Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU

Abstract:  This article argues that European integration has triggered a dual constitutionalisation process in Europe. One is the revision of national constitutions to accommodate the integration project at the national level. The other is the construction of transnational rules to regulate novel inter-state relationships at the European level. EU referendums are contextualised in such a duel constitutionalisation process. At the domestic level, EU referendums handle the debates on national constitutional revision. At the transnational level, these popular votes ratify supranational constitutional documents. The article comparatively analyses three types of EU referendums—membership, policy and treaty referendums—according to this analytical framework, exploring the campaign mobilisation of voters, national governments, and transnational institutions, and examining the legal and political interaction between referendums and European integration. A key finding is that, as the dual constitutionalisation process deepens and widens, entrenched domestic players and restrained transnational actors are under increasing pressure to 'voice' themselves in EU referendums.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe's Self-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-Reference

This article focuses on theoretical reflections on sovereignty and constitutionalism in the context of the globalization and Europeanisation of the nation states, their politics, and legal systems. Starting from a critical assessment of the Kelsen-Schmitt polemic, the author claims that sovereignty needs to be analysed by the sociological method in order to disclose its current structural differentiation. The constitution of society may be imagined as the multitude of self-constituted and functionally differentiated social subsystems. The constitutional pluralism argument subsequently reconceptualizes sovereignty as socially differentiated and divided between specific subsystems. The EU's differentiated constitutional domain and the paradox of divided sovereignty are used as examples of profound structural and semantic changes in contemporary national and transnational societies. While the sovereign nation-state institutions have become marginalized in political structures of European societies, the self-constitutionalization of the functionally differentiated EU legal system proceeds by internalizing the concept of divided sovereignty and using it semantically as its mode of self-reference.     

The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi-Level Control

In its White Paper on the Governance of the European Union the European Commission has adopted a narrow concept of governance which focuses almost exclusively on public institutions exercising legislative and executive power (in other words institutions of government ). The article suggests that a theory of multi-level control in the EU would attend to greater variety both in the available governance institutions and the techniques of control. The deployment of an analysis grounded in theories of control suggests that the European Commission is substantially holding to a long-held preference for instruments of government premised on the exercise of hierarchical power. This reform path sits uneasily with revived concerns to render the governance of the EU more democratic. Equally it inhibits the generation of more efficient governance arrangements which place greater dependence on communities, competition, and design as alternative bases of control to hierarchy. Control theory suggests that the assertion of different reform agendas and institutional structures by other actors can check the more wayward (and arguably illegitimate) tendencies within the Commission plan, whilst drawing in alternative bases of control which, when combined, may yield technically superior governance solutions.     

BREXIT,democracy and the rule of law

This article employs the image of the antisyzygy, the yoking of opposites, as an analytical tool to understand the dynamic and unresolved tensions built into the very idea of the European Union. It describes the EU as a forming a supranational constitutional space which does not supersede nation states, but instead seeks to preserve their specific identities while promoting and protecting the fundamental values they are called upon to embody as liberal constitutional democracies. The article then critically examines constitutional developments in the UK subsequent to its decision to leave the European Union and suggests that, paradoxically, it may have been the European Union which held the post-War post-imperial United Kingdom together and, without it and outside it, we may anticipate the UK's imminent dissolution into its original constituent nations – Brexit leads inexorably to BreUK-up.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

A systematic justification for the EU's pouvoir constituant mixte: Principles of constitutional politics in supranational polities

This article presents a rational reconstruction of the practice of constitutional politics in supranational polities. In doing so, it seeks to refocus the ongoing debate about constituent power in the EU on the question of who, under what conditions, is entitled to decide on the EU constitutional order. The analysis leads to a number of principles of democratic legitimacy, which include the political autonomy of the members of the state demoi as well as the political autonomy of the members of a cross‐border demos. In explicating these parallel entitlements to political autonomy, I provide a systematic justification for the notion of a pouvoir constituant mixte, according to which the citizens should take control of EU constitutional politics in two roles: as European citizens and as Member State citizens.     

