State Budgetary Processes and Reforms: The California Story

This paper analyzes state budgetary processes and reforms to inform California budgetary policy. We consider key institutional provisions, including budget periodicity, tax and expenditure limitations, balanced budget and reserve requirements, and supermajority vote requirements, and analyze the extent to which changes are likely to advance procedural norms. Our analysis suggests that empirically unproven assumptions and poorly articulated linkages between budgetary processes and outcomes have undermined the state's ability to understand the budgetary problem and identify effective reforms. We recommend a focus on procedural norms and related reforms that promote effective budgeting processes as a less partisan framework for reform.     

Jesse Burkhead and the Multiple Uses of Federal Budgets: A Contemporary Perspective

The work of Jesse Burkhead continues to have great relevance today. Its germaneness could be taken as an indictment of how little progress has been made in federal budgeting in the past half century, but it also says a great deal about Burkhead's insights and the lasting legacy of his work. This article discusses some of Burkhead's ideas on the use of the federal budget and their pertinence to the budget issues of today, including the role of the federal government in the economy, budgetary relations between presidents and Congresses, and the role of performance information in budgeting.     

The Policy Constraints of Deficit Reduction: President Clinton's 1995 Budget

The federal budgeting process is now limited by deficit reduction policy constraints. This article examines the FY 1995 budget requests within the context of long term budget trends, changes in the federal budget process, and the recently established political and fiscal budget constraints. It further examines enactment of the Omnibus Budget Enforcement Act of 1993, the policy changes it contained, and its further tinkering with the process of budgeting. Finally the article evaluates the first budgeting process of the Clinton administration and their initiatives in deficit reduction following these policy constraints.     

Is the U.S. Congress an Insurmountable Obstacle to Any “Far‐Sighted Conception of Budgeting”?

In recent years, Congress has recurrently failed to meet its minimum responsibilities in federal budgeting. This article analyzes whether it is possible to repair this problem, using concepts popularized by Allen Schick in his influential article “The Road to PPB.” His article compared the PPB reform effort to the history of budget process reforms that started with the design of the executive budget. It publicized a logical sequence of budget process improvements that started with control and then advanced through management and planning. The article did not substantially address the role of Congress, but eight years after it was published, Congress reasserted its constitutional role in the budget process. Its record of performance since then has ranged from mixed to dysfunctional. The Congress has been criticized for budgetary delays, micromanagement, myopia, procrastination, indiscipline, and an inability to prioritize intelligently. If these faults are set in stone, then an integrated system of budgeting, as described in “The Road to PPB” and related work, is unattainable. On the other hand, if reform of Congressional budgeting is politically feasible, improvements to that system can utilize the unique contributions that a legislature can make to a good system of budgeting.     

After the Earthquake: The President's Budget for FY 1996

What changes has the political earthquake of November 1994 wreaked on the federal budget and, in particular, on the president's budget? Are the policy dynamics of federal budgets so entrenched that they transcend politics and are impervious to shocks? Or do the political changes presage radical policy changes, reversing decades of cumulative commitments? Are budgetary institutions and processes flexible enough to accommodate enhanced conflicts while maintaining their integrity and purpose? This article discusses the fate of the 1995 budget and the initial problems faced in the president's budget for 1996.     

Budgeting for Federal Capital

This article examines the issues involved in federal investment budgeting and planning for the acquisition of federally-owned assets. It describes the unique role of the federal government and examines the different issues and reforms prompted by differing types of capital and investment sponsored at the federal level. It suggests that meaningful changes can be instituted in our budgeting practices that can make a difference for our budgetary choices without adopting a full-scale capital budget. It also presents a framework for improving federal agency capital decision making based on a study of practices used by leading state and local and private sector organizations. The article is based on testimony delivered before the President's Commission to Study Capital Budgeting.     

The Ups and Downs of State Budget Process Reform: Experience of Three Decades

From zero-base budgeting to the Government Performance and Results Act, state budgeting systems have been synonymous with budgeting reform for over 30 years. This article examines the trends, both long-term and short-term, which have been identified through analysis of state budgeting office practices. Particular emphasis has been placed on understanding the changes in performance measurement over the period of 1970 to 2000. The findings reveal trends such as changes in the makeup of budget office personnel, a lack of budget offices in moving toward cost accounting, and trends in budget preparation and budget documents. Some budget reforms seem to have plateaued, beginning in the mid-1990s, while other reforms have exhibited "backsliding." It is clear that the states are not all marching in unison in reforming their budget systems. As with earlier phases of this study, the 2000 data raise many questions that will be explored in future research.     

Federal Budgeting and Finance in 1991: The Future is Now

The large federal deficits run throughout the 1980s generated concern that we were mortgaging our future. In 1991, the note came due. The potential for aggravating the long-run deficit problem constrained fiscal policy from reacting to the recession. Institutional and partisan conflict and the controls established by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) limited responses to a remarkable budgetary opportunity—the dissolution of the Soviet Union—and to a serious budgetary threat—exploding health care costs. The BEA controls were applied rigidly with a few minor exceptions, and credit reform was implemented successfully; on the other hand, Congress and the president made no headway on further deficit reductions even though long-run projections worsened. The agenda-setting role of the president's budget for the fiscal year 1993 diminished, as the document's format was heavily influenced by the upcoming presidential election. In contrast to this mixed record for federal budgeting, progress was made in building a financial management structure and developing accounting standards.     

