbols of the left-wing parties were sketchy, unskillful, too rational, and not giving much space for emotional influence, the right-wing parties gave too large of a dose of different symbols, which were emotional rather than rational. This lack of balance made the campaigns superficial, irrational, sometimes misleading, and abnormal. This feeling of abnormality was strengthened by the fact that the overdose on the part of the right wing was not limited to the campaign period, but the emotional shocking started much earlier. The state of excitement, which was spread in time, actually started in the spring of 1998, and even if there were fluctuations, the general mood of the last four years was characterised by the dug-out hatchet. The political opinion of the Orbán party was clearly expressed by their metaphors. The message of the sentences like 'it is more than change of government, less than change of regime,' 'attacking on the whole field,' 'we change the telephone directories,' etc., was unambiguous: combative four years are coming. During their campaign, 'setting up a record' was realized between the two rounds after the failure in the first round and was still going on showing the election failure, which came about in democratic circumstances (Galló Béla, 2002, 93).

One could hardly judge the effectiveness of agenda building, though some of the crucial social questions appeared as cue words and sentences in the mediated messages of parties (for example, family, health care, education, joining the European Union). Hungarian campaigning, compared to the American presidential election campaign, is colorless and rife with technical and rhetorical errors, and it is a competition without any coherence where the citizen is very often just a means of, but not the goal in, the struggle of the parties.     

Cultural difference in the national state: from trouser-selling Jews to unbridled multiculturalism

ABSTRACT

Stoetzler explores a series of newspaper and journal articles published in Germany in 1879–81 that are part of what later came to be called the ‘Berlin Antisemitism Dispute’. In these articles, anti-Jewish remarks by the historian and right-wing liberal politician Heinrich von Treitschke were responded to by leading political and academic figures, including Theodor Mommsen, Moritz Lazarus and Ludwig Bamberger. Treitschke's texts have been seen as crucial to the development of modern antisemitism in Germany, but the debate that they provoked also points to some of the conceptual weaknesses of the liberal critique of antisemitism. Stoetzler suggests that both Treitschke's support for antisemitism and the ambivalence evident in the views of his opponents are rooted in the contradiction between inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies inherent in the nation-state. To the extent that liberal society constitutes itself in the form of a national state, it cannot but strive to guarantee, or produce, some degree of homogeneity or conformity in the form of a national culture that, in turn, cannot be separated from issues of morality and religion. Stoetzler argues that a discussion of the Berlin Antisemitism Dispute in its specific context of German nineteenth-century liberalism, if interpreted in the more general framework of modern liberal society, can contribute to current debates on nationalism, patriotism, ethnic minorities, immigration and ‘multicultural society’.