Britain and Japan: Long-Range Images, 1900–52

The Anglo–Japanese Alliance signed in 1902 was revised substantially in 1905 and 1911. It survived the First World War and did not lapse until 1923. For two decades, it enabled Britain to withdraw its navy from East Asia, leaving its commercial interests to the protection of Japan. Meanwhile it enabled Japan to expand its influence in Korea and China. There was not an immediate breach of the alliance, but interests clashed in China in the difficult world of economic collapse in the 1930s. When they failed to come to an accommodation, Japan declared war on Britain in 1941. After the war, Britain shared with the United States the task of policing the military occupation of Japan. But when that occupation came to an end in 1952 during the anxious days of the Korean war, the vast majority of Japanese believed that their country's future rested with Washington.     

Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan's security,the US–Japan alliance and the ‘war on terror’ in East Asia

Japan, in responding to US expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’, has displayed a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives, thus prompting policy-makers and observers to dub it the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’. This article argues, however, that Japan is far from assuming this role. For Japan, the ‘war on terror’ serves more as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in military security policy that are often only marginally related to the US's anti-terrorism agenda. Instead, Japan has focused much more on using the terror threat rationale as a means to push forward its response to the regional and traditional security challenges of North Korea and China, even if at times it attempts to depict both as ‘new security challenges’ or as involving elements of counterterrorism. The final conclusion is that US military hegemony may be weakened by Japan's and the Asia-Pacific's potential divergence from the US global security agenda.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo-French Third World Power, 1945-1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

Entente Neo-Coloniale?: Ernest Bevin and the Proposals for an Anglo–French Third World Power, 1945–1949

Ernest Bevin made the Third World Power project his own. He sought an imperial grouping led by Britain and France with economic and defence components and social-democratic values. It was to be a way to access raw materials and bolster European economies, and in time to create a global, strategic space between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Bevin's alternative vision failed, in part because the demands of cold war bipolarity trumped the Third World Power concept. The project was also poorly conceived and badly managed, and did not stem antagonism between Britain and France. France, unlike Britain, was also soon able to upgrade its imperial commercial interests through the European Communities.     

Keeping a Foot in the Door: Britain's China Policy, 1945-50

Based on Britain and China 1945-1950 (DBPO, 2002), this article examines four major themes in Britain's China policy between 1945 and 1950: British attitudes towards Chinese communism and China's civil war, Anglo-American relations over China, attempts to restore and sustain British commerce in China, and the future of Hong Kong. The central feature of policy was to 'keep a foot in the door', even under a communist government, to protect British interests. Only modest success was achieved. British officials were divided over the issue of Chinese communism and Britain miscalculated the timescale in the ending of the civil war. The US administration proved largely uncooperative over China, and British commerce was eventually squeezed out. Hong Kong survived as a British colony. Amidst the considerable thought given to the future of Hong Kong, and to Britain's ability to defend it, intelligence reported that the communists had no plans to seize the colony.     

关于“十年一贡”的争论——19世纪末晚清政府在缅甸问题上与英国的交涉

1885年底英国占领缅甸后,中国与英国就缅甸问题进行了交涉.中国最后与英国达成了英国统治下的缅甸每届十年向中国进献方物的协议.但在英国巩固了对缅甸的占领之后,废除了这一协定.这一协定从确立到废止,反映了中、英双方世界秩序理论的差异.     

How the United Nations Beat Hitler and Prepared the Peace

The United Nations was born in 1942, defeated the Axis Powers led by Germany, Italy and Japan and created today's UN system. This reality has been lost in modern scholarship. We are taught that the Allied countries, mainly America and Britain, with the Soviet Union won the war and that the United Nations was created in 1945. In this way, the achievement of victory can be set in opposition to the United Nations and to multilateralism in general. But it should not be possible to separate victory in the war from the modern United Nations and its priorities, for these were the priorities set by the United Nations at war. America, Britain and the Soviet Union led a large coalition of states organised as the United Nations and this term was used routinely in military orders, in the instruments of surrender signed by the enemy and in political and social life. Bretton Woods and San Francisco were United Nations conferences, and interim United Nations organisations preceded the Charter. Understanding the wartime United Nations reframes our understanding of the second half of the last century and of our own. From UNESCO to the World Bank the primary purpose of the international system is conflict prevention and its wartime architects bequeathed us this system as a realist necessity vital in times of trial, not as a liberal accessory to be discarded when the going gets rough.     

Powerless and Frustrated: Britain's Relationship With China During the Opening Years of the Second Sino–Japanese War, 1937–1939

Foreign policy is multi-faceted. It was not only diplomatic, political, socio-cultural, economic, Imperial, and strategic factors that structured—and limited—Britain's foreign policy during the interwar period; so, too, did those of other countries. Given the number and variety of Britain's—and the interconnected other Powers'—interests in China, Britain's relationship with China during the opening years of the Second Sino–Japanese War provides a useful insight which has wider implications on Britain's road to war narrative. Given the topic's neglect, one can be forgiven for inferring that events in Europe entirely eclipsed those of East Asia. This article demonstrates the contrary. As awareness of Chinese suffering spread and as Japanese aggrandisement threatened British interests, sinophilism became vogue once again. However, the often insurmountable obstacles that the interwar period presented to Britain and others—particularly the United States—limited Britain's ability to aid China. It was not for want of fortitude.     

