On the Relative Chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra

In the discussions concerning the date of Dharmakīrti, Jaina sources have never been seriously taken into account. They may, however, provide a valuable insight because Dharmakīrti both criticised and was criticised by Jaina thinkers. Two Jaina authors, Samantabhadra and Pūjyapāda Devanandin, may prove crucial in determining the actual dates of Dharmakīrti. The paper argues that Dharmakīrti directly influenced Samantabhadra in a number of ways, which sets the terminus ante quem for Dharmakīrti, and his traditional chronology has to be reconsidered in the light of new findings. The paper suggests new dates for all the three authors.     

The Commitments of a Madhyamaka Trickster: Innovation in Candrakīrti’s Prasanna-padā

This paper challenges the notion that there is a complete continuity between the thought of Nāgārjuna and the thought of Candrakīrti. It is shown that there is strong reason to doubt Candrakīrti’s gloss of Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK) 2.1, and that Candrakīrti’s peculiar reading of this verse causes him to alter the context of the discussion in the four cases in which Nāgārjuna quotes MMK 2.1 later in the text—MMK 3.3, 7.14, 10.13 and 16.7. The innovation produced by Candrakīrti is next contrasted to Nāgārjuna’s style of argument, and it is shown that these two author’s notions of emptiness, as well as their particular implementation of Madhyamaka logic, significantly diverge from each other. Finally, Candrakīrti’s reading of these verses is compared with his commentary on MMK 15 so as to suggest a possible subtle metaphysical position that is at the base of his thinking.     

Final Notes on the Sadvitīyaprayoga

The following response first points out the obvious methodological disadvantages of Oetke’s decline to use both primary and secondary sources for his interpretation of the sadvitīyaprayoga (sp). Oetke believes that he is able to provide an “objectively adequate” presentation of the sp and describe “the objective properties” of its content without taking the historical context into account. By divorcing meaning from (historical) context, he distorts the presumed original meaning and intention of the sp, and superimposes on it an anachronistic concern with what he calls “the extrapolation principle.” The second part of the response explores the usage of the term sapak?a as a collective term.     

Additional Notes on the Sadvitīyaprayoga

The present paper defends a position advanced in Oetke (J Indian Philos 41:43–55, 2013 (= BS)) to the effect that a piece of reasoning allegedly advocated by proponents of Indian Materialism (Lokāyata, Cārvāka) does not deserve to be dismissed as a sophism but embodies a significant philosophical criticism. In addition the article argues for the contention that for this type of theoretical assessment consideration of history of reception possesses at best a limited relevance and is even apt to impede the attainment of an adequate evaluation of the matter.     

Dignāga,Kumārila and Dharmakīrti on the Potential Problem of pramāṇa and phala Having Different Objects

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness (svasa?vitti) is the result (phala) of a means of valid cognition (pramā?a). It has also been understood that Dignāga (in I 8cd and I 9) accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramā?aphala: in PS(V) ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object (arthādhigati) as the result; in PS(V) ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga (in I 8cd and I 9cd) presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object (arthādhigati) is the result. In I 9ab (svasa?vitti? phala? vātra) he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the (essentially internal) image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramā?a and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna (not svasa?vitti) is the phala, Kumārila (?V pratyak?a 79cd) points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramā?a and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized (PV III 348b: arthātmā na d??yate) and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasa?vitti (and not bāhyārthajñāna) is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature (PV III 350c: svabhāvacintāyām), i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasa?vitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthani?caya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasa?vitti is the phala.     

Shifting Concepts: The Realignment of Dharmakīrti on Concepts and the Error of Subject/Object Duality in Pratyabhijñā Śaiva Thought

Contemporary scholars have begun to document the extensive influence of the sixth to seventh century Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti on Pratyabhijñā ?aiva thought. Utpaladeva (925–975) and Abhinavagupta’s (975–1025) adaptation of Dharmakīrti’s apoha (exclusion) theory provides a striking instance of the creative ways in which these ?aivas use Dharmakīrti’s ideas to argue for positions that Dharmakīrti would emphatically reject. Both Dharmakīrti and these ?aivas emphasize that the formation of a concept involves both objective and subjective factors. Working within a certain perceptual environment, factors such as a subject’s desires, habits, and conditioning lead him or her to form a concept (vikalpa) based on excluding what is not relevant to the accomplishment of his or her goal. However, the two differ in their account of the relationship between concepts and subject/object duality itself. While Dharmakīrti claims that the division of a cognition into subject, object, and awareness is nonconceptual, the subtly shifted definition of a concept that these ?aivas employ allows them to claim that the error of subject/object duality is actually conceptual. This seemingly small difference in their respective evaluations of the nature of subject/object error has surprisingly large consequences. If, as these ?aivas claim, any awareness involving a duality is conceptual, then subject and object are concepts. Moreover, if the formation of a concept requires desire, then some kind of desire must be inherent to consciousness itself before the formation of a limited subject/object pair. In short, ultimate consciousness must be ?iva, who possesses the freedom to will any and all possible realities.     