Introduction: Reflections on Two Decades of Congressional Budgeting

Even casual observers of federal policy making cannot help but notice the increasing preeminence of the Congressional budget process. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which created this process, brought forth profound changes in budgeting practices, both within Congress and between Congress and the president. In addition, the last decade has seen numerous attempts to use the process for deficit control. The goal of this special symposium is how congressional procedures-adapted over time-have affected the federal budgeting process. Each article examines the original purpose of the 1974 statute and analyzes the statute's impact over more than two decades.     

The Great Unraveling: Federal Budgeting, 1998–2006

Since 1998, budgeting reforms at the federal level have unraveled extensively. The budget process has become ad hoc, fragmented, and opaque, balance has been elusive, and the failure to prioritize has become endemic. One cause was the mismatch between the budget process in 1998, which was designed to eliminate deficits, and the emerging budgetary surpluses of that time. A second contributing factor was the desire to reduce taxes while expenditures were increasing as a result of wars and natural disasters. The consequences of this great unraveling include the failure to fund Medicare and Social Security adequately when the opportunity was presented, as well as threats to constitutional and democratic governance. Renewed reform may require greater transparency and a willingness to embarrass elected officials with iconic stories.     

Performance Measurement in State Budgeting: Advancement and Backsliding from 1990 to 1995

Performance measurement has been one of the dominant themes of budget reform in the 1990s and has been prevalent in the mainstream of budgeting since the 1950s. Given the attention that performance measurement has had nationally, states might be expected to have made major strides in this arena in recent years. The article considers the current status of performance measurement practices, and identifies both advancement and backsliding made by states between 1990 and 1995. The discussion is based on data obtained from surveys of state budget offices in those two years. Indexes of performance measurement were constructed, and these became the bases of regression analyses using independent variables pertaining to state characteristics. Generally, these analyses were unsuccessful in explaining the variations among the states. The findings underscore the diversity among the states in their budgetary practices and the fact that budget reform, in the sense of increased use of performance measurement, is not necessarily achieved in a straight line of progression. The article considers possible explanations for the changes.     

Once more into surplus: Reforming expenditure management in Australia and Canada

Canadian and Australian federal government budgets have returned to surplus. Over the past two decades both countries have undertaken financial management and budgetary reforms in an effort to control expenditure growth and public debt. They exchanged ideas, borrowed techniques, and shared reform experiences. Yet during the mid-1980s and early 1990s they displayed markedly different levels of success in expenditure control. This article explains why relatively similar instruments of expenditure control and financial management produced different outcomes in Australia and Canada. The analysis suggests that budgetary techniques will have marginal impact unless they are congruent with broader policy management systems and administrative cultures. The comparative analysis provides important lessons for budget reformers in all jurisdictions.     

Credit Reform, Negative Subsidies, and FHA

After several years' experience with the new budgetary treatment of federal credit activity, or credit reform, it is appropriate to consider how this innovation is working. One objective of the new approach was to provide both estimates of the cost of credit assistance and a means of monitoring the performance of those estimates over time. In at least one—admittedly difficult—case, FHA single-family mortgage insurance, the reform is not succeeding in reporting the performance of the subsidy estimate because the agency's budget submissions are not consistent with the new accounting. This failure may result from the agency's inability to accept or adopt the fundamental changes in accounting concepts affected by credit reform. This article attempts to explain some of those changes and to show how they may be used to provide relevant information in the budget.     

Federal Budgeting After September 11th: A Whole New Ballgame,or Is It Déjà Vu All Over Again?

Federal budgeting has undergone some profound changes since the tragic events of September 11th, 2001. Large surpluses that existed prior to September 11th and were forecast to continue have been replaced by equally large and intractable deficits. The consensus around a macro‐level norm for federal budgeting has completely broken down. In other ways, the federal budget process has not changed at all. Despite the emphasis on defense and homeland security, domestic discretionary spending is still continuing unabated, as it has since the late 1980s. Further, the federal government continues to have chronic difficulty adopting its budget in a timely fashion.     

The Influence of EU Membership on Methods and Processes of Budgeting in Britain and France, 1970–1995

This article explores the impact European Union (EU) integration has had on methods and processes of budgeting in France and Britain from 1970 to 1995. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by an hybridization effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made compulsory by membership in the EU. Hybridization emphasizes that national and EU budgetary processes are increasingly interwoven and indivisible. Public budgeting is no longer purely national because part of the decision-making on national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in financial and policy terms. Based on an institutional analysis, combined with elite interviewing, the article suggests that hybridization is a significant factor contributing to a convergence of budgetary practices in Britain and France. Underlying the argument is the fact that an increasingly important function of departmental actors involves negotiating with their EU counterparts at the EU level, in addition to the conventional budgetary game at the domestic level. Regarding compliance, there is an influence as testified by significant formal institutional convergence. However, compliance seems a less effective factor in influencing convergence than hybridization because it conveys a "negative" approach to convergence, based on enforcement and sanctions. The article suggests that the convergence of administrative systems is promoted by the growing similarity of administrative practices more than by the harmonization of rules.     

