Strategic Coordination and the Law

We re-examine the relationship between coordination, legal sanctions, and free-riding in light of the recent controversy regarding the applicability of the coordination problem paradigm of law-making. We argue that legal sanctions can help solve coordination problems by eliminating socially suboptimal equilibrium outcomes. Once coordination has taken place, however, free-riding can not lead to the breakdown of coordination outcomes, even if sanctions may still be effective at increasing the equity of such outcomes. Finally, we argue that it is the choice of a legal or constitutional system rather than the choice of law that is paradigmatic of the coordination problem. This view requires a re-assessment of the normative status of sanctions attached to individual laws. We thank Catherine Hafer and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.     

联合国制裁之定性问题研究

国际社会虽然使用“联合国制裁”的措词来表述联合国宪章第七章中规定的强制措施,但却因为其带有浓厚的政治色彩而对其法律制裁的特性深表怀疑,这种怀疑无疑将严重影响联合国制裁机制的进一步发展。然而,按照法律制裁的基本标准来判断,联合国制裁不失为一种专门的法律制裁机制,虽然与国内法律制裁机制相比较,它具有许多缺陷:制裁领域的残缺性;制裁对象的局限性;制裁环节的分权性。但这些缺陷不能从根本上影响其作为法律制裁的本质特性。认识到联合国制裁的这一特性具有十分重大的现实意义,它将为联合国制裁系统最终通过改革而发展成为一种更加全面、完善的法律制裁机制奠定坚实的思想基础。     

DISCERNING UNFAIRNESS WHERE OTHERS MAY NOT: LOW SELF-CONTROL AND UNFAIR SANCTION PERCEPTIONS

Criminologists have long recognized that whether one perceives a sanction as fair or unfair influences the deterrent success of sanctions and the legitimacy afforded to legal authority. Unfortunately, although several scholars have claimed that individual characteristics influence how sanctions are interpreted, very little research has explored the individual factors that influence how one perceives sanctions to be fair/unfair. In this study, we take Gottfredson and Hirschi's notion of self-control and use it to explain, in part, whether an individual perceives a sanction as fair/unfair. We also examine how sanction perceptions and low self-control influence the perceived anger that may result from being singled out for sanctioning and whether self-control conditions the relationship between perceptions and anger. Our results suggest that individuals with low self-control are more likely to perceive sanctions as unfair, that unfair sanctions and low self-control lead to perceived anger for being singled out for punishment and that self-control conditions the effect of unfair sanction perceptions on perceived anger. Future directions are outlined.     

Sanctions applicable to letter of credit administration--Office of the Secretary, HHS. Proposed rule

We are proposing regulations that would govern the imposition of sanctions against recipient organizations holding letters of credit under programs administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. The regulations would describe the conditions which may prompt the imposition of sanctions and would establish uniform procedures for providing affected recipient organizations: (1) Adequate notice of the grounds upon which proposed sanctions are based, (2) an opportunity to respond to the factual and legal bases of the proposed sanctions, and (3) a reasoned decision that articulates the factual and legal bases of the Department's final decision. We believe that these uniform procedures would be useful both as a sound management tool for the Department and as a guide to grantees and contractors.     

The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy Implications

This paper considers why some harm-generating activities are controlled by criminal law and criminal sanctions while others are subject to some other mechanism such as civil law, administrative law, regulation or the tax system. It looks at the question from the perspective of the law and economics approach. We seek to identify the comparative benefits of using the criminal law relative to other enforcement mechanisms and – more broadly – why certain specific behaviours are criminalized. The paper argues that an economic approach emphasizing the relative merits of alternative legal instruments for bringing about harm reduction can provide an explanation for a number of recent legal developments. It argues also that the willingness of legislators to combine the use of sanctions traditionally used in one area of the law with sanctions from other areas is more readily explicable in economic terms than in other terms.     

