Effective Foreign Aid Following Civil War: The Nonstrategic‐Desperation Hypothesis

When does aid foster development after civil war? A testable model is needed to account for the uneven outcomes in postconflict development. This article proposes and empirically tests the novel nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis, an explanation based on the varied incentives that fragile postconflict governments face when confronted with donor development goals. Paradoxically, incentives to meet development goals only exist when donors have little strategic interest in the recipients and when recipients lack income from resource rents and are therefore desperate for income. Ten‐year data on infant mortality changes following civil wars ending 1970–96 and a variety of robustness checks support the hypothesis. By focusing on how income sources constrain the choices of aid recipients, and how these constraints can provide incentives to meet donor development goals, the nonstrategic‐desperation hypothesis explains how the good use of aid can take place following civil war, when institutions are weak.     

Born Weak,Growing Strong: Anti‐Government Protests as a Signal of Rebel Strength in the Context of Civil Wars

All rebel organizations start weak, but how do they grow and achieve favorable conflict outcomes? We present a theoretical model that allows for rebel organizations to gain support beyond their “core” and build their bargaining power during fighting. We highlight that rebel organizations need to win over crucial parts of society to generate the necessary support that allows them to attain favorable civil conflict outcomes. We find empirical support for the argument that low‐income individuals who initially fight the government (rebel organizations) have to convince middle‐class individuals to turn out against the government to gain government concessions. Empirically, we demonstrate that government concessions in the form of peace agreements and the onset of negotiations become more likely when protest occurs in the context of civil conflicts.

Replication Materials

The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MYDZNF .

     

Sexual Violence,Competitive State Building,and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ABSTRACT

This article examines the practices of rape, sexual enslavement, and forced marriage used by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Most research see wartime sexual violence as solutions to battlefields challenges. Studies of civil war and competitive state building during civil wars have largely overlooked the implications of such violence for rebel governance. This article explores how efforts to regulate sexuality figure within processes of violent state formation. ISIS’s practices of sexual violence mirror previous efforts by the Iraqi and Syrian state to substantiate ethno-sectarian domination through violence. But ISIS creates new gendered and ethno-sectarian hierarchies. Repertoires of sexual and gender-based violence can help to sustain and create structures of state control and are thus integral to competitive state building.     

The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party

We analyze the first large‐scale, randomized experiment to measure presidential approval levels at all outcomes of a canonical international crisis‐bargaining model, thereby avoiding problems of strategic selection in evaluating presidential incentives. We find support for several assumptions made in the crisis‐bargaining literature, including that a concession from a foreign state leads to higher approval levels than other outcomes, that the magnitudes of audience costs are under presidential control prior to the initiation of hostilities, and that these costs can be made so large that presidents have incentive to fight wars they will not win. Thus, the credibility of democratic threats can be made extremely high. We also find, however, that partisan cues strongly condition presidential incentives. Party elites have incentives to behave according to type in Congress and contrary to type in the Oval Office, and Democratic presidents sometimes have incentives to fight wars they will not win.     

Romanticizing bureaucratic leadership? The politics of how elected officials attribute responsibility for performance

A core task for elected officials is to hold bureaucratic leaders responsible, but how do they determine if public managers actually influence outcomes? We propose that partisan and leadership heuristics affect how politicians apply a logic of individualized responsibility, that is, focus on individual bureaucrats rather than situational factors to explain organizational outcomes. We match survey data of local elected officials in Denmark with individual partisan variables and objective performance data about the schools they oversee. We provide evidence that partisan beliefs matter, with conservative elected officials more willing to pursue a logic of individualized responsibility. We also find that elected officials are more likely to assume that bureaucratic leaders determine organizational outcomes where performance is very high or low, a leadership attribution heuristic previously established in private sector studies. We argue that our findings have important implications for contemporary governance, given the growing reliance on performance metrics to assign responsibility.     

列宁关于加重对党员判罪的思想及启示

为加强执政党纯洁性,列宁结合苏俄政治建设实际提出了"加重对党员判罪"思想并贯彻在司法实践中。列宁思想的实质就是在提高党的执政能力和领导水平过程中,反对执政党成员特权,反对腐败,加强纯洁性,从严治党。这一思想为中国共产党在新民主主义革命局部执政时期所继承,在全面执政后社会主义建设改革实践中得以发展。马克思主义经典作家关于加重对党员判罪思想对党的廉政建设具有重要价值:反对特权,重申党员领导干部廉洁从政的政治准则;明确责任,进一步提高党员干部的法律意识;严明纪律,加大对违法党员干部的惩处力度。     

Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption

This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians—as well as to create incentives for performance—declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.     

