Politicization,Bureaucratic Legalism,and Innovative Attitudes in the Public Sector

Previous studies have identified institutional, organizational, and individual factors that promote innovation in public organizations. Yet they have overlooked how the type of public administration—and the type of administrators—is associated with innovative attitudes. Using two large, unique comparative data sets on public bureaucracies and public managers, this article examines how bureaucratic politicization and legalistic features are associated with senior public managers’ attitudes toward innovation in 19 European countries. Results of multilevel analysis indicate that the bureaucratic politicization of an administration and the law background of public managers matter. Public managers working in politicized administrations and those whose education includes a law degree exhibit lower pro-innovation attitudes (i.e., receptiveness to new ideas and creative solutions and change orientation).     

Policy Adoption and the Redefinition of Operating Procedures: Comparison Cases at UMTA

Political scientists often consider the place of standard operating procedures (SOPS) in shaping bureaucratic responsiveness to “top-down” direction, but our writing only infrequently considers the processes and ease by which bureaucratic routines, decision standards, and SOPS adjust to produce nm outputs. This article explores the change of routines, decision standards, and SOPs from a behavioral perspective to portray bureaucratic behavior and policy as something other than a static function of extant SOPs or a fully and fluidly malleable function of internal preferences and external incentives. In particular, the role of two organizationally “bottom-up” factors — careerists' policy approval and their policy-relevant working schema — are explored to suggest how readily “top-down” preferences for policy translate into pragmatic working arrangements. The empirical basis for the article is a structured set of cases in the Urban Mass Transportation Administration through the latter 1970s and early 1980s.     

Brazilian genomics and bioinformatics: instituting new innovation pathways in a global context

Abstract

The paper raises issues of analysis and policy for science and technology in developing countries within the global context of the post-genomic era. Based on a case study of a newly created Brazilian research and technology capability, it argues for an understanding of variety creation, where new organizational forms often transgress established scientific and organizational boundaries and arrangements. In particular, new frontiers of science and technology can be opened up by the alternative trajectories generated by differences in socio-economic, institutional and ecological conditions in ways that thereby reinforce those very differences. It stresses the inherent unevenness and heterogeneity of innovation processes. By focusing on the geopolitical significance of diverse pathways of science and innovation, the approach suggests an alternative vision to catch-up models of innovation and development in terms of variety creation.     

The Influence of Political Parties on Policy Coordination

Despite an increasing interest in party‐state relations, the functions political parties as organizations fulfill in the government apparatus are rarely theorized or empirically examined. Instead of focusing on citizen demands toward parties, this article focuses on the demands of government. It argues that party organizational linkages help integrate an increasingly complex government apparatus. To substantiate this claim, it analyzes the impact of party linkages on policy coordination within and across subnational governments in the United States, Canada, and Switzerland. The analysis shows that: (1) the extent to which processes within different policy fields are connected—policy integration—is shaped by the relative strength of party organizational linkages rather than being a mere reflection of institutional divisions and (2) depending on the party configurations predominantly governing at the subnational level, policy integration within subnational governments either facilitates intergovernmental policy coordination or accelerates cross‐jurisdictional conflict between them.     

A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game‐theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task. Importantly, agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal's, and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels. Among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents'. But redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal's. In this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent. Redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent's jurisdiction can be terminated.     

Policy Feedback and the Politics of Administration

This article surveys the policy feedback framework developed in political science and clarifies its implications for public administration. A feedback perspective encourages us to ask how policy implementation transforms the webs of political relations that constitute governance. Administrators play a key role in shaping the political conditions of bureaucratic performance and the organization of power in the broader polity. At the same time, this perspective underscores that policies are more than just objects of administrative action. Policies are political forces in their own right that can alter key components of administration, including phenomena such as organizational capacity, structures, routines, authorities, motivations and cultures. These sorts of administrative themes have received little attention in policy feedback research, just as the political effects of policies have been overlooked in public administration studies. Bridging these perspectives offers a basis for exciting new agendas and advances in public administration research.     

