To act truthfully: Nonverbal behaviour and strategies during a police interrogation

Abstract

In an experiment, nonverbal indicators of deception in police interrogations of mock crimes were examined. Both vocal and nonvocal behaviours were scored. Thirty participants were subjected to long interrogations (over 9 minutes) conducted by 30 experienced police officers, asked to interrogate as they normally do. Although the liars reported being significantly more nervous, and found the task more strenuous than the truth tellers, no differences in the nonverbal behaviours scored were found. In an analysis of the strategies employed, both truth tellers and liars were found to try to not make excess movements. The principal verbal content strategy for the liars was to keep the story simple, and for truth tellers to keep the story real. The reasons why, in this demanding situation, the truth tellers and liars could not be distinguished by their nonverbal behaviour are discussed.     

Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When Training to Detect Deception Works

Research on deception detection in legal contexts has neglected the question of how the use of evidence can affect deception detection accuracy. In this study, police trainees (N=82) either were or were not trained in strategically using the evidence when interviewing lying or truth telling mock suspects (N=82). The trainees’ strategies as well as liars’ and truth tellers’ counter-strategies were analyzed. Trained interviewers applied different strategies than did untrained. As a consequence of this, liars interviewed by trained interviewers were more inconsistent with the evidence compared to liars interviewed by untrained interviewers. Trained interviewers created and utilized the statement-evidence consistency cue, and obtained a considerably higher deception detection accuracy rate (85.4%) than untrained interviewers (56.1%).     

Increasing Cognitive Load to Facilitate Lie Detection: The Benefit of Recalling an Event in Reverse Order

In two experiments, we tested the hypotheses that (a) the difference between liars and truth tellers will be greater when interviewees report their stories in reverse order than in chronological order, and (b) instructing interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order will facilitate detecting deception. In Experiment 1, 80 mock suspects told the truth or lied about a staged event and did or did not report their stories in reverse order. The reverse order interviews contained many more cues to deceit than the control interviews. In Experiment 2, 55 police officers watched a selection of the videotaped interviews of Experiment 1 and made veracity judgements. Requesting suspects to convey their stories in reverse order improved police observers' ability to detect deception and did not result in a response bias.     

Detecting deception in suspects: verbal cues as a function of interview strategy

Research on deception has consistently shown that people are poor at detecting deception, partly due to lack of consistent cues to deception. This research focuses on eliciting verbal cues to deception when questioning suspects who deny crime and how such cues differ due to type of questioning. An experiment examined verbal differences between innocent and guilty mock suspects (N=96) as a function of veracity and interview style (Free recall, Probes, or Free recall plus Probes). Guilty (vs innocent) suspects omitted more crime-relevant information and their statements were more likely to contradict the evidence, showing that statement–evidence inconsistency was a cue to deception. This cue to deception was more pronounced when the interview contained probes. Lie-catchers (N=192) obtained an accuracy rate higher than chance (61.5%) for detecting deceptive denials. Implications for further research on verbal cues to deception are discussed.     

An Empirical Test of the Behaviour Analysis Interview

The present experiment is the first empirical test of the Behaviour Analysis Interview (BAI), an interview technique developed by F. E. Inbau, J. E. Reid, J. P. Buckley, & B. C. Jayne (2001) designed to evoke different verbal and non-verbal responses from liars and truth-tellers. Inbau et al. expect liars to be less helpful than truth-tellers in investigations and to exhibit more nervous behaviours. Just the opposite predictions, however, follow from the deception literature, which notes that liars take their credibility less for granted and are therefore more aware of their responses and their impact on others. This suggests that liars' answers should be more helpful than truth-tellers' answers, and liars' non-verbal responses should appear more relaxed than truth-tellers' non-verbal responses. In the present experiment, 40 participants (undergraduate students) lied or told the truth about an event during a BAI interview. The interviews were coded according to Inbau et al.'s guidelines. The results showed that, compared to liars, truth-tellers (a) were more naive and evasive when explaining the purpose of the interview, and (b) were less likely to name someone who they felt certain did not commit the crime. Truth-tellers also exhibited more nervous behaviours. The results were consistent with the predictions of the deception literature, and directly opposed to the predictions of BAI.     