Śālikanātha’s Criticism of Dharmakīrti’s svasaṃvedana Theory

The aim of this paper is to clarify how Śālikanātha’s epistemology can be distinguished from that of Dharmakīrti, especially in terms of their respective views on cognitive form (ākāra). It has been pointed out that Śālikanātha’s tripuṭī theory and svayaṃprakāśa theory are very close to Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. However, it remains questionable if Śālikanātha, who belongs to the Prābhākara branch of the Mīmāṃsā and is therefore a nirākāravādin, can subscribe to notions that Dharmakīrti developed on the basis of sākāravāda. The present paper concludes that Śālikanātha agrees with Dharmakīrti in assuming that a single cognition consists of three parts; unlike Dharmakīrti, however, Śālikanātha puts emphasis on the difference between these parts, especially between the cognition and its form, on the ground that the cognitive form belongs to the external thing, and not to the cognition (nirākāravāda). In Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, the cognitive form belongs to cognition (sākāravāda); in the ultimate level, there remains no difference between the three parts.     

Śrīharṣa on Knowledge and Justification

In this paper I explore the extent to which the dialectical approach of ?rīhar?a can be identified as skeptical, and whether or how his approach resembles that of the first century Mādhyamika philosopher Nāgārjuna. In so doing, I will be primarily reading the first argument found in ?rīhar?a’s masterpiece, the Kha??anakha??a-khādya (KhKh). This argument grounds the position that the system of justification (pramā?a) that validates our cognition to be true is not outside of inquiry. Closely adopting ?rīhar?a’s polemical style, I am neither proposing a thesis in this paper that ?rīhar?a is a skeptic, nor am I denying such a possibility. I believe we can pursue our arguments on a neutral ground and let the facts speak for themselves. I will outline salient features that define skepticism in the mainstream philosophical discourse so that analyzing ?rīhar?a’s first argument becomes easier. In so doing, I will introduce some of the arguments of Nāgārjuna in light of ?rīhar?a’s position. This comparison, however, is restricted only to the salient features relevant to further the central argument of this paper and is therefore not aimed to encompass the overall positions of these two giants.     

On Dharmakīrti’s Notion of Contingency/Dependence,with a Special Focus on <Emphasis Type="Italic">vināśa</Emphasis>

The concept of contingency is very much debated. In this paper, I’ll offer a novel interpretation of it in Dharmakīrti’s ontology, focusing on his treatment and understanding of vinā?a (translation: perishing) which is, according to Dharmakīrti, not contingent and thus occurs necessarily to everything. I will do so by clarifying some important terms, motivating and explaining Dharmakīrti’s position, and analyzing firsthand some Dharmakīrtian debate excerpts with Nyāya and/or Vai?e?ika philosophers as the main opponents. In the course of this, I will show that basically, for Dharmakīrti, contingency is tantamount to dependency, whereas Nyāya and/or Vai?e?ika authors, e.g., ?rīdhara and Bhāsarvajña, claim that something can be dependent on something else and still be necessary.     

Some Further Comments on the First Section of the Vigrahavyāvartanī

The publication deals with topics concerning the interpretation of the Vigrahavyāvartanī in as much as they are relevant for the understanding of (early) Madhyamaka-philosophy in general. A major part of the article is dedicated to a critical assessment of a number of views which have been propagated recently in a paper by Sharma (In: Nagoya studies in Indian culture and Buddhism, Saṃbhāṣā, 2011). A primary goal of the present investigation consists in substantiating the claim that early Madhyamaka represents a metaphysical teaching which stands in sharp contrast not only to stances of common sense but also to tenets propagated in Buddhist dogmatics.     

Kamalaśīla on Doubt as the Cause of the Activity of Reading

As Funayama has shown, Dharmakīrti’s successors had an animated discussion on the nature and function of the initial statement (ādivākya) of scientific treatises in terms of its effectiveness and requisites. Arca?a (8th c.) in his comments on the initial statement of the Hetubindu considers that the initial statement, which contains the purpose (prayojana) of the treatise, is useless in prompting people to undertake the activity (prav?tti) of reading the treatise because judicious people are supposed to undertake action only due to certainty (ni?caya) which never arises from something that is not a pramā?a. For Arca?a, the initial statement is set forth only to dispel the objection of an opponent who criticizes the treatise for not having a purpose. Kamala?īla (8th c.) criticizes Arca?a on this point; for him the initial statement is effective to prompt people to undertake the reading of the treatise because people act also on the basis of doubt (sa??aya), which arises from the initial statement that is not a pramā?a but an abhyupāya for action. This paper attempts to consider how such doubt can cause reading by examining the debate in the Tattvasa?grahapañjikā and related texts. As Kamala?īla presupposes, when people act due to doubt, they may attain the desired purpose by chance but cannot escape the risks of not attaining an desired purpose and also of attaining an undesired purpose. Taking these risks into consideration, it is reasonable for Granoff to take up Kamala?īla’s position as an example of the maxim of kākatālīya in the introduction of her paper in the present volume. However, the probability for the readers of the Tattvasa?graha to achieve easy comprehension of tattva as a result of reading a full treatise, which they undertake due to doubt out of the initial statement, is higher than that for a crow being suddenly killed by a falling palm-fruit. According to Kamala?īla, the risk of not attaining the desired purpose does not prevent people from reading because such fear equally occurs in activities based on certainty. Furthermore, there is no risk of attaining an undesired purpose from the treatise because authors are supposed to undertake action only for the sake of others. Therefore, doubt which arises from an abhyupāya can make people undertake action.     

