The Dearth of Jointly Dyadic Democratic Interventions

The Democratic Peace Proposition, which states that no two democracies have ever gone to war with each other, has been questioned by scholars who claim that such pacific behavior among free states does not apply to lower forms of conflict. In particular, Kegley and Hermann contend that democracies intervene in the affairs of other liberal states via overt military acts or covert machinations. In many cases, they argue that dyadic democratic interventions (DDIs) occur more frequently than would be expected given the number of jointly democratic dyads in the international system. I examine their research design and suggest changes to their concepts of states, interventions, and regime type, as well as their sample size and definition of dyads in the international system. I implement these changes and retest such arguments on a sample of interventions from 1945 to 1991. I find 11 cases where a democracy intervenes against another democracy, but these cases are rare in comparison to interventions conducted by democratic and/or autocratic states in undemocratic states, or by autocratic states against democratic states. Furthermore, these DDIs are less likely to occur than the presence of democracy in the international system would suggest.     

The Chicken or the Egg?: A Coevolutionary Approach to Disputed Issues and Militarized Conflict

Is state behavior influenced by the context in which it occurs, or does context arise because of the way in which states behave? I investigate these questions in the context of international disputes over issues and states’ militarized behavior. The prevalent assumption in interstate conflict research is that disputed issues are exogenous to militarization patterns. I question the validity of this assumption, arguing there are reasons to suspect certain states self-select into disputes. I use a coevolution modeling strategy to allow the existence of disputes and states’ behavior to mutually affect one another. I find disputes are not exogenous to states’ militarized behavior. States that resort to militarized behavior are more likely to dispute an issue than peaceful states. I also find evidence of behavioral contagion among states engaged in disputes: Militarized behavior begets militarized behavior.     

Rejecting the gift horse: international politics of disaster aid refusal

This is a study of the increasingly common phenomenon of developing states refusing some or all international aid following serious natural disaster. Aid refusal by the Myanmar junta following a 2008 cyclone is only the most recent prominent example of this practice, and I present here an original dataset of all cases of disaster aid refusal occurring between 1982 and 2006. Through quantitative analysis, I show that although poorer states are indeed less likely to refuse aid than wealthier states, recipient need does not alone drive the decision-making process. Nor are autocratic regimes any more or less likely to refuse aid than democratic regimes. Rather, just as recently transitioned states have been shown by other scholars to be particularly likely to engage in military conflict, I find that they are also particularly likely to publicly and explicitly refuse aid and insist on their own ability to handle disaster relief and recovery. Aid refusal, much like aid provision, is at its core a political act.     

Putting the nation back into ‘the international’

Alex Callinicos and Justin Rosenberg have both drawn on the concept of uneven and combined development to resolve what they see as deficiencies in international relations theory: in the case of the former, the absence of a non-realist explanation for the persistence of the states system; in the case of the latter, the absence of a sociological dimension to geopolitics. However, Callinicos omits any consideration of the ‘combined’ aspect of uneven and combined development, while Rosenberg ascribes characteristics of transhistoricity and internationality to uneven and combined development which it does not possess. Against attempts to either restrict or over-extend use of the concept, I will argue that its theoretical usefulness depends on understanding the limits of its spatial and chronological reach. An alternative, if still partial, explanation for the continued existence of the states system will emphasize the continuing indispensability of nationalism as a means of both containing class conflict within capitalist states and mobilizing support for ‘national capitals’ engaged in geoeconomic and geopolitical competition.     

Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes1

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Yet what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed is poorly understood. We argue that the quality of multinational military coalitions—in terms of the coalition’s skill, coordination, and legitimacy—can provide better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing conflict aims. Empirical testing reveals that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success: a history of success, both alone and with the same coalition partners, predicts military success. Moreover, increasing a coalition’s legitimacy via more diverse members has a weak effect, indicating that diversity comes at the expense of coordination and cooperation challenges. Last, we find that elements of coalition quality affect initiating and defending coalitions differently.     

