The Contingent Diffusion of Parliamentary Oversight Institutions in the European Union

What explains the variation in institutional adaptation of national parliaments to European integration? Whereas the existing literature has mainly focused on domestic conditions, this article explains institutional adaptation to integration by focusing on inter‐parliamentary diffusion. The argument draws on ‘learning’ mechanisms of diffusion on the demand side and on ‘emulation’ mechanisms on the supply side. Parliamentary demand for external inspiration is related to uncertainty about functional oversight institutions, and the selection of sources to perceptions of similarity and success. Demand arises in new European Union member parliaments and young democracies that then turn towards culturally alike countries and old democracies. Using spatial econometrics, support is demonstrated for the argument in the article while ruling out alternative diffusion mechanisms such as spatial proximity and learning from Scandinavian frontrunners once links along cultural similarity and democratic experience are controlled for. The results underline the limits of the ‘isolated polity’ approach in the comparative study of institutions in Europe's closely integrated political system, while also showing that, even in this favourable environment, diffusion pathways are contingent on the mechanisms generating demand among policy makers and shaping their selection of sources for external information.     

Domestic adjustment costs,interdependence and dissent in the Council of the European Union

Liberal international relations theory posits that the behaviour of states is affected both by domestic interests and other states with which they are linked in significant patterns of interdependence. This article examines the relevance of this proposition to states' behaviour in the most powerful institution in the furthest reaching example of regional integration in the world today: the Council of the European Union. Compared to previous research, more detailed evidence is analysed in this article on the substance of the political debates that preceded Council votes. It is found that states' disagreement with both discretionary and nondiscretionary decision outcomes affects the likelihood that they dissent at the voting stage. Moreover, in line with the theory posited here, the behaviour of states' significant trading partners has a particularly marked effect on the likelihood that they will dissent.     

Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

Abstract

This paper analyses under what conditions parties engage in parliamentary scrutiny of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. With insights from comparative literature on parliamentary oversight, two main incentives are identified. On the one hand, opposition parties initiate scrutiny to reduce their information asymmetry vis-à-vis the government; on the other hand, coalition parties use parliamentary scrutiny to control their partners. Empirically, the article uses information on scrutiny activities in six EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom) covering 13 years and 21 governments. The findings suggest that opposition parties scrutinise the government if they have access to strong oversight instruments. In contrast, the strength of oversight instruments is not important for coalition partners. They resort to means of scrutiny if the leading minister is weak. Coalitions with a greater number of parties engage in scrutiny less often. Moreover, scrutiny is especially observed in questions with more direct distributional consequences (‘intermestic’ issues).     

National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting

The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or Governments of the European Union (EU) Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda setting power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for domestic agenda preferences in the European Council.     

Striking a pose: Transparency and position taking in the Council of the European Union

In recent years, transparency (or the lack thereof) has become a central concern of the European Union and its attempts to increase the democratic legitimacy of the legislative decision‐making process. The claim regularly made is that increasing transparency increases the potential for holding decision makers to account. This study investigates the manner in which transparency in the decision‐making process affects the policy positions taken by negotiators at the outset of negotiations. The findings presented suggest that increasing transparency tends to lead to polarisation of negotiations, with negotiators taking more extreme positions when they know that their positions can be observed by outside parties. The implication of this result is that advocates of transparency should be aware that there is an inherent trade‐off between increasing transparency, on the one hand, and increasing the incentives to grandstand during negotiations, on the other.     

