State transformation and resource politics: Australia and the regional political economy

Abstract

Although the 1994 Agreed Framework offers a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, many problems may prevent its successful implementation. Should the Agreed Framework break down, the United States and South Korea have indicated that they will ask Japan to join them in a trilateral economic sanctions regime.

Japanese participation would include the severance of trade and financial flows, including money sent to North Korea from Japan's ethnic Korean community. In this paper I examine this financial flow, and, finding it a valuable linkage to the North Korean economy, conclude that Japanese participation is vital for a successful sanctions regime against North Korea.

Given this, I examine whether or not Tokyo's cooperation will be forthcoming. Japan would be inclined to participate given that it has a strong interest in eliminating a regional nuclear threat. Furthermore, Japan would also feel pressure from its allies to display diplomatic leadership in the Asia‐Pacific region, as befits a country of its economic importance.

Despite these international reasons for Japanese participation, domestic factors will be likely to prevent Tokyo from joining a sanctions regime: constitutional questions, the possibility of terrorist reprisals, interest in Pyongyang's regime maintenance, concerns for the rights of Japan's ethnic Korean community, and political ties between North Korean and Japanese politicians. I find that these domestic factors will outweigh international pressures for Japanese participation, and thus conclude that in the event of a breakdown in the Agreed Framework, alternatives to a trilateral sanctions strategy against North Korea must be considered.     

Japanese policy and the North Korean ‘soft landing’

Abstract

The nature of security on the Korean Peninsula has undergone fundamental change in the post‐Cold War period, characterized by the growing recognition on the part of the major regional powers that there is a need for economic as well as military approaches to security and conflict avoidance. The chief manifestation of this trend is the emergence of the US Department of State's ‘soft landing’ and other engagement policies as attempts to resolve North Korean security threats. Some commentators have seen the soft‐landing policy as an opportunity for Japan to use its economic power to contribute to regional and international security. This article examines the evolution and rationale of the soft‐landing policy, how Japanese policy‐makers evaluate its potential as a solution to the North Korean security problem and the current extent of Japan's contribution to it. The article also points out the‐limitations of Japanese support for the soft landing due to international restrictions on the Japanese government's room for diplomatic manoeuvre, domestic political obstacles to engaging North Korea and the general lack of Japanese private business interest in the North. Finally the conclusion shows that, despite the recognition of the need to engage North Korea economically, Japanese policy‐makers have devoted their energies principally to the redefinition of the US‐Japan military alliance based on the legitimacy of the North Korean threat.     

North Korea's Internet strategy and its political implications

Abstract

During recent years, the role of information technology in shaping politics and social movements in the digital age is drawing increasing scholarly attention. There is, however, little such literature on North Korea as the country remains almost completely cut off from the Internet. Since the mid-1990s, the DPRK government has strategically developed its information and communication technology and has subsequently built a domestic intranet. Although North Korea keeps a minimal presence on the web, there are signs that the country is taking small and cautious steps to allow some social elites to take advantage of the Internet in order to leapfrog its economic development. Indeed, a high-profile defector indicated that North Korea will most likely start allowing wider but limited internet access in the near future. This paper examines North Korea's intranet and Internet policies and explores their political implications by drawing upon first-hand data from Korean sources and existing literature as well as by juxtaposing the North Korean case with other communist regimes such as China and Cuba in terms of their attempts to control and manipulate the Internet. It shows that the DPRK government is likely to learn from the Chinese and Cuban experiences and adopt a ‘Mosquito-Net’ model in controlling the Internet in an effort to attract foreign investment while keeping out information deemed threatening by the regime.     