The devil is in the detail: deception and consistency over repeated interviews

ABSTRACT

Research indicates that truthful statements typically contain more details than fabricated statements, and that truth tellers are no more consistent than liars over multiple interviews. In this experiment, we examine the impact of (i) multiple interviewers and (ii) reverse order recall on liars’ and truth tellers’ consistency and amount of reported detail over repeated recall attempts. Participants either took part in a mock crime (lying condition) or an innocent event (truth telling condition) which they were subsequently interviewed about in two separate interview phases. Truth tellers provided more details overall, and more reminiscent details than liars. There were no differences between veracity groups for the number of omissions made or repetitions reported. Despite the popular belief that inconsistency is a cue to deception, we found little support for the notion that consistency (or lack of consistency) offers a diagnostic cue to deception. We found little evidence that switching interviewer or recalling in reverse order induced inconsistencies in liars. In fact, due to the number of reminiscent details in truth tellers’ accounts, our findings suggest that accounts provided by liars tend to be slightly more consistent than those provided by truth tellers. Materials for this paper can be found at osf.io/hgvmk/.     

Will get fooled again: Emotionally intelligent people are easily duped by high‐stakes deceivers

Purpose. There is major disagreement about the existence of individual differences in deception detection or naturally gifted detection ‘wizards’ (see O'Sullivan & Ekman, 2004 vs. Bond & Uysal, 2007 ). This study aimed to elucidate the role of a specific, and seemingly relevant individual difference – emotional intelligence (EI) and its subcomponents – in detecting high‐stakes, emotional deception. Methods. Participants (N= 116) viewed a sample of 20 international videos of individuals emotionally pleading for the safe return of their missing family member, half of whom were responsible for the missing person's disappearance/murder. Participants judged whether the pleas were honest or deceptive, provided confidence ratings, reported the cues they utilized, and rated their emotional response to each plea. Results. EI was associated with overconfidence in assessing the sincerity of the pleas and greater self‐reported sympathetic feelings to deceptive targets (enhanced gullibility). Although total EI was not associated with discrimination of truths and lies, the ability to perceive and express emotion (a component of EI), specifically, was negatively related to detecting deceptive targets (lower sensitivity [d′]). Combined, these patterns contributed negatively to the ability to spot emotional lies. Conclusions. These findings collectively suggest that features of EI, and subsequent decision‐making processes, paradoxically may impair one's ability to detect deceit.     

Eliciting Cues to False Intent: A New Application of Strategic Interviewing

This article examined how to elicit cues to deception when a suspect is asked both about his/her intentions and his/her corresponding past planning, and when the investigator holds evidence on the suspect’s planning activities. In a new experimental set-up accommodating the main characteristics of intent, participants (N = 120) either planned a criminal or a non-criminal act. They were intercepted before completing the planned act. Each participant was interviewed in accordance with one of three interview techniques: Early Evidence disclosure or one of two versions of the Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE) technique. All the interviews were transcribed and scored for consistency. As predicted, the liars were perceived as having a higher degree of inconsistency for two of the three relevant comparisons (Statement on Planning–Evidence on Planning; Statement on Intent–Evidence on Planning). Furthermore, using the evidence strategically resulted in differences between liars and truth tellers being magnified, as predicted. This article advances previous findings in showing that by interviewing strategically with respect to the evidence, it is possible to elicit reliable cues to deception when a suspect is asked about intentions and corresponding planning activities.     

Police officers', social workers', teachers' and the general public's beliefs about deception in children,adolescents and adults

Purpose . The present survey examined the beliefs of different occupational groups (police officers, social workers, teachers) and members of the general public about (i) cues to deception in young children (5‐ to 6‐year‐olds), adolescents (14‐ to 15‐year‐olds) and adults, and (ii) the underlying processes (emotions, cognitive load and attempted verbal and behavioural control), which may explain why cues to deceit do occur. Method . Two hundred and six participants completed a ‘cues to deception’ and ‘processes underlying deception’ questionnaire for three different age groups (young children, adolescents and adults). Results and discussion . The survey revealed that participants believed that liars are nervous, have difficulties in formulating their lies and do not fully endorse their lies. In general, participants associated more cues with deception than seems justified on the basis of deception literature. Participants generally associated the same cues to deceit for all three age groups but, when differences between age groups did emerge, this was most likely to be amongst teachers. Although participants believed that adults control their speech and behaviour more when they lie than adolescents and young children do, this did not result in participants believing that adults exhibit fewer cues to deceit. No major occupational differences emerged, although out of the four participating groups, teachers were most likely to associate cues with deception in young children.     

Detecting Deception Via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence

Deception detection research has largely neglected an important aspect of many investigations, namely that there often exists evidence against a suspect. This study examined the potentials of timing of evidence disclosure as a deception detection tool. The main prediction was that observers (N = 116) would obtain higher accuracy rates if the evidence against the suspects (N = 58) was presented in a late rather than early stage of the interrogation. This prediction was based on the idea that late evidence disclosure would trigger lack of consistencies between the liars’ stories and the evidence; this could be used as a cue to deception. The main prediction received support. Late disclosure observers obtained an overall accuracy of 61.7%, compared to 42.9% of Early disclosure observers. Deceptive statements were identified with high accuracy (67.6%) in Late disclosure, indicating that the technique in this form is beneficial mainly for pinpointing lies.     