National parliaments as guardians of subsidiarity： A feasible task or an utopist chimera？

Ensuring a better control and respect of the principle of subsidiarity is one of the most important and innovative goals of the Treaty of Lisbon. To achieve this goal, the Treaty introduces a mechanism which, apart from checking compliance of draft legislative acts with that principle, may eventually lead a draft act to be deleted from the legislative agenda of the European Union on grounds of violation of subsidiarity. Within this mechanism, a crucial role is attributed to the national parliaments of the member states. According to Article 12 of the TEU （the Treaty on the European Union） and the provisions of the Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, in case one third of national parliaments consider a draft act not respecting the principle of subsidiarity, the commission must review the draft. Additionally, for acts to be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, when the simple majority of national parliaments gives reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a proposal with subsidiarity and the commission does not amend it, the council or the parliament may block any further discussions on that proposal, if they consider it to be in violation of the principle of subsidiarity. While these provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon have the potential to ensure a better control of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity and enable national parliaments to have a stronger voice in the legislative process of the European Union, the present paper argues that several factors may considerably reduce their expected positive impact. This contribution concludes by proposing some suggestions to enhance the functioning of the subsidarity control mechanism introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.     

Adapting to Europe? Regional MPs' Involvement in EU Affairs in Germany

The Lisbon Treaty has led to an expansion of the rights of parliaments in scrutinizing EU decision making, including—for the first time—also regional parliaments. Yet, theoretically informed empirical work on how regional legislatures adapt to the increasing relevance of the EU for subnational jurisdictions remains scarce. Drawing on data from an original survey of 251 MPs, conducted in seven German Länder in 2011, we explore regional MPs' involvement in EU affairs. We find strong variation among MPs' level of EU involvement. Exploring different sets of explanations, we show that individual-level factors—the perceived salience of the EU and MPs' perceived influence in EU matters—hold the highest explanatory power.     

Parliamentary questions as strategic party tools

This article shifts the analysis of parliamentary oversight tools to the level of the political party, asking how political parties make use of written parliamentary questions. It theorises that the use of parliamentary questions is related to the ideological and electoral competition between political parties, borrowing from theories on issue competition and negative campaigning. It provides an empirical test, using data on written questions from the lower house in the Netherlands (1994–2014). The analysis shows that parties tend to put questions to ministers whose portfolios are salient to them, in line with issue ownership theories. Moreover they ask questions of both ministers from parties that are ideologically distant and those with whom they have considerable electoral overlap in line with studies of negative campaigning.     

The opposition deficit in EU accountability: Evidence from over 20 years of plenary debate in four member states

Debates about the European Union's democratic legitimacy put national parliaments into the spotlight. Do they enhance democratic accountability by offering visible debates and electoral choice about multilevel governance? To support such accountability, saliency of EU affairs in the plenary ought to be responsive to developments in EU governance, has to be linked to decision‐making moments and should feature a balance between government and opposition. The recent literature discusses various partisan incentives that support or undermine these criteria, but analyses integrating these arguments are rare. This article provides a novel comparative perspective by studying the patterns of public EU emphasis in more than 2.5 million plenary speeches from the German Bundestag, the British House of Commons, the Dutch Tweede Kamer and the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados over a prolonged period from 1991 to 2015. It documents that parliamentary actors are by and large responsive to EU authority and its exercise where especially intergovernmental moments of decision making spark plenary EU salience. But the salience of EU issues is mainly driven by government parties, decreases in election time and is negatively related to public Euroscepticism. The article concludes that national parliaments have only partially succeeded in enhancing EU accountability and suffer from an opposition deficit in particular.     

Does the UK Have Influence in the EU Legislative Process?

The UK has influenced some major EU policies, such as the creation of the single market and enlargement. But how influential are the UK government and British MEPs in the day‐to‐day EU legislative process? To answer this question, this article analyses recent data from the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The evidence is mixed. In the Council, in recent years the UK government has been outvoted more often than any other EU government, yet UK officials remain well connected ‘behind the scenes’. In the European Parliament, British MEPs are now more likely to be on the losing side than are the MEPs of any other member state, yet British MEPs still win key committee chairs and rapporteurships. The evidence suggests that if the UK votes to remain in the EU, Britain's political elites will need to re‐engage with Brussels politics if the UK is to avoid becoming further marginalised from mainstream EU politics.     

