Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration

Abstract: The interdisciplinary discourse on European law seems paradoxical. While the editors of this Journal plead for a contextual jurisprudence, political scientists are discovering the importance of law for the integration process. This article explores the merits and problems of both of these shifts¹. On the one hand, it points to implicit assumptions of legal arguments that need to be contrasted with the insights of political sciences into mechanisms of integration processes and the functioning of inter-governmental bargaining - and is thus to be read as an appeal for a 'contextual' jurisprudence. On the other hand, it argues that political science analyses, even when they take the legal dimension of European integration into account, tend to rely upon an instrumentalist view of the legal system which fails to acknowledge the Law's normative logic and discursive power. This theoretically complex argument is exemplified first by an analysis of the tensions between the legal supranationalism of the European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court's defence of national constitutionalism, already intensively discussed in this Journal². What the article adds is an extension of the constitutional debate to the economy. It argues that Europe cannot, and should not, be based upon a dichotomous structure of (national) political rights and (European) economic liberties.     

The National Judiciary—Sword of European Court of Justice Rulings: The Example of the Kohll/Decker Jurisprudence

The role of the national judiciary in enforcing EC law, and particularly European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings, has been largely neglected by empirical legal and political science research. Existing research has categorised the role of the national judiciary as either shielding national legislation from the ECJ or as serving as a ‘sword’ to foster integration and to force change on reluctant governments. This article sides with the second assumption and attempts to empirically assess it using the example of the patient mobility jurisprudence by the ECJ, the so‐called Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. The three case studies on France, the UK and Germany show that national courts played an important role in overcoming the resistance against this jurisprudence: via a multiplication of national court cases that contradicted domestic legislation they forced the legislator to end judicial uncertainty.     

Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration

European economic integration with a minimalist social policy at EU level was in part made possible by strong domestic labour market and social welfare institutions. The main contention of this paper is that EU market liberalisation was embedded within institutions of social citizenship at domestic level, which served to counter the liberalisation of the internal market. But this settlement has been put under strain. In addition to the challenges posed to the sustainability of European welfare states by the global economic crisis, the internal market jurisprudence of the Court of Justice casts doubt on the sustainability of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’. This paper focuses on the role of the Court, in particular in its jurisprudence on the interaction between (EU) market freedoms and (national) labour law, which undermines the ability of states to retain their regulatory autonomy over labour or social welfare law and, arguably, speeds up the unravelling of the ‘embedded liberal bargain’.     

The General Provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the Union with a 'more evident' (as the European Council of Cologne asked for) framework of protection of the individuals before the public authorities within the European context, after more than thirty years (since the Stauder Case ) of full confidence in the leading role played by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. This new normative catalogue of fundamental rights (included the so called 'aspirational fundamental rights') implies one more instrument of protection which has to find its own place with regard to the protection afforded by the national Constitutions and the international agreements on human rights, particularly the European Convention on Human Rights, which are already a privileged source of inspiration for Court of Justice of the European Communities. It is the main objective of the General Provisions of the Charter to clarify which is that place and the relationship with those other levels of protection as managed by their supreme interpreters (i.e., the Constitutional—or Supreme—Courts of the Member States of the Union and the European Court of Human Rights).     

A Foetal Right to Life? The Case of Vo v France

This article examines the scope of application of Article 2of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the unborn foetus.The focus of the articles is on the case of Vo v France, and,in particular, on the jurisprudence of the European Court ofHuman Rights on a state's obligation to protect life in respectof both voluntary and involuntary, negligent terminations ofpregnancies. The last part of the article reviews abortion lawsin Europe and the US and suggests that a gradualist moral perspectiveon the status of the embryo could justify the imposition ofcriminal penalties for foetal death caused by violent conductagainst a pregnant woman without prejudice to the rights ofthe woman.     

Immediate Effect of Community Law in the New Member States: Is there a Place for a Consistent Doctrine?

Abstract: Extension of the acquis to the new Member States raises a number of questions relating to the temporal reach of Community rules. This paper examines a general doctrine underlying the solutions. It presents a classic intertemporal doctrine, which has influenced early jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Then, it comments upon the cases brought before the Court in the context of the 1995 enlargement, the entry into force of the EEA Agreement and also the Europe Agreements. These cases evidence substantial differences in the attitudes taken by the national courts, the Advocates General and the Court. One reason for divergence is that the line of reasoning adopted by the Court carries several interpretative difficulties characteristic of the classic doctrine. Secondly, controversies arise in the instances where the Court takes a proactive attitude, which is difficult to reconcile with the traditional scheme. It is argued that greater attention to the structure underlying the reasoning would help to strengthen justification of the Court's solutions and enhance their predictability. This is the more important, as the forthcoming accessions are likely to bring new disputes relating to the effects of Community law in time.     