Staring into the abyss: A crisis of the rule of law in the EU

Acceptance of the meaning, operation and enforcement of the rule of law in the EU by its Member States is critical to the Union's legitimacy. Any perceived or real crisis in the rule of law thus merits careful consideration. This article focuses on how a crisis in the rule of law occurred within the EU and how the intended ambiguity of the rule of law has entrenched this crisis. This article argues that the primary cause of the crisis has been the EU's development of a unique ideation of the rule of law ‐ as a constitutional norm, policy instrument and value ‐ that 'hollowed out' the rule of law from a constitutional principle to an expedient policy tool. The EU institutions have entrenched the crisis in the rule of law and then tried to manage the chasm between what it deems as respect for the rule of law and certain Member States' conduct.     

The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement

Abstract:  The Maastricht-Urteil of the German Constitutional Court of October 1993 has left a deep mark on EU law. Although some may consider it as part of legal history, the decision has never been overruled, and the ideas behind it are very much alive. This article tries to examine the legacy of that decision. From a practical point of view, the article focuses on the following issues: the current situation in Germany; the influence on other constitutional or supreme courts and on constitutional reforms in some Member States; the influence on the European Court of Justice and on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Regarding theory, three sections of the article discuss a number of widespread ' idées reçues ' contained in the Maastricht-Urteil on notions such as the state, constituent power ( pouvoir constituant ), and democracy. The next section presents the movement of legal pluralism as an attempt to come to terms with the Maastricht-Urteil and its legacy. It criticises the radical versions of legal pluralism in view of the damage they may cause to essential dimensions of the rule of law. The final section reflects on the real motives behind the Maastricht-Urteil and its legacy, and on possible future developments.     

Still in Deficit: Rights,Regulation, and Democracy in the EU1

Abstract: Critics of the EU's democratic deficit standardly attribute the problem to either sociocultural reasons, principally the lack of a demos and public sphere, or institutional factors, notably the lack of electoral accountability because of the limited ability of the European Parliament to legislate and control the executive powers of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. Recently two groups of theorists have argued neither deficit need prove problematic. The first group adopts a rights‐based view of democracy and claims that a European consensus on rights, as represented by the Charter of Fundamental European Rights, can offer the basis of citizen allegiance to EU wide democracy, thereby overcoming the demos deficit. The second group adopts a public‐interest view of democracy and argues that so long as delegated authorities enact policies that are ‘for’ the people, then the absence of institutional forms that facilitate democracy ‘by’ the people are likewise unnecessary—indeed, in certain areas they may be positively harmful. This article argues that both views are normatively and empirically flawed. This is because there is no consensus on rights or the public interest apart from the majority view of a demos secured through parliamentary institutions. To the extent that these remain absent at the EU level, a democratic deficit continues to exist.     

Constitutions,Constitutionalism, and the European Union

The institutional reforms of the EU, coupled with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have fuelled the debate about a European Constitution. This paper begins by examining the nature of constitutions and constitutionalism. The focus then turns to the EU itself. It is argued that the Community has indeed been transformed into a constitutional legal order, and that the arguments to the contrary are not convincing. This does not however mean that the EU has, or should have, a European Constitution cognisable as such which draws together the constitutional articles of the Treaties, together with the constitutional principles articulated by the European Court of Justice. The difficulties with this strategy are examined in detail, and the conclusion is that we should not at present pursue this course. It would be better to draw on the valuable work done by the European University Institute in its recent study in order to simplify and consolidate the Treaties.     

OLAF’s role in the fight against fraud in the European Union: do too many cooks spoil the broth?

