Mobilising evidence in public policy: The contribution of the evidence provider

This article contributes to the conceptualisation of evidence‐based policy through providing a framework of the key factors that influence research utilisation, including those that shape the quality of evidence provided. We apply this framework to an analysis of public policy to regulate the remuneration of freight truck drivers to improve workplace safety in their industry. Recent policymaking concerning the regulation of truck drivers’ remuneration in Australia provides an opportunity to examine the quality and utilisation of research evidence by external evidence providers in opposing political contexts. This article suggests the need for informed and vigilant scrutiny of the contributions of evidence providers to government policymaking, particularly in the case of wicked policy problems about which there are sustained ideological differences that underpin problematisation, research interpretation, and conceivable policy solutions.     

Theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in Chile

Although Chilean municipalities are not permitted to borrow, they do so through arrears and leasing contracts. A formal model of municipal indebtedness is estimated, based on a sample of 345 municipalities with yearly data from 2004 to 2007. Variables that are positively and significantly related to borrowing through arrears are: mayors closely tied to the ruling central government coalition; politically diverse municipal councils; years close to elections; and deeper municipal involvement in education. While leasing contracts appear to be insensitive to political factors, they are positively and significantly related to municipal staff managerial skills and municipal revenues per capita.     

Strategic use of evidence in state-level policymaking: matching evidence type to legislative stage

Although interest in research utilization in the policy process has grown, how advocates strategically deploy different types of evidence to influence lawmakers remains not well understood. In this paper, we draw on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Narrative Policy Framework to show how various types of evidence—from empirical findings to personal anecdotes—were utilized by advocates during the 2 years leading to the passage of California’s historic 2010 law to extend foster care. The result was a generous and flexible entitlement policy passed with bipartisan support in the context of a recession, a state budget deficit, and an ambivalent governor. We find that leaders of a diverse advocacy coalition strategically showcased different types of evidence at specific moments in the legislative process. Each evidence type can be tied to a specific narrative element and strategy. Advocates first used research evidence to convince lawmakers of the policy’s effectiveness, then used professional expertise and benefit-cost analysis to convince them it would come at an acceptable cost, and finally used personal narratives to motivate them to act. We conclude that though benefit-cost analyses play an integral role in policymaking during a time of austerity, advocacy coalitions may still benefit from personal stories that lend emotional potency and urgency.     

Government and growth: Cross-sectional evidence

Economic theory suggests that government contributes to total economic growth in two ways: positively, through the provision of Pigovian public goods and services; and negatively, through the inefficient provision of such goods and services and the distortionary effects attendant with their provision. This paper develops a model that differentiates the two effects and empirically tests the model for a sample of forty-eight countries. Evidence suggests that the net effect of government on growth is positive, but that the negative effects are not insignificant. Though growth in government output contributes to total economic growth, at the margin this is approximately offset by distortionary effects attendant with increases in the relative size of government.     

Clientelism and polarized voting: empirical evidence

One must take country-specific institutional features into account when analyzing former communist countries’ transformation process to new political institutions. We do so for post-communist Albania, where the regional and cultural polarization that has existed for centuries has evolved to clientelism in the new democracy. We show how clientelistic parties give rise to very particular voting patterns. These reveal major differences across regions not only in party choice but also in voters’ responses to government policies. These responses depend on the party in government and on the region concerned. This is in sharp contrast with results obtained when applying the same model to a large number of more advanced democracies with similar electoral institutions. A proper evaluation of democratization in Albania thus requires looking beyond the formal institutions governing elections and taking clientelism and its effect on voter behavior into account.     

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.     

Decentralization and development: Theory and evidence from Bangladesh

There is a view that decentralization brings tangible benefits to the developing world, increasing material welfare and reducing the alienation of traditional societies when faced with centralized and modernizing bureaucracies. In theory, this is plausible, but in practice decentralization seldom lives up to its promises. Only strong states are in a position to cede a realistic range of powers. ‘Successful’ decentralization often takes place in conscious opposition to the state, and for that reason it is likely to be short-lived. This paper draws on the past history and more recent experience of decentralization in Bangladesh, to conclude that the reform of local government structures has not in practice been of benefit to rural areas, the villages and the rural poor. The delivery of basic needs has not improved, nor has there been any significant increase in popular participation. The conclusion emphasizes the need to view decentralization in its social and political context. Proper account needs to be taken of the interests that dominate the political process in a highly stratified society such as Bangladesh.     

