The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women

When women carry out a suicide attack they undermine the idea of who and what a terrorist is. What is generally not realized is the extent to which women are involved in terrorism. The purpose of this article is to explore and to analyze the multifaceted roles of the women in the movement of Al Qaeda. The argument is that the role of the women the world audience perceives is the one of a suicide bomber but the role of an ideological supporter and operational facilitator is more important for the maintenance of the operational capabilities and the ideological motivation for a terrorist organization. This article argues that the women follow a gender-specific interpretation of the radical ideology, the female Jihad. The concept of the female Jihad means that the women carry out a political act by supporting their male relatives, educating their children in the ideology and facilitating terrorist operations. The female Jihad is defective when the women follow the male Jihad interpretation of the Jihad by carrying out attacks. For the survival of a terrorists organization women are more important when they follow the female version of the ideology. Because the men could get arrested, die in an attack, or could get shot by the security forces, the women continue to take care about the financial issues of the organization and continue to educate the children in the “right” belief. To verify these arguments the article is divided into three parts. The first part will look at the motivation of women participation at a terrorism organization and the motivation of a terrorism organization to use women for its purposes. The second part tries to throw some light on the female suicide bombers who acted under the umbrella of the movement of Al Qaeda. In this part the female terrorist attacks will be analyzed. In the third part Sisterhoods will be explained and the concept of the female Jihad will be analyzed. The findings of this article about the involvement of women in the movement of Al Qaeda will bring us to conclusion that women do play an essential role in these organizations and groups. Following the argument that successful counterterrorism should address both the motivation and the operational capabilities of a terrorist organization there is an essential need for the national security forces to expand their capabilities to look more carefully at women.     

Trade,Development, and Nonproliferation: Multilevel Counterterrorism in Central Asia

This article was presented in its original form in October 2005 at the Conference on Central Asian Security in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. This article seeks to add to the discourse on counterterrorism by looking at the challenges posed by sub-state radicalism to development and regionalization. Specifically, adequate counterterror campaigns require addressing socioeconomic feeders of radicalism while simultaneously dealing with the threat of political violence itself. In terms of development, this means advocating increased trade volumes and export oriented growth while concurrently controlling for illicit trade (which often finances terrorist movements) and trade in strategic goods (which could serve to undermine the security of the state). The authors use the case study of Uzbekistan and Central Asian insecurity to illustrate the utility of customs modernization, border security, and export control legislation as integral components in wider counterterror campaigns. The study addresses circumstances specific to present day Central Asia but has wider implications in stymieing the relationship between “grey areas” and terrorist movements worldwide.     

After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects

It is just possible that a terrorist nuclear attack could catalyze an inter-state nuclear war. The likelihood of a terrorist group gaining access to nuclear weapons is lower than some fear, and terrorists might not use a nuclear weapon as soon as they had acquired one. But if a terrorist group was to explode a nuclear device in a country that was itself armed with nuclear weapons, and especially if that country was in a conflict-prone relationship with another nuclear-armed state, the broader consequences of even a single terrorist nuclear detonation could be much more serious than some assume.     

After Oslo and Utøya: A Shift in the Balance Between Security and Liberty in Norway?

The article addresses the challenges a society faces to when trying to balance security and liberty after a terrorist attack. A main question is to what extent attitudes toward counterterror measures changed in Norway after the massive terror attacks in July 2011. A hypothesis that people will be more in favor of such measures after a terror attack is examined using data from two surveys—one conducted in 2006 and one in August 2011, with additional results from a survey in 2012. The Norwegian response after the 2011 attacks is compared to the response to the same questions in the United States shortly after 11 September 2001. A main finding is that in Norway, in contrast to the United States, levels of support for counterterror measures declined immediately after the attacks. The authors argue that this can be explained partly by the different levels of trust in the two countries, and partly by differences in the political executive's framing of the crisis. In 2012, support of counterterror measures in Norway has risen to pre-2011 levels. This is related to the changed discourse after the publication of the report from the 22 July Commission.     

