The false promise of unipolarity: constraints on the exercise of American power

In World out of balance, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth make a valuable contribution to ongoing debate about the systemic effects of unipolarity and the durability of US primacy. They are correct that unipolarity engenders systemic stability because the power gap between the United States and potential rivals forestalls military balancing. However, Brooks and Wohlforth underweight other means through which major states are resisting US power and they fail to appreciate that the systemic characteristics of unipolarity may change in relatively short order.     

The future is uncertain and the end is always near

The standard view of contemporary unipolar politics is that systemic constraints impede the translation of American power capabilities into influence over security outcomes, rendering the United States (US) much less capable than its material capabilities imply. Challenging this logic, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that systemic constraints under unipolarity are largely inoperative with respect to the security policies of the unipolar power. Indeed, the US is uniquely positioned in today's world to convert its enormous capability advantages into influence and usable power. While World out of balance is a masterwork of logical and rigorous argumentation, Brooks and Wohlforth, in their exclusive focus on the hegemon and its policies, do not attempt to offer a general theory of unipolarity. Thus, they do not consider the possibility that unipolarity does not constrain any actors or the issue of system change. This essay advances two routes out of unipolarity: (1) a ‘delegitimation’ phase followed by regular balancing behavior and (2) a sudden and dramatic shift from unipolarity to multipolarity brought on by an unforeseen US collapse.     

If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?

The European Union has, since 1999, moved deliberately, if slowly, to develop the capability to undertake autonomously a range of demanding political military operations beyond Europe's borders. This effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (esdp), is a puzzle insofar as post-Cold War Europe is very secure, and most European nations are members of an established alliance, the u.s.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. esdp is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an imminent threat from the United States, they are balancing u.s. power. The concentration of global power in the United States, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the abandonment that u.s. freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global political environment the United States could create.     

Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia

It is widely claimed that secondary states across East Asia are not purely balancing or bandwagoning, but rather hedging between the United States and China by combining policies of economic and political engagement with risk management. We argue that hedging behavior should not include costless activities that do not require states to face trade-offs in their security choices. We redefine hedging as signaling that generates ambiguity over the extent of a secondary state's shared security interests with great powers. This definition returns the focus to security relationships and better accounts for the trade-off between autonomy and alignment. Based on this definition, we argue that hedging occurs in far narrower (but arguably more interesting) circumstances than is widely believed. Many Asian states have existing treaty alliances with the United States or major territorial conflicts with China, creating path dependencies that reinforce balancing behavior rather than hedging. We therefore clarify cross-national variation in state behavior and contribute to the larger research project on regional responses to China's rise.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

The unipolar exit: beyond the Pax Americana

In this article I show that the unipolar era already is drawing to a close. Three main drivers explain the impending end of the Pax Americana. First, the rise of new great powers—especially China—is transforming the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity. Second, the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic over-extension, or as Paul Kennedy dubbed it, imperial overstretch. Third, the United States' relative economic power is declining, and mounting US fiscal problems and the dollar's increasingly problematic role as the international financial system's reserve currency are undermining US hegemony. After examining how these trends undermine the argument for ‘unipolar stability’, I conclude by arguing that over the next two decades the Pax Americana's end presages dramatic changes in international politics.     

Counterterrorism in an Era of Great Power Politics

How should the United States recalibrate its counterterrorism policy for an era of great power competition? With the end of unipolarity, the United States cannot fight terrorists and compete with Russia and China with equal energy, but must instead make hard choices about its priorities and resources. Among those hard choices are what to do with the web of counterterrorism partnerships with other governments that have formed in the post- 9/11 era. This article proposes three broad principles—linkages, license, and legitimacy—that the United States can use to evaluate its policy and these partnerships, with the aim of recasting U.S. counterterrorism policy for an era of great power competition.     

