Attitudes of the British Political Elite towards the Soviet Union

This article is an examination of the attitudes of the British political elite towards the Soviet Union and an assessment of the influence such attitudes had upon British foreign policy between March and August 1939. Through a detailed analysis of individuals including Cabinet ministers and those politicians elsewhere referred to as the 'anti-appeasers', the article contributes to the 'counterrevisionist' position concerning war origins. Thus it does not accept that the British government was constrained by factors outside of its control and instead argues that an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance was not concluded because of the failure of British ministers to put aside their anti-Soviet prejudices.     

Britain's power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government's defence debate at Chequers in November 1964

Prior to the advent of the Wilson government, there existed a large number of official memoranda and reports on Britain's power and influence in the world. Central to Whitehall's concern was the discovery of some means of reducing the cost of maintaining Britain's three main strategic roles ‐ nuclear deterrence, the defence of western Europe and East of Suez. It was clear that Britain should not, and could not, maintain these three roles indefinitely, a view which was shared by Labour ministers at the Chequers meeting. This article examines the evolution of Whitehall's thinking on Britain's long‐term world role during the period before and after Labour came into power in October 1964, and concludes that British ministers and officials began to consider Britain's eventual disengagement from bases East of Suez, a disengagement which was finally announced by the Wilson government in July 1967.     

Accredited to Africa: British diplomatic representation and African experience,c. 1960–95

This article examines the 1960 soviet attack on Dag Hammarskjold and its proposal to reform the office of the UN Secretary-General into a troika and the Soviet lines, the article seeks to show that the British had sufficiant concerns about the direction Hammarskjold was taking the office of Secretary-General to be more in line with Soviet attitudes than they would have been willing to admit publicly. British support for Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis was not unqualified and the article notes that following Hammarskjold's death, it was not Britain's interest to see Hammarskjold's successor being given the political freedom he had enjoyed.     

The Press,Public Opinion,Arms Limitation,and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-34: Some Preliminary Observations

One of the least understood issues concerning interwar Britain is the connection between public opinion and the development and implementation of foreign and defence policy. And what is true generally of these crucial elements of interwar British statecraft is doubly so for perhaps their most nettled subset: disarmament. Public opinion polling did not begin in Britain till 1937; yet in 1932-34, when Britain played a leading role in the League of Nations-sponsored World Disarmament Conference, government ministers and their civil service and armed forces advisors sought to produce policy for this conference that would balance between limiting the national armoury and protecting national and Imperial security. Their reading of public opinion was crucial; but so, too, was the reading that the opposition parties and extra-parliamentary interest groups did and the subsequent pressures that they brought to bear on the government. This article offers some preliminary observations on the efficacy of using the national press as a means both of assessing public attitudes and of connecting the public debate over disarmament policy with policymaking within the British government.     

The Press, Public Opinion, Arms Limitation, and Government Policy in Britain, 1932-34: Some Preliminary Observations

One of the least understood issues concerning interwar Britain is the connection between public opinion and the development and implementation of foreign and defence policy. And what is true generally of these crucial elements of interwar British statecraft is doubly so for perhaps their most nettled subset: disarmament. Public opinion polling did not begin in Britain till 1937; yet in 1932-34, when Britain played a leading role in the League of Nations-sponsored World Disarmament Conference, government ministers and their civil service and armed forces advisors sought to produce policy for this conference that would balance between limiting the national armoury and protecting national and Imperial security. Their reading of public opinion was crucial; but so, too, was the reading that the opposition parties and extra-parliamentary interest groups did and the subsequent pressures that they brought to bear on the government. This article offers some preliminary observations on the efficacy of using the national press as a means both of assessing public attitudes and of connecting the public debate over disarmament policy with policymaking within the British government.     

Lord Ponsonby and the Churchill affair of 1836: An episode in the eastern question

William Churchill, a British merchant in Turkey, accidentally wounded an Ottoman boy and, after being savagely beaten, was imprisoned in the notorious bagnio by the Reis Effendi and Achmet Pasha. Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador, sought dismissal of these ministers. His tactics and threats of demands that his government would make, couched in extravagant language, provoked Russian intervention and alarmed the other powers. Before the British government could react, the Sultan dismissed the Reis Effendi, but Britain's failure to demand dismissal of Achmet left Russian influence supreme. Ponsonby, however, emerged from defeat with credit, and Churchill received compensation.     

