Presidential priorities,congressional control,and the quality of regulatory analysis: an application to healthcare and homeland security

Elected leaders delegate rulemaking to federal agencies, then seek to influence rulemaking through top-down directives and statutory deadlines. This paper documents an unintended consequence of these control strategies: they reduce regulatory agencies’ ability and incentive to conduct high-quality economic analysis to inform their decisions. Using scoring data that measure the quality of regulatory impact analysis, we find that hastily adopted “interim final” regulations reflecting signature policy priorities of the two most recent presidential administrations were accompanied by significantly lower quality economic analysis. Interim final homeland security regulations adopted during the G.W. Bush administration and interim final regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act in the Obama administration were accompanied by less thorough analysis than other “economically significant” regulations (regulations with benefits, costs, or other economic impacts exceeding $100 million annually). The lower quality analysis apparently stems from the confluence of presidential priorities and very tight statutory deadlines associated with interim final regulations, rather than either factor alone.     

The Obama Administration's Challenges after the “War on Science”: Reforming Staffing Practices and Protecting Scientific Integrity in the Executive Branch

In this article, we examine the difficult leadership position President Barack Obama inherited as he took office with respect to science and technology policy making and implementation, particularly following the Bush administration and years of the so‐called “war on science.” We contend that the Obama administration's challenge is not only to take substantive policy action, but also to reform certain administrative practices, particularly in light of the previous administration's practice of the politics of strategic vacancies, a managerial technique that rearranges an agency's ideological inclinations not through the usual forms of active politicization (i.e., by filling the appointee ranks with like‐minded ideologues) but instead by “starving” the agency of staff and co‐opting its agenda that way.     

How Bush bungled Asia: militarism,economic indifference and unilateralism have weakened the United States across Asia

Abstract

Criticism of the Bush administration's policies in East Asia is hardly common fare. Roseate colors certainly pervade the picture painted by defenders of Bush's policies toward Asia who argue that relations between the US and that region have never been better. This paper shows to the contrary that the Bush administration politicized wide swaths of public policy, including foreign relations, in an effort to create a permanent Republican electoral majority. That effort created a host of failures in America's Asian relations. The article focuses on three central problems: excessive militarization of American foreign policy; economic mismanagement; and a unilateralism that distanced the US from the rising Asian regionalism. The failures are not irreversible however and a change in administration has the potential to revitalize cross Pacific ties.     

Government Reform,Political Ideology,and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources. Further analysis reveals that differences in reported agency effort can be explained partly by objective differences in the demands that PART placed on agencies—liberal agencies were required to evaluate more programs and implement more improvement plans relative to their organizational capacity—and partly by the ideological beliefs of employees—on average, liberal managers reported more agency effort, even after accounting for objective measures of administrative burden.     

Using Parallel Strategies to Promote Change: Forest Policymaking under George W. Bush

This study of policy change examines the parallel strategies the administration of President George W. Bush has used to substantially alter the direction of forest policy during his first term. Using the Healthy Forests Initiative as a case study, this analysis explains how, by framing the problem of wildfires and forest health in terms of process and pointing blame at environmental groups misusing appeal procedures, the administration was able to emphasize process, rather than the content of existing forest policy. It also provided a reasonable explanation for the president to take a lead in seeking both legislative as well as regulatory change. We contend that the use of two parallel policymaking paths—legislative and administrative—enabled the president to pursue policy change more rapidly, and, from a strategic standpoint, more effectively, than by relying upon the legislative process alone. We offer that the Bush administration's approach to changing forest policy represents a redirection that is likely to serve as a template for further environmental policy change.     

The Obama Administration and PBB: Building on the Legacy of Federal Performance‐Informed Budgeting?

The administration of President Barack Obama, like those of his immediate predecessors, is focused on trying to improve the quality of, and use of, performance data. The federal government has been pursuing performance‐informed budget reforms for more than 50 years. Most recently, the Bush administration reforms included the President’s Management Agenda and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). The Obama administration reforms include: measuring the effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; reducing or eliminating poorly‐performing programs; setting a limited number of short‐term, high‐priority performance goals; and funding detailed program evaluations. The administration is taking a more agency‐driven approach than the Bush administration, but continues to find it challenging to move beyond production of performance data to its use. There should be opportunities to show how performance information can be used for decision making, given the change in the political climate and the needs to reduce spending and the deficit. Historically, there has been little appetite in the Congress for evidence‐based decision making. The administration, however, can continue to demonstrate how federal agencies can use performance information to more effectively manage programs.     

The Politics of Regulatory Change: National Forest Management Planning under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush

This paper examines regulatory change from the William J. Clinton administration through the presidency of George W. Bush by focusing on their respective efforts to alter national forest planning procedures mandated by the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA). While rule making has become an important alternative pathway for making policy, the strategies used to develop a new rule may vary among presidents because of differing values and management styles. Both presidents were adept at framing the planning regulation to reflect dominant values such as preserving ecosystems (Clinton) or administrative efficiency (Bush). Between‐administration differences in regulatory tactics also tended to alter the relative importance of institutional venues and, by extension, the influence exercised by differing political constituencies.     

