Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing terrorist activity

Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.     

Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model

Terrorism in general, and suicidal terrorism in particular, is popularly seen as “irrational,” but many economists and political scientists argue otherwise. This paper distinguishes three different senses of irrationality: unresponsiveness to incentives, deviation from narrow self-interest, and failure of rational expectations. It concludes that an intermediate position on the rationality of terrorism is appropriate. The typical terrorist sympathizer deviates only slightly from homo economicus. But active terrorists arguably stray from narrow self-interest and rational expectations, and suicidal terrorists probably violate both. Deterrence remains a viable anti-terrorism strategy, but deviations from rational expectations increase the potential of persuasion and appeasement.     

International political system, supreme values and terrorism

Terrorism is becoming a weapon of ever increasing importance to reach certain ends, given the potential of mass destruction available to leading international powers and the rise of one superpower dominating the international system. In most cases terrorism is driven by an ideology comprising a world view with supreme values. Since these values are absolutely true to believers, they have to be preferred to everything, so that terrorists are required to sacrifice not only the lives of others but also their own. It is therefore difficult to prevent this kind of terrorism. But the threatening damages can be mitigated by economic, technological and political decentralization. In the long run, it is even more important to win the spiritual fight. This can be done by starting from the fact that believers in ideologies whose supreme values are conflicting, can only live together peacefully, if they accept that each individual has the right to choose his or her own belief. A corresponding education has to prevent fundamentalist instruction and to inculcate the basic rules of a free society.     

Bargaining and Learning While Fighting

Much of the existing formal work on war models the decision to go to war as a game-ending, costly lottery. This article relaxes this assumption by treating war as a costly process during which the states run the risk of military collapse. The model also allows for uncertainty over either the cost of fighting or the distribution of power. The analysis makes four contributions to the growing costly-process literature: (i) the present model provides a more general treatment of the learning process that occurs when states are uncertain about the distribution of power, (ii) it explicitly compares the bargaining and learning processes for the two different sources of uncertainty, (iii) it suggests a way to empirically distinguish wars arising from these two sources, and (iv) it shows that the equilibrium dynamics of informational accounts of war may be quite sensitive to the underlying bargaining environment through which information is conveyed .     

The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism

We conduct an empirical analysis of data relating measures of economic and political freedom to the occurrence of transnational terrorism 1996–2002. We use binary logistical regression models to predict the probablities that a country will experience transnational terrorist attacks and that a given terrorist originates in a particular country. We find that the extent of political rights and civil liberties is negatively related with the generation of transnational terrorists from a country, but where the former is also negatively related with the occurrence of transnational terrorism in a country, the latter exhibits a non-linear relationship. A number of alternative explanations are disconfirmed: transnational terrorism is unrelated to inequality, economic growth, education, poverty, etc., while a society's fractionalization has mixed importance, and the religious composition has no or little association with attracting or producing transnational terrorism. A more trade-oriented economy seems consistently to associate with smaller probabilities of a country experiencing and generating transnational terrorism.     

Collective versus unilateral responses to terrorism

Global terrorism presents collective action issues for targeted nations. Proactive measures (e.g., preemptive strikes) against terrorists create external benefits for all at-risk nations. In contrast, defensive actions deflect attacks to softer targets, thereby giving rise to external benefits to protected foreign residents and external costs to venues abroad. Coordinated antiterrorism measures are particularly difficult to achieve when many nations must participate and nonparticipants can undo the efforts of others. Thus, freezing terrorists’ assets or abiding by a no-negotiation pledge pose difficult collective action problems. These same concerns do not plague decisive action against domestic terrorism.     

Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War

Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.     

The Israel and Palestine land settlement problem, 1948–2005: An analytical history

This paper traces the history of the current conflict between Israel and Palestine from 1948–2005 C.E. It focuses on the frontier conflict between Israel and Palestine, a conflict that has resulted in four major wars during the post-Second World War period, and that has left Israel as the occupying power over a large swathe of territory not allocated to it by the United Nations in 1947. It outlines the nature of the refugee problem in Palestine and neighboring Arab states, and defines the political problems posed both by relative Israel-Palestine population growth, and by the `right to return’ claim by ousted Palestinian Arabs. It reviews the political problems posed by religious extremism and theocratic government both in Israel and Palestine. It concludes with a brief discussion of the unpleasant alternatives left as the road map to peace disintegrates and outlines a preferred solution from the perspective of the advanced western nations.     