The new Korean political economy: beyond the models of capitalism debate

Abstract

A key theme within the literature on the evolution of the Korean political economy since the 1997/8 crisis has been the extent to which Korea remains a ‘developmental state’ or has pursued radical neoliberal reform. These debates have not only reflected a concern with understanding the Korean economy but with a wider set of questions relating to the future of capitalist diversity within a globalized economy. By the late 1980s Korea had come to be regarded as a model of successful state-led late capitalist development. Korean modern economic history has insured that questions relating to the extent that it has pursued neoliberal reform have been of keen interest to students of political economy globally. This paper argues that substantive neoliberal reform has taken place in Korea since 1997. The thesis that a new ‘developmental state’ is in process of consolidating itself is simply wrong. However, the state's reform program interacted with material conditions and political coalitions at the meso level in a complex and uneven manner. In certain critical sectors, such as finance, a neoliberal regulatory regime has been consolidated. In others, such as telecommunications, developmentalist regulatory structures have proven to be highly resilient. In order to fully understand the complexity of the contemporary Korean political economy it is necessary, therefore, to prioritize the importance of meso-level analysis.     

Aesthetics and politics in North Korean socialist realist painting: On approved ways of seeing

This paper inquires into aesthetics and politics in North Korean socialist realist painting by way of an examination of North Korean journalist Han Chol Ju's article series “Visit to Korean Art Gallery” and three paintings in Korea Today (2010–2011). The paper explains late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il's national-Stalinist conception of Juche socialist realism in On Fine Art (1991); considers one Korean painting (Chos?nhwa), two oil paintings (yuhwa), and one jewel painting (pos?khwa); and addresses approved ways of seeing in political-aesthetic experience and response in the North Korean situation.     

Visualizing the invisible hands: the shadow economy in North Korea

Abstract

The outside world is well aware of the totalitarian side of North Korea. Much less well-known is the shadow economy of the country which has enveloped the everyday lives of ordinary North Koreans for the last fifteen years or so. Based on refugee testimonies, this article aims to shed light on this heretofore unexamined aspect of the country, by visualizing the invisible hands of the ever-growing shadow economy in North Korea. In particular, we will investigate who the main actors are (the agency question), how they obtain their items (the supply mechanism), how they move items from one place to another (the distribution mechanism) and who consumes these items (the consumer question) in contemporary North Korean society.     

Multilateral CBMs on the Korean Peninsula: Making a virtue out of necessity

Abstract

As its economy has become near to collapse, North Korea has tried to avoid direct contacts with South Korea because of the ‘absorption phobia’. Instead, the North has made continuous efforts to improve its relations only with the United States, seeking a guarantee for its survival. Given this circumstance, this paper argues that useful multilateral approaches such as KEDO and Four‐Party Talks will contribute to improving inter‐Korean relations. Thus, it would be sensible to explore every possible way (even through multilateral mechanisms) until both Koreas make a breakthrough for the deadlocked inter‐Korean CBMs. But the multilateral CBMs constitute a transitional and complementary role as South and North Korea should be primarily responsible for addressing major problems such as reunification. Among the multilateral approaches, the Four‐Party Talks will be a most useful mechanism which will enable the two Koreas to resume dialogue for the peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula. In this peace process, more positive roles of major powers are also requested.     

An Empirical Analysis on the Determinants of the Length of Ministerial Tenure in Korea, 1980–2008

ABSTRACT

The study of the length of ministerial tenure has received some attention by scholars of public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of empirical research on ministerial duration in non-Western countries, this article empirically examines the determinants of ministerial duration based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. The empirical findings are as follows. First, being a female minister decreases the probability of stepping down by 1.78 times compared to a male minister. Second, political democratization after 1987 drastically increases the probability of ministerial stepping down by 3.46 times. Third, confirmation hearings after 2005 decrease the probability of ministerial stepping down by 0.53 times. Based on these empirical findings of the analysis, we can identify distinctive characteristics of ministerial duration in Korea. We argue that as the Korean political system shifts from military or authoritarian rule to democratic rule after 1987, a single five-year presidential term may set a political environment for frequent changes of ministers to allocate political spoils.     

Defection of North Korea's ideologist a sign of regime crisis

Abstract

The defection of Hwang Jang‐yop, one of North Korea's major ideological authorities and a senior member of the leadership, is a clear indication of regime crisis in Pyongyang. Hwang's assessment of the nature of the Kim Jong‐il regime, which he regards as incapable of reform and committed to war with South Korea, will strengthen those in Seoul who argue for a tough approach to be taken in negotiations on security issues with North Korea. At the same time, his remarks on the extent of communist influence in South Korean politics may influence the outcome of the 1997 presidential elections.     

