Renewable energy and East Asia's new developmentalism: towards a low carbon future?

Abstract

East Asia's renewable energy (RE) sector has grown faster than any other region's since the mid-2000s. It is argued that renewables formed an integral part of the region's new industrial policies and new developmentalism, which are founded on new configured forms of state capacity shaped in response to various challenges, primarily climate change, energy security, globalisation and global neo-liberalism. By studying the recent progress of East Asia's RE sector, we gain useful insights into these key developments in East Asia's political economy and the region's prospects for transition towards low carbon development. This analysis considers how and why different approaches to RE policy emerged in East Asia, to what extent the promotion and expansion of East Asia's RE sector is part of a new industrial policy paradigm and new developmentalism, and what the study of East Asian policies on promoting renewable energy can tell us about the region's broader approach to low carbon development. Although the promotion of renewable energy has been a fundamental part of East Asia's recent macro-development plans and new developmentalism generally, these same plans suggest that East Asian states will simultaneously continue to significantly promote high carbon and ecologically damaging industrial activities, thus undermining the low carbon credentials of East Asia's new developmentalism. The path to meaningful low carbon development will be very long and will take many decades to achieve. However, it is contended that by maintaining and improving their various forms of state capacity over time, the East Asian states will be well positioned to sustain the significant growth of their renewable energy sectors and thereby further strengthen the low carbon development orientation of their new industrial policies, macro-development plans and strategic economic thinking.     

What are the strategic and economic implications for South Asia of China's Maritime Silk Road initiative?

This article focuses on South Asia's role in China's Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative. Given the saliency of this MSR enterprise as part of ChinesePresident Xi Jinping’s “One-Belt-One-Road” strategy, how this ambitious scheme impacts China’s relations with South Asian states along the MSR’s route, i.e. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh, merits investigation. The fate of the MSR will be determined by China’s relations with these states, since South Asia is in the middle of major sea-lanes between East/Southeast Asia and Middle East/Europe. The study examines the intentions and executions of China’s MSR projects in South Asia, evaluates the political and economic calculations of participating in the MSR for regional states, and identifies actions taken by them that can decide the initiative’s success. Politically, reactions of South Asian states to the MSR are explained as: fear of expanding Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean for India; and attempts by which Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh use China to counteract possible domination by India. Economically, two MSR pathways for South Asian states are analyzed: increases in Chinese infrastructure investments; and expansion in South Asia-China trade; both of which are reducible by loans owed to China, or “strings”/conditions attached.     

Escaping the merchant/missionary dilemma: an imperial policy for the Asia-Pacific

The Asia policy of the Bush administration follows from two principles: its preference for ‘hub-and-spoke relationships’ led from Washington, and the restored priority of security issues over the mixture of trade interests and human rights that was the hallmark of the Clinton presidency. The initial focus of the administration on the restoration of political and strategic ties with old allies such as Japan, and on strategic competition, has been mitigated by another realistic approach: the need to seek new allies and partnerships. This policy was already evident towards India before September 11, 2001, but has been magnified with the onset of a coalition against terrorism, and almost as importantly, against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The resumption of strategic and military ties with China, the priority of anti-terrorist cooperation over human rights issues with Southeast Asia, the increased support for India that is of more strategic value than America's tactical involvement with Pakistan, are developments that overshadow the US relationship with traditional allies such as Japan or the European Union. The major weakness of the Bush Asia policy, however, is its relative neglect of major economic and social issues in the region. Although support for some weakened ASEAN economies has increased, there is neither a more intense coordination of economic policies with Japan, in spite of initially declared intentions, nor a major economic and social strategy for Southeast and South Asia that would support the fight against terrorism.     

Testing the China Threat paradigm: China's high-speed railway diplomacy in Southeast Asia

Vying for high-speed railway projects overseas has become a prominent feature of China's diplomacy in recent years, including in Southeast Asia. These efforts have been widely depicted within the premises of the China Threat narrative – as a part of Beijing's agenda to alter the power balance in Southeast Asia at the expense of the economic, political, and security well-being of countries in the region. This paper challenges such interpretations and concludes that these projects do not have either the intention or capacity to facilitate such a hostile and far-reaching agenda toward the region.     