Creating Shared Responsibility through Respect for Military Culture: The Russian and American Cases

The key problem in civil‐military relations in established polities such as Russia and the United States is not civilian control of the military, but rather how to create a symbiotic relationship of “shared responsibility” between senior military officers and civilian leaders. In such a situation, civilian leaders obtain much needed expertise from the military, but ultimately remain in control. The keys to symbiotic civil‐military relations are a desire on the part of military officers to work with civilians and civilian respect for military culture. When civilians respect military culture—that is, the military’s (1) devotion to clear executive leadership, (2) commitment to corporate identity, (3) drive to increase professional expertise, and (4) dedication to political responsibility—a system of shared responsibility is likely to emerge. This thesis is elaborated by comparing recent civil‐military relations in Russia and the United States.     

Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

Wars within states have become much more common than wars between them. A dominant approach to understanding civil war assumes that opposition movements are unitary, when empirically, most of them are not. I develop a theory for how internal divisions within opposition movements affect their ability to bargain with the state and avoid conflict. I argue that more divided movements generate greater commitment and information problems, thus making civil war more likely. I test this expectation using new annual data on the internal structure of opposition movements seeking self‐determination. I find that more divided movements are much more likely to experience civil war onset and incidence. This analysis suggests that the assumption that these movements are unitary has severely limited our understanding of when these disputes degenerate into civil wars.     

If They Endorse It,I Can't Trust It: How Outgroup Leader Endorsements Undercut Public Support for Civil War Peace Settlements

Civil wars are a greater source of violence than any other type of conflict, yet little is known about one of the key determinants of civil war peace settlement success: civilian support. We evaluate how a core component of nearly all peace settlements, leader endorsements, affects public support. We predict that individuals in conflict settings will view settlements endorsed by outgroup leaders as less trustworthy and that they will become less supportive. We conduct an endorsement experiment with nearly 1,000 respondents in South Sudan in 2016, taking advantage of a brief cessation in a devastating civil war. Public support for a tentative settlement drops precipitously when it is endorsed by an outgroup leader but does not increase when it is endorsed by an ingroup leader. We find suggestive evidence that effects are strongest for individuals with the greatest reason to fear outgroup leaders: those whose communities were targeted most violently by that outgroup.     

Civilian victimization and international military intervention in civil wars

Civil wars are particularly destructive and asymmetric in nature. As a result, humanitarian crises and episodes of one-sided violence against civilians are likely to emerge. In the post-Cold War era, human rights norms have been strengthened by a global commitment stating that nations have a responsibility to protect people against war crimes. Although the doctrine does not require military responses, as episodes of one-sided violence increase dramatically in the midst of civil conflict, we would expect those cases to experience relatively swift foreign response, including military intervention; a growing trend of at least purportedly humanitarian interventions should be observable. Expectations relating to the responsibility to protect are tested on all civil conflicts occurring between 1989 and 2006. Findings indicate that there is little evidence that one-sided violence leads to military intervention, suggesting that the internationally community does not use its most powerful tool to protect civilians in trouble.     

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.     

State Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges

Do state supreme courts act impartially or are they swayed by public opinion? Do judicial elections influence judge behavior? To date these questions have received little direct attention due to the absence of comparable public opinion data in states and obstacles to collecting data necessary for comprehensive analysis of state supreme court outcomes. Advances in measurement, data archiving, and methodology now allow for consideration of the link between public opinion and judicial outcomes in the American states. The analysis presented considers public opinion's influence on the composition of courts (indirect effects) and its influence on judge votes in capital punishment cases (direct effects). In elective state supreme courts, public support for capital punishment influences the ideological composition of those courts and judge willingness to uphold death sentences. Notably, public support for capital punishment has no measurable effect on nonelective state supreme courts. On the highly salient issue of the death penalty, mass opinion and the institution of electing judges systematically influence court composition and judge behavior.     