The Dynamics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Domestic Security Dilemma

This article argues that the concept of the “domestic security dilemma” can help us to better understand public opposition to government counterterrorism policies. It examines the concept of the “security dilemma” in international relations theory and argues that this concept can also be applied to the analysis of domestic security politics. The article explains that when the government takes actions intended to make people safer from terrorist threats, it often has the unintended consequence of heightening concerns about government oppression. Thus, counterterrorism represents a “domestic security dilemma”—a situation where security tradeoffs have consistently undermined anticipated security gains.     

The Case of Nord-Ost: Dubrovka and the Search for Answers

The paper reviews the experience of the group Nord-Ost (The Regional Social Organisation for Assistance and Defence of the Victims of Terrorist Acts) as an example of an NGO that has taken a rights advocacy position which has led it into confrontation with the state. Nord-Ost demands the state's accountability for the consequences of its response to the 2002 Dubrovka terrorist attack. Thus, it confronts challenges common to other rights advocacy groups in Russia today.     

Terrorism and the Kenyan Public

Since 11 September 2001, terrorism has been a global security threat. One of the partners in the war on terrorism is Kenya. Considering Kenya"s recent experience with terrorist acts, their effects on its public psyche, and Kenya"s reactions to them in domestic and foreign policies, this study presents perceptions on terrorism from an exploratory survey in Kenya. Respondents feel most threatened not by terrorism but by AIDS and local criminals. Among terrorist acts, the most threatening include suicide terrorism, a plane crash, and stabbing attacks. Media reports on terrorism not only intensify feelings of anxiety and helplessness but also strengthen feelings for both peaceful and revengeful reactions. In order to prevent terrorist attacks, routine security checks, recognizing a Palestinian right to statehood, and intelligence collaboration with the CIA and Mosad are considered the most effective measures. Kenya"s commitment to the war on terrorism may be less a response to Kenyans" perceptions of terrorist threats than a policy to support the United States against terrorists in exchange for U.S. support against AIDS and for political stability, democracy, pluralism, and economic development.     

The Dark Matter of Terrorism

The consequences of states’ reactions to terrorist attacks can far outweigh the effects of the attacks themselves. Yet risk analysis, widely accepted as the proper analytical basis for assessing terrorist threats, largely ignores the consequences from potential reactions to attacks. It also generally fails to consider how the anticipation of these reactions may influence terrorists’ attack preferences. Policymakers should therefore be wary of the limitations of risk analysis as currently practiced. Further, states should strive to avoid reactions to attacks that unwittingly further their adversaries’ agendas, a goal that may be aided by strengthening public resilience to terrorism.     

A Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Analysis of Spatiotemporal Patterns of Terrorist Incidents in Iraq 2004–2009

As terrorism on all scales continues, it is necessary to improve understanding of terrorist and insurgent activities. This article takes a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) approach to advance the understanding of spatial, social, political, and cultural triggers that influence terrorism incidents. Spatial, temporal, and spatiotemporal patterns of terrorist attacks are examined to improve knowledge about terrorist systems of training, planning, and actions. The results of this study aim to provide a foundation for understanding attack patterns and tactics in emerging havens as well as inform the creation and implementation of various counterterrorism measures.     

What Does the “Terrorist” Label Really Do? Measuring and Explaining the Effects of the “Terrorist” and “Islamist” Categories

Many scholars and practitioners claim that labeling groups or individuals as “terrorists” does not simply describe them but also shapes public attitudes, due to the label's important normative and political charge. Yet is there such a “terrorist label effect”? In view of surprisingly scant evidence, the present article evaluates whether or not the terrorist label—as well as the “Islamist” one—really impacts both the audience's perception of the security environment and its security policy preferences, and if yes, how and why. To do so, the article implements a randomized-controlled vignette experiment where participants (N = 481) first read one out of three press articles, each depicting a street shooting in the exact same way but labeling the author of the violence with a different category (“terrorist”/“shooter”/“Islamist”). Participants were then asked to report on both their perceptions and their policy preferences. This design reveals very strong effects of both the “terrorist” and “Islamist” categories on each dimension. These effects are analyzed through the lenses of social and cognitive psychology, in a way that interrogates the use of the terrorist category in society, the conflation of Islamism with terrorism, and the press and policymakers' lexical choices when reporting on political violence.     