Two Investigations on the Madhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī

Purpose of the article is to provide support for the contention that two fundamental treatises representing the teaching of Madhyamaka, viz. the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās and the Vigrahavyāvartanī, were designed to establish and justify a metaphysical tenet claiming that no particulars of any kind can exist on some level of final analysis and that this was the only primary concern of those works. Whereas the former text is in the first place dedicated to providing proofs of the central metaphysical thesis the major objective of the second treatise lies in a defense of the claim against possible objections. A correlate of this view regarding the content of those two works is on the one hand that the philosophy of the founder of the Madhyamaka-school essentially consists in a metaphysical teaching implying a radical rejection of a stance propagated in earlier Buddhist schools according to which objects of ordinary experience could be reduced to or explained by the existence of other sorts of particulars that can be theoretically postulated. On the other hand the exegesis advocated in the article implies that theorems pertaining to the nature of language or the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality are not at all a predominant issue in the pertinent texts and presumably were not a major matter of concern of early Madhyamaka in general. Accordingly matters pertaining to questions of semantics attain relevance at best in the form of objective consequences which the metaphysical doctrine might entail. The paper focuses on the second chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās as well as the segment of the Vigrahavyāvartanī which deals with the first major problem, represented by the verses 1–4 and 21–29. The reason is that a detailed and thoroughgoing investigation of these two textual passages is suited to disprove a contention voiced by Western scholars who suppose that the teaching of the founder of Madhyamaka embodies a particular claim pertaining to the relationship between language and non-linguistic reality.     

High-Risk Interrogation: Using the “Mr. Big Technique” to Elicit Confessions

Kassin et al. (Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendation, 2009) provide a detailed and thoughtful analysis of how police interrogation practices might elicit false confessions from innocent suspects. The purpose of this commentary is to provide a brief review of a relatively recent development in Canadian police investigation practice and discuss how this procedure may increase the likelihood of police-induced false confessions. The so-called “Mr. Big Technique” is a non-custodial interrogation tactic wherein suspects are drawn into a supposed criminal organization (actually an elaborate police sting) and subsequently told that to move up in the organization, they must confess to a crime. In this article, we describe this remarkable interrogation technique and discuss issues relevant to the potential induction of false confessions.     

Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept

The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) when it was appropriated by ?aiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition (ahampratyaya). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmaka??ha (‘reflexive awareness’) and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti (‘intentional self-awareness’). It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda, the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda, the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmaka??ha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti’s contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself.     

Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag tsang’s Charge Against Tsongkhapa’s Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s Philosophy

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramā?a—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsa?gika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramā?a (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsa?gika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramā?a in the Prāsa?gika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsa?gika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsa?gika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.     

Mr. Winterkorn’s Pay: A Typology of Justification Patterns of Income Inequality

This article develops a typology of justification patterns of income inequality by means of analysing the discourse surrounding executive pay in Germany. The case of a public debate about the record salary of the car manufacturer VW’s CEO, Martin Winterkorn, in 2012 and 2013, is identified as a rich source for a reconstruction of specific argumentative patterns and their underlying premises. The typology presents five justification patterns, (1) equality of opportunity, (2) desert, (3) procedure of salary determination, (4) harmful consequences of income inequality and (5) need. Further cross-patterns are identified. A key finding is the crucial—but often not explicit—role of factual, definitional or behavioural premises. It is argued that unveiling the structure of justification patterns of income inequality can provide a key tool in scrutinizing as well as in further analysing public debates about income inequality.     

Issues on Nibbāna with Special Reference to Verse No. 1074 of the Upasīvamāṇavapucchā in the Suttanipāta

This paper discusses verse 1074 of the Suttanipāta’s (Sn v. 1074) Upasīvamā?avapucchā. While various interpretations of the verse are possible due to a lack of textual sources to draw from for interpretation, I attempt to understand this verse—which describes the state of nibbāna using the metaphor of an extinguished fire—through a philological examination of the text itself and other contemporary ones. Specifically, I focus on whether the verse implies that nibbāna takes place in the present life or at and after the end of life by examining the compound nāmakāya and the phrase attha? paleti that appear in it. Arguing that the former term is a dvandva meaning “name-and-body” and that the latter means “goes down” (implying the end of life), I conclude that in this verse the Buddha is discussing nibbāna at and after the end of life. However, I do not deny that different interpretations are possible. When dealing with an ancient verse, the interpretation of one word can affect one’s understanding of the verse itself or the sutta overall, possibly leading to perspectives on early Buddhist thought completely different from the original meaning or original intention of the author of the sutta. Taking this into consideration, this paper adopts a meticulous approach to philologically examining early Pāli texts.