The Rise of the Rest Warms the Planet

tokyo —America's post‐World War II commitment to universal rules of openness has spread economic gains far and wide, enabling new prosperity on a global scale. It is this American‐forged stable world order that has led to what Fareed Zakaria refers to as “the third great powershift” in the last 500 years: the “rise of the rest,” which follows on the rise of the West and the rise of the United States as the dominant Western power. It is indeed a remarkable legacy of American hegemony that China, India and others are rising, or arising anew, without the pillage, plunder and war associated with the emergent great power experiences of the past.     

Development perspectives from the Antipodes: an introduction

Abstract

Is there a distinctive Antipodean approach to development? In this introduction I take up Raewyn Connell's challenge to explore the possibilities for knowledge production that reflects Australia's and New Zealand's geographical situation of rich peripheral countries and their history of settler colonisation. While Antipodeans' contributions to development theory have been limited, their work is characterised by close connections between theory and practice. The Antipodes' positioning as global North in the geographical South has stimulated a search for alternative approaches to development knowledge. This is variously pursued through collaborative research relationships with indigenous communities, close engagement with non-Western cultural frameworks, and a focus on marginal spaces and positions. As the centre of global economic power shifts to the South, existing development relationships and established ways of doing development are increasingly challenged by newly constituted subject positions and coalitions.     

The Rise of India: Overcoming Caste Society and Permit-License-Quota Raj,Implementing Some Economic Freedom

Two or three centuries ago most of mankind was still very poor. When the West outgrew mass poverty, India was a British colony and suffered from stagnation. When East Asian economies exploited the advantages of backwardness and benefited from export-led growth, India remained inward-looking and poor. The ‘Hindu rate of growth’ preserved mass poverty. Since the reforms of the early 1990s India has exploited the advantages of backwardness and some global markets. In this article, the roots of India's failure to grow rapidly before the end of the twentieth century are analyzed. Stagnation is blamed on restrictions of economic freedom, whereas growth is explained by the expansion of economic freedom. Before the mid-twentieth century, the caste system and the legacy of sultanism curtailed economic freedom and contributed to economic stagnation. Thereafter, democratic socialism distorted incentives and generated ‘permit-license-quota raj’ or a rent-seeking society. When some obstacles to growth were dismantled, vigorous growth followed. Although expanding economic freedom remains limited. India's growth potential is not yet fully exploited. Indian infrastructure and human capital formation remain inadequate, regulations intrusive, and the budget in deficit. The rule of law looks better on paper than from the ground. Compared to China Indian public policy still has a lot of room for improvements. ‘Maoists’ or Naxalites threaten political stability and economic freedom. Geopolitics may explain India's late, slow and incomplete reforms. The rise of Asia, in particular of China and India, generates geopolitical challenges of its own. Conceivably, the global expansion of economic freedom permits not only the rise of Asia, but the peaceful management of the coming power transition between Asia and the West.     

China’s road from socialism to global capitalism

Abstract

China’s engagement with global capitalism is driven by the emergence of a statist and private transnational capitalist class. Nevertheless, aspects of China’s foreign policy from the Maoist period still echo today. Consequently, elements of third world solidarity and opposition to Western domination continue to exist as China’s past is redefined to further its transnational strategies in Latin America and the US. The main Chinese investments in South America have been in energy and infrastructure among the left lead countries of the Pink Tide. In the US, Chinese capital has grown despite heated political rhetoric. This paper will examine how economic ties in South and North America reflect past and present conditions, and if China has initiated a non-Western globalisation.     

Drugs and Dirty Wars: intelligence cooperation in the global South

Intelligence is a subject dominated by an Anglospheric lexicon. Little is known of intelligence in the global South, still less of intelligence cooperation. Since 9/11 Western democracies have sought to intensify their intelligence alliances across the world in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia as part of a US-led ‘war on terror’. However, the conceptualisation of intelligence and the nature of secret service cooperation—often referred to as ‘liaison’—remains dominated by concepts derived from Western technocratic Cold War surveillance. This article calls for a re-examination of intelligence cooperation based on activity ‘beyond the Anglosphere’. It attempts to redefine what intelligence is in the global South and explores the texture of South–South cooperation using Latin American examples. It offers an alternative model of intelligence liaison focused on opportunistic cooperation in the context of drugs and dirty wars.     

