Shooting the fox? UKIP’s populism in the post-Brexit era

Abstract

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has moved from being a single-issue party par excellence to a broader party of protest, taking advantage of wider feelings of discontent and disconnection. However, the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU fundamentally challenged its development and operation, by removing a core part of the party’s rationale and identity, and radically shifting the overall political landscape. This paper considers the re-positioning through the referendum period, both rhetorically and organisationally. Drawing on party press releases and media coverage, the paper argues that UKIP has become caught in a set of multiple transformations, pushing it in the longer term towards a more conventionally populist position in a way that carries important resonances for other Eurosceptic parties across the continent.     

Addressing contradictory needs: the Lega Nord and Italian immigration policy

ABSTRACT

Cento Bull addresses the question of whether the Italian Lega Nord, when in government, pursues policies that contradict its rhetoric (politics of simulation or symbolic politics) or policies that are in line with its dominant discourse (politics of identity). Her analysis focuses on immigration policy because this is an area that links together economic issues (immigration is highly functional to the economy of those regions of Italy that form the Lega's strongholds) and identity issues (immigration is seen as visibly threatening cultural values and disrupting community cohesion). She argues that recent legislation in this area, approved in July 2009, is formally in line with Lega rhetoric but also that actual policy outcomes contradict both the party's rhetoric and the legislation itself. This confirms the validity of the concept of ‘simulative politics’ in so far as it refers to a societal practice of self-deception, rather than simply to practices of deception on the part of political actors.     

The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right‐Wing Populism Here to Stay?

This article outlines the rise and fall of the ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West’ (Pegida), a right‐wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dresden in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined fear of ‘Islamisation’ with general criticism of Germany's political class and the mainstream media. This ambivalent and largely undefined political profile proved its strength in mobilising a significant minority of right‐wing citizens in the local context of Dresden and the federal state of Saxony, but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social profile of the Pegida movement, which included ‘ordinary citizens’ with centre‐right to far‐right attitudes, points to significant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets.     

A Strategic Left? Starmerism,Pluralism and the Soft Left

This article places the Labour Party’s present post‐Corbyn renewal in the context of previous periods of renewal in the party’s recent history, associating with the new leadership of Keir Starmer a potential to rediscover the strategic project of the pluralist soft left as an alternative to the programmatic character of the hard left. After assessing the Corbynist hegemony established in the Labour Party between 2015 and 2019, it considers the current absence of any clearly defined set of principles or values underpinning ‘Starmerism’. It then looks back to the Kinnockite ascendency in the 1980s, and the Blairite ascendency in the 1990s, as possible templates for how the party reassesses its positioning with reference to changing electoral, social and economic circumstances. A critique of Corbynism’s left populism culminates in a consideration of the possible grounds for a new pluralist agenda attuned to the policy and electoral challenges Labour faces today.     

Why Right‐Leaning Populism has Grown in the Most Advanced Liberal Democracies of Europe

Immigration and new class divisions, combined with a growing anti‐elitism and political correctness, are often used as explanations for the strong gains for right‐leaning populist parties in national elections across Europe in recent years. But contrary to what we might assume, such parties have been very successful in the most developed and comprehensive welfare states, in nations—such as the Nordic countries—with the best scores on economic equality and social inclusion and long established political and judicial institutions enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy. As argued in this article, this seems to happen because a duopoly of the centre‐left and centre‐right political establishment has kept issues such as immigration and new class divisions off the public agenda and hence paved the way for right‐leaning ‘disruptor’ populist parties with an anti‐immigration agenda in times of increasing immigration.     

State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus

As a result of the steady rise of populist parties and politicians all over the world – and particularly since the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump – populism research has become increasingly popular and widespread. The field, however, also faces some tricky challenges. First, it is easy to confuse populism with related concepts like, for instance, ‘nativism’ and ‘Euroscepticism’. This brings the risk of sloppy conceptualisation, and, as a result, invalid inferences. Second, populism research remains relatively detached from adjacent fields, and fruitful fertilisation across literatures is still rather uncommon. In order to deal with these challenges, populism research should become both more and less focused. How can these two seemingly conflicting recommendations be reconciled? When it comes to conceptualisation/categorisation strategies and drawing conclusions from studies by other researchers, populism scholars should employ a narrow framework and be precise, distinctive and consistent. Yet when it comes to exploring the literature in search of new hypotheses, scholars should employ a more open mind-set. After all, theories developed in adjacent fields can inspire populism scholars to formulate innovative new questions and expectations.     

Adult roles and the gender gap in political knowledge: a comparative study

The unusual size and persistence of the gender gap in political knowledge is perplexing in comparison to other dimensions of politics. Building on situational explanations of political engagement, this article claims that women’s and men’s specific adult roles lead to an enlargement of the gender gap in knowledge. The present study analyses men and women’s levels of political knowledge at different life stages by means of two unique datasets specifically collected to measure what people know about politics. Findings show that adult roles provide more opportunities for men to gain political knowledge than for women. Furthermore, the comparison of levels of political knowledge in two such dissimilar countries as Finland and Spain suggests that while gender equality policies are successful in tearing down some of the obstacles that hinder women’s contact with the political world, they are still insufficient to completely bridge the gender gap in political knowledge during adulthood.     