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in Its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive's governing legitimacy. Inspired by Charles Tilly (1984), the authors compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular, configurations of assigned decision‐making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies, the elected government of Ireland's parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e., democratic) legitimacy, while the executive government of Hong Kong's administrative state favors output (i.e., performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.     

Bureaucratic Resistance to International Intelligence Cooperation – The Case of Europol

Abstract

This article analyses the gap between government ambitions and actual outcomes in the case of European counter terrorism intelligence cooperation. Specifically, it investigates why Europol has not managed to live up to its tasks despite outspoken government support. Drawing on rational choice institutionalism, the study suggests why bureaucrats might be motivated to resist calls for international cooperation. By examining the process by which Europol has developed as an actor in the counter terrorism field, this article shows how development in the field of intelligence cooperation is not exclusively the reflection of government preferences. It concludes by suggesting that scholars could gain greater insight from a less state centric approach to the study of intelligence. In addition, the article suggests that policy makers cultivate a greater familiarity with bureaucratic factors and that they continually work with those factors in mind.     

Rule growth and government effectiveness: why it takes the capacity to learn and coordinate to constrain rule growth

This paper asks whether strong bureaucracies can effectively constrain the continuously growing stock of rules in modern democracies through organizational coordination and learning. To answer this question, the paper analyzes the growth of rule stocks in the areas of environmental policy and social policy in 23 OECD countries over the period between 1976 and 2005. To do so, it develops a new measure of rule growth based on the content of laws and regulations rather than their length. The analysis highlights that effective bureaucracies are indeed better able to contain rule growth in these areas than weak bureaucracies. Since rules have to be implemented, countries suffering from bureaucratic capacity and quality constraints thus appear to be stuck in an implementation deficit trap. Appropriate implementation is not only inherently more challenging for countries with weak public administrations, but the body of rules to be implemented also tends to grow quicker in these countries.     

Early Innovation Adoption: Effects of Performance-Based Motivation and Organizational Characteristics

Abstract

Early adopters of innovation play a critical role in the successful spread of the innovation by legitimizing the adoption of the innovation and/or providing evidence of its effectiveness. This article explores why some organizations adopt innovations before than others by focusing on determinants of early innovation adoption. Analysis reveals that there is a U-shaped influence of organizational performance on early innovation adoption. Most organizations are encouraged to be early adopters by their poor performance, but some organizations with very high performance tend to be innovation-friendly. Other organizational characteristics such as organizational size and pro-innovation bias also have positive impacts on early innovation adoption. These findings have practical implications about strategies for successfully diffusing innovations.     

How Do “Organizational Designs” Influence Welfare Politics? A Study of the Nordic Pension Systems

The interplay between organizational structure and political behaviour is one of the focal points of political science. How and to what extent do existing organizational structures constrain and channel future political decision-making? One specific hypothesis from the welfare literature provides the starting-point for this article: Korpi's argument that “institutional” welfare arrangements grant the poor better welfare provisions than “marginal” welfare arrangements. By confronting Korpi with his critics, I argue that the interplay between welfare designs and political decision-making is more complex than Korpi's thesis suggests. Implications for the broader welfare debate are discussed.     

Kantei diplomacy? Japan's hybrid leadership in foreign and security policy

This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries.     

Tolerant,If Personal Goals Remain Unharmed: Explaining Supranational Bureaucrats' Attitudes to Organizational Change

Growth in membership and intensifying responsibilities require much greater adaptability in organizational structures and administrative arrangements at international than at national levels. The ongoing transformation toward multilevel governance seems to empower international organizations and thus shines a new spotlight on international civil servants. We know little, however, about what motivates this growing class of bureaucratic elite. Against this background, this article explores the question as to how officials of the European Commission relate to the recent management modernization within their institution (Kinnock reform). Competing explanatory approaches (opportunity, socialization, and governance views) are used to develop hypotheses about the relationship between Commission officials and their acceptance of or opposition to administrative reform. The main finding is that the individual attitudes of Commission officials toward administrative change can best be explained by the opportunity model, which emphasizes the rational calculation of individual costs and benefits.     

Sorting through the garbage can: under what conditions do governments adopt policy programs?

