Deciding Not to Decide: The Politics of Recusals on the U.S. Supreme Court

When are U.S. Supreme Court justices more likely to recuse themselves from cases? This article proposes a strategic model of recusal behavior, hypothesizing that the justices balance statutory guidelines concerning recusals against other policy and institutional goals. Using data from the Supreme Court Database, I find evidence that recusal behavior is influenced by a combination of statutory, policy, and institutional considerations. Consistent with statutory explanations, which emphasize the elimination of bias or its appearance, justices are more likely to recuse themselves from cases when business interests are before the Court, when they have served for shorter terms, and when they have previously acted as Solicitor General. However, I also find that the justices are less likely to recuse themselves when cases are likely to be close or when the justices' policy goals are likely to be advanced by participating. These findings suggest that while the justices do follow statutory recusal guidelines, they also have other institutional and policy incentives that lead them to participate in cases despite their conflicts of interest.     

Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?

Does understanding how U.S. Supreme Court justices actually decide cases undermine the institutional legitimacy of the nation's highest court? To the extent that ordinary people recognize that the justices are deciding legal disputes on the basis of their own ideological biases and preferences (legal realism and the attitudinal model), the belief that the justices merely “apply” the law (mechanical jurisprudence and the myth of legality) is difficult to sustain. Although it is easy to see how the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, the most unaccountable of all American political institutions, is nurtured by the view that judicial decisionmaking is discretionless and mechanical, the sources of institutional legitimacy under legal realism are less obvious. Here, we demonstrate, using a nationally representative sample, that the American people understand judicial decisionmaking in realistic terms, that they extend legitimacy to the Supreme Court, and they do so under the belief that judges exercise their discretion in a principled and sincere fashion. Belief in mechanical jurisprudence is therefore not a necessary underpinning of judicial legitimacy; belief in legal realism is not incompatible with legitimacy.     

The Influence of Public Sentiment on Supreme Court Opinion Clarity

We examine whether public opinion leads Supreme Court justices to alter the content of their opinions. We argue that when justices anticipate public opposition to their decisions, they write clearer opinions. We develop a novel measure of opinion clarity based on multifaceted textual readability scores, which we validate using human raters. We examine an aggregate time series analysis of the influence of public mood on opinion clarity and an individual‐level sample of Supreme Court cases paired with issue‐specific public opinion polls. The empirical results from both models show that justices write clearer opinions when their rulings contradict popular sentiment. These results suggest public opinion influences the Court, and suggest that future scholarship should analyze how public opinion influences the written content of decision makers’ policies.     

Diversifying State Supreme Courts

Why do some states diversify their supreme courts sooner than others? Using original data on the first black and female state supreme court justices, I contend that political and institutional pressures influence when states diversify their high courts. The results suggest that selection systems, institutions affecting turnover, and the appointment of political minorities to the United States Supreme Court are associated with states seating their first black and female justices. The findings have implications for our understanding of the political and institutional circumstances that promote judicial diversity.     

Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Division

Research on the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that judges' decisions are influenced by their policy preferences. Moreover, judges behave strategically to facilitate outcomes that conform as close as possible to those preferences. We seek to generalize this assertion to judicial actors in two very diverse social systems: Canada in the post-Charter years and apartheid-era South Africa. Specifically, we analyze the use of panel assignments by the chief justices in both countries. We find that chief justices do behave strategically. Chief justices in both countries do not assign judges to panels randomly but rather are influenced by the tenure and ideology of the sitting judges and the issues presented in the case.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">Originalism</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Bold">, Pragmatic Conservatism,and Living Document Judicial Philosophies: Explaining Variation in U.S. Supreme Court Votes in Criminal Procedure Cases for the 1994–2014 Terms of Court</Emphasis>

Prior research on U.S. Supreme Court justice votes and case outcomes has examined a variety of hypotheses to explain variation in voting and case decisions in criminal procedure matters. Largely ignored by prior work, however, is the notion that the effects of the measures used to examine these prior hypotheses may vary for the justices based on the judicial philosophy espoused and followed by the justice. This article identifies three distinct overarching judicial philosophies of law interpretation that have guided the justices for much of the Rehnquist Court and the entirety of the Roberts Court: Originalism, Pragmatic Conservatism, and Living Document. It contextualizes the Information, Affected Groups, and Legal Issue hypotheses in a framework that considers their potential effects across Originalist, Pragmatic Conservative, and Living Document justices on the Court for the 1994 through 2014 terms. The study finds that enhanced activity by special interest organizations (the Affected Groups Hypothesis) in support of the non-government other party impacts vote direction among Pragmatic Conservative and Living Document justices but not for the Originalist justices. It also finds more case type (Legal Issue) effects for Originalist justices than for Pragmatic Conservative and Living Document justices in that for Originalist justices a vote for the government is less likely in cases that concern statutory meaning (relative to constitutional meaning). Implications are discussed.     