The limits of economic globalization in East Asian developmental states

Abstract

In an attempt to adjust to economic globalization or internationalization, East Asian developmental states have liberalized their domestic economic systems, accelerating the introduction of the free‐market ideology. Despite their plan to establish the internationally compatible open‐market economy, however, the extent to which they can advance economic liberalization is limited. Political and economic burdens that the developmental state's extensive intervention in the market has incurred in the course of state‐led mercantile economic development, make it impossible for those states to execute full‐scale economic liberalization. The South Korean case clearly shows this. The Korean developmental state retains two major economic burdens: the exclusive ownership and the poor financial structure of the chaebôl. Insofar as Korean big business preserves those weak spots, the government cannot surrender the power of regulation despite its spontaneous implementation of the economic liberalization policy. In addition, the common ‘egoistic’ interests which government bureaucrats and the political class share also limit the degree to which economic liberalization policy can be implemented. The degree of state intervention in the market in Korea has been deeper than that in Japan which pioneered Asian developmental statism, and, thus, the political and economic burdens it has incurred for itself are heavier. Consequently, the East Asian developmental state cannot entirely withdraw its intervention in the market. The ‘support’ of industries is likely to diminish, but ‘regulation’ for the formation of the autonomous market will increase. For the Korean developmental state, globalization and economic liberalization are political economic slogans to re‐launch economic growth and to elevate the international economic competitiveness of industries under the initiative of the state, and motivated by nationalistic reasons. Hence, the role of the state in the market is still far from becoming redundant even in the tide of globalization and economic liberalization in the case of South Korea, where the legacy of strong developmental statism remains considerable.     

Economic crisis,domestic politics and welfare state changes

Abstract

This essay re-examines the debate over the relationship between economic crises and welfare system changes and the role of domestic political factors which may refract the wave of influence from economic crisis. While acknowledging the inherent weakness of research design in a single case study, this study cautiously contends that an examination of the Korean case reveals that domestic factors continue to play an important role in welfare policy-making, even when decisive global economic forces are at work. Theoretically, this study argues not only for the continued theoretical relevance of the state-centered theory, but also in favor of a more integrated and configurational approach.     

Framing and dominant metaphors in the coverage of North Korea in the Australian media

Through the selective allocation of attention, framing and metaphors in covering foreign affairs and countries, media narratives often act to delegitimise, marginalise and demonise international actors. Focusing on Australian reportage of North Korea in The Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald and from the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2012, this paper explicates how the framing mechanisms utilised in media point to media complicity in reinforcing a negative, adversarial orientation towards North Korea. It also discusses implications for how Australians view the North Korean people, Australian–North Korean relations, and policy pertaining to Northeast Asia more broadly.     

Uncertain allies or uncomfortable neighbors? Making sense of China–North Korea Relations, 1949–2010

Abstract

This study is based upon two premises: (1) the available literature, though voluminous, fails to provide systematic understandings of the complex and evolving relations between China and North Korea; and (2) China and North Korea had been short of being trusted allies bound in blood and belief even before the launch of post-Mao reforms and the normalization of Beijing–Seoul relations. This article dissects this curious relationship into four questions: (1) What does history inform us about China's relations with (North) Korea? (2) Has China communicated effectively with North Korea? (3) Have China and North Korea been ‘trusted allies’? (4) How effective has China been in inducing North Korea to comply with its demands over the years? The authors argue that, geo-strategically, China can hardly afford to put North Korea in an adversarial position. Furthermore, residues of the Factional Incident of 1956 and North Korea's deep-rooted suspicion of China still linger on. These have been the sources of Beijing's dilemma in consistently opting for ‘soft’ measures despite that North Korea's provocative acts and nuclear weapons programs have negatively affected China's interests. From the outset, China and North Korea had been more uncertain allies who had to cooperate with each other under the ideological and geopolitical imperatives of the difficult times. The authors also suggest that it would be misleading to put Sino–North Korean dynamics in a usual category of big power–small nation relations where power asymmetry generally works against the latter. North Korea has undoubtedly been an atypical ‘small nation’. It is due to these limitations that China's pressurizing has not been always effective and that Beijing's reactions have been continuously cyclical. This cyclical trend is not likely to be broken since the upcoming drama of Sino–American rivalry is bound to close the window of such opportunities for China, which will nevertheless regard North Korea increasingly as a liability, if not uncomfortable neighbor.     

