Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from 'Liddism' to 'Drainism'

Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action - and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the rebirth of independent security states.     

The Judicial Role in Defining National Security and Access to Information in South Africa

This article argues that judicial and other institutions concerned with legal interpretation are playing an increasing role in regulating and defining the concept of national security for South Africa, particularly in the realm of national security information. Part I surveys the post-apartheid evolution of accountability of South Africa’s national security agencies with particular attention to the treatment of national security information. Starting from a low base, intelligence agencies in South Africa have become more accountable, in part through the greater degree of access to national security information. Part II portrays the placement of access to national security information within South Africa’s legislative framework, taking into account the keys laws underpinning both secrecy and disclosure regulation. Here, with no definition of national security on the secrecy side, it is on the disclosure side of South Africa’s legislative framework that the judiciary and other legal actors are crafting an operative definition of national security. Part III covers three recent developments, arguing that they demonstrate the increasingly important regulatory role played by the judiciary and other legal institutions. These include two key Constitutional Court decisions and an ongoing legislative reform effort.     

From laboratory to the WMD Commission: how academic research influences intelligence agencies

Academic research can improve national security, yet the process by which findings flow from the ivory tower to intelligence agencies is not well understood by scholars. This article addresses this gap through an exploratory case study of when research impacted intelligence: the incorporation of cognitive biases research in intelligence analysis. The results of this study illustrate the importance of idea entrepreneurs—individuals who promote academic research—as well as the need for making academic findings applicable to intelligence practitioners. These results, while based on a single case, suggest new avenues for scholarship exploring knowledge utilization in intelligence.     

International organized crime

He has served as a consultant to the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, and related agencies of the U.S. government. He has written, coauthored, or edited over sixteen books on intelligence and national security.     

James Bond,Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary between the ‘real’ and the ‘imagined’

This article looks to answer the question of why the James Bond novels and films should matter to scholars of intelligence and national security. We argue that Bond is important because, rightly or wrongly, and not without inaccuracy, it has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats. On another level, this article explores the unexpected yet important interactions between Bond and the actual world of intelligence. We contend that the orthodoxy dictating that Bond and spying are diametric opposites—one is the stuff of fantasy, the other is reality—is problematic, for the worlds of Bond and real intelligence collide, overlap and intermesh in fascinating and significant ways. In short, Bond is important for scholars because he is an international cultural icon that continues to operate at the borders of fiction and reality, framing and constructing not only public perceptions but also to some degree intelligence practices. Core narratives of intelligence among not only the public but also policymakers and intelligence officers are imagined, sustained, deepened, produced and reproduced through and by Bond. We conclude that Bond and intelligence should be thought of as co-constitutive; the series shapes representations and perceptions of intelligence, but it also performs a productive role, influencing the behaviours of intelligence agencies themselves.     

Managing Dynamic Public Sector Networks: Effectiveness,Performance, and a Methodological Framework in the Field of National Security

ABSTRACT

Networks are increasing in number and in importance across the security field as a means of providing inter-agency coordination. Based on a large qualitative study of networks in the field of national security in Australia, this article aims to advance our knowledge of the internal properties of public sector networks in the field of national security and the conditions shaping their performance. It puts forward a multi-level theoretical framework involving five interdependent levels of analysis—structural, cultural, policy, technological, and relational—which aims to account for the internal properties of networks and examines each of these levels in relation to public sector networks in the field of national security. Using detailed interviews with senior members of security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, the article aims to highlight the potential lessons this framework has for strategically organizing and managing dynamic networks within and beyond the field of national security.     

Making future leaders in the US intelligence community: challenges and opportunities

This article explores what factors are important in developing the future leaders of the US intelligence community in the post-9/11 security environment. It surveys traditional leadership theory to assess whether any of its perspectives are applicable to understanding leadership in the intelligence context. It argues, that although some leadership theory may be applicable, the intelligence studies field may be better served by developing its own body of leadership theory. Second, any leadership theory needs to consider together the two synergistic components of intelligence leadership: personal leadership development and the ability to lead organization reform. Furthermore, the role of intelligence governance may be the most critical factor in promoting better leaders of US intelligence agencies and the broader community.     

The Munich Olympics Massacre and the Development of Counter-Terrorism in Australia

Counter-terrorism is a product of government, identifying as its target a kind of violence defined as terrorism. This article explores a particular moment in its development, as an intersection of international, national and bureaucratic responses to the Munich Olympics massacre of 1972. Australian understandings of the development of counter-terrorism have been dominated by a number of themes – principally by the Hilton Bombing of 1978 and the subsequent acceleration of security restructuring during the Fraser years, by the collapse of the Cold War focus of the security and intelligence agencies at the end of the 1980s and then by the ‘war on terror’ following 9/11 and the Bali bombing. Counter-terrorist planning was however an emerging business of government in the 1970s, in Australia as in its alliance partner the United States. While the Hope Royal Commission into intelligence agencies (1974–7) has dominated attention in later accounts of the development of counter-terrorism, a 1972 Interdepartmental Committee on Terrorism and Violence in Australia anticipated many of its concerns. In this developing concern with terrorism, the role and interest of the domestic intelligence agency (ASIO) at this time was limited. This paper contextualizes the Munich massacre as one of the factors shaping a rethinking of security and policing strategies in the early 1970s, a moment in the emergence of a modern government of terrorism.     

