A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages

A study was conducted to investigate civil juries' decisions concerning defendants' liability for punitive damages in tort cases. A total of 121 six-member mock juries composed of jury-service-eligible citizens were presented summaries of previously decided cases and given a comprehensive instruction on the defendant's liability for punitive damages. Most of the mock juries decided that the consideration of punitive damages was warranted, although appellate and trial judges had concluded that they were not warranted. The tendency to find the defendant liable was partly due to jurors' failure systematically to consider the full set of legally necessary conditions for the verdicts they rendered. Individual differences in the jurors' backgrounds were not strongly related to their verdicts; income and ethnicity were weakly related to judgments. The social processes in deliberation on civil juries were similar to the dynamics of deliberation that have been observed in criminal juries.     

The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors' Reasoning Skills

The effect of jury deliberation on jurors' reasoning skill in a murder trial was examined. Specifically, the effect of deliberating on reasoning competence (as defined by Kuhn, Weinstock and Flaton, 1994) was explored. One hundred and four participants viewed a videotaped murder trial and either deliberated in 12-person juries or ruminated on the case individually. Among those assigned to juries, half had their reasoning skill assessed prior to deliberations, while the others were tested after deliberating. Jurors in the individual rumination condition were assessed after they had the opportunity to reflect on the case alone. As hypothesized, post-group-deliberation jurors were more likely to discount both the selected verdict and alternative theories and incorporate judgmental supporting statements than were the other mock jurors. However, the mock jurors did not differ with regard to making statements that supported alternative verdicts or including judgmental statements that discounted their chosen verdict. In terms of Kuhn's reasoning continuum from satisficing (low level) to theory–evidence coordination (high level), there is some evidence that post-group-deliberation jurors may be closer to the high end than predeliberation jurors or post-individual-rumination jurors in some aspects of the task, but not in others.     

A concept in search of a definition: The effects of reasonable doubt instructions on certainty of guilt standards and jury verdicts

Eighty (6-person) juries heard 1 of the 5 reasonable doubt instructions in a trial that either had strong evidence for guilt or favored acquittal. None of the instructions produced acceptable criteria of self-reported reasonable doubt, although instructions that informed juries to be firmly convinced (FC) elicited the highest standards of proof. The FC instructions yielded verdicts that tended to correspond with the evidence in both versions of the trial. FC juries focused proportionately more on the evidence and less on non-probative issues than juries given other instructions. Juries had lower self-reported standards of proof when the trial evidence was weak for conviction as opposed to when it was strong. The discussion addresses the surprisingly low self-reported standards of proof.     

An Analysis of the Effects of Subjective and Objective Instruction Forms on Mock-Juries' Murder/Manslaughter Distinctions

Defendants' emotions at the time of their crimes may potentially serve as mitigating circumstances in murder/manslaughter cases. The present study examined whether differences between two forms of instructions given juries in such cases affected mock-juries' murder/manslaughter distinctions. Jurors' reasons for their verdicts and definitions of murder and manslaughter were also compared. In addition, three factors found to be predictive of murder/manslaughter distinctions in previous research were evaluated. It was found that, though instruction forms affected jurors' stated reasons for their verdicts and their definitions of murder and manslaughter, they did not significantly affect murder/manslaughter distinctions. Defendants were most likely to be convicted of murder if they had a history of violence with the victim and dwelt upon their emotions. We suggest jurors likely construe instructions given them to fit their a priori understandings of murder, manslaughter, and the potentially mitigating role of defendants' emotions.     

Examining the “CSI-effect” in the cases of circumstantial evidence and eyewitness testimony: Multivariate and path analyses

As part of a larger investigation of the changing nature of juror behavior in the context of technology development, this study examined important questions unanswered by previous studies on the “CSI-effect.” In answering such questions, the present study applied multivariate and path analyses for the first time. The results showed that (a) watching CSI dramas had no independent effect on jurors' verdicts, (b) the exposure to CSI dramas did not interact with individual characteristics, (c) different individual characteristics were significantly associated with different types of evidence, and (d) CSI watching had no direct effect on jurors' decisions, and it had an indirect effect on conviction in the case of circumstantial evidence only as it raised expectations about scientific evidence, but it produced no indirect effect in the case of eyewitness testimony only. Finally, implications of the present study as well as for future research on the “CSI-effect” on jurors are discussed.     