Anglo–American Relations and the Cold War in 1950

1950 was a crisis year in the Cold War and saw a growing rift between the United Kingdom and the United States over how best to wage it. It was in the Far East that the most dangerous crisis occurred. Britain recognised the People's Republic of China, not only because the Communist regime clearly controlled the mainland, but also because it was felt that it was not irretrievably linked to the Soviet Union. The United States, on the other hand, regarded China as a Soviet satellite and displayed a consistently hostile attitude towards it. The situation worsened with the outbreak of the Korean War in June. Although the United States and Britain agreed that the invasion of South Korea must be repelled, the British were anxious not to broaden the conflict, whilst the Americans used it as a stick to beat the Chinese. The war also prompted accelerated rearmament and the Americans favoured the rearmament of West Germany. Things came to a head in November, with the large-scale Chinese intervention in Korea, followed in early December by a visit to Washington by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. The British believed that the United States had already concluded that a global war was inevitable, whereas they wished to avoid it if possible. As this article shows, the events of 1950 amply demonstrated the subordinate position of Britain in the “special relationship.”     

“We Can't be more Russian than the Russians”: British Policy During the Liman von Sanders Crisis, 1913–1914

This article examines British policy in the Liman von Sanders crisis, which arose between Germany and Russia in late 1913. It takes issue with recent arguments that Britain was too closely bound to the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, that concern for her Indian empire determined her foreign policy, and that the Anglo-German cooperation in 1912 and 1913 was a hollow détente. Britain played an important role in resolving the crisis, by restraining an erratic Russian policy and appealing to Germany to make concessions. Moreover, Britain was the dominant power in the entente and influenced French restraint in this crisis. This served Britain's interests in Turkey, which aimed at the strengthening of that state. Finally, the resolution of the crisis demonstrated a functioning international system, based on alliances and the Concert of Europe, not a system on the verge of collapse into war.     

发心中所感 斥战争之罪——论大江健三郎随笔的反战观

大江健三郎在文学创作活动中 ,是把小说和随笔视为“文学生活中的车之两轮” ,他通过文学中“两轮”的“随笔”之轮对侵略战争进行总清算。即日本对中国和亚洲各国发动战争的目的是灭亡中国、征服亚洲 ,战争的性质是侵略战争 ,战争的责任由日本承担。日本必须向中国及亚洲各被害国赎罪、道歉、赔偿 ,才能得到中国及亚洲各国人民的谅解和信任。     

An appreciation of Alvey Adee

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo–American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo–American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo–American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

Russian–Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese war in the context of world politics

Abstract

The Treaty of Portsmouth could not solve all the diplomatic problems between Russia and Japan, and dissenting voices were heard in both countries. Nevertheless, Russo-Japanese relations went in the direction of not only normalization, but also building an alliance. That radical change from hostility has not often happened in history and needs careful research, in particular the early stages of this process after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The construction of an alliance was not the primary goal at the beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations after the war between the two nations. This goal appeared during the process of solving different problems, and so the international situation is extremely important to understand changes in Russo-Japanese relations. This process had several facets. First, there was the deterioration in Anglo-German relations with a corresponding realignment of British policy towards Russia. Second was the resolution of problems in Central Asia between Russia and Great Britain. Third, there was the mutual interests Japan and Russia had in China, in particular rail interests, which were related to the organic unity of the northern part of the Russian railroad in China. Finally, Russia had the desire to keep relations with France as a corner-stone of foreign policy.     

A Problem Postponed: Britain and the Future of Austria-Hungary, 1914-18

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

John Barrett and collective approaches to United States foreign policy in Latin America, 1907–20

Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s.     

'Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955-63

As it emerged from a long, self-imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo-American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

“A Projected New Trusteeship”? American Internationalism, British Imperialism, and the Reconstruction of Iran, 1938-1947

Diplomatic histories identify an early cold war “paradigm shift” as restoring the troubled Anglo-American “special relationship.” However, an integrated analysis of Second World War and post-war Iran suggests continuity in ideologically based Anglo-American differences on the reconstruction of the postwar world economic periphery, and that this was the defining context for crucially elusive relations during successive crises to come. The Americans had embraced Iran as an exemplar of “new deal internationalism,” being as much opposed to competing British neo-imperialist political and economic models there as to Soviet encroachments. They continued to identify autonomous British policies and interests antipathetically during the early cold war period and beyond, not merely out of economic self-interest, but at crucial moments disavowing geopolitical realpolitik. This perplex also determined during future crises of British power, in Iran and throughout the Middle East, that US interests would shift to new relationships, whenever having to decide, with indigenous peripheral actors rather than neo-imperialist European allies, precluding institutionalized, comprehensive Anglo-American partnership, which Britain had hoped would preserve and extend its role as a regional power.     

‘Unfortunate Arabia’: The United States,Great Britain and Yemen, 1955–63

As it emerged from a long, self‐imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo‐American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

中日交涉与张群对日外交策略

中日交涉自“九.一八”开始就以各种途径、不同形式在进行,张群因早年留日,与日本渊源较深,为蒋介石所倚重,负责调整中日关系。华北事变后的中日交涉,是抗战正式爆发前中日间最后的较量,张群在与日方的周旋与应对中,实施了一系列积极的外交策略。     

苏联政府战后对日战俘的政策评析

日本宣布无条件投降后,苏联政府并没有遵照波茨坦会议有关战俘问题的协议,将日本战俘遣返回国,而是将50多万日本战俘扣留并押送到苏联境内从事繁重的强制性劳动.苏联政府制定这一战俘政策的原因不仅和当时苏美争夺战后对日占领和管理的斗争密不可分,而且和苏联领导人对国家安全的考虑及苏联国内的经济状况因素紧密相连.