Following in China's footsteps? The political economy of North Korean reform

Since the coming to power of Kim Jong Un in 2012, the North Korean government has recently announced, and to some degree has implemented, a new set of economic management policies known as the June 28th measures in 2012 and the May 30th measures in 2014. Both of these sets of measures seek to build upon the abandoned reforms of the early 2000s through restructuring North Korea's highly inefficient collective farm and state-owned enterprise management system. In addition, the government has intensified ongoing efforts at building special economic zones for the purpose of attracting foreign investment. As such, the country is attempting to emulate the reforms adopted by China in the late 1970s. Although the success of these efforts is by no means guaranteed, they do serve to question mainstream analyses that suggest that Juche Self-Reliance or S?n'gun Military First Politics ideologies will inhibit any genuine attempt at economic reform in North Korea. We argue, in contrast, that ongoing changes to North Korean state and society mean that, a cyclical stop and start rhythm to the reforms notwithstanding, such attempts at economic reform are likely to continue. However, we also argue that while the contemporary reform drive resembles and may indeed reproduce some of the successes of the Chinese experience, North Korea faces significantly greater challenges, including the greater decline of North Korean industry, local resistance to reform, and the dangers of inflation. Furthermore, North Korea faces a highly challenging external security environment that undermines the ability of the regime to attract investment and by extension the political standing of reformist elements within the country. Given this contrast with the international environment surrounding China's own reform experience, our analysis emphasises the importance of geopolitical context in shaping experiences of economic reform and of development more broadly.     

Constructing a Rogue State: American Post-Cold War Security Discourse and North Korean Drug Trafficking*

Through an analysis of government reports, political testimony, influential periodicals and interviews, this paper holds that claims of North Korean drug trafficking and producing are greatly exaggerated. An assessment of the 1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 North Korea Advisory Group Report, 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment, and 2004 United Nations Report on World Drugs, among other sources, reveals only inconclusive and anecdotal support for the contention that North Korea is a drug state. This lack of reliable intelligence allows American security analysts to construct North Korea as a drug sponsoring country, making the “truth” about North Korea's relationship to drugs come from endless repetition rather than sustained analysis. As a result, US approaches towards security and drug policy in the region need to be reexamined and contextualized.

The dominant definition of a problem acquires, by repetition, and by the weight and credibility of those who propose and subscribe it, the warrant of “common sense.” (Stuart Hall1 ^?1 Stuart Hall, Culture, Society, and the Media (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 82. )     

Civic activism and Korean democracy: the impact of blacklisting campaigns in the 2000 and 2004 general elections

Abstract

For the general elections in 2000 and 2004, civic groups in South Korea joined forces to stage the so-called ‘blacklisting campaign’ or ‘defeat campaign’ against allegedly corrupt, incompetent or anti-reform politicians. The campaigns not only played a significant role in thwarting many politicians from getting nominated or elected but also heralded a new era in Korean politics: civic groups have now emerged as a major political force, capable not only of challenging party policies and pending legislation but also taking on an agenda-setting prominence in a wide array of policy areas. In analyzing the success of NGO political activities in the 2000 and 2004 general elections, this paper draws on resource mobilization theory to show how the civic groups effectively utilized various resources, including leadership skills, communications and office facilities, and access to the mass media, to achieve their objective rather than relying simply on the spontaneous participation of voters. In comparing the efforts of civic groups in the two elections, the paper also explains the factors that made their endeavors relatively less successful in 2004 (e.g. a splintering of alliances among the civic groups). On the whole, the paper argues that the greater political involvement by civic groups is likely to lead to a more pluralistic, open and competitive form of democracy, and that the vibrant civic activism in Korea is an indication not only of maturing democracy but also a more secure entrenchment of civil society.     