Construing Motive in Videotaped Killings: The Role of Jurors' Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty

Death-qualified jurors are generally able to impose the death penalty, whereas excludable jurors are generally either unable or unwilling to do so. A long line of research studies has shown that the former are more likely than the latter to convict criminal defendants. Ellsworth (1993) argues that jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty predict verdicts because they are embedded in a cluster of beliefs and theories about the criminal justice system. Her studies show that jurors interpret ambiguous conduct based on these belief structures. The present study examines the possibility that death penalty attitudes also influence jurors' conceptions of criminal intent. We showed mock jurors the filmed murder of a convenience store clerk and examined the inferences they drew from this evidence. Jurors who favored the death penalty tended to read criminal intent into the defendant's actions and jurors who opposed the death penalty were less likely to do so. These data provide further explanation of the conviction-proneness of death-qualified jurors.     

Juror background characteristics and attitudes toward rape

Although numerous writers have discussed the importance of and link between juror characteristics and juror decisions in rape trials, anempirical investigation of the relationships between these characteristics and juror verdicts has not been made. Using data obtained from a sample of 896 citizens serving as mock jurors, the principal focus of the present research was on the correlations of jurors' background characteristics and their attitudes toward rape with their decisions in a simulated rape case. Results of the study showed that the jurors' background and attitudinal variables were associated with their decisions. In addition, the pattern of the correlations was quite stable as the characteristics of the case evaluated (in terms of defendant and victim race, victim physical attractiveness, victim sexual experience, strength of evidence presented, and type of rape committed) were found to have only negligible effects on these relationships. Other tests showed that only the attitudinal variables accounted for differences in the jurors' decisionsafter characteristics of the case had been considered. Further, as compared to background data, the jurors' views of rape were the most important predictor of their decisions. Implications of the role of jurors' views of rape in jurors' decisions in rape trials and the use of rape attitudes for selecting jury members in rape cases discussed.     

Deciding mental retardation and mental illness in capital cases: The effects of procedure,evidence, and attitudes

Abstract

When finding unconstitutional the execution of defendants who were mentally retarded at the time of their crime in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the US Supreme Court left the States to decide on procedures for deciding a defendant's mental retardation. This has and will lead to substantial variation, and will include juries being responsible for these verdicts. Two studies are presented that test procedural, evidentiary, and attitudinal effects on mock juror verdicts as to a capital defendant's mental retardation. Both studies show significant effects of procedural variables. Making the retardation and death decision at the same trial phase changed jurors’ interpretation of evidence, including severity of mental problems. Jurors were insensitive to differences in the burden of proof on mental retardation verdicts, although demanding proof beyond a reasonable doubt may make jurors more sensitive to retardation evidence when deciding on a death sentence. Areas for future research are outlined.     

The effects of outlier presence,plaintiff population size,and aggregation of plaintiffs on simulated civil jury decisions

An experiment was performed to determine the effects of the size of the plaintiff population, the presence or absence of an outlier, defined as a plaintiff whose injuries were significantly more severe than other plaintiffs, and whether plaintiffs were tried individually or were aggregated in a group. Sixty-six person juries were assigned to one of eleven experimental conditions, listened to a 4-h toxic tort tria, and after deliberating, delivered verdicts on liability, and damage awards. The verdicts were increased significantly by the presence of an outlier and by an increase in the plaintiff population. While the punitive awards were higher in the outlier condition, there was also a tendency for juries to find the company not liable.The meaning of the above findings, as well as the fact that juries exhibited great variability in their verdicts was discussed. Evidence as to the decision-making process of the juries was also gathered and discussed.This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES 860 9892 and by a University of Toledo College of Arts and Sciences Faculty Development Grant. Special thanks to members of the Toledo Repertoire Theatre and University of Toledo Theatre Department for their assistance in preparing the materials for this study.     

The Jury Persuaded (and Not): Computer Animation in the Courtroom

In two experiments, we examined the persuasiveness of computer animation on juror decision making by comparing animation to diagrams in two mock trials—a plane crash case and a car accident case. The persuasiveness of the animation on verdicts was dependent on the case; in the plane crash case, participants rendered verdicts in favor of the side presenting the animation. In the car accident case, the animation had no effect on verdicts. The role of familiarity with the depicted scenario is discussed as a possible explanation for the differing impact of animation. Additionally, jurors' expectations about the persuasiveness of animations were discrepant with the animations' actual influence on jurors' verdicts.     