The paper aims at explaining the adoption of policy programs. We use the garbage can model of organizational choice as our theoretical framework and complement it with the institutional setting of administrative decision-making in order to understand the complex causation of policy program adoption. Institutions distribute decision power by rules and routines and coin actor identities and their interpretations of situations. We therefore expect institutions to play a role when a policy window opens. We explore the configurative explanations for program adoption in a systematic comparison of the adoption of new alcohol policy programs in the Swiss cantons employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The most important conditions are the organizational elements of the administrative structure decisive for the coupling of the streams. The results imply that classic bureaucratic structures are better suited to put policies into practice than limited government.     

Bureaucratic Professionalization and the Limits of the Political Control Thesis: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission

This article explores the political control thesis in light of the literature on bureaucratic politics and agency professionalization. It argues that existing studies of political control have been limited by a failure to analyze the impact of organizational factors on policy change. The article tests political-control and bureaucratic hypotheses through an analysis of changing enforcement priorities at the Federal Trade Commission, The results suggest that the growing role of economists in the agency, rather than congressional oversight or presidential appointments, is critical in explaining the changing antitrust priorities of the Federal Trade Commission.     

The Impact of Management Capacity on Government Innovation in Korea: An Empirical Study

ABSTRACT

A common assertion within public management is that management capacity drives policy outcomes. This study tests that argument, focusing on an important policy outcome—innovation. Data were drawn from the Korean government to examine the impact of government's management capacity for the adoption and implementation of innovation. The results confirm that both managerial behaviors and structures are drivers of government innovation. The adoption and implementation of innovative projects require full-scale management capacity, encompassing innovative leadership, a quality workforce, appropriate structures/systems, and the ability to manage external influences. These results suggest that public management capacity drives innovation in government by changing managerial behaviors and structures. Implications of these results for managing government innovation are discussed.     

Interministerielle Netzwerke: Formale und informelle Koordinationsstrukturen bei der Vorbereitung der deutschen Verhandlungspositionen zur Regierungskonferenz 1996

How do German ministries manage the preparation of national negotiation positions for EU intergovernmental conference? After a survey of the debate on organizational deficits of the interministerial coordination in Germany, we are consulting decision- and organization-theoretic approaches in IR. Drawing on organizational economics we concretise and supplement these older frameworks. We conceive the management of a governmental organization as a specific aggregation of heterogeneous preferences and information. Applying social network analysis we take into account formal as well as informal aspects of coordination channels. The objective of this article is to make visible the complex structures and processes that constitute foreign policy making, and to provide a preliminary assessment of its efficiency.     

Two spheres of regulation: Balancing social and economic goals

Independent regulatory authorities hold comprehensive policy mandates that cover both economic and social goals. They take on various roles in market regulation, competition policy, consumer protection, and labor inspection. This article questions whether policymakers are driven by different rationales when delegating the realization of social, as opposed to economic goals, and analyzes how regulators accommodate their various roles in practice. The conceptual framework links the literature on delegation and organizational models. Comparative analysis of postal policy in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom covers a serious area of potential conflict between social and economic regulation. Variation in delegation points to the relevance of instrumental considerations, but also to the politics of institutional arrangements. Variation in regulatory practice shows that organizational models make a difference in accommodating conflict. The article makes a strong case that social and economic regulation need to be addressed as two distinct, yet interacting spheres. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd     

Does Increasing Ethnic Representativeness Reduce Police Misconduct?

This article examines whether representative bureaucracy improves organizational integrity using evidence from English and Welsh police forces that implemented ambitious targets to increase the share of ethnic minority officers during 2000–2010. The evidence shows an association between an increase in police force ethnic minority representation and a subsequent reduction in police misconduct. An increase in representativeness is also shown to be associated with a decrease in the share of black complainants but not with a change in the ethnicity of those subject to complaints. This evidence suggests that diversifying a bureaucratic workforce to reflect the community it serves may effectively catalyze bureaucratic integrity. In turn, improved organizational integrity influences bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviors toward minority citizens, resulting in greater satisfaction among minority constituents. Representative bureaucracy may be an effective internal means of controlling administrative power for the good of the citizenry.