This article discusses the role of OLAF in the fight against fraud in the European Union (EU) by examining (1) its powers and capacity to coordinate the activities of anti-fraud agencies in the twenty seven member states and (2) the constraints which prevent OLAF from operating in a more effective manner. It also analyses OLAF’s relationship with other transnational agencies such as Eurojust and Europol and highlights the degree of fragmentation which exists among the many actors involved in the fight against fraud, a fragmented legal approach and the difficulties this presents in attempting to police sophisticated transnational frauds. The effect of EU expansion on this situation is considered and the support offered to new member states who have been asked to bring their anti-fraud structures up to the standards of existing members within a very short period of time is also examined. The efforts of Romania in seeking to build up anti-fraud structures and systems are discussed in some detail. This article concludes that despite the best efforts of the actors involved, a fragmented legal system and institutions have hampered the fight against fraud in the EU.     

Prospects and Limits of Democratic Governance in the EU

The EU Treaty contains for the first time a title on democratic principles. These provisions emphasise the importance of national parliaments and the EU parliament for the democratic legitimacy of the EU. The new chapter on democratic principles does not address the central challenge of the EU polity to the traditional understanding of democratic legitimacy, the disjunction of political and economic governance as expressed by the important role of independent institutions like the Commission, the European Central Bank and agencies in EU governance . This is a consequence of the fact that the status of independent regulatory institutions in a democratic polity has not been clarified—neither in the EU nor in the Member States. However, such independent institutions exist in diverse forms in several Member States and could hence be understood as a principle of democratic governance common to the Member States. Such an understanding has not yet evolved. The central theoretical problem is that regulatory theories which explain the legitimacy of independent institutions as an alternative to traditional representation remain outside the methodology of traditional democratic theory. Economic constitutional theory, based on social contract theory and widely neglected in the legal constitutional debate, offers a methodological approach to understanding independent regulatory institutions as part of representative democratic governance.     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

Pluralism,Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine

In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co‐equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ‘doctrine of deference’, a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault‐free, it offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be put to good use by the EU courts.     

Constitutionalism and Dissonances: Has Europe Paid Off Its Debt to Functionalism?

Abstract The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional Treaty have opened a period of profound constitutional disenchantment in relation to the EU. This impression seems confirmed by the recent Presidency Conclusions of the European Council which, although salvaging many important solutions contained in the Constitutional Treaty, explicitly sanction that ‘the constitutional concept . . . is abandoned’. In the light of this context, what role could the constitutional scholarship play? How to make sense of a polity in which the claims of constitutionalism as a form of power are politically unappealing though legally plausible? This article tries to respond to these questions by reaffirming functionalism as a valid analytical and normative perspective in facing the current constitutional reality of European integration. The analytical value associated with functionalism is evidenced by testing against the current context of the EU legal framework the accounts for EU constitutionalism which postulate functional equivalence between the EU and the Member States. The normative potential of functionalism, then, is discussed by arguing that there may be a value worth preserving in a degree of functional discrepancy between the EU and state constitutionalism and, notably, that the transformative and civilising dividend inherent in functionalism could still be exploited, at least in certain areas of EU policy making. Finally, the article suggests that the difficulties in accounting for EU constitutionalism in the light of state‐centred constitutional theory could be regarded as symptoms of European integration marking a moment in the theoretical evolution of constitutionalism.     

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro‐crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self‐determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand‐alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long‐term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.     

Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case

This note examines the UK Supreme Court's judgment in the Brexit case, Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. The case upheld the decision of the High Court, which rejected the claim that the foreign affairs prerogative provided a legal basis for giving notice to EU institutions of the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU. But the Supreme Court's preferred basis for dismissing that claim rested on the more general proposition that significant constitutional change can only be effected by statute. This position offers the germs of a jurisprudence of constitutional change and was substantiated by means of an analysis of Parliament's dual capacity as legislator and constituent agent. Miller also includes important and potentially innovative dicta on the relationship between international and domestic sources of law.     

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post‐crisis will be a very different animal from the pre‐crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path‐dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post‐crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision‐making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.