Game of courts: A tale of principles and institutions

The ontological, terminological and conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept of ‘general principles of European Union law’ is far from being resolved. The constitutional interlocutors—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the highest courts in Member States—have at times fiercely argued about their different understanding of general principles, whereas European legal scholarship has failed to convincingly clarify the intricacies surrounding this source of law. Instead of engaging with a more abstract, theoretical question of what general principles are, this paper reflects on the practical, functionalist question: how are they used by the Court of Justice and what are some of their functions and implications? To do so, it enquires into contextual, institutional and strategic features of the Court's behaviour and jurisprudence and responses of the highest national judiciaries to this jurisprudence. The aim is to offer an alternative account of the Court's jurisprudence on general principles.     

German and Swedish procedures as models for the empowerment of racial minority women in rape trials

Drawing on the concept of intersectionality developed by Crenshaw, this article analyses the erasure of racial minority women in rape cases, and assesses the ways in which English adversarialism compounds this erasure. It outlines the contours of a transformative procedure for rape trials that includes racial minority women's experiences of intersectional oppression. Based on a comparative analysis of German and Swedish law, it contends that the introduction of auxiliary prosecutors or victims' lawyers in the U.K. would contribute to the generation of a space for the inclusion of such experiences within adversarial trials. It invokes recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as Council of Europe provisions, to argue that auxiliary prosecutors or victims' lawyers would not infringe defendants' right to a fair trial, and concludes that objections to their introduction in the U.K. are not persuasive.     

Tackling Ill-Treatment in Places of Detention: The Work of the Council of Europe’s “Torture Committee”

The article examines the working methods and effectiveness of the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the CPT) which, since 1990, has been carrying out visits to places of detention. It also examines the impact the Committee has had upon European standards and expectations, and, in particular, upon the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and raises certain issues in respect of the establishment of the United Nation’s Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of the Committee against Torture. This article draws upon material to be published in The Treatment of Prisoners: European Standards (Council of Europe Press: 2006).     

Every complaint matters: Human Rights Commissioner's opinion concerning independent and effective determination of complaints against the police

Police complaints are a developing area of European human rights law and criminal justice policy. In response to the risk of cultures of police impunity emerging in some European states the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights launched a police complaints initiative in 2008. Written by the consultant to the Commissioner this paper examines his recently published Opinion concerning independent and effective determination of complaints against the police. Firstly, an overview is presented of the different types of complaints mechanism currently operating across Europe. This is followed by an outline of the five police complaints principles developed in the jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights and explanation of the two-tiered citizen oversight approach advocated in the Commissioner's Opinion. The paper concludes with a discussion of the importance of the principles as a means for ensuring that every police complaint is handled appropriately and proportionately.     

The Effect of Human Rights on Criminal Evidentiary Processes: Towards Convergence,Divergence or Realignment?

This article examines the contribution which the European Court of Human Rights has made to the development of common evidentiary processes across the common law and civil law systems of criminal procedure in Europe. It is argued that the continuing use of terms such as 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' to describe models of criminal proof and procedure has obscured the genuinely transformative nature of the Court's jurisprudence. It is shown that over a number of years the Court has been steadily developing a new model of proof that is better characterised as 'participatory' than as 'adversarial' or 'inquisitorial'. Instead of leading towards a convergence of existing 'adversarial' and 'inquisitorial' models of proof, this is more likely to lead towards a realignment of existing processes of proof which nonetheless allows plenty of scope for diverse application in different institutional and cultural settings.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.     

Of Values and Legitimacy – Discourse Analytical Insights on the Copyright Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) increasingly faces societal value‐conflicts in EU law disputes. For example, in EU copyright law, in the digital age, diverse fundamental values, as well as cultural and societal developments, are at stake. This article discusses the role of the CJEU in the European value discourse, using copyright law as a case study. The methodological approach used, critical discourse analysis, is seldom applied in jurisprudential studies, but is well suited for teasing out value‐related aspects of case law. Exploratory research of seminal copyright cases suggests that the CJEU's discourse of the various values seems unnecessarily one‐sided and shallow. A lack of discursiveness in the jurisprudence would diminish the legitimacy of the Court's decisions, and would not offer adequate guidance to national courts or private decision‐makers, to whom the Court at the same time may be leaving more of the task of value reconciliation.     

Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagination

Two recent books, Joseph Weiler's The Constitution of Europe and Larry Siedentop's Democracy in Europe, seek to address one of the defining issues in contemporary European legal studies; the search for a European public philosophy. Both site their critiques within a particular jurisprudential tradition, the modernist; one that is bound up with anxieties about legitimacy and constitutionalism. This review article suggests that the ‘new’ Europe has been too easily distracted by the lures of constitutionalism, and more particularly by the temptations of Treaties. Public philosophies are not found in Treaty articles. Rather, a public philosophy is a state of mind, a product of the political imagination. And it is the absence of such an imagination which lies at the root of contemporary concerns regarding constitutionalism and legitimacy; the concerns which underpin Weiler's and Siedentop's books. A discussion of these books, in the first two parts of this article, is followed by a discussion of Godfried Wilhelm Leibniz's ‘universal’ jurisprudence. It is suggested that such a jurisprudence is better able to furnish a public philosophy for the ‘new’ Europe; just as, indeed, it was for the ‘old’ Europe. Moreover, such a jurisprudence is far more than a mere theory of laws and constitutions. Leibniz's jurisprudence requires that we think, not merely ‘beyond’ sovereignty, or even beyond democracy, but beyond constitutionalism.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

Unveiling a role for the EU? The ‘headscarf controversy’ in European schools

Many European countries have introduced laws and policies which proscribe religious clothing in public educational institutions. The European Convention on Human Rights has been deployed to uphold such actions, the European Court of Human Rights recognising that States should be able to limit the manifestation of religious beliefs. National courts considering the matter in terms of religious freedom (as opposed to discrimination) have reached similar conclusions. Most affected States are members of the European Union as well as the Council of Europe. This article will argue that it is more likely that European Union law could be engaged by an aggrieved teacher to challenge national law.     

The Court of Justice and the Union Citizen

Abstract Over a decade since the conception of the Union citizen, the aim of this article very simply is to measure his growth and maturity with a sustained analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in this regard. After all, it was Advocate General Lèger who stated that it was for the Court to ensure that its full scope was attained. The article focuses predominantly on three areas of study: Member State nationality law and citizenship, the effect and meaning of Article 18 EC, and the ever‐evolving right to equal treatment for the Union citizen. It is fully updated in the light of recent case law, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the newly adopted Directive 2004/58 EC.     

The Limitations of a Multilingual Legal System

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the way in which it works can be seen as a microcosm of how a multilingual, multicultural supranationalisation process and legal order can be constructed—the Court is a microcosm of the EU as a whole and in particular of EU law. The multilingual jurisprudence produced by the CJEU is necessarily shaped by the dynamics within that institution and by the ‘cultural compromises’ at play in the production process. The resultant texts, which make up that jurisprudence, are hybrid in nature and inherently approximate. On the one hand, that approximation can lead to discrepancies between language versions of the Court’s case law and thus jeopardise the uniform application of EU law. On the other hand, that approximation and hybridity define EU law as a distinct, supranational legal order. This paper analyses the operation of the CJEU and considers whether a linguistic cultural compromise exists within that institution which exercises a formative influence on the character of its ‘output’—i.e. its jurisprudence—and what that may mean for our understanding of the development of EU law.     

Heteronormativity and the European Court of Human Rights

This article examines a recent judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (E.B. v France) that upheld the complaint of a homosexual woman who alleged that her application for authorization to adopt a child had been refused by domestic French authorities on the grounds of her sexual orientation. I argue that the judgment constitutes an innovative and atypical legal consideration of, and challenge to, the heteronormative social relations of contemporary European societies. After exploring the evidence presented by the applicant, and the Court’s interpretation of it, I argue that in order to reach its judgment it was necessary for the Court to make a significant departure from its established jurisprudence in relation to sexual orientation. An essential element of this involved the adoption of a distinctive critical approach, strongly resonant with aspects of ‘queer theory’, which focused attention on the social, cultural and political construction of normative heterosexuality. Whilst a number of commentators have assessed the importance of the judgment in terms of its evolution of ‘gay rights’ in the area of family life, I argue that the Court’s reconceptualized ‘theoretical’ understanding of, and critical approach to, heteronormativity offers the potential to expand the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights across a number of areas of social life—in marriage, public assembly, freedom of expression, as well as family life—where non-heterosexuals continue to face discrimination in contemporary Europe.