Subregional economic zones,politics and development: The Philippine involvement in the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA)

In Southeast and East Asia there has been a recent trend towards setting up subregional economic zones often known as ‘growth triangles’. This article examines the concept of subregional economic zones and then focuses on the history of the recently established East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) locating it in the wider Philippine policy context. The article also assesses the likely contribution of EAGA to Mindanao's future development, paying particular attention to the political issues which could impinge on the attainment of economic prosperity.     

Sudpolitik: the political economy of Taiwan's trade with Southeast Asia

Abstract

In December 1993 the Taiwan government adopted a policy called nanjin zhengce or sudpolitik, a policy aimed at diverting part of Taiwan's trade and investment flows from China to Southeast Asia. This paper addresses the following questions: what is sudpolitik? why adopt such a policy? what are the economic, political, and strategic considerations in the pursuit of this policy? which countries are its specific targets? how do the countries directly affected by this policy respond to it? The paper also discusses the issue of Taiwan's aid in connection with sudpolitik. While the effectiveness of the policy is far from clear at present, the paper concludes with four observations: Taiwan's trade and aid are beginning to intertwine; Taiwan's diplomacy is largely economically or commercially led; Taiwan has achieved some positive results in improving its relations with Southeast Asian countries; and, Taiwan has reached a new stage in its economic development whereby it needs to invest overseas in order to sustain its economic growth. Overall, sudpolitik represents a novel step in Taiwan's diplomatic practice.     

US rebalance: potential and limits in Southeast Asia

A central theme of US policy towards Asia during 2012 has been the strengthening of America's military deployments, political relationships and economic partnerships in Southeast Asia. It is evident that China's growing power and assertiveness have provided an important stimulus for renewed US policy activism in a sub-region towards which some observers had detected neglect by Washington over the previous decade. But while Southeast Asian states may take advantage of renewed American interest to hedge against China's rise, most of them will keep their strategic options open.     

A new dynamism in Sino-Japanese security relations: Japan's strategic use of foreign aid

Abstract

In November 2004 a Chinese nuclear submarine cruised into Japan's territorial waters near the Okinawa Islands. In response, the Japanese government dispatched several Japanese naval ships and planes to chase the Chinese submarine until it navigated into international waters. This event, which potentially could have become the first exchange of fire between Japan and China since the Second World War, illuminated increasingly problematic security relations between the two neighbouring countries in the twenty-first century. In fact, deterioration of Sino-Japanese security relations is not a recent phenomenon but has already been evident since the mid-1990s, when Japan imposed a series of economic sanctions on China. Between 1995 and 2000 Japan had suspended its foreign aid to China in protest against: China's nuclear weapons tests; China's large scale war game including the launch of missiles across the Taiwan Strait; and Chinese naval activities in disputed areas in the East China Sea. This article looks at Sino-Japanese security relations since the mid-1990s through three case studies of the aid sanctions imposed by Japan on China. It clarifies the domestic political and bureaucratic interests that motivated aid sanctions and determined the decision-making process leading to these sanctions. The article argues, that with certain politico-security interests, Japanese governments actively used foreign aid as a strategic instrument to counter provocative military actions by China in the East Asian region since the mid-1990s. Despite the limited influence that Japanese aid sanctions have actually had on Chinese military behaviour, Japan's strategic use of foreign aid has undeniably created a new dynamism in security relations between the two neighbouring great powers in Asia.     

Institutional transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN,TAC, and the Bali Concord I in 1968–1976

Abstract

Many international relations (IR) scholars discuss whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) possesses institutional utility in maintaining security in Southeast Asia or East Asia. While this has important implications for both academics and policy-makers, ASEAN's role has been too often evaluated in terms of what has persisted within the association rather than what changed. Yet, exploring the causes and processes of institutional transformation are particularly important because they have made ASEAN expand its security utility by creating security dialogues and fostering security cooperation in the region. In this context, the crucial question is: when and how has ASEAN changed?