On Finding for Defendants Who Plead Insanity: The Crucial Impact of Dispositional Instructions and Opportunity to Deliberate

One hundred twenty participants functioned as mock-jurors and as members of deliberating juries in an experiment designed to assess the impact of dispositional instruction on verdicts rendered in an insanity trial. Consistent with prior research (K. E. & J. R. Ogloff, 1995), dispositional instruction had no effect on the verdict preferences of individual jurors prior to deliberating. Yet, as expected, the instruction manipulation had a major impact on postdeliberative decisions (i.e., group verdicts; individual juror verdict preferences). Content analyses of jury deliberations revealed that postdeliberative shifts toward harsh verdicts in uninstructed juries and toward lenient verdicts in instructed juries were mediated by the impact of the Instruction manipulation on the content of jury deliberations: uninstructed juries feared that an acquitted-insane defendant would be freed to act again, whereas instructed juries recognized that finding for an insane defendant implied his retention and treatment. Implications of these results for both legal policy and the conduct of mock-trial research are discussed.     

A comparison of three studies of the influence of expert testimony on jurors

Three conceptual replications of the effects of expert testimony on jurors' decisions and behaviors were compared. Taken together, these studies demonstrated significant increases in jurors' scrutiny of the evidence presented to them and significant reductions in their beliefs in the general accuracy of eyewitness testimony. The overall effect of expert testimony had a combined probability ofp=.0000084. This means that these combined results would occur by sampling bias alone less than one time out of 100,000. Expert testimony accounted for 3% of the variance in verdicts and 68% of the variance in the time jurors deliberated about eyewitness testimony. Several implications of these findings for psychologists investigating eyewitness identification and for the criminal justice system are discussed.I would like to thank James V. Devine, Judith P. Goggin, Elizabeth F. Loftus, and Gary L. Wells for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article.     

An experimental investigation of procedural issues in complex tort trials

An investigation of the impact of innovations in civil trial procedure manipulated trial structure (unitary vs. separated trial issues), order of decisions (liability or causation first), and number of decisions made (one to four) in a simulated toxic tort trial. Juries gave verdicts and damage awards. Recordings were made of the juries' deliberations. The results showed significantly more verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs in unitary trials (causation, liability, and damages heard together) as opposed to separated trials. However, average damage awards were higher in the separated than in the unitary trial conditions. Juries assigned more responsibility to the defendant in the unitary trial. Juries also used the totality of the evidence to decide all issues, especially general causation, which contained the most ambiguous testimony. The performance of these simulated juries in complex litigation was discussed in terms of group and individual cognitive factors.     

The effect of jury nullification instruction on verdicts and jury functioning in criminal trials

Jury nullification is a mechanism, and a defense, which allows the jury, as representatives of the community, to disregard both the law and the evidence and acquit defendants who have violated the letter, but not the spirit of the law. Should juries simply follow the law as articulated by the trial judge, or should they act as “conscience of the community,” and neglect the strict requirements of the law when it would lead to unjust or inequitable verdicts? The present study was aimed at providing empirical data for the following question: will the jury operate in a manner which is different than its normal functioning if given explicit nullification instructions? Three nullification instructins varying in explicitness as to nullification were combined with three criminal cases to yield a 3×3 factorial design. Forty-five six-person juries (270 subjects), were randomly assigned to the nine experimental groups. The results showed that juries given explicit nullification instructtions were more likely to vote guilty in a drunk driving case, but less likely to do so in a euthanasia case. The third case, which dealt with murder, did not show any differences due to instructions. Juries in receipt of nullification instructions spent less deliberation time on the evidence and more on defendant characteristics, attributions, and personal experiences.     