Newspapers and political accountability: evidence from Japan

This study examines the effects of local and national newspapers on local political accountability. Local newspapers are expected to monitor local governments’ behavior. However, national newspapers could also contribute to local governments’ accountability by attracting nationwide attention to a local policy issue. Using the method developed by Snyder and Strömberg (J Polit Econ 118:355–408, 2010), I construct a variable that measures the weighted market share of locally circulated newspapers in an administrative district in Japan. I find that an increase in the market share of local newspapers is associated with a reduction in local public works spending (seen as rents for local interest groups), which indicates an improvement in political accountability. In addition, the accountability effect of local newspapers becomes greater one year after national newspapers focus readers’ attentions on the issue of unnecessary public works. This result suggests that national newspapers serve as an agenda setter and complement local newspapers for strengthening local political accountability.     

Insuring legislative wealth transfers: theory and evidence

Authorities rely on reports from private citizens to detect and enforce more than a trivial portion of effective law-breaking. The present article is the first to study the cultural aspect of peer reporting experimentally. By collecting data in a post-Soviet country (Moldova), we focus in particular on how the Soviet legacy of using citizens as private informants may have a long-lasting effect on their willingness to cooperate with state authorities. We then contrast those effects with peer reporting behavior in France, a Western society. Our results suggest that participants in Moldova view cooperation with authorities as less socially acceptable than their counterparts in France. Our results also suggest that participants in Moldova engage less frequently in peer reporting than individuals in France. However, we also find that less peer reporting does not necessarily imply less tax compliance. Participants in both countries exhibit very similar tax compliance rates. We explain the effect of peer reporting on tax compliance in Moldova using the country's past experience during the Soviet era, when being reported to authorities was common and carried grave consequences.

     

Ranking state fiscal structures using theory and evidence

This paper offers unique rankings of the extent to which fiscal structures of U.S. states contribute to economic growth. The rankings are novel in two key respects: They are well grounded in established growth theory, in which the effect of taxes depends both on the level of taxes and on the composition of expenditures; and they are derived from actual estimates of the link between fiscal structures and economic growth. Estimates for the latter yield a growth hill, in which the incremental effect of taxes spent on productive services and infrastructure initially rises, reaches a peak, and then declines. Rankings derived from these estimates differ sharply from typical rankings based on levels of taxation alone. Two hypothetical policy experiments highlight both the growth‐hill effects of tax investments in productive services and infrastructure and the short‐ and long‐term tradeoffs in attempting to fund strong social services. © 2008 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Ideological proximity and voter turnout in multi-level systems: evidence from Spain

ABSTRACT

Does ideological proximity between the individual and political parties determine electoral participation in regional elections, as much as in national elections? Does the degree of self-rule of a region affect the interplay between ideological distance and turnout? This article addresses these questions and provides empirical evidence drawing upon individual-level and regional-level data from 53 regional elections and 4 national elections in Spain. Results indicate that citizens are more likely to vote when they perceive there is at least one congruent policy option among the party supply, and this happens at both regional and national levels. However, whether the closest party is in national government or whether it is a regionalist organization has a dissimilar impact on turnout in different tiers. This relationship between the type of party which is most ideologically proximate and electoral participation is partially affected by the degree of regional autonomy of the territory.     

Day care and female employment in Mexico: descriptive evidence and policy considerations

"This paper analyzes the supply and organization of public day care in Mexico and presents a series of considerations as to the formulation of future policy. The research concentrates on the evolution of public policies to provide day care to working women in the formal sector through the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). Data on the evolution of female labor force participation, changes in family structure, the supply of day care and patterns of child care arrangements, suggest that access to formal facilities falls short of demand.... Innovative policies for the reorganization and expansion of the provision of day care are presently under consideration." (EXCERPT)     

Variations in appointment delays for physicians' services: Theory and empirical evidence

Waiting times for physician appointments have been used in past studies as a measure of access to, or excess demand pressure on, local ambulatory care systems. This paper offers an alternative view—that short appointment delays are one of several types of amenities produced by physicians in combination with health services. Empirical evidence is presented that illuminates some previously unknown relationships between appointment delays, patient diagnosis, site of care, and family income. A model is developed with the capability of predicting short-run responses to changes in demand for physicians' services. The model and empirical evidence are used as the basis for interpreting recent experience in Canada with its system of national health insurance (NHI) and for predicting potential consequences regarding the production of amenities of NHI in the US.This research has been supported in part by a grant (HS—00825) from the Center for Health Services Research, US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to the University of Florida. We are indebted to John B. Wayne and to Paula Sloan for their assistance and to University of Florida colleague Gary Shannon for comments on an earlier draft.     