Using sketch drawing to induce inconsistency in liars

Purpose. Consistency as a cue to detecting deception was tested in two experiments using sketch drawing and verbal reports in repeated interviews. Liars were expected to be less consistent than truth‐tellers. Methods. In Expt 1, 80 undergraduate students reported truthfully or deceptively about an alleged lunch date – they sketched the layout of the restaurant and then answered spatial questions about objects in the restaurant. Ratings were given for the consistency between sketches and verbal reports. In Expt 2, 34 undergraduate students reported truthfully or deceptively about completing a series of unrelated tasks – they answered spatial questions about objects in a room and then sketched the layout of the room. Proportions were calculated for the consistency between verbal reports and sketches. Results. Expt 1. Liars were rated as less consistent than truth‐tellers. Up to 80% of truth‐tellers and 70% of liars could be correctly classified. Expt 2. Liars were less consistent than truth‐tellers on consistency proportions. Up to 100% of truth‐tellers and 77% of liars could be correctly classified. Conclusions. Using sketches to induce inconsistency may be a reliable, resource efficient way to help investigators detect deception.     

Psychopathy and deception detection using indirect measures

Purpose. The goal of the current study was to examine psychopathy and indirect measures of deception detection. Methods. Undergraduate students (N=444) viewed video clips of adult male offenders telling true and false stories about crimes. For each story, participants rated indirect measures of deception (thinking hard, nervousness, emotional arousal, and attempting to control behaviour) and credibility. Participants also chose the story they believed to be true and rated the confidence in their decision. Offenders were rated on the psychopathy checklist – revised. Results. Consistent with past research, deception detection accuracy was at chance level and unrelated to confidence. Ratings on indirect measures by undergraduates did not distinguish true and false statements in offenders. Psychopathic offenders were less successful at deception than non‐psychopathic offenders. Psychopathic traits were associated with lower perceived credibility during deception and ratings of thinking harder while lying. Conclusions. The results suggest that indirect measures of deception detection may be less useful in offender samples. Further, the findings are consistent with the general inability of psychopathic offenders to demonstrate superior deception skills in empirical studies. Indirect measures of deception uniquely related to psychopathic traits offer new insight into the relationship between psychopathy and deception.     

Lie Detection Accuracy—the Role of Age and the Use of Emotions as a Reliable Cue

Literature surrounding the accuracy of deception detection has produced inconsistent findings, and the majority of investigations have been based upon low-stakes lies. Although recent research has suggested that high-stakes situations may produce reliable cues to deception, it remains unclear whether knowledge of these cues actually improves the detection of lies. In an online experiment, we assessed participant’s ability to detect lies in 22 public appeals for help with missing or murdered relatives (N = 196). Participants were randomly allocated to either the cue condition (presented with previously identified cues to deception) or no cue condition (instructed to make judgement on instinct), before being presented with the video footage. Participants were asked to indicate whether the appealer is lying or telling the truth, how confident they are in their judgement and if they were familiar with the case. At the end of the experiment, participants wrote qualitative responses on the cues that they used during lie detection. Although cue knowledge and confidence did not significantly predict accuracy scores, there was a positive relationship between accuracy and age. Participants who used emotion-based cues were significantly better at detecting deception. The findings are discussed with reference to the existence of reliable cues.     

Applying the Verifiability Approach in an international airport setting

In the current study, we tested the utility of applying the Verifiability Approach (VA) within an international airport setting. The VA works on the notion that truth tellers provide more verifiable details than liars and has shown to be successful within other empirical deception detection scenarios. Three hundred and ninety-nine airside participants (those originating from Europe, Asia and African) were asked questions regarding their travel plans. We asked participants to either lie (n?=?195) or tell the truth (n?=?204) about their planned activities. The critical question required participants to provide information that would convince the investigator that they were telling the truth. We then transcribed and coded their responses for verifiable details; that is, details that could potentially be checked by an investigator. Overall, truth tellers provided significantly more verifiable details than liars. Furthermore, when taking their geographical origin into account, there was no interaction effect between veracity and region. Additionally, truth tellers provided a higher verifiable/total detail ratio than liars, which again showed no interaction effect between veracity and region. These findings support the suitability of the VA as a cross-cultural veracity tool and implications for its use as an additional security aid are discussed.     