Mapping and Explaining Parliamentary Rule Changes in Europe: A Research Program

We outline a comprehensive research program on institutional reforms in European parliaments. Original data show that parliamentary rules in Western European parliaments have been changed frequently and massively during the period from 1945 to 2010 suggesting that actors use institutional reforms as a distinct strategy to pursue their substantive goals. We discuss how institutional instability affects existing theoretical and empirical arguments about institutional effects. Furthermore, we present four ideal‐typical approaches to analyzing rule changes, present new software tools for identifying and coding changes in large text corpora, and demonstrate their usefulness for valid measurement of the overall change between subsequent text versions.     

Birth Order,Preferences, and Norms on the U.S. Supreme Court

The members of the U.S. Supreme Court have different ideas about what constitutes good judicial policy as well as how best to achieve that policy. From where do these ideas originate? Evolutionary psychology suggests that an answer may lie in early life experiences in which siblings assume roles that affect an adult's likely acceptance of changes in the established order. According to this view, older siblings take on responsibilities that make them more conservative and rule‐bound, while younger ones adopt roles that promote liberalism and greater rebelliousness. Applying this theory to the Court, I show that these childhood roles manifest themselves in later life in the decisions of the justices. Birth order explains not only the justices’ policy preferences but also their acceptance of one important norm of judicial decisionmaking, specifically their willingness to exercise judicial review.     

Lawyers,Justices, and Issue Salience: When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?

A good deal of scholarly evidence suggests that the decisionmaking of the U.S. Supreme Court is affected by legal argument. At the same time, it seems clear that in a great many cases the justices have enduring, strongly held views. In such cases, they should be impervious to the effects of advocacy. When are the justices apt to be influenced by the Court's legal community, and when will lawyers be less relevant? The answer, we think, has to do with the salience of the issue before the Court. We suspect that in nonsalient cases the justices have less‐intense preferences and therefore are open to the persuasion of lawyers. In salient cases, by contrast, the content of legal policy matters much more to the justices. As a result, they are less amenable to legal argument and adhere more strictly to their personal policy preferences. Our empirical tests support this orientation.     

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: Jury Size and Jury Verdict Requirements—Legal and Social Science Approaches

We review six recent U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with the constitutionality of decision-making by juries with fewer than twelve members or operating under verdict requirements less stringent than unanimity. For the issues raised in each of these cases, we contrast the views of Supreme Court justices with data drawn from social science research and from statistical models of group decision processes.     

Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court

How do interest groups influence U.S. Supreme Court justices to vote in favor of their preferred outcomes? Following prior research on the influence of the Solicitor General, we develop and expand on the signaling theory of interest group influence via amicus curie briefs. We argue that an interest group's ideological reputation and the nature of the ideological signal it sends in its brief both function as powerful heuristics that convey information to the justices depending on the justices' own ideological preferences. When an organization files an amicus brief advocating for an outcome seemingly contrary to its traditional preferences (i.e., an unexpected signal), this signal should be more noticeable and credible than a signal in accordance with a group's conventional views (i.e., an expected signal). However, unexpected signals should have greater influence on justices who share the brief filer's preferences. We test our signaling theory on the terms from 1991 through 2002. We find that unexpected signals (but not expected signals) are associated with Supreme Court voting, and the influence of unexpected signals appears to be particularly strong among justices who share the ideological preferences of the brief filer.     

The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making

Law professors and political scientists generally subscribe to opposed theories of Supreme Court decision making. Law professors, to a great degree, adhere to an internal view: Supreme Court justices decide cases according to legal rules, principles, and precedents. Political scientists follow an external view: justices decide cases according to their political ideologies or preferences. This article develops an interpretive-structural theory that harmonizes these seemingly opposed views. This interpretive-structural theory not only explains why the internal and external views often are both effective but also why, sometimes, one approach might be more effective than the other. The article concludes by comparing the interpretive-structural theory with the "new institutionalism" that is emerging in political science.     

The Intent Behind the Cryptic Concurrence That Provided a Reporter's Privilege

Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence in Branzburg v. Hayes that, despite a majority opinion to the contrary, eventually provided room for journalists to claim a privilege against testifying in grand jury proceedings. For decades, scholars and judges have questioned what Justice Powell meant by his concurrence and whether he, in fact, supported a reporter's right to refuse to reveal confidential information. Justice Powell's personal papers and case files, as well as those of his fellow justices, observations of one of his former law clerks, and oral arguments shed light on the reasoning behind Justice Powell's enigmatic concurrence. This article concludes that Justice Powell supported a qualified reporter's privilege, applied on a case-by-case basis.     