The politics of warning: Terrorism and risk communication

The problem of risk communication in the context of imperfect intelligence regarding a prospective, rather than actual, terrorist attack is examined in order to assess recommendations for precise guidance for the public. Particular problems are noted with the iterative quality of risk communications about terrorism, as they allow the terrorists to change their behaviour, the difficulty of offering tactical warning without a prior strategic analysis, and the tendency to focus on the vulnerabilities of a society rather than the intent of the terrorists. These issues are assessed through a case study of the Bali attacks of 2002, before an analysis of the American experience following the attacks of 9/11. This experience confirms the difficulties of attempting to convey risks to the public by altering public alert levels.     

The friend of my enemy is my enemy: International alliances and international terrorism

Terrorism is an instrument for groups that cannot achieve their political goals legally. One important strategic function of terrorism is to weaken the government – either directly by attacking representatives or supporters of the government or indirectly by causing a political response that is unpopular among the population. Often, however, political stability of the home government is buttressed by foreign powers. In this case, the terrorists can have a strategic interest in attacking nationals of these foreign countries. This article analyses this logic by looking at international alliances as a proxy for international support. If the friend of my enemy is my enemy, then terror entrepreneurs, which seek to overthrow their home country's government (the enemy), may find it attractive to target nationals of the foreign allies of their country (the friends of the enemy). The theory in this article predicts that attacking nationals of a foreign ally is particularly attractive if this ally is militarily more powerful than the home country. Moreover, the combined effect of alliance and relative power differentials becomes stronger the more democratic the ally and becomes weaker the more democratic the terrorists' home country. Empirical support for the hypotheses in this article is found in an analysis of a directed country dyad sample of international terrorism.     

The Strategy of Territorial Conflict

Many empirical studies have found that disputes over territory are central to the outbreak and intensity of the majority of interstate military conflict. However, the existing literature lacks an explicit theoretical link between the role territory plays in disputes and the outbreak of violence as well as an exploration of how the control of territory is related to conventional military capabilities. This article demonstrates that the targets of territorial claims can consolidate their control over disputed territory to improve their ability to fight effectively on it. The empirical analysis suggests that when territory is strategically located, target states are more likely to consolidate their position, while challenger states are less likely to escalate militarily. Furthermore, when the presence of territorial characteristics such as strategic location makes consolidation an effective strategy, target states are increasingly likely to consolidate as they face stronger opponents.     

Governance of Terror: New Institutionalism and the Evolution of Terrorist Organizations

A preoccupation with network approaches in terrorism studies has inadvertently marginalized the fact that terrorist groups are subject to many of the same bureaucratic forces that impact all purposeful organizations. Because typical organizations are subsumed in the concept of networks, it is curious that scholars have been so quick to bypass more traditional models of organizations and bureaucracy that may help us understand network topology. This article relies on the new institutional approach to organizational behavior. Using the Coase theorem to explain the costs and benefits associated with different organizational structures, it follows that counterterrorism efforts may drive some groups toward greater autonomy while compelling others to adopt common bureaucratic processes, often referred to as isomorphism. By exploring the different costs that terror groups face and examining the characteristics of terrorists associated with different groups, organizational theory can help explain a divergent trend in terrorism research: leaderless jihad and increased bureaucratization.     

All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism

This article discusses the important role that Signals Intelligence (Sigint) has played, and continues to play, in the war against international terrorism. It sets out what is known or can be authoritatively established about the role that Sigint played in the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, especially the performance of America's Sigint organization, the National Security Agency (NSA). The article also analyzes what the potential future role of Sigint may be in the war on terrorism given the ever changing nature of terrorist operations, the growing number of technological impediments to effective Sigint collection against terrorist targets, and shifting geostrategic considerations on the part of the nations engaged in the fight against the international terrorists.     