Explaining the Chinese framing of the “terrorist” violence in Xinjiang: insights from securitization theory

This paper critically examines the Chinese framing of the “terrorist” violence in Xinjiang. Drawing on the Copenhagen school of securitization theory, it examines how the historical perception of the region as a primary source of security threats to inner China has led today’s China to continue with representing the Han Chinese–Uyghur discord as an existential threat. In framing the ethnic conflict as a security issue, China has capitalized on the global “war on terror” of the early 2000s to transform the unrest into acts of Islamist terrorism to legitimize its counter-insurgency policies in Xinjiang. However, both the 2009 Urumqi riots and the 2014 Kunming attack lead us to conclude that the securitization strategy fails to quell the unrest. Not only have the Strike-Hard campaigns served to radicalize Uyghur nationalists, but also Han Chinese are not convinced that the Chinese government can contain the “terrorist” threat. Yet securitization blinds the leadership to the dysfunctional ethnic policy.     

Breaking Al Qaeda Cells: A Mathematical Analysis of Counterterrorism Operations (A Guide for Risk Assessment and Decision Making)

How can we tell if an Al Qaeda cell has been broken? That enough members have been captured or killed so that there is a high likelihood they will be unable to carry out a new attack, and military resources can be redirected away from them and toward more immediate threats? This article uses order theory to quantify the degree to which a terrorist network is still able to function. This tool will help law enforcement know when a battle against Al Qaeda has been won, thus saving the public's money without unduly risking the public's safety.‐     

A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers

Over the past two decades repeated attempts have been made to identify the next "new" form of terrorism, but all have come up short. Modern terrorism is not about the next trend, but is--and long has been--characterized by mass casualty bombers (defined as those terrorist groups that have killed 25 or more people in a bombing attack). When compared to other "new" terrorists, mass casualty bombers are more prolific than state-sponsored terrorists, more deadly than suicide terrorists, more identifiable than religious terrorists, and more plausible than CBRN terrorists. Mass casualty bombers have long presented the greatest terrorist threat to international peace and security and will likely continue to do so in the future.     

Dhiren Barot: Was He an Al Qaeda Mastermind or Merely a Hapless Plotter?

This article profiles Dhiren Barot, a convert to Islam who was convicted in Britain in October 2006 on charges of conspiracy to commit murder for planning terrorist attacks in the United States and the United Kingdom. Upon his conviction, much of the British press, and many other observers, claimed Barot was a high-level Al Qaeda figure whose plans were on the verge of execution. Other observers, and Barot's defense attorneys, however, argued that these allegations were exaggerated. Barot, they claimed, had done nothing more than sketch vague plans for which he had no funding and was merely being used by the British government as an example in the War on Terror. This article details Barot's life and terrorist activity. It argues that he was a committed jihadi, was likely an Al Qaeda member, and did indeed represent a security threat. Nonetheless, the lack of public information available on his life suggests that certain allegations about his status within Al Qaeda and the immanency of his plans should be treated skeptically. It concludes by considering to what extent Barot fits the profile of other Islamic terrorists.     

‘Refugees Not Welcome Here’: State,Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland

The Polish response to the crisis that escalated across Europe in 2015, banning refugees from crossing its borders, has been one of the least welcoming in Europe. Poland has been reprimanded by the EU for its lack of solidarity with other countries that accepted refugees. The government’s response was that it does indeed welcome refugees as long as they are not Muslims, since letting Muslim refugees in would be a security risk. The figure of the Muslim terrorist posing as a refugee has become a key trope through which xenophobic nationalist politics have been employed. In this sense, Poland can be seen to be drawing particular inspiration from the Eurosceptic politics of Orbán’s Hungary while also reflecting a broader European trend towards Islamophobia in countries such as France, Germany, Sweden or the UK. This article maps responses to refugees from key public actors. It focuses on how three key players in the Polish public sphere—the Catholic Church, the State and civil society actors—responded to the looming perspective of welcoming refugees to Poland. The paper argues that the Polish response to the so-called refugee crisis should be analysed as subtext to a broader political change in the country towards nationalism that has as its goal to push out all foreign ‘invasion’. Mobilised within this are new and old manifestations of racism, suggesting that Poland’s long history of racial Othering and exclusion has not been sufficiently accounted for.     