Focusing on the causes and processes of institutional transformation which have occurred within ASEAN, this article explores ASEAN's transformation from 1968 to 1976, by using a theoretical model, developed from historical institutionalism and the punctuated equilibrium model. Applying this approach to institutional transformation of ASEAN in the political-security field, three transformation processes are constructed. First, ASEAN member states’ expected changes in the external security environment triggered internal discussions regarding ASEAN's political-security function; second, these internal political discussions fostered institutional consolidation of ASEAN during this period; and third, such direction of institutional transformation was fundamentally guided by ideas provided by institutional norm entrepreneurs (INEs), especially Malaysia's neutrality proposal.

In particular, this article examines the process of ASEAN's creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Bali Concord in 1976, and argues that this model shed light on the significance of ZOPFAN that created a foundation of TAC and the Bali Concord, for which conventional wisdom has dismissed as an insignificant institutional concept by academics and practitioners.     

Asia … whose Asia? A ‘return to the future’ of a Sino-Indic Asian Community

Abstract

This article is an attempt to provide a corrective to a marked Sinocentrism in contemporary debates on regional integration in Asia. In order to do so, firstly, as a heuristic device, a crucial distinction is made between ‘regionalization’, as involving multifaceted integrative socio-economic processes, and ‘regionalism’, defined as a form of identity construction akin to nationalism. Secondly, a degree of historical depth is proposed to better explain recent developments. Finally, throughout the article, an interdisciplinary approach is taken involving employing realist, historical/sociological institutionalist and constructivist perspectives in the area of international relations. The first two East Asian summits are contextualized in relation to various conceptualizations of an Asian Community over the last century or so. Particular attention is given to the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung as a watershed in this evolution. Varying conceptions of East Asia as part of a larger, transpacific regional entity (APEC) and in, and of, itself (East Asian Economic Group/ASEAN +3) are examined. In situating the first two East Asian summits five developments of significance are examined. These are: a continuing Japanese role in setting the regional agenda; the ambivalence of China's positioning vis-à-vis neighbouring countries; the re-entry of Central Asia in the Asian regional equation; India's ‘return to Asia’; and efforts to maintain ASEAN's centrality in regional construction. These factors, it is argued, are militating towards a return to the Sino-Indic Asia of Bandung. It is thus suggested that notions of an Asian Community involving only Northeast and Southeast Asia are now rejoined by a concept of a Greater Asia. While the historical roots of this conception partly explain its salience, it nevertheless competes with other complementary – and antagonistic – definitions of an Asian Community of more recent lineage.     

Embracing electronic media but suppressing civil society: Authoritarian consolidation in Singapore

In contrast with some other parts of Southeast Asia, challenges to media controls in Singapore have been limited and ineffectual. Lately the government has been refining legislation to try and keep it that way. But this strategy is not principally based on the unrealistic objective of direct information control. Rather, preventing the emergence of organized social and political forces that could lead to a genuine civil society lies at the heart of the strategy. One of the factors that serves to reinforce the government's agenda here is the high degree of direct and indirect dependence on the state by Singaporeans for social and economic resources. This translates into vulnerability to political persecution and caution by social and ­political actors. Meanwhile, the promotion of Singapore as an 'infocommunication hub' has met with a positive response from global media organizations. New ­electronic media businesses appear just as capable of being reconciled with the authoritarian regime as more established media have proven to be.     

Southeast Asia in the study of international relations: The rise and decline of a region

Three features stand out from the literature on Southeast Asia's international relations, written over the last fifty years: the dominance of extra‐regional scholarship; an overwhelming emphasis on regional security, and a related preponderance of realist perspectives; and the appearance, consolidation, and ebbing of the perceived utility of Southeast Asia as a useful analytical region. During the 1990s, there has been a questioning of the realist assumptions which have underlain international relations writing on the region, and there has been increased emphasis on economic issues. Southeast Asians are making an increasingly important contribution to the study of their own region's international relations, though mainly in terms of policy‐oriented research. The most important recent development has been the questioning of Southeast Asia's usefulness as an analytical region, in view of the growing intensity of economic and security relations between Northeast and Southeast Asia.     