Crises and Crisis Generations: The Long-term Impact of International Crises on Military Political Participation

Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in government and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of acute international crises rather than its chronic threat environment. Poor outcomes—defeats or stalemates—in major international crises lead to professionalization and depoliticization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. A poor outcome creates pressure for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years later due to generational shifts. As officers of the “crisis generation” become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964–2008 and find strong support for it.     

Inequality Amid Equality: Military Capabilities and Conflict Behavior in Balanced Dyads

Studies of power parity and conflict implicitly assume all balanced dyads are created equal. However, variation exists within the capabilities of the states in these particular dyads. I address the question of what affects the likelihood of conflict onset within relatively balanced dyads. I argue uncertainty—in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict—determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty of costs means a greater likelihood of miscalculation leading to bargaining errors. First, I argue as an opponent’s capabilities increase, uncertainty of costs increase and the likelihood of conflict increases. Second, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state’s willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. Third, information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of conflict onset, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of conflict escalation. The testing of nondirected dyads from 1946 to 2001 supports the theory’s implications.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.     

Enduring trade disputes: Disguised protectionism and duration and recurrence of international trade disputes

Why do some WTO trade disputes endure and recur while others do not? States have difficulty resolving trade conflicts when they involve certain types of trade-restrictive domestic regulations. While such regulations vary in their extent of legitimacy—fulfilling non-trade domestic regulatory objectives and availability of less trade-restrictive options—complainant states cannot always distinguish legitimate barriers from illegitimate ones. In such scenarios of disguised protectionism, which I argue is most prevalent with policies involving WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, disputants confront difficulties concluding their disputes. Disputes last longer and are more likely to recur. I test the argument against a data set of WTO disputes structured in an innovative manner—one that links together related and recurring disputes into single conflicts. Both an event history analysis of conflict duration and a count analysis of conflict recurrence using this data strongly support this argument.     

Threats to Primal Identities: A Comparison of Nationalism and Religion as Impacts on Ethnic Protest and Rebellion

The post World War II world has witnessed a proliferation of conflicts based on ethnic differences. Religion and national identity are two dominant features of many of these ethnic struggles. The purpose of this study is to determine which of the two has a greater impact on protest and rebellion using large-n methodology, employing variables from the Minorities at Risk Phase 3 dataset as well as data collected independently. It was found that the simple answer is that nationalism has a greater impact on conflict than does religion. However, this simple answer is not an accurate answer. This is because the simple answer that nationalism has a greater influence is to a great extent due to the fact that the majority of ethnic conflicts are between groups that are not religiously different. If one looks only at those ethnic conflicts where religion can potentially be a factor, religious and national issues are involved in ethnic conflicts approximately as often. Also, while religious issues alone seem to have less of an influence on ethnic conflict than national issues, religious issues have a strong influence on the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict, to the extent that the relationship between nationalism and ethnic conflict can not be fully understood without accounting for the influence of religion.     

Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force

I examine the role of domestic gender equality in predicting whether or not a state is more aggressive in international disputes. This research adds to a growing body of feminist research in international relations, which demonstrates that states with higher levels of gender equality exhibit lower levels of violence during international disputes and during international crises. Many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence results in a greater likelihood of state use of violence internationally. This argument is most fully developed within feminist literature; however, research in the field of ethno-nationalism has also highlighted the negative impact of domestic discrimination and violence on state behavior at the international level. Using the MID data set and new data on first use of force, I test, using logistic regression, whether states with higher levels of gender equality are less likely to be aggressive when involved in international disputes, controlling for other possible causes of state use of force. Beyond this project's contribution to the conflict literature, this research expands feminist theory by further incorporating it into traditional international relations theory to deepen our understanding of the impact of domestic gender equality on state behavior internationally.     

