Changing Regulation and Governance of Finnish Energy Policy Making: New Rules but Old Elites?

Energy policy making is commonly seen as a sector dominated more by experts and technocrats than politicians. Regulation of Finnish energy policy, which was traditionally characterized by state‐centeredness and detailed governmental control, was step by step annulled in the mid‐1980s on, and a deregulation policy was introduced. The return of regulation can be timed to in the beginning of the twenty‐first century, being the result of the global debate and measures dealing with climate change. The purpose of this study was to assess the extent to which the changes of operational environment have transformed the power structure of Finnish energy policy making and whether the key actors constitute a coherent energy elite in terms of attitudinal unanimity and interaction networks. Methodologically the study was based on three sets of elite interview data collected in 1987, 1997, and 2009 and a postal survey conducted among the citizenry in 2007. The major finding was that despite fundamental changes in the operational environment the power structure of the energy sector policy making has been fairly stable from 1987 to 2009 and the old cohesive energy elite is still in power.     

Social Upheaval and Transformation of Elite Structures: The Case of Finland

The purpose of this study is to ascertain how certain important changes in Finnish society in the 1990s altered the national elite structures and affected democracy. We examine how the patterns of recruitment, interaction and cohesiveness among the elites changed in the period 1991–2001. The data for the study were drawn mainly from postal surveys conducted among the elites and a sample of the population in 1991 and 2001. The first research task was to establish how recruitment to various elites has altered in terms of social stratification and education. The second was to analyse changes in patterns of interaction between various elites as far as physical contacts and attitudes were concerned. The third was to study the relationship between the elites and the general population on the basis of attitudinal affinity. The conclusions were based on theoretical models characterising various elite structures and their interconnections with democracy. The concept of a responsive elite is developed on the grounds of the theory of democratic elitism. The changes in the Finnish elite structure have meant a passage towards an inclusive structure compatible with democracy rather than towards an exclusive elite configuration. Finnish elites have become more open and more diverse.     

科层制视角下的权力监督

科层制是公共行政的组织形式与技术手段,其组织基础对公共权力的监督有重要影响。从组织社会学的角度来观察,科层制的效率取决于对组织权力运行的良好控制。但是单一权力核心、严格层级制的科层组织是一个核式结构,它对组织内部底层和高层的权力运行的监控呈现＂近勤远怠＂和＂灯下黑＂两大规律,最终使权力得不到有效的监控。解决之道唯有加强独立的司法权、专业的立法权对行政权的控制和促进公民社会的成长。     

Social Structure and Campaign Style: Finland 1954–1987

This study addresses the hypothesis concerning the ideological convergence of political parties in light of election campaigns in Finland. The basic expectation is that the parties have become more alike in terms of their orientation vis-à-vis the electorate and in their use of propaganda techniques. The empirical data consists of editorials in the leading newspapers of the four largest Finnish parties in connection with the parliamentary election campaigns of 1954, 1966, 1975 and 1987. The main hypothesis is clearly corroborated, as traditional elements such as class orientation have been replaced by references to the nation at large and to the political elite. A re-ideologization could be noted in connection with the 1975 campaign, followed by a strong de-ideologization in 1987. Despite the virtual disappearance of offensive propaganda techniques, recent campaigns were not found to be decisively less 'propagandists' than the earlier ones.     

Cleavages – Dead and Gone? An Analysis of Cleavage Structure and Party Choice in Contemporary Finland

In cleavage research in political science, few studies have tested the applicability of a threefold cleavage strategy when analysing national cleavage structures. This study, which has contemporary Finland as a test case, makes two contributions in evaluating the continued relevance of cleavage research. First, it assesses both old and new social structural positions simultaneously in order to explore how they are reflected in the values and attitudes in the electorate. Second, it analyses how these cleavage elements are manifested in party choice and discovers whether value/attitudinal dimensions act as intermediate variables between social structural position and the vote. The statistical analyses are conducted with data from the Finnish National Election Studies from 2003–11. The results show that threefold cleavage definition is not satisfactory for identifying the dynamics in the party‐voter‐ties despite Finland often being regarded as the epitome of a cleavage‐based system. The effect of social structural position on value/attitudinal dimensions is fairly weak and the effect of the social structural position on party choice is mediated through values and attitudes only in some cases. Even though the remnants of cleavage politics remain in Finland, with conflicts based on native language and type of residential area best fulfilling the cleavage criteria, the threefold cleavage does not serve to describe the whole complex set of political conflicts. Since Finland has had an archetypical status as a system of cleavage‐based party support, further elaborations on cleavages are needed to understand the complexity of present conflict structures in any established Western democracy.     