Portfolio Budgeting in the Australian Portfolios-Principles and Practice

In the mid-eighties Australia implemented a budgeting system that is similar in its principles to the U.S. PAYGO rule and the now defunct Policy and Expenditure Management System of Canada. Termed as portfolio budgeting, it seeks to encourage greater ministerial participation (a ministry comprising a number of related departments) in the portfolio budget process. It obligates portfolio ministers to offer offsetting savings for funding new policies. Ministers have to thereby set new policy priorities so that only the most deserving new policies obtain funding through the savings identified. Additionally, portfolio budgeting requires ministers to prioritize their ongoing programs so that budget allocation to these programs reflects ministerial priorities. The article examines the practice of portfolio budgeting in the Australian portfolios in light of these objectives. The article suggests that portfolio budgeting has caused greater ministerial involvement in budgetary management. However, there has been little significant change in budget decision making at the portfolio level. The state of play of portfolio budgeting at the national budget process (cabinet and the Department of Finance) offered little incentive to portfolios to provide offsetting savings for new policy proposals. And, the appropriation structure and the organizational and political dynamics impeded ministers from allocating and reallocating their budgets (operating expenditure or running costs) for ongoing programs along ministerial priorities.     

The influence of the gramm-rudman-hollings act on federal budgetary outcomes, 1986—1989

This article analyzes the impact of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act on federal budgetary and fiscal outcomes. Rather than portraying it as a two-on federal budgetary and fiscal outcomes. Rather than portraying it as a two-party game between Congress and the president, each with monolithic policy preferences, we view GRH as a multiparty negotiation game among advocates of different programs and agencies. In this game, agencies subject to sequestration and their congressional advocates have an incentive to reach a budget accord, while those exempt from sequestration do not. Consistent with this argument, we find that GRH has restrained outlays for nonexempt programs and that exempt programs have, if anything, experienced more rapid growth. Overall, GRH is estimated to have restrained outlays by $59 billion by fiscal 1989, and to have restrained outlays more effectively after the 1987 modifications in the Act. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act signals another phase in the decade-long struggle between the White House and Congress over public spending priorities. Our final counterfactual analysis suggests that GRH partially returned federal fiscal and budgetary relationships and priorities to those that prevailed before Reagan.     

The Bush Administration's Proposal for Credit Reform: Background, Analysis, and Policy Issues

Large recent and forecasted federal outlays to cover losses on deposit insurance and federally-assisted credit have increased concern in the executive and legislative branches about potential future liabilities of the federal government. These potential liabilities include federal credit; consequently, this renewed interest in federal credit reform. Credit reform would have to change the budgetary treatment of federal direct loans and federal guaranteed loans. Currently, the unified budget measures the cost of federal credit on a cash flow basis. Critics (including the Bush Administration) maintain that the appropriate budgetary measure of the costs of federal credit is the present value of the subsidies to credit recipients in the fiscal year that the credit is advanced. The Bush Administration's proposal for credit reform is presented in most detail in the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1989 (the Act), which was proposed but not enacted. The Act would have had federal officials estimate credit subsidies based on the equivalent interest rates in private credit markets. These subsidies would have been used to measure the budgetary cost of federal credit and would have required annual appropriations. Two credit revolving funds would have been established in the Treasury to finance credit flows. Many of these credit reform practices were included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 though.     

Federal Credit Reform

The Congress has now enacted, and the president has signed, legislation requiring credit reform accounting in the 1992 budget. This article summarizes the state of federal budgeting for credit activities, covering (1) where we are now with regard to budgeting for ciedit, (2) how we got where we are, (3) the major weaknesses of the older approaches and why credit reform is important, and (4) the fundamental elements of the recently enacted credit reform legislation.     

An Integrated Theory of Budgetary Politics and Some Empirical Tests: The U.S. National Budget, 1791–2010

We develop a general theory of budgetary politics and examine its implications on a new data set on U.S. government expenditures from 1791 to 2010. We draw on three major approaches to budgeting: decision‐making theories, primarily incrementalism and serial processing; policy process models; and path dependency. We show that the incrementalist budget model is recursive and that its solution is exponential growth, and isolate three periods in which it operates in pure form. The equilibrium periods are separated by critical junctures, associated with wars or economic collapse. We assess policy process dynamics by examining the deviations within equilibrium periods. We offer three takeaways: (1) exponential incrementalism is fundamental to a theory of budgeting; (2) disjoint shifts in the level of exponential incrementalism are caused only by critical moments; (3) temporally localized dynamics cause bends in the exponential path, longer returns to the path within budgetary eras, and annual punctuations in budget changes.