On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option

We examine whether nations, faced with the threat of terrorism, will be motivated to engage in the efficient amount of retaliation against terrorists. We demonstrate that the problem confronting the efforts of nations to achieve an optimal retaliation against terrorists is understated by the traditional free-rider analysis. In particular, nations have the option of actually selling or reducing the public good of retaliation, provided through the efforts of others, by offering safe havens to terrorists in return for the terrorists' pledge to attack elsewhere. This paid-rider behavior is also shown to apply to other public good scenarios.The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Gordon Tullock on an earlier draft. Sole responsibility for the paper's content rests with the authors. Todd Sandler's research was supported by a Science and Humanities Research Institute Summer Grant at Iowa State University.     

Border Controls as a Dimension of the European Union's Counter-Terrorism Policy: A Critical Assessment

This article critically examines the use and effectiveness of border controls in the European Union (EU)'s counter-terrorism policy. It shows that the EU has made substantial progress towards achieving the objectives that it had set for itself in this policy area, but has not managed to fulfil all of them, and certainly not by the deadlines originally set. It further argues that, contrary to their usual depiction in EU official documents, these border control measures make a limited contribution to the actual fight against terrorism, whilst having some negative effects. From that viewpoint, the fact that the EU has failed to meet all of its objectives in the use of border controls for counter-terrorist purposes may paradoxically be seen as a positive outcome.     

Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes

Recent research suggests that democracies have advantages and disadvantages in wars. Democracies are more likely to win the wars they initiate and the ones in which they are targeted. Wars initiated by democracies are also uniformly shorter and less costly than wars initiated by nondemocracies. However, democracies are also less likely to continue fighting and less likely to win as war drags on. Democracies are also particularly likely to be targeted. We present a bargaining model that reconciles these divergent findings. The model explains why democracies are more likely to win but are also more likely to settle and more likely to be targeted than other types of regimes. The model's explanation of these facts differs in important ways from existing explanations. The model also suggests several new hypotheses relating regime type to the terms of settlement and the onset of war .     

Terrorism as theater: Analysis and policy implications

In some regards the production of terrorism resembles the production of culture, especially television and theater. Terrorism is a spectacle produced for viewers, many of whom live apart from the violent staged events. Spectacular theater and the telling of memorable stories are inputs for fundraising and motivating subsequent terrorists. This understanding of terrorist motivation has concrete policy implications.     

Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies

The perception of threat and the experience of anxiety are distinct but related public reactions to terrorism. Anxiety increases risk aversion, potentially undercutting support for dangerous military action, consistent with terrorists' typical aims. Conversely, perceived threat increases a desire for retaliation and promotes animosity toward a threatening enemy, in line with the usual goals of affected governments. Findings from a national telephone survey confirm the differing political effects of anxiety and perceived threat. The minority of Americans who experienced high levels of anxiety in response to the September 11 attacks were less supportive of aggressive military action against terrorists, less approving of President Bush, and favored increased American isolationism. In contrast, the majority of Americans who perceived a high threat of future terrorism in the United States (but were not overly anxious) supported the Bush administration's antiterrorism policies domestically and internationally.     

How migration policies moderate the diffusion of terrorism

There is an ongoing debate among practitioners and scholars about the security consequences of transnational migration. Yet, existing work has not, so far, fully taken into account the policy instruments states have at their disposal to mitigate these risks, and reliable evidence is lacking for the effectiveness of such measures. This article addresses both shortcomings as whether and to what extent national migration policies affect the diffusion of terrorism via population movements are analysed. Spatial analyses report robust support for a moderating influence of states’ policies: while terrorism can travel from one country to another via larger migration populations, this only applies to target countries with extremely lax regulations and control mechanisms. This research sheds new light on the security implications of population movements, and it crucially adds to our understanding of governments’ instruments for addressing migration challenges as well as their effectiveness.     

谈铁路反暴力恐怖中的防范与保卫

铁路联系着国民经济的各行各业,往往是恐怖分子进行恐怖活动的首选目标。事实上来自新疆、西藏等地的“东 突”、“藏独”民族分裂势力、暴力恐怖势力、宗教极端势力已对铁路构成了严重威胁。面对严峻的恐怖敌情,我们必须加强防 范与保卫工作,通过提高安全意识、加强安全措施,对可能遭受恐怖袭击的目标进行保护,防范潜在的恐怖威胁。根据铁路的 实际情况,防范工作重点是:建立和完善反暴力恐怖协调机制;加强反暴力恐怖宣传教育工作,树立全民防范意识;明确目标, 落实责任;运用手段,获取情报;加强对危险物品的监督管理。