The triumph of regulatory politics: Benefit–cost analysis and political salience

While benefit–cost analysis (BCA) is now a permanent part of the regulatory process in the United States, and many other countries around the world as well as the European Union have adopted it or are moving toward it, there have been few empirical attempts to assess either whether its use improves regulations or how BCA interacts with the political environment. We use a unique US database of the costs and benefits of 109 economically significant regulations issued between 2000 and 2009 to examine whether the amount of information provided in the BCA or political factors surrounding the regulation better correlate with the net benefits of the regulation. We find that there is little correlation between the information provided by the analysis and the net benefits. However, we find that regulations that receive few public comments and are not issued at the end of an administration, have the highest net benefits. These are the regulations that are the least politically salient. This interaction between the political environment and the economic performance of a regulation has been under‐examined and deserves further study.     

What's wrong with the back of the envelope? A call for simple (and timely) benefit–cost analysis

Observers across the ideological spectrum have criticized benefit–cost analysis for as long as it has been part of the rulemaking process. Still, proponents and detractors agree that analysis has morphed into a mechanism often used by agencies to justify regulatory decisions already made. We argue that a simpler analysis of more alternatives conducted earlier in the regulatory process can resuscitate it as a tool to inform policy. Recognizing that requiring a procedure does not ensure that regulators will follow it, we offer possible remedies, including strengthening or relaxing subsequent review of proposed rules, which raise the cost of circumventing the reform or lower the cost of following it.     

The United States’ Syria quandary

Following the collapse of the latest ceasefire, the Obama administration faces increasing pressure from interventionists for more robust military action against the Assad regime. But the United States' military options are problematic. The administration's Syria policy will probably not change substantially before he leaves office in January, though Hillary Clinton – his likely successor – has indicated that she would lean farther forward, in particular by imposing no-fly zones.     

BLM,the Administrative Presidency,and Policy Shifts: Policy Tools Affecting Oil and Gas Operations

This paper addresses change in oil and gas policies pushed by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) during the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Administrative policy changes occurred not only because of election outcomes and the emergence of new governing coalitions but BLM's selective utilization of policy tools such as rulemaking, planning, environmental impact analyses, and the use of discretionary authority to increase or relax enforcement decisions. The data reveal that BLM put more emphasis on the use of discretionary authority to limit environmental inspections and to limit environmental reviews of proposed drilling projects under Bush while agency officials gave priority to adopting new planning procedures to allow greater stakeholder input under Obama as well as increasing the number of environmental inspections.     

Should the housing voucher program become a state‐administered block grant?

Abstract

The Bush administration has proposed that the current national Housing Choice Voucher Program, which has an essentially uniform program design and is administered largely by local public housing authorities, become a block grant administered by the states. This article examines the potential benefits and hazards of such a change.

While this article does not support or analyze directly the administration's proposal, it concludes that state administration is fundamentally a good idea. However, the choice‐based nature of the voucher program should be preserved, and the early stages of implementation should permit changes to the program's subsidy structure and housing quality inspection only in selected states and with careful evaluation. The law enacting the new program should include clearly articulated goals and mandated reporting requirements. Also, the program should be funded and monitored to maintain the national commitment to meeting the housing needs of low‐income renters.     

Presidents and Patronage

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.     

The regulatory state and the UK Labour Government's re‐regulation of provision in the English National Health Service

Following its election in 1997, the UK Labour Government embarked upon a 10 year program of reform of the National Health Service (NHS). By 2005, Labour had doubled the NHS budget and dramatically transformed the shape of the Service. In England, a basic characteristic of the NHS is the organizational split between provider and commissioning agencies. In this article I argue that Labour's re‐regulation of NHS provision is a coherent representation of the influence of the “regulatory state” in restructuring arrangements between government, market, and society. The article offers an account of the regulatory state based on a discussion of five key theses: The Audit Society, Regulation Inside Government, The New Regulatory State, The British Regulatory State, and Regulatory Capitalism. The article unfolds Labour's program of reform across themes common to these accounts: the division of labor between state and society, the division of labor within the state, the formalization of previously informal controls, and the development of meta‐regulatory techniques of enforced self‐regulation. It concludes that the key themes of the regulatory state are at work in Labour's transformation of NHS provision and it offers a discussion of the implications for both scholars of regulation and the UK and European health policy literature.     

North Korea’s fifth nuclear test

North Korea conducted its fifth and most powerful nuclear test on 9 September, and is moving towards mounting a nuclear bomb on ballistic missiles of increasing range. The Obama administration's policy of strategic patience may now be insufficient. Pyongyang is unlikely to restrain its nuclear bomb and ballistic missile development in the absence of greater US and Chinese assertiveness and more creative strategies.     