我国商业贿赂民事救济之不足及完善

商业贿赂破坏了我国公平的市场经济秩序,治理商业贿赂一直是我国市场建设的一部分,但是由于我国法律对于商业贿赂的治理,偏重于行政制裁与刑事制裁,缺乏有效的民事救济措施,民事责任的规定极少,而且缺乏操作性,这不仅使商业贿赂的受害者难以得到有效的赔偿,也让商业贿赂这种经济违法行为没有得到应有的经济制裁,所以我国应当完善我国现有法律对商业贿赂民事救济的规定,达到最为有效的治理效果。     

Regulating Legal Misconduct in the Commonwealth of Virginia

Abstract

This research reviews malfeasance committed by legal actors in Virginia over a four-year time period, and examines the corresponding sanctions imposed on them. The inquiry entails the review of disciplinary cases reviewed by the Virginia State Bar. These cases cover a vast spectrum of misconduct ranging from those seemingly venial to those that are flagrantly criminal. The sanctions imposed are examined as well as the reasons for the sanctions. Further, the study examines if rates of misconduct and severity of sanctions vary by gender. Implications that arise from the study are also discussed.     

PERCEIVED SANCTION THREATS,GENDER, AND CRIME: A TEST AND ELABORATION OF POWER‐CONTROL THEORY*

This research addresses the need to incorporate the perceived threats of informal sanctions, specifically, shame and embarrassment, into the power‐control model. First, the possibility that gender differences exist in the perceived threats of shame and embarrassment, as well as legal sanctions, and that these differences vary between more patriarchal and less patriarachal households of origin is explored. Second, the relative impact of the informal sanction threat variables compared with the formal legal sanctions is ascertained. Results indicate that significant gender differences exist in the perceived threats of embarrassment and formal sanctions, and that these differences vary by household of origin type. In addition, among those individuals reared in more patriarachal households, the perceived threat of shame accounts for a significant proportion of the gender‐crime relationship.     

法律制裁的历史回归

探寻法律制裁的起源并勾勒其演进脉络,不仅可以透视法律制裁的发生机理,而且可以把握法律制裁的发展规律。法律制裁在历史长河中,不仅有线性的流逝,而且有循环的转化;不仅有各种法律制裁方式产生与灭亡的烙印,而且有同种法律制裁方式由轻至重又由重转轻的轨迹。社会文明进步的标志之一就是法律制裁方式由严酷走向轻缓:从摧残生命的酷刑最终转向以补偿和定纷止争为内容的纠纷解决,从而使法律制裁回归历史的起点。     

Coordinating in the Shadow of the Law: Two Contextualized Tests of the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance

In situations where people have an incentive to coordinate their behavior, law can provide a framework for understanding and predicting what others are likely to do. According to the focal point theory of legal compliance, the law's articulation of a behavior can sometimes create self‐fulfilling expectations that it will occur. Existing theories of legal compliance emphasize the effect of sanctions or legitimacy; we argue that, in addition to sanctions and legitimacy, law can also influence compliance simply by making one outcome salient. We tested this claim in two experiments where sanctions and legitimacy were held constant. Experiment 1 demonstrated that a mandatory legal rule operating in a property dispute influenced compliance only when there was an element of coordination. Experiment 2 demonstrated that a default rule in a contract negotiation acted as a focal point for coordinating negotiation decisions. Both experiments confirm that legal rules can create a focal point around which people tend to coordinate.     

Deterrence and tax treatment of monetary sanctions and litigation costs

The tax treatment of monetary sanctions and litigation expenditures varies across legal jurisdictions and time. The effects of these different tax regimes – particularly, on crime deterrence – have not been fully explored. Instead, legal intuitions in court decisions and legislative reforms are found. This paper explores the effects of these tax regimes. It shows that our common intuitions are sometimes misguided, since we tend to ignore cross-effects between crime and litigation. For example, contrary to commonly held views, it is shown that non-deductibility of monetary sanctions may increase the level of crime, if litigation expenses are deductible. In addition, if deductibility of legal expenses depends only on a successful trial outcome, this may also increase amounts spent on litigation and time allocated to crime. As this paper shows, however, a complete deductibility regime, under which both monetary sanctions and litigation expenditures are deductible, maintains the pre-tax levels of crime and litigation expenditures for risk-neutral offenders. The paper further explores the effects of different tax reforms.     