Jury nullification

The present study was conducted to determine the effects of nullification information to the jury from two sources, judge's instructions and lawyers' arguments, on juries' verdicts and decision making in three criminal cases. In addition, the research tested the impact of challenges to nullification information on trial outcomes. The results, gathered from 144 six-person juries, indicated that when juries are in receipt of nullification information from the judge or defense attorney they are more likely to acquit a sympathetic defendant and judge a dangerous defendant more harshly than when such information is not present or when challenges are made to nllification arguments. Analysis of the juries' decision-making processes suggested that nullification information may alter the way in which juries perceive and use the trial evidence. In those trials in which a nullification defense was successful, juries used the outcome of the case, as well as the intent of the defendant, to evaluate the worth and weight of the evidence. Pronullification conditions devalued the currency of the evidence and permitted juries to utilize nonevidentiary factors in deciding the cases used in this study.This research was supported by a grant from The University of Toledo Graduate School.     

Jurors' Use of Hearsay Evidence: The Effects of Type and Timing of Instructions

To examine the effects of curative judicial instructions on jurors' perceptions of hearsay testimony, mock jurors (N = 180) were exposed to one of six versions of a trial that included proprosecution hearsay evidence accompanied by either disregard or limiting instructions, presented either immediately after the hearsay, at the end of the trial, or at both of these times. Also included were control conditions in which (1) the information was presented as nonhearsay (first-hand), (2) no hearsay was presented, or (3) the hearsay was presented without instructions. Results indicated that neither the hearsay nor the instructions, regardless of their form or timing, affected verdicts. In fact, findings revealed that participants may have disregarded the hearsay regardless of instructions heard. There was some evidence to suggest, however, that evaluations of other admissible evidence presented by the hearsay witness were negatively affected.     

Expert Evidence Pertaining to Battered Women: The Impact of Gender of Expert and Timing of Testimony

The present study investigated the impact of two variables relating to general expert testimony pertaining to battered women on juror decision processes. Specifically, the gender of the expert, as well as the timing of the presentation of the testimony, were investigated in a simulated homicide trial involving a battered woman who had killed her abuser. Results indicated that when the expert was female and the testimony was presented prior to the defendant's testimony, jurors' verdicts were more lenient. Moreover, across a range of case judgments, male jurors' perceptions were more favorable to the defendant when the expert was female as opposed to male. On two of the judgments this latter pattern of results was only evidenced when the testimony was presented early as opposed to late. The significance of these findings is discussed.     

Conduct and its Consequences: Attempts at Debiasing Jury Judgments

Jurors in negligence cases are supposed to judge a defendant by the reasonableness of his or her conduct and not by the consequences of that conduct. But several studies have shown that a cognitive heuristic known as hindsight bias can skew post hoc judgments of some prior behavior. Thus, jurors who must evaluate the actions of a defendant may be influenced inappropriately by the consequences of those actions. A complementary problem arises when jurors must evaluate the injuries incurred by the plaintiff. Here, jurors' knowledge about the defendant's allegedly negligent conduct can proactively influence their assessment of the plaintiff's injuries and determination of damages. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effectiveness of two procedural techniques intended to reduce or eliminate the impact of hindsight bias in negligence cases—multiple admonitions from a judge about the proper use of evidence—and bifurcation (actually withholding irrelevant evidence from jurors). We presented a re-enacted automobile negligence trial to 355 jury-eligible adults drawn from the community, varied the evidence and instructions that they heard, and measured liability judgments and damage awards from individual jurors both before and after deliberating, and from juries. Results showed that admonitions were generally ineffective in guiding jurors to the proper use of evidence but that bifurcation was relatively more effective. Deliberations had no curative effect on jurors' misapplication of evidence.     

Jurors' use of probabilistic evidence

Mock jurors' use of probabilistic evidence was examined in a fractional factorial design manipulating 7 variables: strength of nonstatistical evidence; quantification of nonstatistical evidence; strength of statistical evidence; combination of 2 pieces of statistical evidence; instruction in use of Bayes' theorem; and presentation of fallacies (both prosecutor's and defense attorney's) concerning use of statistical evidence. One hundred eighty-nine subjects viewed 1 of 16 videotapes presenting a condensed mock trial. Subjects completed dependent measures after each of 4 witnesses and at the end of trial. The strength of both nonstatistical and probabilistic evidence affected verdicts; the other manipulations did not. Overall, subjects slightly underused the probabilistic evidence, as compared to their individualized Bayesian norms, and subjects did not succumb to fallacies. However, subjects greatly varied in over-or underutilization, even after Bayesian instruction. Future research should examine use of weak nonstatistical evidence, and should test different probabilistic instructions.