‘Then we offer them a new project’—the production of projects in social work conducted by civil society in Sweden

In some areas in Europe and Sweden, it is possible to find institutional deficits, that is, areas wherein the welfare state has more or less withdrawn its institutions. In parallel with this development, greater interest has shifted towards social work already being conducted by volunteers and non-profit organizations. How this social work could take on more responsibility for the social well-being of society is a key question. By applying the theory of ‘production of projects’, this article examines 13 projects conducted by civil society organizations in Sweden and how they could relate to the civil sector becoming a complement or even an alternative to the state welfare sector. In terms of competition for funding, the projects need to be able to package their ideas well and manage relationships with the beneficiaries. The lack of long-term alternatives and the demand for innovative ideas influence the civil sector’s ability to take more responsibility for the social well-being of society and make political influence more difficult.     

The Haunting of Alice: Local Approaches to Justice and Reconciliation in Northern Uganda

Through the story of a former rebel fighter, this article examinessome of the justice and reconciliation challenges in northernUganda today. While talks between the Lord's Resistance Army(LRA) and Government of Uganda have generated the best chancefor peace in the 20-year conflict, the International CriminalCourt's indictment of rebel leaders threatens this process.The rebels refuse to disarm if indicted; the Chief Prosecutorrefuses to withdraw indictments as he believes withdrawal willfoster impunity. To resolve this dilemma, local cultural andreligious leaders advocate adapting local justice and reconciliationmechanisms to the situation, arguing that these will both holdrebels accountable and achieve peace. However, little is knownabout local justice processes or their potential to foster reconciliationin war-torn northern Uganda. On the basis of participatory research(2004–2006) with war-affected persons, the article seeksto address this gap, illustrating the potential and limitationsof such locally relevant mechanisms.     

Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions

Abstract

The normative and practical success of the 1990s campaign on the right and responsibility to intervene to stop civil wars should be acknowledged so that policy and research can move on to the more pressing question of how we intervene and improve on currently inadequate results. This essay confronts a standard explanation, the failure to address the root causes of a conflict. It argues from academic research on three aspects – the knowledge on causes shaping current policies, the interests of those who matter in intervention, and the new research on civil war – that a focus on root causes would not improve outcomes and could even be counterproductive.     

铁路公安消防监督中的建设工程单位确定之我见

铁路公安机关消防机构在建设工程防火设计审核、验收、备案、检查等监督执法中,与建设单位往往存在一定的分歧。有些＂建设单位＂是不具备民事责任能力的。这使得铁路公安机关消防机构实施的消防许可、下达违法通知书、消防行政处罚等具体行政行为的对象确定出现错位。基于此,＂建设单位＂应从民法学的角度,按照是否具有民事权利能力和民事行为能力,依法独立享有民事权利和承担民事义务的标准进行判定。     

Sharing the costs of fighting justly

ABSTRACT

Combatants who attempt to obey the laws of war often have to take considerable risks in order to effectively discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Sometimes this task is made even more complicated by systemic factors which influence their ability to discriminate effectively without unduly risking their lives or the mission. If they fail to do so, civilians often pay the price. In this paper, I argue that to the extent that non-combatants benefit from the attempt to fight justly, and to the extent that wars in which combatants attempt to fight justly can be understood as a system of social cooperation which produces both burdens and benefits, non-combatants have a responsibility to shoulder their fair share of these burdens. Thus, if combatants (and by extension enemy non-combatants) are disproportionately burdened in a conflict, non-combatants ought to take on some costs, for instance in order to reduce the strain imposed on combatants by systemic factors such as the availability and distribution of resources.     

Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War

Although violent organizations often use terrorism as a means to achieve political aims, recent studies suggest the tactic is ineffective because it fails to help groups gain concessions. While focused exclusively on concessions, these studies overlook other important markers of success, specifically whether groups are invited to participate in negotiations as a result of their use of terrorism. Extant studies also conduct statistical analyses on overly aggregated data, masking any effect terrorism has on important bargaining outcomes. Using new monthly data on the incidence of negotiations and the number of concessions offered to groups involved in African civil wars, this paper demonstrates that rebel groups are both more likely to be granted the opportunity to participate in negotiations and offered more concessions when they execute a greater number of terror attacks during civil wars.