The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content

We address fundamental questions about the ability of interest groups to shape public policy by examining the influence of amicus curiae briefs on U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion content. We argue that the justices will incorporate language from amicus briefs into their opinions based on the extent to which the amicus briefs contribute to their ability to make effective law and policy. Using plagiarism detection software and other forms of computer assisted content analysis, we find that the justices adopt language from amicus briefs based primarily on the quality of the brief's argument, the level of repetition in the brief, the ideological position advocated in the brief, and the identity of the amicus. These results add fresh insight into how interest groups influence the development of federal law by the Supreme Court.     

Collegial Influence and Judicial Voting Change: The Effect of Membership Change on U.S. Supreme Court Justices

Understanding the source of voting changes by appellate judges provides an important window into the factors that shape the votes of the judges more generally. We argue that membership changes, by altering the collegial context in which judges make their choices, affect the information environment, long-term collegial considerations, and short-term strategic calculations. As a result, membership change should lead to greater uncertainty and more frequent voting changes among continuing justices in the term following a replacement. We test this proposition by looking at vote change by justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in two separate analyses: justices' votes on search-and-seizure cases since Mapp v. Ohio (1961) and on the progeny of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) . Our results support the argument that the collegial context helps explain changes in voting choices. Our analysis suggests that collegial considerations are an important component of judges' behavior and merit further evaluation in a cross-national context.     

Does Chevron Matter?

In this article we evaluate whether the Supreme Court's much-discussed decision in Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council (1984) signaled a lasting difference in how the justices decide administrative law cases, by comparing and testing the predictions of three distinct theories of Supreme Court behavior. The legal model predicts an increase in deference to administrative agencies. This prediction is shared by the jurisprudential regime model, which also predicts that the justices evaluate key case factors differently before and after Chevron . The attitudinal model predicts no change in the justices' behavior as a result of Chevron . Although we find that attitudes matter, the fact that we also find support for the legal and jurisprudential regime models undermines the assertion of the attitudinal model that law cannot explain Supreme Court votes on the merits.     

Affirmed: A Study of Criminal Appeals and Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal

The work of state intermediate appellate courts is often described as “correcting legal errors” and “supervising” trial courts. But what do these labels mean in practice? This article explores the intermediate appellate process through a study of criminal appeals in a California Court of Appeal. Part I describes the characteristics and dispositions of criminal appeals. Contrary to popular impression, a conviction was reversed in only about 5 percent of these appeals. To explain the low reversal rate, part II draws upon interviews with justices of the Court of Appeal to examine the institutional norms and perspectives guiding the court's decisions. The basic decision norms described by the justices are norms of affirmance: for example, the harmless error rule and the substantial evidence rule incline the court to affirm despite certain legal errors or factual questions. Moreover, the particularistic approach the court typically takes in its decision making apparently sensitizes it to the substantive characteristics prevailing in criminal appeals: the crimes are serious and there is little doubt about factual guilt. The low reversal rate and the analysis of the court's norms suggest that intermediate appellate review of criminal convictions is narrower and more constrained than the “error correction” and “supervision” labels imply. Part III explores the implications of the case study for appellate policy.     

POLICY PREFERENCES OF JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS

Focusing on the issue of civil rights, this study examines the relationship between policy preferences of presidents and the votes of the Supreme Court justices they appointed. Through content analysis of presidential statements, relatively systematic measures of civil rights policy views for five recent presidents were obtained and compared with the voting records on civil rights of justices they appointed to the Supreme Court. The findings suggest that although a correspondence exists between presidential preferences and judicial votes, presidents have been only moderately successful in appointing justices whose votes reflect presidential preferences.     

U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making, Case Salience, and the Attitudinal Model

Does case salience condition the role of ideological preferences in the decisions of U.S. Supreme Court justices? Does the attitudinal model of judicial behavior hold equally true in high salience and low salience cases? In this article, we analyze the role of case salience as a moderating influence on the explanatory capacity of the attitudinal model and test the strength of the model in high salience versus low salience contexts. Using civil rights votes during forty‐seven Supreme Court terms, from 1953 through 2000, we find that the attitudinal model is sensitive to case salience and that justices rely significantly more on ideological preferences when deciding high salience cases than low salience ones. Our findings represent an important qualification to the attitudinal model.