The mix that makes unipolarity: hegemonic purpose and international constraints

The nature of a global arena dominated by one great power remains a critical subject for understanding international relations. Brooks and Wohlforth's recent book makes an important contribution by arguing that unipolarity poses few constraints to the hegemon and that the United States today should pursue a policy of primacy. The puzzle is that the United States has mostly resisted a primacy policy since becoming the sole superpower, and when it has done so, has often been less successful than the promise of its power advantage. Explaining this puzzle requires building on ‘the no constraint’ approach to develop a positive theory based on hegemonic purpose, a reformulated notion of constraints, and how purpose and constraints interact to shape outcomes. This reformulation suggests that any American strategy that looks like ‘primacy’ is unlikely to succeed.     

The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War

This article argues that militant clients should be understood as a pillar of Iran's grand strategy and an extension of its military power. The article examines why Iran has relied on militant clients since the 1979 revolution and the benefits and costs of its client approach. In evaluating these issues, it identifies five main areas where Iran has gained from its client strategy: 1) maintaining independence from the West; 2) successfully exporting its religio-political worldview; 3) extending its military reach and power; 4) reducing political costs of its foreign activities; and 5) establishing needed regional allies. It further identifies five main dangers that Iran faces by continuing its strategic behavior: 1) increased pressure from the United States and a broader US military regional footprint; 2) more unified regional adversaries; 3) the risk of unintended escalation with the United States and regional adversarial states; and 4) enduring regional instability and insecurity     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.     

Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

Recent studies report that temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, the World Bank, or in US foreign aid in exchange for their political support for permanent members. Nevertheless, few studies have examined whether this favorable treatment and these benefits have actually made any significant changes in the member states’ voting behavior in the United Nations. To explore this question, we investigate whether membership on the UN Security Council influences a state’s voting in the UN General Assembly. In the analysis of panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1946 to 2008, the empirical results show that elected members of the UN Security Council tend to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the IMF and the World Bank increases. Also, US foreign aid significantly increases temporary members’ vote coincidence with the United States and other permanent members. In this regard, this article contributes to our understanding of state voting behavior and power politics in international organizations.     

Failure after 1441: Bush and Chirac in the UN Security Council

The unanimous passage of Security Council Resolution 1441 marked the onset of the most severe crisis of legitimacy that the United Nations has faced in the post-Cold War period. While some have asserted that the diplomatic clashes between erstwhile allies France and the United States were inevitable given the rise of American unipolarity, an analysis of events leading to the failed US attempt to gain a second resolution reveals that the outcome was among the least preferred for both participants. Using the Verbs In Context system, we conduct a computer-based content analysis of the public statements of the United States and French leaders. Our findings suggest that the diplomatic breakdown was exacerbated by each leaders' elevated sense of control over the situation and their inaccurate perception of their opponent's preferences.     

Theodore Roosevelt: Imperialist or Global Strategist in the New Expansionist Age?

This article argues that as the first modern US president and an innovative shaper of American foreign relations, Theodore Roosevelt launched the rising United States on the world stage as a major actor in power politics, that American diplomacy came of age with him and not with Woodrow Wilson, and that the secular pragmatist who succeeded because he was abreast of the times should not be begrudged the laurels that are so often bestowed on the religious-minded visionary who failed because he was ahead of his time. In American historiography Wilson has often eclipsed—unfairly and erroneously—the geopolitical and diplomatic skills, professionalism and expertise in foreign policy of Roosevelt. Even as ex-president, Roosevelt would be a force to be reckoned with. The use and misuse of a misconstrued legacy that some have tried to confiscate for their own benefit is perhaps best illustrated by presidential candidate John McCain's reverential claim that he is “a Teddy Roosevelt Republican” rather than a neo-Wilsonian.     

安倍治下的日本对华政策:从战略制衡到战术避险

日本的对华外交深受国际体系和中美日三角关系的影响。由于中美两个大国在全球层面的战略竞争加剧,以2017年为分水岭,第二次安倍内阁领导下的日本的整体对华外交政策经历了从"战略制衡"向"战术避险"方向的转变。在2017年以前,日本为了联美对华实施"战略制衡",在外交方面,以"印太战略"孤立中国;在安全方面,加强岛屿防卫能力和强化日美同盟;在经济方面,大力支持"跨太平洋伙伴关系协定"和对"一带一路"倡议持冷淡态度。在2017年以后,在中美关系的不确定性增大的情况下,安倍领导下的日本对华实施"战术避险"。在外交方面,加强印太战略的开放性、领导人互访和对华自制;在安全方面,继续强化国防上的内部制衡;在经济方面,有条件地认同"一带一路"倡议并对华展开第三方市场合作。展望未来,令和时代的日本将是一个拥有部分战略自主的中等强国,在日美同盟框架下维持与中国有距离的交往,力图在瞬息万变的国际政治角力中实现日本国家利益的最大化。     