Do Carrots Work? Examining the Effectiveness of EPA's Compliance Assistance Program

The role of compliance assistance in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's overall enforcement strategy has been quite variable over the past decade and a half, increasing in prominence under the Bush administration and now slated for significantly reduced funding under the Obama administration. While theoretical models and anecdotal evidence suggest that compliance assistance should play some role in a comprehensive enforcement strategy, to date there has been relatively little empirical evidence on the actual effectiveness of existing compliance assistance programs. To help inform the debate over the appropriate use of compliance assistance, this paper uses data on hazardous waste generators nationwide to assess the effect of federal compliance assistance programs in improving compliance with hazardous waste regulations. The paper also conducts a direct empirical analysis of the relationship between traditional enforcement tools and compliance assistance. The results show that federal compliance assistance efforts do increase compliance, but the evidence does not suggest any consistent relationship between traditional enforcement and compliance assistance. Also, while states do not appear to substitute federal compliance assistance for traditional enforcement, state compliance assistance programs do appear to decrease the likelihood of inspections among the smallest hazardous waste generators.     

The Presidential Election of 2008*

Senators Barack Obama and John McCain each has severe problems. McCain must take his distance from the very unpopular President Bush while keeping the support of the core Republican voters, but suffers from lack of rapport with the Fundamentalist Protestants and traditionalist Catholics. In foreign policy, he is more devoted to US global hegemony (in a world which stubbornly refuses it) than the incumbent. Senator Obama knows that this is a dangerous illusion but thinks that it is unwise to say so. He supports Israel in exaggerated terms and repeats the fabrications of the war party about Iran. Obama has the difficulty of being part black and entirely intellectual, and he needs the votes of the working class men and women who are very reserved about him. McCain seeks low taxes and less government expenditure and intervention, but tens of millions of economically hard‐pressed citizens are ready to return to the ethos and practices of the New Deal. Obama promises to revive the regulatory and redistributive role of government to help them, but his reluctance to criticise the arms budget may makes him seem unrealistic. Obama's vision of the United States puts the achievement of the American Revolution in the future whereas McCain thinks of the nation as already perfected. In many respects, we have a classical conflict between left and right.     

Historical perspective and better regulatory governance: An agenda for institutional reform

Compared to economics, sociology, political science, and law, the discipline of history has had a limited role in the wide‐ranging efforts to reconsider strategies of regulatory governance, especially inside regulatory institutions. This article explores how more sustained historical perspective might improve regulatory decisionmaking. We first survey how a set of American regulatory agencies currently rely on historical research and analysis, whether for the purposes of public relations or as a means of supporting policymaking. We then consider how regulatory agencies might draw on history more self‐consciously, more strategically, and to greater effect. Three areas stand out in this regard – the use of history to improve understanding of institutional culture; reliance on historical analysis to test the empirical plausibility of conceptual models that make assumptions about the likelihood of potential economic outcomes; and integration of historical research methods into program and policy evaluation.     

Toward the usable recognition of individual benefits and costs in regulatory analysis and governance

Regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe have well‐deserved reputations for fixating on the total benefits and costs of proposed and final regulatory actions, without doing any more than anecdotally mentioning the subpopulations and individuals who may bear disproportionate costs or reap disproportionate benefits. This is especially true on the “cost” side of the cost–benefit ledger, where analysts exert little effort to even inform decisionmakers and the public that the costs of regulations might be distributed either regressively or progressively. Many scholars and advocates have observed that regulation can increase the efficiency of market outcomes, but caution about its untoward (or suboptimal) effects on equity. Here, we argue that without considering distributional information about costs and benefits, regulatory policies in fact can also cause violence to notions of efficiency, for two reasons: (i) society cannot hope to approach Pareto‐efficient outcomes without identifying those who must lose so that others can gain more; and (ii) because the harm experienced by involuntary risks and by imposed regulatory costs is likely non‐linear in its magnitude (at the individual level), efficiency is, in fact, a strong function of the shape of the distribution of these effects. This article reviews evidence about the distribution of regulatory costs and benefits, describes how agencies fail to incorporate readily available distributional information, and sketches a vision for how they could analyze costs and benefits to promote more efficient regulatory choices and outcomes.     

American Politics Today: An Interview with Frances Fox Piven

Readers of New Political Science know Frances Fox Piven as the author or co-author of a series of path-breaking articles and books on the development of American social policies, political mobilization and voter turnout, and the attack on the welfare state. She is also a supporter of long standing of this journal and its sponsor, the Caucus for a New Political Science. In the last year Piven has come under attack by FOX News host Glenn Beck and other right-wing activists for ideas she developed in the 1960s with the late Richard Cloward. Beck and others have been keen to link Piven and Cloward's analysis in far-fetched ways to the economic policies of the Obama administration. In this interview Piven interprets the meaning of the right-wing attacks and discusses the state of contemporary American politics more broadly. She comments on the Obama administration's major policies and the prospects for political mobilization and offers advice for progressive scholars in the early stages of their careers.