Counter-Terrorism,Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for Collection,Exchange and Analysis

In this article we seek to address the emerging role of the European Union (EU) as a security and intelligence actor from the perspective of counter-terrorism. Intelligence as a process and product has been strongly promoted by the EU as a useful and necessary tool in the fight against terrorism, radicalization, organized crime and public order problems. A range of agencies has been established that collect, analyze and operationalize intelligence in view of strategically defined security threats. Examples are Europol and Frontex. This article makes an inventory of their roles and competences in the field of intelligence and looks at the list of instruments that encourage the sharing of intelligence between different law enforcement and security agencies. Moreover, it is argued in this article that as intelligence becomes more hybrid and as the EU only holds light powers of oversight on ownership and integrity of data, considerable governance challenges lurk around the corner. As ‘intelligence’ is usually a complex and sensitive product, it often travels outside formal bureaucratic channels, which undermines accountability and transparency of where, how and for what purpose the intelligence was gathered.     

National Assessment by the National Security Council Staff 1968–80: An American Experiment in a British Style of Analysis?

At a time of intense debate over the specific organizational arrangements of American national security agencies with new or refocused intelligence responsibilities, the relative proximity between intelligence producers and consumers is a key issue. Intelligence capabilities may have to be kept separate from decision-making because of organizational economies of scale and scope, but separation alone does not mean intelligence must be distant from decision-making. For example, the British style of analysis involves a much closer relationship between intelligence producers and consumers than exists in the American context. Efforts to improve the integration of intelligence into decision-making by closing the distance between them would do well to study the history and efficacy of this process as they look to create new ways of structuring the relationship between intelligence analysis and decision-making. Specifically, history demonstrates that the US National Security Council staff implemented a process in 1968 through 1980 that approximated the British style of analysis, and this may provide US policymakers with a model for bridging the gap between intelligence analysis and decision-making.     

Analytic Outreach for Intelligence: Insights from a Workshop on Emerging Biotechnology Threats

This article describes a new effort to engage in analytic outreach between academic scholars and intelligence analysts on the issue of emerging biotechnology threats to US national security. The context of this outreach was a September 2012 meeting in London to explore possibilities for enhanced analytic outreach in relation to emerging biotechnology threats, supported by the UK Genomics Policy and Research Forum. This meeting consisted of a mix of current and former intelligence practitioners and policy officials, and social science and scientific experts, from both the UK and the US. As will be described below, this unique pairing of experts and subjects revealed new insights into how to improve intelligence assessments on biotechnology and bioweapons threats. It also revealed continuing challenges in reforming assessments within existing intelligence work routines.     

The intelligence of fear

Intelligence agencies long have brought unwelcome news to civilian political and military masters – and sometimes suffered severely for it. Even in Western democracies, insecurities and outright fear produce behavioral responses by individuals and defensive institutional reactions that distort normal intelligence activities and affect the overall performance of intelligence agencies. Causes of fear include: political leaders, overseers, agency managers, and the security elements of their organizations. This article highlights the importance of institutional factors, especially organizational cultures and incentives, on the activities and overall performance of intelligence agencies and suggests that motivated biases, caused by personal and organizational self-interest and fears, are more significant causes of intelligence failures than are commonly believed.     

The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing in Romania

The twenty-first century's security environment has triggered a phenomenon of ‘proliferation’ of intelligence and security cooperation, both domestically and internationally. After the ousting of the communist regime (whose intelligence system served the regime) in 1989, Romania embarked upon democratic reform of its new intelligence system (including strengthening cooperation), to better tackle the current security challenges. This has been a rather onerous process, yet worthwhile: Romania's intelligence is presently cooperating well with national and international partners, to counter national, regional, and global security threats. This paper assesses Romania's efforts in developing intelligence cooperation, after the demise of the communist regime.     

Terrorism,Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons

More than a generation ago, in the wake of investigations by the US Congress into improprieties carried out by US intelligence agencies, the United States, in effect, raised the wall between intelligence and law enforcement in order to protect the liberties of Americans. For similar reasons, its Cold War institutions enshrined distinctions between foreign and domestic, and public and private. The CIA was and is, for instance, enjoined from law enforcement and domestic activity.

Those distinctions served the country tolerably well during the Cold War but set it up to fail on September 11. Now, a rethinking of them is underway, as the balance between security and liberty is re-struck. It is imperative, though, to learn the right lessons on September 11. That means thinking carefully and proceeding slowly as changes are made. It also means carefully evaluating the effects of proposed changes, especially to avoid ‘pain for no gain’ measures that do inconvenience people, or even affect their liberties, for little or no gain in the war on terrorism.     