“Special” Communiqué Issued by the Belgian Marxist Terrorist Group, “Communist Combatant Cells” (CCC)

This section of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism is dedicated to the reprinting of selected, translated terrorist communiqués that provide insights into the mindset, worldview, or operational thinking of a group. In terms of communiqués, this section employs the following typology of terrorist communiqués. There are three types of terrorist communiqués: attack, strategic, and special. Attack communiqués are issued to claim responsibility for an attack, explain the target selected, and provide the political rationale for attacking the target. A strategic communiqué is a longer document that is issued to provide strategic direction or commentary on political events, issues, and developments relevant to the group's cause and constituency. It can be used to explain changes of strategy or reinforce the strategic direction of the group. The special communiqué is similar to the attack communiqué in that it is event-driven but addresses non-attack events like anniversary dates, hunger strikes, elections, deaths of leaders, ceasefires, issuing threats or warnings, annual progress reports, issuing apologies, and so on. All three communiqués are issued publicly and intended to influence various audiences.     

Schools and Terrorism: Global Trends,Impacts, and Lessons for Resilience

This study characterizes trends in the frequency and characteristics of terrorist attacks in child-serving educational institutions around the world, examining the specific vulnerabilies of children and schools with regard to terrorist violence, as well as the various impacts that violence has on children, communities, and societies. Following the analysis of available data on terrorist attacks against educational institutions, vulnerabilities, and impacts, the study concludes with a discussion of what still needs to be understood in the intersection of child vulnerability and terrorism, and provides recommendations for improving resilience to terrorist attacks against child-serving educational institutions.     

Freedom,Hate, and Violence on the American Right

Most studies on Middle East security focus on traditional threats such as military aggression and terrorism. This draft report examines the scope and dimensions of a broadened regional security agenda. It focuses on three specific issues: the opium trade in Central and Southwest Asia; unregulated population movements from the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and North Africa; and maritime piracy around the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula. Although Washington is not directly affected by any of these "soft" or "grey area" challenges, they are relevant for the United States in at least five respects. First, they represent a subset of the transnational problems that both the Clinton and Bush administrations have emphasized as a growing threat to national and international stability (such as international organized crime, corruption and generalized non-state violence and chaos). Second, they have, in varying degrees, undermined and distorted institutional state capacity, trade and (legitimate) economic growth in a region that is of geostrategic importance to Washington. Third, all carry significant implications for the lives, welfare and safety of ordinary citizens, including Americans. Fourth, in certain instances they have interacted with other sources of political tension to act as an additional catalyst for inter-state hostility and rivalry. Finally, because these challenges cannot be readily deterred by established mechanisms of border security, they necessarily require innovative and novel countermeasures--something that the United States is well placed to facilitate, both by virtue of its resources and global leadership role.     

“Purity of Arms,” “Preemptive War,” and “Selective Targeting” in the Context of Terrorism: General,Conceptual, and Legal Analyses

Selective targeting (or targeted killing) of terrorist leaders is a legitimate mode of operation and part of a state's counterterrorism, anticipatory, self-defense activities that are designed to prevent the continuation of terrorism. Paradoxically, this counterterrorism measure is the best way of preserving the military ethical conventions of “purity of arms.” The concept refers to moral rules advocating the exercise of restraint and compassion in the course of a confrontation with the enemy. The “purity of arms” concept is debated extensively in democracies. Selective targeting of terrorist activists is a measure designed to hurt the real enemy while minimizing civilian casualties. Terrorist leaders and planners are targeted and an attempt is made, trying to avoid so far as possible, “collateral damage” that often accompanies any general military offensive. Customary international law permits targeting the enemy, provided that the criteria of necessity and proportionality of the attack are maintained. The relationship between the threat of terrorist attacks and the actual attacks carried out is shown in this study. The results contribute to reinforcing the legality of selective targeting as a preemptive mode of operation because they show that one should relate to a threat of an attack as to an imminent danger.