Nationalism and war for territory: from ‘divisible’ territories to inviolable homelands

How did the rise of nationalism affect patterns of interstate wars? The conventional wisdom in mainstream security studies tends to treat the rise of nationalism as a ‘force amplifier’ that allowed states to wage war on an unprecedented scale, leading to deadlier—and, consequently, less frequent—wars. By building on emerging interdisciplinary research on territory and territoriality, this essay suggests that there was a second mechanism—complementary to the ‘force amplifier’ logic—through which the rise of nationalism affected the patterns of interstate war: nationalism changed the ‘character’ of territories in the modern state system, which, in turn, transformed state preferences over their territorial belongings. Before the rise of nationalism, state elites viewed their territories more as ‘divisible’ goods, which created strong incentives for states to wage frequent yet limited wars. The rise of nationalism, in this context, rendered territory controlled by a state more of an ‘inviolable homeland’, which then contributed to the increasing severity and decreasing frequency of interstate wars. The arguments presented in this essay have implications for not only the study of nationalism and war, but also bargaining models of war and the so-called ‘border fixity’ norm.     

Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability

Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.     

Explaining the behaviour of small states: an analysis of Jordan's nuclear energy policya

Conventional analyses claim that small states bandwagon with leading international powers. The dominant view is that small states' vulnerabilities and limited power hinder their ability to pursue policy goals. This study critiques this position by investigating why and how Jordan continues to pursue a nuclear energy programme despite objections from the United States—its principal ally. By using theories of small states, this study analyses discursive practices in Jordanian policymaking. This approach is used to describe Jordan's nuclear energy policy and posit a logic of the effects that energy insecurity has on the government's perception of Jordan as a ‘small state’. I use this to create hypotheses concerning the conditions under which small states may not simply bandwagon with key international allies, but may have more freedom to pursue their goals than traditional analyses predict. Explanations that assume small states always have limited freedom to pursue policy goals without the backing of key allies are not supported by the evidence considered here.     

The Resource Curse Reconsidered: Cash Crops and Local Violence in Kyrgyzstan

It is often noted in resource curse literature that agricultural economies are less conflict-prone than countries managing mobile, high-value resources. In the vast literature linking resource endowment and conflict, cash crop economies are often considered immune to civil violence, believed to stand apart from the many horrific episodes of violence and civil war centered on “lootable” wealth (such as alluvial diamonds, tin, tungsten, or other conflict minerals). But many incidents of violence—especially local violence—are in fact occurring in cash crop economies. Drawing on newspaper accounts, policy analyses, ethnographic interviews, and in-depth reports by international organizations, I examine an episode of local violence in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan. Through this case study, the article provides a better understanding of local violence in cash crop economies that can apply to other weak states.     

Territorial nationalism in spatial rivalries: An institutionalist account of the argentine‐chilean rivalry

The rivalry concept explored in the conflict literature during the past decade offers considerable potential for theory building in international relations. This paper explores one possible avenue to this end by applying insights from historical institutionalism to a case of spatial rivalry in order to explain many of the findings from the quantitative literature. As I demonstrate in this paper, the focus on issues is a good start at explaining rivalry, yet it masks important underlying domestic processes that initiate, maintain, and terminate rivalries. I explain how the “issue” of territory came to be fused with national identity in the case of Argentina‐Chile resulting in a history of conflict and classification as an enduring rivalry. I draw on this case to argue that territorial nationalism may explain why seemingly disparate territorial conflicts separated by time and space can be considered linked to form a spatial rivalry.     

De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011): A New Data Set

Sovereign states remain the primary units of analysis in conflict research. Yet, the empirical record suggests that the international system includes a wider range of actors whose behavior is relevant for conflict outcomes. This article introduces De Facto States in International Politics (1945–2011), a new data set dedicated to understanding the behavior of de facto states—separatist statelike entities such as Abkhazia. I begin by explaining why de facto states deserve attention. Further, I provide a definition of the de facto state that separates it from cognate phenomena. Thereafter, I offer an overview of the data set and illustrate its utility by demonstrating how it contributes to the literatures on war and state making, civil war, and rebel governance.