Counterterror intelligence operations and terror attacks

We present a formal model of an intelligence agency that must divide its resources between the collection and analysis of information pertaining to terror plots. The model highlights the negative consequences of queues which form when collection exceeds analytic capacity. We incorporate the response of a terrorist organization to the operating characteristics of the intelligence system it faces, and solve for equilibrium strategies for the intelligence system and terrorist organization. Our results demonstrate the importance of properly balancing resources between collection and analysis, and stand in contrast to the observed state of overcollection in US intelligence agencies.     

A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA's dismal performance against WMD threats

American preemptive or preventive military action against WMD-armed adversaries in the future will simply not be feasible without high-quality and timely intelligence. But is American intelligence up to this load-bearing task for the post-11 September national security? This article surveys the Central Intelligence Agency's record of gauging potential WMD threats for more than a decade and assesses its overall performance as dismal. The CIA's recent intelligence debacle against Iraq was one of the greatest in a long series of failures that has publicly exposed the Agency's profound weaknesses. These intelligence failures were due in large measure to the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied alone by the creation of the new Director of National Intelligence post. This article recommends steps needed to increase the quality of intelligence produced by CIA, or elsewhere in the new intelligence community, to move American intelligence in lockstep with military transformation to give the Commander-in-Chief realistic options for countering hostile nation-states or terrorist groups seeking or acquiring WMD.     

Astropolitics and the “Exopolitics” of Unacknowledged Activities in Outer Space

The role of unacknowledged classified programs remains an enigma for fully understanding activities in space and the study of astropolitics. Classified programs by law are not publicly announced, and remain inaccessible to all except those with valid security clearances to be briefed about them. In the United States, waived Unacknowledged Special Access Programs are the most highly classified programs conducted by the military and intelligence community. The same classification protocols are also required of private contractors working with U.S. military departments and intelligence agencies on classified programs. As space continues to grow in its national security significance, the number of these unacknowledged programs pertaining to space is likely to grow significantly from its current number. This requires adopting the necessary conceptual tools and methodological flexibility for investigating unacknowledged activities in space. This also extends to evidence concerning unidentified flying objects and extraterrestrial life. This article suggests that “exopolitics” is a unique multidisciplinary approach to extraterrestrial life that offers a helpful set of conceptual tools for studying unacknowledged space activities, and complements the field of astropolitics.     

Security Providers: Obstacles to Effectiveness in Democracies

To usefully discuss security, one must analyze the security providers states utilize to enhance international and domestic security. These are the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies. This paper analyzes the implications of democratization on the requirements—posited as strategies, resources, and coordination institutions—these providers require in order to achieve the goals civilian leaders set for them. In analyzing case studies of how nations implement six different tasks, it becomes clear that the absence, or weakness, in any of the requirements leads to serious weakness in implementation. Two findings from the case studies are particularly important for policy. First, presidents, who are elected directly and for fixed terms, may ignore or even abolish institutions, including national security councils, that are created to coordinate policy. Second, as civilians are in control, if they lack clear incentives they are not willing to provide the necessary requirements for the security providers.     

Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden

The Edward Snowden leaks challenge policy makers and the public's understanding and perspectives on the role of security intelligence in liberal democratic states. This article explores the challenges confronting security intelligence collection by the ‘Five Eyes’ countries – particularly those most affected by the leaks. We argue that the debate now needs to move beyond simplistic notions of privacy vs. security to a more detailed understanding of the policy and ethical dilemmas confronting policy makers and intelligence agencies. To that end, we provide a schematic framework (methods, context and target) to promote a better understanding of the practical, policy and ethical problems for security intelligence collection emerging post Snowden. The framework is a first step in identifying common principles that could be used develop an ethically informed set of policy guidelines to help decision makers better navigate between citizen's two basic rights: security and privacy.     

The Liddell diaries and British intelligence history

This article discusses the wartime diaries of Guy Liddell of MI5. It argues that they are a crucial source for the study of wartime intelligence history, not only in respect of MI5 but also of other British secret agencies, particularly MI6 and SOE. Written in an accessible style, the diaries cast much new light on personalities, events, discussions and decisions both on operational matters and on questions of high policy, including relations with foreign intelligence services, debate on postwar intelligence priority and organization, and ministerial involvement in intelligence and security issues. In their breadth of coverage and information, their treatment of opinions and personalities, their abundance of detail and their fresh and unguarded prose, they are far more interesting, more accurate and more authoritative than either the various in-house MI5 section histories which have been opened to research in recent years, or the Hinsley Simkins volume of the official history of British intelligence. They are as significant a source for intelligence history as are the Cadogan diaries for the study of British foreign policy between 1939 and 1945. The article also points to inconsistencies in redaction throughout the diaries, and to other questions arising from the appearance of this crucial source.