Democratization,regional integration,and human rights: the case of the ASEAN intergovernmental commission on human rights

Abstract

In the post‐Cold War era, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has attempted to maintain and enhance its institutional status in the Asia‐Pacific by increasing its membership and range of activities. ASEAN has tried to assume significant responsibilities for regional security and economic relations through initiatives like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and by demanding a major role in the Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. This paper critically evaluates ASEAN's attempts at institutional expansion. It argues that ASEAN lacks the political, economic and military resources necessary to play the dominant role that it envisions for itself within the Asia‐Pacific. Its attempts to increase its diplomatic weight by increasing its membership actually have the potential to undermine ASEAN's unity as well as its standing in the world community. The East Asian economic crisis is largely exacerbating ASEAN's inherent weaknesses. If ASEAN is to remain relevant in the twenty‐first century its members need to modify their expectations of the level of international influence that ASEAN can afford them. They must also use ASEAN to directly address issues of dispute between member states. There is little evidence that ASEAN's members are prepared to reform the organization in this way. Therefore, ASEAN is likely to lose its pre‐eminent regional status to other institutions, and may even fade into irrelevance, in the next century.     

The South Korean–Japanese security relationship and the Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute

Abstract

The metaphor of Asia is frequently used nowadays as a concept for regional identity, but it is very problematical because geographic Asia contains such a large piece of humanity in all cultural, political and economic forms. Historically Asia also has negative connotations, and at times other regional concepts have been preferred over it. Pan‐Asianism, Greater East Asia, Asian‐African cooperation, Asian Socialism, Southeast Asia, Western Pacific, Asia Pacific, and East Asia are some of the regionalist permutations of the metaphor of Asia during this century, but thus far no strong institutional structures have emerged to fill the concepts with lasting and effective political power.     

Hedging in search of a new age of non-alignment: Myanmar between China and the USA

Abstract

The American ‘return’ to East Asia is currently characterized by a particularly high degree of competition with Beijing among the small and medium powers of Southeast Asia, where the recent Chinese ‘charm offensive’ achieved its most significant outcomes.

This article, hence, aims to explore the nature and patters of this ongoing process of strategic repositioning put into practice by Myanmar within the political triangle with Washington and Beijing. Against this backdrop, we will draw upon the conceptualization of ‘hedging strategy’, which identifies a set of multidimensional ‘insurance policies’ adopted by small actors in their relations vis-à-vis great powers.     

Norm diffusion and the limits to forestry governance reform in Southeast Asia's new democracies

Abstract

The return of the World Bank Group (WBG) to Burma after some 25 years’ absence, along with other international financial organizations, follows a series of extraordinary political reforms that have taken place in the country since 2010. Burma has made a transition from 50 years of authoritarian rule to what its leaders call ‘disciplined democracy’. This paper examines the likely consequences of the Bank's return for the forestry sector in Burma and the potential outcomes in forestry governance given the evolution of its development agenda over the past 25 years. While measures to address deforestation have been applied in Southeast Asia, the success of forestry governance reforms depends to a large extent on their endorsement and adoption by local power structures and political figures, as well as on the nature of the political regime itself. The record on forestry governance in Southeast Asia is particularly poor and international financial organizations continue to neglect the local political economy of deforestation. Comparatively, few studies have attempted to investigate the relationship between types of political regimes and rates of deforestation. The paper examines two other new democracies in Southeast Asia (Indonesia and Cambodia), and the impact that governance reforms have had on their deforestation trends and land use, in order to contextualize the potential impact of the WBG's return to Burma. In Southeast Asia, powerful vested interests continue to outweigh the support inside governments or civil society for the forestry governance norms promoted by international organizations. The cases of Indonesia, Cambodia and Burma illustrate that deep patrimonial interests operate within the region and that local politics cannot be ignored by international organizations designing policy reforms. The WBG should effectively engage wherever possible with the local communities and a broad range of civil society groups before developing further initiatives.     

China's security agenda after the cold war

The end of the cold war has changed China's basic perception of world politics and its conception of national security. In the cold war era, Chinese leaders tended to view national security from the perspective of global balance of power and China's strategic relations with the two superpowers. It was in Beijing's security interests to maintain a comfortable position in a strategic triangular relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Soviet Empire and the East European communist regimes collapsed, the structure of the postwar international system dissolved, and the old parameters for Beijing's security strategy disappeared. The Chinese leadership suddenly found itself in a totally new world in which China needed to reorient and redefine its security strategy on a new strategic axis.