Policy visions of big data: views from the Global South

Abstract

Government intentions stand at the heart of debates about how big data can and should be used in the Global South. This paper provides new insights by examining the political and economic visions promoted by emerging power governments in Brazil, India and China (the BICs). Doing so is crucial as these countries not only comprise some of the world’s largest populations, but have also demonstrated their initiative in national and international promotion of big data politics. Drawing on a content analysis of strategic and legal documents discussing the use of big data, we identify potential areas for big data cooperation among the BICs by determining the compatibility of national policy visions. Three visions are apparent: data as a force for political liberation or repression, for improving public services and for facilitating development. Successful BIC cooperation is likely related to the latter two, but less probable for the liberation/repression vision. We conclude by identifying the implications of BIC engagement with big data for the Global South more broadly.     

How representative are brics?

The five countries known as brics, while not homogeneous in interests, values, and policy preferences, do have a common interest in checking US/Western power and influence through collaboration with non-Western powers. They vary considerably but all are ahead of other developing countries on population, military power, economic weight, geopolitical clout, and global reach and engagement. They are unrepresentative of the typical developing country in terms of interest, capacity, and resources, but they can represent the interests and goals of developing countries as a group on those issues for which the North–South division is salient. The diversity within brics, their differences from other developing countries, and their potential to reflect and represent the global South are explored with respect to climate change, finance, trade, aid, human rights and intervention, and development. It remains unclear whether brics can morph from a countervailing economic grouping to a powerful political alternative.     

All that Glitters is not Gold: India's rise to power

Recent years have seen a plethora of writings—by scholars, journalists and policy makers alike—on India's rise to power. This paper argues that this much-vaunted rise needs to be viewed with caution. It examines the case for India's rise, and operationalises its growing influence by applying and further developing the concept of ‘veto-player’. It highlights ways in which India has indeed acquired the status of a de facto veto-player in international relations. But the paper then presents three sets of reasons for caution. First, even though India's rise to power might appear dramatic and sudden, it is a product of a long and incremental process. This has policy implications: not all the policies of the preceding era should be carelessly abandoned by India or by other developing countries in similar circumstances. Second, there are still significant hurdles—many of which are domestic—that it must overcome if it is to fully realise its potential and acquire the status of a great power. Third, India may have acquired effective veto-player status in certain crucial negotiations, but this does not automatically translate into an ability to achieve preferred outcomes. Having examined the hurdles that India faces on its pathway to power, the paper goes on to suggest strategies that could be adopted to convert veto-player status into positive influence.     

Citizen Participation in Governance Through Representation: Issue of Gender in East Asia

Abstract

In the modern age, although East Asia represents some of the most successful economies such as Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and (now) China, the level of political and administrative development in the region remains controversial. One of the major indicators of such politico‐administrative development is the extent of citizen participation in governance through various democratic means, including the formation and expression of public opinion, people's involvement in government decisions and deliberations, and direct representation of citizens in governing institutions. However, the direct representation of citizens is considered one of the most effective modes of participation in institutions such as legislature, cabinet, and bureaucracy. In this regard, although the representation of women in these governing institutions has gained global significance, it still remains relatively weak in most East Asian cases. This article evaluates the extent of such women's participation in governance through representation in East Asia, examines the major factors constraining this representation, and suggests remedial alternatives to improve the situation.     

Western Medical Education on Trial: The Endurance of Peking Union Medical College, 1949–1985

Abstract

In the early twentieth century, Beijing's Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) stood as a prominent symbol of Western medical science and education in China. After the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) took control of the College between 1952 and 1956.This article argues that the endurance of PUMC as an institute of scientific, Western biomedicine in China was largely contingent upon reforms that the PLA instituted there. Drawing on Chinese accounts, as well as the observations of North American and European physicians, it asserts that political campaigns under Army leadership vehemently attacked American influences on the College but avoided direct criticisms of Western medical science itself. This dynamic politically legitimized the Western medical education that the College embodied. It also permitted PUMC to contribute to the development of Chinese military medicine, suggesting a significant connection between civilian and military medical education in the early People's Republic.     

Network Governance of Private Sector Development Policy Implementation in Singapore

The discussion examines private sector development policy implementation in Singapore, examining the new role of the government's economic development agencies from the point of changing relationships among public and non-state actors in the policy arena. Singapore's model of private sector development consists of an exclusive network of partnerships among economic development agencies and between these agencies and private sector actors, such as business and organized labour, as integral policy stakeholders. As Singapore has moved within the past 15 years towards its articulated goal of becoming a knowledge-based economy and an industrial hub in the Asia Pacific region, the country's model of network governance is undergoing a gradual reconfiguration to include a greater role for local enterprises in the policy process. The changing institutional mechanics of network governance surrounding the new model of private sector development in Singapore are examined, along with the highlights of some implications surrounding this shift.     