Electoral misgovernance cycles: evidence from wildfires and tax evasion in Greece

We present detailed empirical evidence from Greece that around elections, misgovernance results in significant increases in wildfires and tax evasion and has important economic implications: these effects have led to the destruction of property or loss of government revenue estimated at 8 % of GDP. There are two plausible reasons why misgovernance might intensify around elections: (i) attention and effort of elected officials is directed to campaigning instead of governing; and (ii) the misgovernance may benefit special interests and serve as a pork barrel transfer that is hard to monitor or control. Empirically, we find that redistributive politics are likely a dominant cause of electoral misgovernance. In the case of wildfires we also find evidence that political competition tends to increase electoral misgovernance; furthermore, electoral misgovernance helps incumbents get reelected. While misgovernance may manifest differently among countries, our analysis suggests that electoral cycles everywhere may be much more multifaceted and harmful than previous literature suggests.     

Empirical evidence of paradoxes of voting in Dutch elections

In this paper we analyze four national elections held in 1982, 1986, 1989 and 1994 in the Netherlands on the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox. In addition, we investigate these elections on the occurrence of three so-called majority-plurality paradoxes. The first paradox states that a party having a majority over another party may receive less seats. The second states that a Condorcet winner may not receive the largest number of seats and even may not receive a seat at all. The third says that the majority relation may be the reverse of the ranking of parties in terms of numbers of seats.     

Social security and private saving: theory and historical evidence

This article is a nontechnical presentation of the debate that has gone on during the past decade over whether the U.S. social security system has depressed private saving in the economy. The heart of the article is an assessment of economist Martin Feldstein's original evidence, presentation of the alternative evidence that concluded that currently available historical data do not support the proposition that social security reduces private saving, and an evaluation of the contradictory evidence presented by Feldstein in response to the alternative evidence. The article concludes that, although the total body of evidence is inconclusive, the historical evidence fails to support the hypothesis that social security has reduced private saving. The Office of Research, Statistics, and International Policy, as part of its ongoing research mission, investigates the interrelationship between social security and the economy. This article presents an examination of one of several aspects of this relationship relevant to public policy considerations and is intended to make previously published technical papers available to a broader audience.     

Cross-city evidence on the relationship between immigration and crime

Public concerns about the costs of immigration and crime are high, and sometimes overlapping. This article investigates the relationship between immigration into a metropolitan area and that area's crime rate during the 1980s. Using data from the Uniform Crime Reports and the Current Population Surveys, we find, in the cross section, that cities with high crime rates tend to have large numbers of immigrants. However, controlling for the demographic characteristics of the cities, recent immigrants appear to have no effect on crime rates. In explaining changes in a city's crime rate over time, the flow of immigrants again has no effect, whether or not we control for other city-level characteristics. In a secondary analysis of individual data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we find that youth born abroad are statistically significantly less likely than native-born youth to be criminally active.     

Decentralisation and corruption: evidence from drinking water sector

This article presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. The current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. The conventional wisdom that decentralisation brings management closer to the service recipients and is therefore likely to reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large database from two large Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the interaction between various actors is analysed. We find that the level of corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is higher than that in the agencies run by the regional government. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New evidence on government efficiency

Government is generally not considered an efficient producer. Yet, conceptually, it is relatively simple to construct a system of incentives and controls that should lead to efficiency. The outcomes of over 1700 recent competitions between government producers and the private sector, conducted under OMB's Commercial Activity (CA) Program, provide new evidence. Analysis of the Navy's CA program outcomes demonstrates that the government is as efficient as the private supplier at least 21% of the time. The local incentives and controls that induce this outcome are not widespread, however. Less than half of the government managers selected an efficient mix of inputs without a competitive stimulus and an additional seven percent of the managers did not do so even then.