Cold‐blooded lie catchers? An investigation of psychopathy,emotional processing,and deception detection

Purpose. The process of catching liars is challenging, though evidence suggests that deception detection abilities are influenced by the characteristics of the judge. This study examined individual differences in emotional processing and levels of psychopathic traits on the ability to judge the veracity of written narratives varying in emotional valence. Methods. Undergraduate participants (N= 251) judged the veracity of 12 written narratives (truthful/deceptive) across three emotional categories: positive, negative, and neutral events. Levels of psychopathy were assessed to investigate its relation to accuracy and cue use. Results. Overall accuracy was close to chance, although participants were more accurate in determining the veracity of truthful relative to deceptive narratives. Accuracy was impaired for emotional (positive and negative) relative to neutral narratives. Psychopathy was not associated with levels of overall accuracy, but related to discriminative ability, and differential use of cues in decision making. Reported cue use also differed across emotional narrative conditions. Conclusions. We speculated that an emotive truth bias may have detracted judges from attending to valid cues that are indicative of the deceptive nature of stimuli because they were distracted by the emotional content of the report. Implications for deception detection in forensic settings are discussed.     

Criteria-Based Content Analysis: An empirical test of its underlying processes

Abstract

Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) is a tool to assess the veracity of written statements, and is used as evidence in criminal courts in several countries in the world. CBCA scores are expected to be higher for truth tellers than for liars. The underlying assumption of CBCA is that (i) lying is cognitively more difficult than truth telling, and (ii) that liars are more concerned with the impression they make on others than truth tellers. However, these assumptions have not been tested to date. In the present experiment 80 participants (undergraduate students) lied or told the truth about an event. Afterwards, they completed a questionnaire measuring “cognitive load” and “tendency to control speech”. The interviews were transcribed and coded by trained CBCA raters. In agreement with CBCA assumptions, (i) truth tellers obtained higher scores than liars, (ii) liars experienced more cognitive load than truth tellers, and (iii) liars tried harder to control their speech. However, cognitive load and speech control were not correlated with CBCA scores in the predicted way.     

The Verifiability Approach to detection of malingered physical symptoms

Inspired by recent research showing that liars are reluctant to include verifiable details in their accounts, we explored in two studies (N?=?125; N?=?105) whether participants who report fabricated symptoms (‘malingerers’) present fewer verifiable details than participants who report genuine ill-health symptoms. In Study 1, participants were instructed to describe a typical day on which they had experienced a genuine or malingered symptom. Truth tellers’ statements included significantly higher proportions of verifiable details concerning the reported symptoms than malingerers’ statements. Compared with truth tellers, malingerers generated longer statements with more unverifiable details. In Study 2, we informed participants that their statements may be assessed for verifiable or checkable details. Malingerers often mentioned ‘false’ witnesses to provide checkable information and differences between malingerers and truth tellers in statement length, and checkable and uncheckable details were no longer significant. The utility and implications of the Verifiability Approach to detection of malingering are discussed.     

You cannot hide your telephone lies: Providing a model statement as an aid to detect deception in insurance telephone calls

Deception research regarding insurance claims is rare but relevant given the financial loss in terms of fraud. In Study 1, a field study in a large multinational insurance fraud detection company, truth telling mock claimants (N = 19) and lying mock claimants (N = 21) were interviewed by insurance company telephone operators. These operators classified correctly only 50% of these truthful and lying claimants, but their task was particularly challenging: Claimants said little, and truthful and deceptive statements did not differ in quality (measured with Criteria‐Based Content Analysis [CBCA]) or plausibility. In Study 2, a laboratory experiment, participants in the experimental condition (N = 43) were exposed to an audiotaped truthful and detailed account of an event that was unrelated to insurance claims (a day at the motor races). The number of words, quality of the statement (measured with CBCA), and plausibility of the participants' accounts were compared with participants who were not given a model statement (N = 40). The participants who had listened to the model statement provided longer statements than control participants, truth tellers obtained higher CBCA scores than liars, and only in the model statement condition did truth tellers sound more plausible than liars. Providing participants with a model statement is thus an innovative and successful tool to elicit cues to deception. Providing such a model has the potential to enhance performance in insurance call interviews, and, as we argue, in many other interview settings.     

Aggressive and Non-Aggressive schizophrenics: Symptom profile and neuropsychological differences

Abstract

The present experiment examined the ability of fifty-two uniformed police officers to detect deception. The experiment differed from previous experiments into detecting deceit because of its high stake lies scenario. The judges were exposed to videotaped press conferences of people who were asking the general public for help in finding their relatives or the murderers of their relatives. They all lied during these press conferences and they all have been found guilty of killing their own relatives. The judges did not perform better than could be expected by chance. Additional analyses showed that accuracy was unrelated to confidence, age, years of job experience in the police force, or level of experience in interviewing suspects. There was, however, a significant positive correlation between having experience in interviewing suspects and being confident in detecting deception. Finally, men were better at detecting deception than women.