A Case of a Surplus Majority Government: The Finnish Rainbow Coalition

Surplus majority government is the most frequent type of cabinet in postwar Finland. The case study investigates the explicative power of two groups of theories of surplus majority government on the Finnish rainbow coalition formed in 1995. Firstly, theories that model surplus size as instrumental for government capability, i.e. surplus size as critical to decision-making capability. Secondly, theories that model the surplus size as a possibility or where the size is the result of the expected utility of government being higher than that of opposition for the political parties in terms of goal realisation. The main materials studied are internal party documentation and interviews with key people. The result of the study is that parties' strategic features best explain the surplus size of the rainbow coalition, since participation in government offers greater opportunities for the realisation of party goals, such as policy, votes and future office.     

From Class Party to Catchall Party?: The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party

This article seeks to apply Kirchheimer’s ‘catchall party thesis’ to the transformation of the Agrarian-Center Party in Finland. On at least two counts this might seem a hopeless endeavor. First, Kirchheimer excluded most parties in the smaller West European democracies like Finland from his analysis on the curious grounds that they either had effective majorities or regular access to power and, therefore, had no need of catchall strategies. Second, he expressly excluded certain parties, including significantly Agrarian parties, from his purview because they were too narrowly based to become catchall parties. Kirchheimer also asserts that in general only major parties could successfully achieve a ‘life-saving transformation.’ The Finnish Agrarian Party was certainly that. In the early 1960s, it was the largest single party, with a substantial classe gardée, and was also the pivotal party of governing coalitions. Accordingly, this article addresses three interrelated questions: a) Why did the Finnish Agrarians seek catchall status? b) What were the catchall strategies they pursued? c) Has an archetypal mass-class party, contrary to Kirchheimer’s submission, been able to extend the basis of its support to become a catchall party? It is argued that although the Center Party today exhibits the electoral attributes of the catchall party – and is the only Finnish party really to do so – it lacks the organizational characteristics of the genre as enumerated by Kirchheimer.     

Divided Interests: Multi‐level Parties and the Politics of Territorial Reform in Sweden

In the beginning of 2007, the Committee on Public Sector Responsibilities (CPSR) presented its final report on the future organization of the intermediate level of government in Sweden. The CPSR, which consisted of representatives from all parties in parliament, recommended replacing the existing structure of 20 county councils with six to nine regional municipalities. The committee's proposal is paradoxical in light of the resistance to regions that exists within the country's two largest parties: the Social Democrats and the Moderates. The purpose of this article is to describe and explain the CPSR's unanimous proposal to establish regional municipalities despite this resistance. How was it possible to achieve a unanimous proposal? In order to explain this paradox, I use the ‘multi‐level party’ theoretical approach. The empirical study, consisting of a qualitative case study of the actions of the Moderates and the Social Democrats on territorial policy, supports this theoretical construct. It is evident from the empirical record that groups within the parties had different views about territorial policy. Within the CPSR, the advocates for regions took control, which made a unanimous proposal possible. The research findings improve our understanding of party organization in a polity characterized by multilevel governance. When the central level delegates more power and responsibility to subnational levels, the balance of power within parties changes. New regional and local elites arise, which makes it possible for a single party to communicate different messages on territorial policy depending on which group is in charge within a particular arena.     

Unanimous constitutional consent and the immigration problem

This paper utilizes the cross-cutting cleavages approach to evaluate the probability of a unanimous constitutional consent and, based on these results, discusses the implications of immigration on an existing constitutional consent. It is shown that previous conclusions of beneficial effects stemming from a multitude of political dimensions for a unanimous constitutional consent crucially depend on the assumption of an extreme mode of intrapersonal compensation of constitutional majority and minority preferences. These conclusions are reversed once you consider more restrictive schemes of such intrapersonal compensation. Since, furthermore, the probability of constitutional consent unambiguously falls with a growing size of the collectivity, only a policy of selective and controlled immigration will be able to guarantee with regard to the existing cleavages of a society that the existing constitutional consent will not be damaged or destroyed, whereas uncontrolled immigration, possibly based on ethical norms, will risk the breakdown of any constitutional consent in a society.     