Don’t Call it Climate Populism: On Greta Thunberg’s Technocratic Ecocentrism

The growing popularity of Greta Thunberg has led an increasing number of pundits and scholars to consider her message to be an instance of ‘climate’ or ‘environmental’ populism. Following a qualitative content analysis of key speeches by the young activist, this paper challenges this view, and argues that her message is far from being a case of populism. On the contrary, it abides by a substantially different set of ideas that can be defined as technocratic ecocentrism. In particular, it is argued that rather than people-centrism, anti-elitism and vox populi, Greta Thunberg’s message is grounded on three different core ideas: ecocentrism, technocracy, and on the exaltation of the vox scientifica. However, whereas Thunberg’s technocratic ecocentrism is at odds with the foundations of the populist set of ideas, it shares a similar emphasis on monism, moralisation, a Manichean vision of the world, a critique of key features of the metapolitical status quo, and a tendency to personalisation.     

Greek Everyman: Andreas Papandreou at 100

2019 marks 100 years since the birth of Andreas Papandreou, Greece's first socialist prime minister and an extraordinary figure of twentieth century European politics. Looking back, the central purpose of this article is to answer pivotal questions about Papandreou and his career. What have been the major turning points in his life? What were his main beliefs? What motivated him and his politics? What were his political priorities and methods? What did he want to achieve as prime minister? Why did he become so involved in foreign policy issues? What were his assets as prime minister? Did they outweigh his shortcomings as a politician and leader? Did power change him and how? What will be Papandreou's place in history?     

网络民粹主义：反话语表征与消解策略

网络民粹主义是社会底层通过互联网的技术赋权与话语赋权,以话语策略生产参与公共政策的博弈,如参与公共事件舆论、社会运动等,集体聚合来影响行政权力。网络民粹主义在本质上仍然为民粹主义,其具有民粹主义反抗精英、推崇人民、批判性、暴戾性、非理性的基本特征。结合网络民粹主义反话语表征,可以发现其内在机理与背后折射出当前社会的发展弊端。以此提出改善民生、阶层糅合,话语融合、平衡阶层,完善网络法律法规建设,网络社会组织的赋权,提升公众参与网络舆论表达的实践能力来对网络民粹主义的滥觞进行消解,从而使公共政策能够真正回归至公共利益的诉求。     

Conservatism between theory and practice: The case of migration to Europe

This article explores the neglected relationship between conservatism as political theory and conservatism as political practice using the example of recent immigration to Europe. A cursory glance at how European politicians have responded to migration challenges suggests that they roughly divide into an open‐arm, leftist ‘liberal’ camp and a right‐wing ‘conservative’ one. The situation, however, is more complex. This article engages with the resources of conservative theory to argue that there are many distinct conservative theoretical positions for any one policy point. Using contemporary migration patterns as a case study, the findings suggest that Conservative parties have not borrowed much from conservative theory in its variety of incarnations. In fact, conservative theory can buttress a course of action that is generous toward migrants and at odds with the claims of right‐wing populist movements. While certain strands of conservatism imagine a homogenous people, there are others that are no less pro‐pluralism than liberal theories, and sometimes more so.     

政党代表性危机与西方国家民粹主义的兴起

西方国家民粹主义的兴起,是代表性危机的结果。从政党政治的角度,主流政党疏离社会、融入国家,由代表组织转变为统治机构,导致政治回应性的弱化。主流政党代表功能的萎缩,促使社会成员转向民粹主义的替代模式。为了控制政策议程,民粹主义政党仍然需要遵循选举政治的逻辑。民粹主义固然挑战了主流的民主模式,但它同样可以在调整国家与社会关系的基础上重构政党体制,扩展政治代表的渠道。只有客观地分析国家、社会与政党在代表性建构中的互动机制,才能准确地认识民粹主义的社会基础及其发展趋势。     

The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the United States,the Netherlands and Germany

What are the psychological roots of support for populist parties or outfits such as the Tea Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom or Germany's Left Party? Populist parties have as a common denominator that they employ an anti‐establishment message, which they combine with some ‘host’ ideology. Building on the congruency model of political preference, it is to be expected that a voter's personality should match with the message and position of his or her party. This article theorises that a low score on the personality trait Agreeableness matches the anti‐establishment message and should predict voting for populist parties. Evidence is found for this hypothesis in the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. The relationship between low Agreeableness and voting for populist parties is robust, controlling for other personality traits, authoritarianism, sociodemographic characteristics and ideology. Thus, explanations of the success of populism should take personality traits into account.     

Do terrorist attacks feed populist Eurosceptics? Evidence from two comparative quasi-experiments

Over recent years, Europe has experienced a series of Islamic terrorist attacks. In this article, conflicting theoretical expectations are derived on whether such attacks increase populist Euroscepticism in the form of anti-immigration, anti-refugee and anti-European Union sentiment. Empirically, plausible exogenous variation in the exposure to the 2016 Berlin attack is exploited in two nationally representative surveys covering multiple European countries. No evidence is found for a populist response to the terrorist attack in any of the surveyed countries. On the contrary, people in Germany became more positive towards the EU in the wake of the Berlin attack. Moreover, little evidence is found that ideology shaped the response to the attack. The findings suggest that terrorist attacks are not met by an immediate public populist response.     

Who is willing to participate? Dissatisfied democrats,stealth democrats and populists in the United Kingdom

This article demonstrates that two quite distinctive types of political disaffection – ‘dissatisfied democratic’ and ‘stealth democratic’ – exist among British citizens, with the former being more prevalent. While both types manifest low trust in political elites, the dissatisfied democrat is politically interested, efficacious and desires greater political participation, while the contrary is generally true of the stealth democrat. However, stealth democrats are favourably disposed towards direct democracy, which can be attributed to the populist nature of stealth democratic attitudes. Even so, when given the opportunity to take part in a national referendum, neither stealth democrats nor dissatisfied democrats showed much inclination to vote.