构建社会信用体系中政府职能分析

信用缺失造成的信用危机 ,扰乱了正常的市场秩序 ,提高了市场交易成本 ,成为制约我国经济发展的瓶颈和突出因素。建立社会信用体系是整顿市场秩序的“治本”方法。政府作为经济的宏观调控者 ,有责任为经济的持续健康发展营造一个公平高效的环境。因此政府运用其所拥有的公共权威积极推进社会信用体系的建设 ,被提上了议事日程。     

信用建设 政府先行

社会主义市场经济是建立在稳定的信用关系之上的法制经济,稳定可靠的信用体系是市场经济的重要基础条件之一。但面对我国当前十分薄弱的社会信用制度和信用体系,我们又不得不进行反思,在反思中,我们发现构建社会信用体系必须由政府作起,既表现在政府要采取各种措施调整各类社会行为,构建社会信用体系,也表现在他必须率先建立自身信用。本文力图从政府的职能界定这个内因和WTO规则对政府的要求这个外因两方面分析得出这一结论的依据,阐明政府在信用建设中不可替代的重要地位和率先垂范的必要性。     

社会信用危机的伦理分析

信用危机是当代中国一种可以被广泛感受到的经验事实与客观社会现象,它是一个关涉个体美德、但又不仅仅是个体美德的问题,信用危机具有深刻的社会背景与社会成因。从社会伦理的角度分析,信用危机是信用关系嬗变、信用意识淡薄和信用机制残缺共同作用的后果。     

发展民族信用评级体系促进资本市场健康发展

国际金融危机的根本原因是资产证券化无法转移风险化解机制，导致虚拟经济与实体经济严重脱节，市场无法结清。当前高度垄断、缺乏制衡、存在利益冲突、意识形态化的国际信用评级机构难辞其咎。信用评级的不真实、不公正以及顺周期性加剧了危机的蔓延。为此应重塑国际信用评级体系．大力发展我国民族信用评级体系，推进资本市场健康发展。     

论政府信用及其重构

在整个社会信用体系中 ,政府信用是关键。当前 ,我国经济社会生活出现的政府信用危机 ,已成为经济社会发展的“瓶颈”。为此 ,必须进行政府信用的重构 ,使政府的行政手段从以政策为主转向以法律为主 ,加强对政府行政行为的拘束 ,加强信用制度立法 ,建立有效的失信约束和惩罚机制。通过行政体制改革来切实转变政府职能 ,严惩行政腐败 ,重树政府威信     

政府信用在社会信用体系中的政治学分析

在整个社会信用体系中 ,政府信用是最高层次的信用 ,其影响的范围和力度都比其它信用广大。政府信用主要表现为管理信用、服务信用、行政领导人信用等。政府信用缺失在法律、管理、行政人员、服务功能、行政道德等等方面都有不同程度的表现。提升政府信用的途径选择 ,可从建立科学完善的决策机制、政府监督机制、责任追偿制度、加强行政文化建设、提高公务员队伍素质等方面进行     

和谐社会背景下的政府信用建设

加强政府信用建设是构建社会主义和谐社会的重要组成部分,也是构建社会信用体系的关键。政府信用失范是政府信用缺失、信用贫困、信用滥用、信用危机的统称,政府信用失范将会造成政府失效乃至政府失败。因此,要提高政府信用,必须重视政府的信用意识,做到依法行政,言出有据、言而有信。同时,要进一步转变政府职能,规范政府行为。在目前政府主导形态下,政府信用的提高和信用危机的克服主要仰赖于政府的行为自主性即政府自觉。     

信用缺失与中国社会信用体系重构

信用是市场经济的基础。中国经济面临信用考验 ,尽快整肃信用秩序 ,健全社会信用体系不仅是建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制的迫切需要 ,更是当前保证国民经济协调发展的当务之急。本文从信息经济和新制度经济学的角度探讨了当前我国信用缺失的现状及原因 ,并就健全我国社会信用体系提出了几点看法。     

政府信用法制化初探

近年来,政府信用危机日趋严重,靠以往的道德自律显然已不足以规范日益崩溃的政府信用市场。政府信用危机亟待刚柔并济的制度安排以及法律保障。党的十八大报告指出":推进依法行政,创新行政管理方式,提高政府公信力和执行力。"法治是治国之本,执政之基,政府信用法制化是提高政府公信力的有效手段。建议通过完善立法、严格现有法律法规等途径保障我国政府信用的建设,为政府信用建设提供强有力的制度支撑和法律保障,从而为整个社会信用体系的建构开辟道路。     