Japan’s uncertain security environment and changes in its legislative‒executive relations

Abstract

Focusing on Japan, this paper explores whether powers and competences in the political system are likely to be recalibrated in favour of the executive when the environment is perceived as increasingly threatening. It shows that the executive has been significantly strengthened during the past two decades of political reforms, though a closer look reveals that only the most recent efforts are motivated by security concerns. Case studies on military deployments and arms exports do not expose any clear trend towards curbing parliament’s formal control powers, but they indicate two related mechanisms that affect executive?legislative relations. Firstly, the executive has sought to ensure faster decision-making in security policy, which may limit the Diet’s ability to scrutinise policies in depth. Secondly, the level of contestation over security policy issues has been decreasing, especially given the securitisation of North Korea and China. This provides the executive with more leeway in devising policies.     

Framing and reframing R2P—a responsibility to protect humanity from evil

ABSTRACT

This article takes issue with de-politicised and moralistic conceptions of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and, inspired by the political theory of Hannah Arendt, develops a ‘re-politicised’ and ‘de-moralised’ account of R2P. It argues that by relying on a link between a moral responsibility to ‘save strangers’ and practical political action, R2P turns a blind eye to the political interest of powerful actors. And by trying to transform R2P into a ‘blueprint’, ‘roadmap’ or ‘emergency plan’ for political action, many commentators try to render obsolete political deliberation and practical judgement on a case-by-case basis. The present article argues that it is necessary to develop a more realistic view of R2P’s role and potential in world politics. R2P, it is argued, has an important discursive function and considerable potential to influence and guide international decision-making processes. Drawing on Arendt’s conception of ‘evil’ as a crime against humanity itself, this article reframes R2P as a ‘responsibility to protect humanity from evil’. An Arendtian understanding of mass atrocities as crimes against our common humanity (i.e. as evils) facilitates the development of a re-politicised and de-moralised account of R2P: This account recognises its discursive role, it actively seeks to generate political interest for action in the face of harrowing mass atrocities but also acts as a leash on intervention in less severe cases.

Abbreviation R2P: Responsibility to Protect; UN: United Nations; NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; ICISS: International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty     

Involvement in voluntary associations in North America and Western Europe: Trends and correlates 1981–2000

Abstract

There is no lack of studies that point at discomforting trends in community life and citizens' social and political involvement in contemporary society. According to various indicators, Americans have become increasingly disconnected from their families, friends, neighbours and associations, leading to a decline of civic community and social trust and to more individual unhappiness. Similar developments are supposed to take place elsewhere. In this article we use data from the European and World Values Studies to address, for North America and Western Europe, (1) trends regarding voluntary associations, social trust, political involvement and happiness in the 1981–2000 period; (2) changing patterns and types of involvement in associations; and (3) macro and micro relationships between this involvement and political involvement, social trust and happiness. We find no general decline in these traits, no trend towards more passive membership, and only mixed evidence for positive connections between involvement, trust and happiness.     

The Elite Politics of Media Advocacy in Human Rights

ABSTRACT

Advocacy nongovernmental organizations based in the North adopt digital tools to bypass repressive regimes, raise awareness amongst global publics, sustain grassroots activists in the South, and engage in political action. Social media was expected to offer innovative platforms for mobilizing participants to act on behalf of “distant others.” But the practices of some organizations signal that something else is at play. Rather than empower individuals, digital campaigns reify elite politics, using outsider strategies to support insider lobbying. Through communicative processes of mediatization, organizations pay homage to the existence of a movement, but only afford thin forms of participation. Using the framework of media advocacy to explore Human Rights Watch and the Enough! Project, we argue that social media becomes a top-down platform that exacerbates the elite design of organizations, enabling them to assert legitimacy for political actions, while disingenuously marketing themselves as democratic with bottom-up credibility.