Straightening the three streams: Theorising extensions of the multiple streams framework

This article suggests theoretical refinements to the multiple streams framework (MSF) that make it applicable to parliamentary systems and the decision‐making stage of the policy process. Regarding the former, the important role of political parties in parliamentary democracies is highlighted. Party policy experts are expected to be members of the policy communities in the policy stream and to promote viable policy alternatives in their respective parties, while the party leadership is concerned with adopting policies in the political stream. With regard to the latter, the introduction of a second coupling process to analyse decision making more rigorously is suggested. Moreover, the article provides operational definitions of the framework's key concepts when applied to parliamentary systems and derives a systematic set of falsifiable hypotheses for agenda‐setting and decision making in these systems, thus addressing one of the main critiques against the MSF – namely that no hypotheses can be derived from it.     

Fixed‐Term Parliaments and the Challenges for Governments and the Civil Service: A Comparative Perspective

The Fixed‐term Parliaments Act significantly reduces the powers of the Prime Minister to manage the risk of government termination and to time elections to his or her party's advantage. In this paper we ask how the Act is likely to change the way in which governments terminate, their durability and opportunities for planning in government and departments. In answering these questions we draw on quantitative comparative evidence from other European countries that operate with fixed‐term parliaments. Our analysis suggests that fixing the parliamentary term can be expected to convert some opportunistically called elections into regular elections and to stabilise governments toward the end of the parliamentary term. But the Act is also likely to have unanticipated consequences in increasing governments’ vulnerability to failure before they reach the final sessions of Parliament. We explore these unanticipated consequences and outline their implications for governing style and Civil Service planning.     

European integration and electoral democracy: How the European Union constrains party competition in the Member States

The assignment of policy competencies to the European Union has reduced the divergence of party policy positions nationally, leaving the electorate with fewer policy options. Building upon insights from spatial proximity theories of party competition, the convergence argument predicts convergence particularly in policy domains with increasing EU competence. As the policy commitments that derive from EU membership increase, parties become more constrained in terms of the feasible policy alternative they can implement when in office. The analysis uses manifesto data at the country‐party system level for nine policy domains. It uses ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation with country fixed effects, a lagged dependent variable and country corrected standard errors. Controlling for other factors that could plausibly explain policy convergence, the models also assess whether the convergent effect of party positions varies across different types of parties. The main finding is that in policy domains where the involvement of the EU has increased, the distance between parties' positions tends to decrease. The constraining impact of EU policy decisions differs between Member and non‐Member States. This effect is more apparent for the policy agendas of larger, mainstream and pro‐EU parties in the Member States.     

System Analysis of the Banking Systems of the USA and the EU

The article compares the banking systems of the USA and the EU employing the system analysis. The functions of the Executive Board and the Board of Directors are considered, there is also a comparison of the bank authorities, responsible for the decision-making： the features and interrelation of the parts of the system and their alternative within another bank system. The special attention is paid to the efficiency of the system construction on the basis of bank authorities and the degree of the power decentralisation. The article considers in details the efficiency of bank systems exposure to the countries＇ monetary policy. In particular, the tools of the monetary policy implementation are considered. The article also presents comparison of the methods of influencing the monetary policy, the frequency of their employment, the degree of their impact, and the way of implementation. In the process of analysing the banking systems of the USA and the EU, there is the conclusion on the high efficiency of the system with higher level of decentralisation since this system is accomplished formation.     

A Question of Culture or Economics? Public Attitudes to the European Union in Britain

Previous research has suggested that attitudes towards the European Union (EU) are shaped by two sets of considerations—economic and cultural. Using data from the 2015 British Social Attitudes survey, this article assesses which matters more in shaping attitudes in Britain towards the EU as the country prepares to vote in a referendum on whether it should remain in or leave the European Union. It shows that while concern about the cultural consequences of EU membership is widespread, voters are inclined to think that membership is economically beneficial. This cultural concern underpins a widespread scepticism about Europe, but voters are only likely to want to leave the EU if they are also convinced of the economic case for doing so.