建立完善的社会信用体系势在必行

造成社会信用恶化的原因是多方面的,主要可概括为:一是社会信用管理制度不完善;二是经济体制方面存在的问题;三是信用主体本身在自律管理和信用管理方面存在的问题;四是地方保护主义的影响助长了失信行为的滋生和蔓延。因此,建立完善的社会信用体系,一是要从树立良好的政府信用做起;二是要强化全社会的信用观念和信用意识;加大社会信用的管理、教育、宣传力度。三是要强化信用立法,使全社会信用发展置于法律监督约束之下;四是要建立和完善社会信用评级服务制度,加强对自然人和企业法人的信用管理。五是要强化信用主体的内部管理,促进各经济主体自身建设,在建设完善的信用体系过程中发挥基础性作用。     

Implementation, accountability and trust

Abstract. According tot standard dictionaries 'implementation' is ambiguous, as it means either the act of implementing or the state of having been implemented. This duality has characterized implementation theory, which models the process of implementation in different ways, each presumably conducive to successful implementation as an outcome. It is argued that one model of implementation as a process is most suitable for successful implementation meaning the fulfillment of policy objectives by programme technologies. However, there is no necessary relation between some model of implementation processes and implementation as an outcome. Public policies may be implemented in various ways and some policies do fail implementation or result only in political symbolism, but that does not warrant generalizations about the impossibility of successful implementation or create a case for some special model of implementation as hierarchical authority, or as evolution, learning or coalition. Basic to implementation is accountability, which restricts the amount of trust that gives autonomy to those responsible for the implementation of policies. The conceptualization of implementation as a combination of accountability and trust points in a new direction for the analysis of policy cycles.     

Constitutional verbosity and social trust

A common argument in the trust literature is that high-trust cultures allow efficient commercial contracts to be shorter, covering fewer contingencies. We take this idea to the topic of social contracts. Specifically, we ask whether social trust affects the length and detail of constitutions. Cross-country estimates suggest that national trust levels are indeed robustly and negatively associated with the length of countries’ constitutions.     

Will you still trust me tomorrow? The causal effect of terrorism on social trust

The absence of a deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for the polity. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving the willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. While in the fixed scheme, performance has no impact on the pension, the pension increases with short-term performance in the flexible scheme, using the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election as a performance indicator. Such a pension choice improves the well-being of citizens since officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that are beneficial for society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.     

Spheres of trust: An empirical analysis of the foundations of particularised and generalised trust

While the literature on trust has produced various conceptual models, there is also some confusion concerning different types of trust and their formation. In this article, three contested points are empirically clarified. First, are there really different forms of trust as much of the literature suggests? Second, if so, then how are these different types of trust related to each other? Third, what are the foundations of these different forms of trust? Relying on data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel, it is concluded that two types of trust can be empirically identified: an intimate trust in people close to the truster, as well as an abstract trust in people in general. Although these types of trust constitute separate dimensions, they are positively related to each other. Furthermore, this article challenges the widely held assumption that experiences are most relevant for particularised trust, while generalised trust is based on psychological predispositions. It is argued instead for a sphere‐specific logic of trust formation: It is the radius of experiences and predispositions that matters for the radius of trust. Finally, the analysis goes beyond the existing research by highlighting hitherto unknown conditions under which trust in familiar domains is more or less likely to extend to generalised trust.     

民主:在信任与不信任之间——兼论民主与信任的关系

民主总是处于"信任"与"不信任"之间。本文从政治社会学的视角出发,探究了民主何以总是处于信任与不信任之间,并提出并不是所有类型的信任都有益于民主,信任与民主之间存在着一个悖论。     

Voice and trust in parliamentary representation

In both social and political matters, individuals trust those they believe will treat them fairly. Individuals in democracies have little objection to abiding by policies instituted by parties they did not vote for because the system by which the parliament is formed is considered fair. However, even among democracies, some electoral systems are fairer than others. It stands to reason that trust in parliament is affected by the perceived fairness of the electoral system. This research demonstrates that actual or perceived provision of voice in parliamentary representation does increase individual trust in parliament. Systems designed with the intent to provide fair representation and those that provide the illusion of fair representation produce higher levels of trust in parliament.