Beijing's security strategy after the cold war is redefined by its domestic priorities, growing foreign economic relations, the new security environment in Asia, and concerns over territorial disputes. In a sense, the myopic conception of security based on war and peace is fading away. Beijing's thinking on national security becomes more inclusive, diverse, and complicated. The nature and intensity of external threats has changed. China's growing economic ties with the outside world have redirected Beijing's attention to economic interests and security. The Chinese leadership realizes that its security is affected not only by the military forces of other countries, but also by political, economic, societal, and environmental factors in international relations Beijing needs to employ both traditional military defence and non‐military actions to safeguard its territorial integrity and to realize its full capacity in world affairs.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse China's security agendas after the cold war. It first examines the impact of the end of the cold war on China's thinking on national security, then discusses Beijing's threat perception and changing defence strategy. This is followed by an examination of domestic stability considerations and economic interests in Beijing's security strategy. Finally, it discusses the implications of China's growing power for regional security.     

Chinese and Japanese investment in Southeast and South Asia: case studies of the electronics and automobile industries

Abstract

This article uses extensive fieldwork data to focus on the question of how Chinese and Japanese companies are competing in neighboring countries of Asia, and what economic forces will shape their future growth in the region. It begins by briefly discussing the history of Chinese and Japanese investment in the South and Southeast Asian regions. It traces the development of Japanese overseas investment policies, as well as China's more recent ‘Going Out’ government program to encourage overseas flows of capital. It then builds on prior political economy work as it uses case study focuses, with primary data based on the author's fieldwork research in several nations of Southeast Asia and in India, of the two key sectors of automobiles and electronics. It compares and contrasts the investment strategies of companies from each country, as well as the successes and failures of investments in the industries. It finds that Japanese companies’ advantages lie in industries utilizing advanced technology and management skills. Though the Japanese continue to lead in many areas, including automobiles, they have begun to face competition and potentially reduced profits in vital manufacturing areas. Meanwhile, Chinese overseas companies have made significant advances in the consumer electronics sector, using low prices and good quality, though overseas automobile investments have gained little traction. The article concludes that, if the Chinese can improve their product quality, capitalize on improving managerial skills and a deeper level of experience in the region, and establish brands they can sell with reliable distribution networks, Japanese companies could face losses to their Asian neighbor in these important parts of the continent they have dominated for decades.     

Ecological socialism and human needs∗

The proposed Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is the keystone of India's Narmada Valley Project, consisting of 30 large, 130 medium, and 3000 small dams. Backed by the Indian government and the World Bank (the tatter to the tune of $450 million in loans), the SSP has generated unprecedented opposition from farmers and others whose lands would be submerged by the project, as well as from many Indian environmentalists and environmental and human rights groups around the world. In 1990, under tremendous pressure, former World Bank President Barber Co noble called for the Bank to make an independent review of the project. The Team's Report of the Independent Review, which evaluated the resettlement and environmental impacts of the SSPt backed up the criticisms of the projecfs opponents. One of India's best known engineers, CNS Editorial Consultant KM. Datye, his associates, and other scientists working on sustainable development alternatives have produced a wealth of critical studies of large dam projects including the SSP project in India. Their conclusion is that there are technical alternatives to the project which better serve the interests of democratic control of water and energy resources, economic and social equity, and economic efficiency.     

Powerhouses or pretenders? Debating China's and India's emergence as technological powers

Abstract

Are China and India emerging as innovative technological powerhouses in the twenty-first century? This essay reviews the interdisciplinary debate that has been inspired by this question in recent years. It begins by considering recent studies that are relatively impressed with China's and India's recent accomplishments and potential in this regard. Next, it reviews works that are less impressed with their track records and prospects. It then considers a series of more equivocal studies that remain more or less undecided about China's and India's technological trajectories. The final section evaluates the debate as a whole and proposes new directions for scholarship in this field.