The Africa-China relationship: challenges and opportunities

The dramatic growth in the relationship between Africa and China is one of the great stories of the twenty-first century, part of the profound transformations taking place in the global political economy. It has been greeted with excitement, consternation, and confusion. To its cheerleaders, it represents the enduring partnership between Africa and China, spawned by the historical affinities of struggles against Western imperialism and humanistic aspirations for development. To its critics, it is reminiscent of European colonisation a century earlier, in which Africa serves as a cheap source of raw materials, a lucrative export market for Chinese manufactured goods, and an outlet for its surplus capital. Rather than a development partner, some see China as Africa's biggest development competitor, whose explosive growth and insatiable quest for global markets threatens Africa's industrialisation and competitiveness. This paper examines the factors behind the development of Africa-China relations, especially its economic magnitude, and the challenges and opportunities it offers both regions.     

Introduction: rising powers and the future of global governance

There has been much debate over the extent to which the rising powers of the global South are challenging contemporary global political and economic governance. While some observers see an emancipatory potential in the redistribution of power among states, others see the rising powers as firmly located within the Western-centred neoliberal world order. This collection of papers seeks to go beyond the state-centrism of existing approaches by examining how challenges to global governance by rising powers are rooted in specific state–society configurations. Through studies of Brazil, India, China and other important developing countries within their respective regions, such as Turkey and South Africa, the papers examine the way domestic structures, arrangements, actors and dynamics influence the nature of the international interventions and behaviour of rising powers. They ask how their increased political and economic enmeshment in the international system impacts upon their own internal societal cohesion and development. By examining these issues, the papers raise the question of whether the challenge posed by the rising powers to global governance is likely to lead to an increase in democracy and social justice for the majority of the world’s peoples.     

The “Tibet question”: Tibetan,Chinese and Western perspectives

The historical conflict between Tibet and China goes back almost a thousand years. Both sides use history to argue their point about the core issues in this dispute – Tibet's claim of independence and autonomy, and China's of suzerainty. This article looks at the historical roots of this conflict, particularly since 1949, when China began its gradual takeover of Tibet. Chinese policies toward Tibet, which have been driven by a desire to communize and sinicize Tibet, has been met by stiff resistance from the Tibetans, who see Han Chinese dominance as a force that will, over time, destroy Tibet's unique religion, language, culture, and history. This resistance has drawn the attention of the West, who see Chinese policies in Tibet as a symbol of the failings of Beijing's rulers to embrace a strong commitment to human rights at the same time that China is becoming a global economic power. The 14th Dalai Lama, a key figure in this conflict, and his government-in-exile have served as bridges to Western efforts to try to force Beijing to embrace more open, humane policies toward Tibetans throughout China. His retirement as political head of the exile government in 2011, coupled with China's growing economic and strategic power globally, raises serious questions about the willingness of the USA, and other democratic powers to risk their relationships with Beijing to continue to promote true human rights and autonomy throughout the Tibetan Plateau.     

China and the Rest Are Only Joining the American‐Built Order

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Is Japan Closer to the West Than Turkey?

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

Here Comes the Second World

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

When Western Interests Trump Values

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.     

The Evolution of ‘Homegrown Conditionality’ in India: IMF Relations

This article explores the historical relationship between the Government of India (GOI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a successful model for the ways in which a developing country can learn to work with and through multilateral organisations to promote economic and political development while sustaining democratic institutions and relative international political autonomy. In the mid-1960s, India's relations with the USA, IMF, and World Bank were strained after an attempt by these institutions to exert ‘leverage’ over Indian economic policies was exposed to parliamentary debate and the scrutiny of a free press. By the late 1970s, the GOI charted a new course in its interaction with the IMF. In 1981, India was awarded the largest IMF loan to a developing country up to that time. This article will evaluate India's economic reform strategy in the early 1980s and explain the development of the concept of ‘homegrown conditionality’ within the GOI.     

The Coming Battle of the Atlantic: Euro vs. the Dollar

American‐led globalization has enabled the third great powershift of the last five hundred years—the “rise of the rest” following on the rise of the West and then the rise of the US as the dominant power in the West. When China, India, Brazil, Turkey and the rest sit at the table of global power with the West what will the world order look like? Will it be post‐American? Will it be culturally non‐Western, but play by the same rules of an open international order laid down by the American's after World War II? In the following pages, leading American and Asian intellectuals ponder these questions.