The Limits of Populist Diplomacy: Fidel Castro's April 1959 Trip to North America

This article asks what lessons about diplomacy can be drawn from Fidel Castro's April 1959 trip to the United States and Canada, a trip long neglected by historians as an aberration in US–Cuban relations because of its apparent public relations success. The trip's meaning, rather, lies in the populist style Castro practiced to circumvent normal protocol, and more importantly in the failure of that populism to sway not only US foreign policy makers but also the US public. Based on comprehensive media and archival research and of interviews in Cuba and the United States, this is the first ever article-length treatment of this diplomatic visit. It helps to understand not only the US–Cuba divide that soon followed Castro's trip but also the limited potential of a populist diplomacy.     

Ideological Polarity and Balancing in Great Power Politics

This article examines the international effects of a variable that has yet to be studied in a systematic manner in the international relations literature: the number of prominent, distinct ideological groups that are present in a particular system, which is a variable that I label “ideological polarity.” My basic argument is that systems in which the great powers are divided into one, two, or three or more ideological groups (or “ideological unipolarity,” “ideological bipolarity,” or “ideological multipolarity,” respectively) have very different dynamics, including major variations in overall threat perceptions among the great powers and the efficiency of the balancing process against perceived dangers. The effects of ideological polarity explain key outcomes that analyses based on power polarity cannot. I test the argument by examining great power relations in two cases: the decades after the Napoleonic Wars and the years leading up to the Second World War. Both periods were multipolar in terms of power but varied in terms of ideological polarity. The result was significant variations in states’ core security policies for reasons consistent with the argument.     

Assessing the balance

Save for the single issue of balance of power theory's relevance to the current system, where we and some of our critics are in real disagreement (and they are wrong), every aspect of this symposium has been highly productive. Our critics do not directly dispute the proposition that a rapid end of a single superpower world is extremely unlikely. They generally endorsed our core finding that the systemic constraints featured in IR scholarship are largely inoperative with respect to a United States that remains the sole superpower. These essays are consequently devoted mainly to discussing the implications of our findings and the future research agenda. In particular, they developed serious challenges to the idea of US led institutional revisionism, generated new ideas about both systemic and non-systemic constraints, and suggested potentially powerful theories about constraints on other states besides the United States.     

Avoiding the Geoeconomic Domino Theory

The recent US emphasis on a geoeconomic confrontation with China in the developing states could spawn an economic version of the domino theory. Geoeconomic domino theory assumes that if Beijing’s economic influence is not stopped in a developing state, America might witness more developing states incorporated into the Chinese economic orbit. The falling economic domino eventually can reach the developed economies. Nonetheless, there are reasons to expect that the developing economies would not fall to China one after another. China’s gains in the developing regions in material capacity, ability to govern key issue areas, and ideological appeal are also dubious. In conducting geoeconomic competition with China, the United States should concentrate on the developed economies—Western Europe and Northeast Asia—that have a significant impact on the balance of power.     

The US View of the Transforming Strategic Context in the MENA

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reiterated US support for the expansion of the Abraham Accords and called for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. As highlighted by this volume’s authors, the Accords are the most significant regional peacemaking achievement in decades, having already reduced Arab-Israeli tensions—particularly at the government level—and provided opportunities for Arab states to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. The changing regional security architecture can only be welcomed by the United States. Yet, due to political authoritarianism in the region, the Accords may fall short of their potential if the economic gains fail to reach marginalized populations. This essay contends that trade relations that support job creation and access to water and energy may increase public support. Just as a return to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is important, political reform in the Arab countries is needed to make the Accords successful by bringing more economic benefits to the Arab streets and ensuring that there will not be a “Cold Peace.”