Meeting Hauteur with Tact,Imperturbability, and Resolution: British Diplomacy and Russia, 1856–1865

This article takes a broad view of Anglo–Russian relations in the years between the Peace of Paris, 1856, and the death of Viscount Palmerston, 1865, examining the shifts within that period in an essentially high-political diplomatic history. It traces a number of strands in geopolitics, offering a sense of the competing strategies of the European Great Powers, particularly the roles of British diplomats: the private and public communication amongst prime ministers, foreign secretaries, ambassadors, ministers-plenipotentiaries and consular officials concerning British policy towards Russia in the post-Crimean War period. It outlines the principles that underlay that policy and the ways in which the diplomatic network observed the tsar and his advisors and agents, assessed the developing situation in Russia, Central Asia, and the Ottoman Balkans, made decisions, and implemented policy. It focusses on the diplomatists’ attitudes and perceptions—how they thought about Russia and British interests and how they worked to protect them. It also analyses British policy in light of the European dimension. The years 1856 to 1865 not only witnessed Russian attempts to undermine the Crimean settlement, they also saw revisionist Bonapartist France work to destroy the constraining Vienna system of 1815—primarily in northern Italy. These policies complicated British attempts to maintain the status-quo and defend their interests in the East. The evolving situation was highly complex.     

Britain's power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government's defence debate at Chequers in November 1964

Prior to the advent of the Wilson government, there existed a large number of official memoranda and reports on Britain's power and influence in the world. Central to Whitehall's concern was the discovery of some means of reducing the cost of maintaining Britain's three main strategic roles - nuclear deterrence, the defence of western Europe and East of Suez. It was clear that Britain should not, and could not, maintain these three roles indefinitely, a view which was shared by Labour ministers at the Chequers meeting. This article examines the evolution of Whitehall's thinking on Britain's long-term world role during the period before and after Labour came into power in October 1964, and concludes that British ministers and officials began to consider Britain's eventual disengagement from bases East of Suez, a disengagement which was finally announced by the Wilson government in July 1967.     

“A Very Great Clerk”: Sir Ronald Campbell and the Fall Of France,May–June 1940 1

Sir Ronald H. Campbell was the first British ambassador during the Second World War to manage a key bilateral relationship with a wartime ally. When the Germans invaded France in May 1940, Campbell's Embassy was transformed from a diplomatic reporting post into a frontline base that had to brief London not only on the political situation in France but also on strategic military matters. However, the British ambassador would constantly struggle to register his authority in the overall management of the Franco-British relationship, and more often than not, was bypassed by Whitehall departments, special advisors and senior ministers. Campbell only found himself in a more pivotal role as communications between the British and French Governments disintegrated and the latter moved to Bordeaux. It then fell upon Campbell to make some of the most dramatic decisions in twentieth century Franco-British history.     

Timothy E. Cook: 1954–2006

Abstract

This article describes the organizational and operational aspects of diplomacy's interplay with the news media in Britain. It examines the media's role as a source of information for ministers, officials, and the wider public; the media's effect on official and unofficial thinking; the media's roles in interdepartmental coordination and during international negotiations; and the uses of the media by the government as channels to mold public attitudes at home and abroad. It concludes by considering the implications of advancements in media technology, and greater public interest in international affairs, for media diplomacy.     

IAI annual report, 1971

Despite the belief of some that British Prime Minister Brown's attitudes towards the European Union could not be predicted, much in his period as Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that Britain's role within the European Union would not be a high priority of his premiership. Early indications bear out this expectation. There will probably not be a British referendum on the Reform Treaty, but the rhetoric employed by Brown's government to describe the Treaty will be negative and minimalist. Although no significant body of British opinion favours withdrawal from the European Union, British popular resentment towards the Union is unlikely to disappear under Brown's leadership.     

Britain,the united states and the control of nuclear weapons: The diplomacy of the Thor deployment 1956–58

The 'Tilea Affair' of March 1939 is among the most contentious of the short-term events leading to the Second World War. V.V. Tilea, the Romanian minister in London, brought information to the British Foreign Office, about an alleged German threat to his country. The guarantee to Poland soon followed and, in turn, the outbreak of the war. This article examines the evidence offered by contemporary British witnesses, the ensuing historical controversy - bringing to bear a variety of new revelations, including materials derived from the author's acquaintance with Tilea - and the present state of historical knowledge. It concludes that closure can be applied to most aspects of the 'Tilea Affair'.     

Eisenhower,the British and the security of Hong Kong, 1953–60

This article is an examination of Hong Kong's importance within British‐American security arrangements in the Far East during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Archival evidence indicates that the Eisenhower Administration accepted a greater deal of commitment to the defence of Hong Kong during the 1950s — a period of significant hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. To understand this policy evolution in the broader context, this study evaluates the differences in British and American attitudes towards China during the 1950s and the effect of this on US policy towards Hong Kong.     

The British and the 1960 soviet attack on the office of united nations secretary-general

This article examines the 1960 soviet attack on Dag Hammarskjold and its proposal to reform the office of the UN Secretary-General into a troika and the Soviet lines, the article seeks to show that the British had sufficiant concerns about the direction Hammarskjold was taking the office of Secretary-General to be more in line with Soviet attitudes than they would have been willing to admit publicly. British support for Hammarskjold in the Congo crisis was not unqualified and the article notes that following Hammarskjold's death, it was not Britain's interest to see Hammarskjold's successor being given the political freedom he had enjoyed.     