The 1988 Presidential Election in Finland

The article aims to describe and analyse the 1988 presidential election in Finland. The parties and candidates in the election are presented and the electoral system is discussed. For the first time a double-vote system was used in which there are two ballots, one for the direct election of the president and one for the elector of the president. If a candidate wins more than 50 percent of the vote, then that candidate is elected. If, however, no candidate receives 50 percent or more of the vote, then the electoral college elects the president. Although it was fairly certain that the incumbent president Mauno Koivisto would be re-elected, the campaign was a heated one, with the electorate very politically engaged. It is concluded that despite the fact regional differences between north and south Finland were aggravated—the candidate for the opposition, Paavo Väyrynen, received considerable support especially in northern Finland-the presidential election showed that the Finnish political system functions relatively smoothly and that its overall effect is highly legitimizing.     

The Finnish Christian League: Party or ‘Anti-Party’?

Work on the Finnish protest elections of the 1970s has concentrated on Vennamo's Rural Party. Yet at the general elections in 1979 the Finnish Christian League succeeded in surpassing not only the Rural but also the centre-based Swedish and Liberal People's parties. This paper has two main objectives: firstly, to consider why in a monoreligious, multiparty polity an interest-specific Christian party has emerged; and, secondly, using elite interviews and survey data, to examine the genealogy of its active members. A distinctive genus, at once party and 'anti-party', is traced.     

Morality,Benevolence, and Responsibility: Regime Legitimacy in China from Past to the Present

Taking an interpretive approach, this study argues that Chinese political tradition plays an important role in the maintenance of regime legitimacy in China today. Contrary to the popular view that the Chinese Communist regime relies primarily on economic performance to sustain its legitimacy, the current regime legitimacy is maintained because of the historically rooted moral bond between the state and society and the societal expectation that the state would be responsible for the wellbeing of the population. The regime legitimacy in China has three overlapping layers: The basic layer is the morality of political elite. The crucial part of the morality is the benevolent governance which specifies that the government has to be compassionate to the people. The central component of a benevolent government is the state responsibility to the welfare of the people. All together, these layers create a moral bond between the state and society. The government will enjoy legitimacy as far as the society expects it to fulfill its end of the deal. This study further argues that the morality-based regime legitimacy in China has to be calibrated within its multi-level power structure. Governments at different levels enjoy different degree of legitimacy and face different degree of challenges. In general, the central government enjoys the most legitimacy and faces the least challenges comparing to the local governments. This multi-level power structure would cushion many regime legitimacy crises.     

论公民社会的权力监督功能

公民社会是反腐败最广泛、最深厚的社会基础。公民社会是政治力量平衡的政治安排、合理机制和合法结构。公民社会对国家权力监督的现实性表现在政府职能转变、社会阶层分化和市场经济的发展，正义性表现在实质性特征、形式正义性特征和程序正义性特征三方面。公民社会监督类型可分普遍性监督、制度性监督、自治性监督、结构性监督、功能性监督。加强公民社会监督功能的路径在于实现国家、社会、市场三者之间的良性互动。     

Participation of the elderly in sociocultural life: human rights and inclusive practices under residential care

Although there is a growing tendency in academic literature to explore the rights of the elderly, the sociocultural dimension of well‐being of the elderly under residential care has not as yet been extensively conceptualized. This is why from the perspective of international human rights law, this article deals with the issues of implementing sociocultural rights of the elderly under residential care. The author analyses legal grounds justifying the existence of state obligations to implement sociocultural rights of the elderly within the institutions. Possible limitations of these rights are scrutinized. Investigating the issue of state obligations to implement the rights of the elderly to participate in sociocultural life within the institutions, the author refers to legal experiences of Finland. Examining whether Finnish statutory law is sensitive to sociocultural rights of the elderly under residential care, the author analyses the legislation of Finland and reports the materials of Finland, submitted to the European Committee on Social Rights. Prior to this, the author attempts to establish whether such a right as the right of the elderly to participate in sociocultural life has emerged in international human rights law. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Genro Rule in China and Japan: A Comparative Perspective

For a time in both Japan (roughly 1890–1915) and much more briefly in China (about 1987–1992), major political decisions were made by cohesive groups of retired elders of the founding generation. Necessary if not sufficient conditions for rule by elders include a closed system, with the elite not held responsible to a wider public; and a constitutional or practical vagueness about the locus of final political authority. The more general pattern in such systems is personal dictatorship, with rule by elders as an alternative when cultural or political conditions stand in the way of one-man rule. This essay explores the pattern, conditions, and characteristics of rule by elders in China and Japan as genro rule serves as an alternative to one-man rule in generational transitions in political regimes with a relatively cohesive ruling group and a weak institutional structure. Peter R. Moody, Jr. is professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame and he specializes in the study of Chinese politics. His more recent books include Tradition and Modernization in China and Japan, Political Change in Taiwan, and Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society. He is editor of China Documents Annual and book review editor for the Review of Politics. He has written on Chinese politics, Asian international affairs, Chinese political thought, international relations theory, and theory of political parties.     