公司股东抽逃出资的法律制裁及完善

随着我国社会主义市场经济的不断发展．作为市场经济重要参与主体之一的公司也在其中发挥着重要作用。公司资本是公司财产的重要组成部分,是公司具有法人人格最基础的物质基础,是维护公司对外交易安全、股东、债权人以及公司等合法权益的重要保证。对公司而言．股东出资是公司成立和存续的物质基础,是公司资本形成的最基本途径。然而,股东抽逃出资是公司治理中较为普遍的现象。本文在对股东抽逃出资内涵界定的基础上,对其法律制裁措施的不足、成因以及出路做以探讨,以期为完善股东抽逃出资的法律制裁措施提供参考。     

Modeling the longitudinal impact of legal sanctions on narcotics use and property crime

Structural equation models are used to confirm the suppressive effects of legal sanctions, e.g., probation and parole, on narcotics use and property crime. Both concurrent and longitudinal effects of legal sanctions are tested within two different models, which together span the entire addiction career. The findings indicate that (1) the suppressive effects of legal sanctions are evident only when legal sanctions are operationalized as parole or probation officer contact where urine monitoring is utilized; (2) only concurrent suppressive effects are statistically significant, and longitudinal suppressive effects are not; (3) both narcotics use and property crime are suppressed by legal sanctions, although the latter is less responsive than the former to intervention by the criminal justice system; and (4) suppressive effects tend to be more pronounced later in the addiction career. The significance of the findings and the implications for criminological theory related to issues regarding surveillance effects are emphasized.     

Criminalizing white-collar misconduct

In this article we examine three explanations for the differential treatment of white-collar offenders by the legal system: (1) an organizational advantage argument in which offenders in “organizationally shielded” positions receive more lenient treatment, (2) an alternative sanctions argument in which civil sanctions replace criminal sanctions in the response to white-collar crime, and (3) a system capacity argument in which the legal response to white-collar crime is driven primarily by resources and caseload pressures. These three theoretical arguments are tested through an analysis of data on individuals suspected of having committed serious crimes against savings and loan institutions in the 1980s. We seek to determine the factors that influenced prosecutors to file criminal charges against some of these suspects and not others. We conclude that all three models may be limited in their ability to explain low rates of prosecution in cases involving white-collar crimes of the sort examined here, and suggest that these limitations may have to do with the circumscribed levels of analysis at which these explanations have been pitched.     

Sanction and Obligation in Hart's Theory of Law

Abstract. The paper begins by challenging Hart's argument aimed to show that sanctions are not part of the concept of law. It shows that in the “minimal” legal system as understood by Hart, sanctions may be required for keeping the legal system efficacious. I then draw a methodological conclusion from this argument, which challenges the view of Hart (and his followers) that legal philosophy should aim at discovering some general, politically neutral, conceptual truths about law. Instead, the aim should be to discover the values because of which certain things in the world are classified as law and others as non‐law. Focusing on those would give us a more insight to the roles law plays in society, as well as more illuminating answers to traditional jurisprudential questions like the status of law in evil regimes.     

When Formal Sanctions Encourage Violent Offending: How Violent Peers and Violent Codes Undermine Deterrence

Research focusing on deterrence has stressed the negative relationship between perceived formal sanctions and criminal behavior, ignoring the possibility that in some populations formal sanctions may serve to increase offending under some conditions. Utilizing a sample of 300 homeless street youths, the study explores if violent peers, violent values, and the culture of the street moderates the association between perceived legal sanctions and violent offending. The results suggest that violent peers, violent values, and the culture of the street condition the perceived certainty of punishment so that it leads to higher levels of violence. Further, the culture of the street conditions the relationship between perceived severity of punishment and violence. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed.     