High Hopes,Bold Aims,Limited Results: Britain and the Establishment of the NATO Mediterranean Command, 1950–1953

Although a great deal has been written about British policy in the Middle East in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the reorganization of the Southern flank of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe after the admission of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the assumption of NATO's naval Mediterranean Command by Britain has attracted little attention. This article analyses British aims and policy on the formation of the Mediterranean Command, the talks between London and Washington concerning the appointment of a Naval Commander-in-Chief, the attitudes of France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey towards British policy, and finally, the establishment of NATO's Mediterranean Command in conjunction with the reorganization of SHAPE's Southern flank. For strategic as well as prestige reasons, Britain tried to retain its traditional dominant eastern Mediterranean position by encouraging the establishment of an Allied naval Mediterranean Command under a British Commander-in-Chief. However, the decline of British military and naval power and political influence meant that Britain secured a compromise settlement which only partially satisfied its aspirations.     

The Rise and Fall of the 'Ethical Dimension': Presentation and Practice in New Labour's Foreign Policy

This article explores why the New Labour government in Britain stopped using the former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's notion of an 'ethical dimension' to present its foreign policy to the public. The article begins by tracing the rise of the 'ethical dimension' in New Labour's foreign policy pronouncements. It then surveys some of the debates about the party's foreign policy record, investigating how far its explicit appeal to ethics merely overlies traditional British foreign policy practices. The final section discusses three possible explanations for New Labour's decision to abandon the language of an 'ethical dimension'. It is argued that this decision suggests two important lessons for the future relationship of ethics to foreign policy. While explicit ethical standards provide important benchmarks for activists and public intellectuals, they can also serve to highlight the failures of an administration at the expense of more positive developments. Consequently, jettisoning the language of an 'ethical dimension' may actually encourage a more sophisticated public debate that moves beyond the facile and misleading belief that foreign policies are either 'ethical' or 'unethical'.     

Anglo-American relations after Suez,the rise and decline of the working group experiment,and the french challenge to NATO, 1957-59

This article explores the establishment of a number of Anglo-American working groups at the Washington Conference of October 1957, and explains how the British regarded the groups as an attempt to institutionalize the principle of consultation in Anglo-American relations. American and British officials were anxious that the existence of the groups be kept secret for fear that they would be a cause of resentment to other close allies. De Gaulle's attacks on an Anglo-American monopoly within NATO, and disruptive calls for institutionalizing tripartite cooperation following his assumption of power in June 1958 underlined this point, and helped to cool US attitudes to any notion of formal machinery that by-passed established alliance structures. Practical problems associated with the functioning of the groups, as well as the potential for political embarrassment they could represent, meant that their role had largely by the spring of 1959, yet their brief history was illustrative of the tensions that exclusivity in ANglo-American relations could bring to the Western alliance.     

Bringing in the rogues: political violence,the British government and Sinn Fein

The article explores the relationship between the British government and the Irish Republican movement. In contrast to the established view, it argues that the British government had never had any objection to the inclusion of Republicans into a political settlement, and that – therefore – there was no need for any significant changes in government policy during the 1990s. Far from being an obstacle to inclusion, the British government's political strategy not only provided an incentive for the IRA to cease its military campaign, but also the opportunity to follow it up with an equitable political process, resulting in the Belfast Agreement.     

Lord Ponsonby and the Churchill affair of 1836: An episode in the eastern question

William Churchill, a British merchant in Turkey, accidentally wounded an Ottoman boy and, after being savagely beaten, was imprisoned in the notorious bagnio by the Reis Effendi and Achmet Pasha. Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador, sought dismissal of these ministers. His tactics and threats of demands that his government would make, couched in extravagant language, provoked Russian intervention and alarmed the other powers. Before the British government could react, the Sultan dismissed the Reis Effendi, but Britain's failure to demand dismissal of Achmet left Russian influence supreme. Ponsonby, however, emerged from defeat with credit, and Churchill received compensation.     

Is Belarus a demagogical democracy?

The article analyses the meaning and the forms that contemporary democracy may take, especially in application to the new regimes in Eastern Europe. The evaluation of developing polities always poses a difficulty, as one never knows whether an existent form of government is the final one that a state aims to achieve, or whether it is simply an interim effort to survive transition. Furthermore, there may be as many forms of democracy as there are different states, and the currently prevailing liberal form of democracy may not necessarily be the only or the best means to form a sustainable government. From this perspective, contemporary Belarus provides an insightful study of a regime that may be labelled as 'authoritarian', but in this article is arguably viewed as a 'demagogical democracy' following Aristotle's conceptualisation of a democratic state. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable support of INTAS (99-00245) and the British Academy (SG-31102 and PDF/2001/174), without which the project on which my quotations are based would not have been possible.