Gender Equality as a Closed Case: A Survey among the Members of the 2015 Danish Parliament

Despite almost unanimous adherence to the principle of gender equality in contemporary Denmark, a society with a long historical record of gender equality policies and almost 40 percent women in parliament, are there still divergences to be found among the members of parliament concerning gender equality principles and policies? This article argues that in order to identify underlying cleavages it is necessary to pose fundamental questions that go beyond the day‐to‐day disagreements on policy issues. Based on a new survey of the members of the Danish parliament, this study finds that the support for gender equality is not just a matter of lip service insofar as few MPs hold traditionalist views on women. However, the study reveals conflicting perceptions, left‐right cleavages and gender gaps, sometimes also within the parties. A new discourse is identified, supported by a large minority that includes all of the male MPs from the four right‐wing parties; this minority considers gender equality to be a ‘closed case’ – that is, as having by and large been achieved. This may provide clues to the puzzle of the stagnation in gender equality reforms in spite of the general support for ‘gender equality’. The article discusses the possible connection between the ‘closed case’ discourse, present neoliberal trends in society and the recent construction of gender equality as an ‘intrinsic Danish value’ – an argument familiar in other countries with a harsh debate over immigration.     

Is There Demand for Radical Right Populism in the Finnish Electorate?

Since the 1980s, the main interest in radical right-wing studies has been on occurrences of the phenomenon. Non-occurrences have not received much attention, although they could have something to offer the field as well. This article focuses on the 'Finnish exception' and by approaching the theme in terms of single-issue and protest voting theories, asks to what extent the electorate in Finland differs from those of other European countries with respect to the two crucial sets of attitudes for radical right-wing parties: those towards the political system and those towards immigration. After the country comparison, the focus turns to the Finnish case to explore where in the electorate anti-system and anti-immigrant appeal would find the strongest support. The data used in the study is taken from the European Social Survey 2002–2003, which is analysed by principal component analysis and linear regression. The country comparison shows that in the light of single-issue and protest voting theories, the attitudinal atmosphere in Finland provides a breeding ground for radical right populism as fertile as that in most other West European countries. Second, the case analysis of Finland reveals that anti-immigrant attitudes and dissatisfaction with the political system are most accentuated among older, poorly educated men with no interest in politics.     

‘Bigwig hatred’ and the emergence of the first Scandinavian agrarian-populist party

In the genealogy of the Scandinavian populist-party family, agrarian populism has been largely neglected and, when discussed at all, it is traced back to Finland in the late 1950s. This paper argues: (i) that agrarian populism long predated the 1950s and that it was politically salient from the decade before Finnish independence in 1917; (ii) that it is useful to distinguish between an agrarian-class and agrarian-populist party type; (iii) that in wider comparative perspective, first-wave Finnish agrarian populism was distinctive; and iv) that during the critical party-building phase, the Finnish Agrarian Party (AP) is best characterised a populist party embodying a diffuse small-farmer antipathy towards socially superior urban elites. The AP did not create this ‘bigwig hatred’ (herraviha), but in perpetuating it and ‘othering it’ within a binary ‘us-and-them’ paradigm, it became the first populist party in both Finland and Scandinavia.     

The public service ethos and the role of the British civil service

The last Conservative administration invested much time and effort in reforming the structure and organisation of the Civil Service. Yet it left untouched the core principles which underpinned Whitehall, often referred to as the public service ethos. In this article, we argue that this ethos has been defended by both conservative and liberal opinion as something fundamentally good. Yet, in reality, the public service ethos is a power/knowledge system which legitimises the rule of a particular elite by presenting public service as a worthy occupation and, thereby, authorising a system of power which is relatively closed and secretive. This accounts for why it has been in the interests of both the last Conservative administration and the present Labour government to ensure the ethos remains intact.