Sanctions on digital platforms: Balancing proportionality in a modern public square

This paper asks which legal tools digital operators could use to manage colliding rights on their platforms in a digitalised and transnational space such as the Internet. This space can be understood as a “modern public square”, bringing together actions in the digitalised world and their interactions with actual events in the physical world. It is then useful to provide this space with a discursive framework allowing for discussing and contesting actions happening on it. In particular, this paper suggests that two well-known legal concepts, proportionality and sanctions, can be helpfully articulated within that discursive framework. In a first step, proportionality, a justificatory tool, is often used to suggest a way for managing colliding rights. This paper argues that for proportionality to be useful in managing colliding rights on digital platforms, its role, scope and limits need to be better framed and supplemented by an overall digital environment which can feed into the proportionality test in an appropriate way. This can be provided, thanks to a second step, namely labelling in law the actions digital operators take as sanctions. Sanctions are the reactions organised by digital operators to bring back social order on the platforms. The labelling of these reactions under the legal category of “sanctions” offers a meaningful tool for thinking about what digital operators do when they manage colliding rights by blocking or withdrawing contents and/or accounts. As different types of sanctions can be distinguished, differentiated legal consequences, especially in relation to managing colliding rights, can be identified. Here the role played by the proportionality test can be distinguished depending on the type of sanctions. In any case, for sanctions and proportionality to help address colliding rights on the modern public square, a discursive framework needs to be developed, which depends on the existence of relevant meaningful communities engaging in reflecting on the use of sanctions and proportionality.     

Relational legal consciousness in the punitive welfare state: How Dutch welfare officials shape clients' perceptions of law

With a growing number of strict obligations and harsh sanctions for welfare recipients, the Netherlands has increasingly become a punitive welfare state. This article looks at what this means for welfare clients and their commonsense understandings of the law. To analyze how welfare officials shape clients' legal consciousness, I draw on an online survey among Dutch welfare clients (N = 1305) and a correlation analysis. The findings show that there is a clear relationship between welfare clients' own legal consciousness and their assessment of welfare officials' beliefs about the law. However, not all elements of their legal consciousness are relationally influenced by the same factors. Also, clients' self-reported compliance behavior is less relationally influenced than other elements of their legal consciousness. This study adds to our understanding of the mechanisms that constitute the production of relational and second-order legal consciousness and it contributes to the development of new research methods to study people's perceptions of law.     

Vicarious Annihilation: The Effect of Mortality Salience on Perceptions of Hate Crimes

Previous research has found that reminding participants of their mortality creates a need for individuals to maintain and defend subjective cultural worldviews. As a result, mortality salient participants typically strive to uphold legal sanctions and also react negatively to individuals who espouse alternative worldview beliefs, exhibiting behaviors toward those targets ranging from verbal derogation to physical aggression. This paper extends this line of research by examining perceptions of hate crimes. Hate crimes represent a unique class of crime where both the perpetrator and victim may be viewed as worldview violators. Study 1 revealed that mortality salient participants were more supportive of hate crime legislation than were control participants when hate crimes were described in abstract terms and no specific victim was mentioned. In Study 2, a specific victim who posed a potential worldview threat was identified. In this case, mortality salient participants were less punitive toward offenders who attacked these specific worldview-threatening victims.     

Sanctioning corporate crime: How do business executives and the public compare?

Previous literature on attitudes toward the punishment or seriousness of criminal behavior has largely neglected to focus systematically upon five issues: (1) public perceptions of corporate illegality rather than perceptions of street crime or other forms of white-collar lawlessness; (2) how evaluations are conditioned by the degree of culpability and harm an offense involves; (3) the circumstances under which citizens will support the use of legal sanctions against an individual executive as opposed to a corporate entity; (4) the public's willingness to support criminal as opposed to civil intervention into various kinds of illegal corporate activities; and (5) how business executives' attitudes toward corporate legal sanctioning compare to those held by the general public. Through a survey of residents and business executives in a midwestern metropolitan area, an attempt was made to shed light on these issues. The analysis revealed a pervasive willingness among the sample to embrace the use of civil sanctions against corporations regardless of the circumstances surrounding the conduct being rated. By contrast, advocacy of civil remedies against executives and criminal penalties against either the corporation or its executives was found to vary considerably according to the culpability and harm manifested by a given illegal act. Also, public support for sanctioning corporate behavior was consistently higher than the support evidenced by executives, especially where the sanctions were directed at individual corporate managers.